Major changes in the technological, societal, political, and economic environment have forced organizations across Europe to reshape and expand their strategic communication activities. However, knowledge of the future viability of public relations, employee and consumer communication, public affairs, or investor relations is often scarce. This has led to an increased demand for external consulting in the field. The quality of such intangible services is difficult to assess; this is a challenge for clients and consultants alike, and often results in conflict. (...) Communication research has rarely addressed this topic to date. This article expands the body of knowledge by introducing the key concepts, exploring drivers for quality assurance, and identifying sources of conflict in an empirical study of 1,558 communication practitioners in 43 European countries. The findings provide insights into current practices, indicate ways to secure quality and avoid conflict, and suggest directions for future research in an area of growing importance. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Emergence or Reduction?".

Wenn man in Lehrbüchern und einschlägigen Lexika nach einer Charakterisierung der Erkenntnistheorie sucht, findet man eine große Übereinstimmung im Hinblick auf die Grundfragen dieser Disziplin. Im ersten Band der von Jürgen Mittelstraß herausgegebenen Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie etwa findet sich folgender Eintrag: Erkenntnistheorie (!), philosophische Grunddisziplin, deren Gegenstand die Beantwortung der Frage nach den Bedingungen begründeten Wissens ist. Im klassischen Sinne schloß dies die Fragen nach der Entstehung, dem Wesen und den Grenzen der Erkenntnis ein ('die Wissenschaft vom Wesen und (...) den Prinzipien der Erkenntnis, vom [logischen] Ursprung, den Quellen, Bedingungen und Voraussetzungen, vom Umfang, von den Grenzen der Erkenntnis', R. Eisler, Wörterbuch der philos. Begriffe 1, Berlin, 41927, 389). (576f.) Und im neuesten Standardwerk, der von Edward Craig herausgegebenen Rout- ledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, schreibt Peter Klein. (shrink)

Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.² In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. (...) In the course of this paper I will therefore do two things: At the start, I will try to sketch the logical topography of the „solution space“ of the problem Kim is concerned with. As a second step, I shall then comment on the concepts of identity, realization and reduction and attempt to show that Kim’s concept of realization is too narrow, because he is still very much in the grip of the traditional view with regard to what it means to show that a property _F _is identical with, or realized by, another property _G_. (shrink)

Diese Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem Status von empirischen Naturgesetzen in Immanuel Kants kritischer Philosophie. Insbesondere geht es um die Beantwortung der Frage, welche argumentativen Ressourcen Kant im Rahmen seines Ansatzes bereitstellt, um empirischen Naturgesetzen den Status der Notwendigkeit zuzusprechen. Außerdem wird geklärt, welche Art Notwendigkeit dabei erfüllt wird.

Ansgar Lyssy,Christian Leduc | : Le principe de moindre action fut découvert dans le domaine de l’optique et dans celui de la mathématisation du corps en mouvement à l’intérieur d’une structure de forces. Aussi bien Euler que Maupertuis prennent appui sur une compréhension métaphysique de la nature pour justifier l’extension de ce principe à un principe général de physique. Dans le présent article, je soutiens que les deux croient que la nature elle-même ne saurait employer de moyens inutiles pour (...) ses fins, et est donc économique. Le principe de moindre action peut être compris comme une tentative d’intégrer l’idée métaphysique d’une « économie de la nature » à l’intérieur du domaine de la science. | : The principle of least action was discovered in the realm of optics and in the mathematical properties of a body moving within a framework of forces. Both Euler and Maupertuis rely on a metaphysical understanding of nature to justify the expansion of this principle into a general principle of physics. In this paper, I argue that both believe that nature itself uses no unnecessary means for its ends, thus is economical. The principle of least action can be understood as the attempt to integrate this metaphysical idea of an “economy of nature” into the realm of science. (shrink)

Gustav Theodor Fechner was one of the main proponents of inductive metaphysics in the 19th century. The idea of inductive metaphysics is to use empirical sources and inductive forms of inference in metaphysics. Although this sounds like a research program which might well appeal to scientifically minded philosophers, some of Fechner’s metaphysical conclusions look very suspicious from a scientific viewpoint. For example, Fechner famously argues that the planets and stars are animated by a soul and that the same holds for (...) the whole universe. In the present article it is shown that Fechner’s mystical cosmological views are based on a principle of analogy which is too permissive and that as a result of that his central argument to the conclusion that the earth is animated by a soul is not correct. As the article argues, the principle Fechner bases his inference on has to be supplemented by a causal condition along the lines of Mary Hesse’s account of analogical inferences, a condition Fechner at least implicitly recognizes but fails to meet. (shrink)

Examination and interpretation of Kabbalistic traces in Theodor W. Adorno's philosophy.

ZusammenfassungDie Schaffung optimaler Rahmenbedingungen für eine möglichst individualisierte Athletenentwicklung stellt Leistungssportorganisationen vor vielschichtige Herausforderungen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag begründen wir das Design eines Organisationsentwicklungsprogramms zur Förderung der individualisierten Athletenentwicklung, welches derzeit im Netzwerk aus dem Olympiastützpunkt und Bundesstützpunkten der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar implementiert, evaluiert und optimiert wird. Im Rahmen theoretischer Überlegungen wird zunächst gezeigt, dass Athletenentwicklung ein komplexer biopsychosozialer Prozess ist, der neben der Förderung sportmotorischer Höchstleistung auch die nachhaltige Gesunderhaltung und konstruktive Bewältigung alltäglicher Lebensaufgaben beinhaltet. Vor diesem Hintergrund konzipieren wir individualisierte (...) Athletenentwicklung als Managementaufgabe in Stützpunktnetzwerken des Leistungssports, die einen angemessenen Umgang mit Heterogenität, Interdisziplinarität und Flexibilität erfordert. Zudem wird die praktische Relevanz von partizipativen Ansätzen aus dem Bereich der Organisationsentwicklung verdeutlicht. Auf dieser Basis stellen wir die Konzeption der PRIO-Intervention vor, die im Kern aus drei vernetzten Phasen und einem prozessbegleitenden multi-stakeholder Koordinierungsteam besteht. Dieser Ansatz soll insbesondere den Athletinnen und Athleten die Möglichkeit geben, sich aktiv an der Entwicklung von Lösungen zur Optimierung ihres Stützpunktnetzwerks zu beteiligen. Durch die Evaluierung des Implementierungsprozesses lassen sich zudem neue Erkenntnisse über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen partizipationsbasierter Interventionen der Organisationsentwicklung im Leistungssport gewinnen. (shrink)

In the extensive methodology of his Logik, Wilhelm Wundt examines in detail the methodological procedure in the individual sciences. As will be shown in this article, these investigations are not only intended to clarify or improve the procedures in the individual sciences, but also to be of benefit to philosophy and especially to metaphysics. Wundt belongs to the traditional line of inductive metaphysics, whose representatives were of the opinion that metaphysics should be based on the results and methods of the (...) individual sciences. In this sense, Wundt's detailed investigation of the methods of the individual sciences should be understood as a prelude to an inductive metaphysics. By means of a central example, namely the introduction of the concept of causality based on an inference to the best explanation, this article shows how Wundt conceives the construction of a metaphysics based on the foundations of the individual sciences. (shrink)

Kausalität und Teleologie sind zentrale Begriffe in der Philosophie von G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716). Leibniz betont immer wieder, dass das Weltgeschehen zugleich kausal und final bestimmt ist. In epistemologischer Hinsicht bedeutet dies, dass jedes Ereignis sowohl aus seiner Ursache als auch aus seinem Zweck heraus erklärt werden kann. Für die Ontologie gilt, dass physische Ereignisse durch Wirkursachen bestimmt sind, die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Substanzen aber nach Perfektion streben und damit auf Ziele hin ausgerichtet sind. Leibniz entwickelt in diesem Zusammenhang ein komplexes (...) philosophisches System, das diese scheinbar gegenläufigen Ideen integrieren soll und das eine Prinzipienlehre, eine komplexe Substanzontologie, eine Theorie dynamischer Kräfte und eine Organismuskonzeption umfasst. Anders ausgedrückt: Leibniz will die galileische Mechanik mit der aristotelischen Substanzenlehre und der christlichen Schöpfungslehre versöhnen. Ansgar Lyssy macht einen Vorschlag, wie diese metaphysische Synthese zu verstehen ist. (shrink)

Dieerfolgreiche Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes liegt mit diesem Bandnun in der dritten, nochmals überarbeiteten Auflage vor. Das Studienbuch informiert in systematischer Orientierung über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion. Die Grundfragen, die mit dem Leib-Seele-Problem verbunden sind, die zu diesen Fragen vertretenen Positionen sowie die entsprechenden Argumente und Gegenargumente werden knapp, aber so umfassend dargestellt, dass sich die Leser einen zuverlässigen Überblick verschaffen können.

This is the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the state of the art in philosophy of mind, a flourishing area of research. An outstanding team of contributors offer 45 new critical surveys of a wide range of topics.

In this paper, I take a closer look at Hans Reichenbach’s relation to metaphysics and work out some interesting parallels between his account and that of the proponents of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late 19th century and the early 20th century in Germany. It is in particular Hans Reichenbach’s conception of the relation between the natural sciences and metaphysics, as displayed in his treatment of the question of the existence of the external world, that (...) shows some very interesting similarities with inductive metaphysics. By a comparison with the position of the inductive metaphysician Erich Becher and his handling of the problem of realism, I work out the parallels between Reichenbach’s program and inductive metaphysics. I come to the conclusion that while there are certainly some respects in which Reichenbach’s logical empiricism is closer to the positions of the representatives of the Vienna Circle, it turns out that with regard to his views on metaphysics there is a greater affinity with the program of inductive metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s account of causality as developed in the Science of Logic can be described as a ‘manipulationist’ account of causality. First, some conceptual clarifications will help set our sights on the goal of the paper. What is a theory of causality comprised of? And what is a manipulationist account of causality? Next, I sketch the development of those concepts in the SL that are relevant to the present topic (e.g., causality, objectivity, and the idea). (...) Here, Hegel moves from developing the concept of causality to unfolding a set of objective causal relations. The latter is then understood as a theory and hence as a product of the self-conscious mind that filters for relevancy and usability. I argue that Hegel’s account of causality does meet the criteria for being understood as an example of a MAC. (shrink)

One of the key factors that hinders integration of distributed, heterogeneous information systems is the lack of a formal basis for modeling the complex, structured knowledge that is to be exchange...

Das logische Problem des Übels gilt weitgehend als gelöst, weil es zumindest logisch möglich zu sein scheint, dass alles Leid und jeder Schmerz in der Welt zur Erlangung von höherwertigen Gütern logisch notwendig ist. Doch diese Sicht ist widerlegt, wenn es auch nur einen einzigen Schmerz oder ein einziges Leid gibt, bei dem es nicht möglich ist, dass dieser Schmerz oder dieses Leid zur Erlangung eines höherwertigen Gutes logisch notwendig ist. Und die Aussichten, einen solchen Fall zu finden, sind nicht (...) schlecht. Wenn Kant Recht hat, dass Menschen niemals nur als Mittel gebraucht werden dürfen, ist z.B. jedes Leid und jeder Tod eines unschuldigen Kindes durch kein Gut der Welt zu rechtfertigen. Jedes Wesen, das den Tod eines solchen Kindes um eines anderen Zieles willen in Kauf nimmt, handelt unmoralisch und kann daher nicht im christlichen Sinne allmächtig, allwissend und allgütig sein.Many philosophers think that the logical problem of evil is dissolved since it is at least logically possible that all pain and all suffering in this world is logically necessary for the attainment of a more valuable good. This view, however, is refuted if there is at least one pain or one suffering that can be shown not to be logically necessary for the attainment of a more valuable good. And the prospects for finding such an evil are not bad. If Kant is right that no person is ever be treated only as a means the suffering and death of an innocent child cannot be justified by any good in the world. A being who accepts the death of an innocent child for the attainment of whatever good is acting immorally and, therefore, cannot be all-powerful, all-knowing and supremely good as the Christian god is supposed to be. (shrink)

Kant claims that the understanding prescribes the existence and necessity of empirical laws to nature, while it does not prescribe which particular empirical laws hold. That is to say, the understanding prescribes the general form of nature and the form of the empirical laws without prescribing the material content. But how is this possible? How can the understanding guarantee that there are necessary empirical laws without prescribing particular empirical laws to nature? In this paper, I want to answer this question (...) by analyzing Kant’s argument for the Second Analogy of Experience in combination with an analysis of his conception of actuality. As I want to show, an application of Kant’s conception of actuality to the argument for the Second Analogy not only fills a gap in this argument, but also leads to an explanation of how the understanding can prescribe lawfulness to nature without prescribing particular laws. (shrink)

This paper sheds new light on Putnam's hypothesis that watching television, particularly entertainment programs, contributes to an erosion of social trust. Previous studies have been unable to reach convincing evidence regarding this claim. It is argued that this is a consequence of the neglect of indirect, interpersonally mediated TV effects which supplement the influence of direct exposure, and extend even to those who do not watch television. Using data from the 2002 and 2004 waves of the European Social Survey in (...) combination with aggregate data from telemetric audience research, we conduct a multilevel analysis of TV's impact on social trust. Investigating this macro-micro relationship, we find that patterns of general TV use in 25 European societies exert substantial effects on individual social trust that by far exceed those of individual TV use. In line with Putnam's hypothesis, there is a negative impact of total TV time; however, high market shares of public TV increase social trust. (shrink)

It was not so long ago that the dominant picture of Kant’s practical philosophy was formalistic, focusing almost exclusively on his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. However, the overall picture of Kant’s wide-ranging philosophy has since been broadened and deepened. We now have a much more complete understanding of the range of Kant’s practical interests and of his contributions to areas as diverse as anthropology, pedagogy, and legal theory. What remains somewhat obscure, however, is (...) how these different contributions hang together in the way that Kant suggests that they must. This book explores these different conceptions of humanity, morality, and legality in Kant as main ‘manifestations’ or ‘dimensions’ of practical normativity. These interrelated terms play a crucial role in highlighting different rational obligations, their source, and their applicability in the face of changing circumstances. (shrink)

Neural network models of memory are notorious for catastrophic interference: Old items are forgotten as new items are memorized (French, 1999; McCloskey & Cohen, 1989). While working memory (WM) in human adults shows severe capacity limitations, these capacity limitations do not reflect neural network style catastrophic interference. However, our ability to quickly apprehend the numerosity of small sets of objects (i.e., subitizing) does show catastrophic capacity limitations, and this subitizing capacity and WM might reflect a common capacity. Accordingly, computational investigations (...) (Knops, Piazza, Sengupta, Eger & Melcher, 2014; Sengupta, Surampudi & Melcher, 2014) suggest that mutual inhibition among neurons can explain both kinds of capacity limitations as well as why our ability to estimate the numerosity of larger sets is limited according to a Weber ratio signature. Based on simulations with a saliency map‐like network and mathematical proofs, we provide three results. First, mutual inhibition among neurons leads to catastrophic interference when items are presented simultaneously. The network can remember a limited number of items, but when more items are presented, the network forgets all of them. Second, if memory items are presented sequentially rather than simultaneously, the network remembers the most recent items rather than forgetting all of them. Hence, the tendency in WM tasks to sequentially attend even to simultaneously presented items might not only reflect attentional limitations, but also an adaptive strategy to avoid catastrophic interference. Third, the mean activation level in the network can be used to estimate the number of items in small sets, but it does not accurately reflect the number of items in larger sets. Rather, we suggest that the Weber ratio signature of large number discrimination emerges naturally from the interaction between the limited precision of a numeric estimation system and a multiplicative gain control mechanism. (shrink)

J. Habermas hat vor kurzem eine Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit in ihren Grundzügen skizziert, die er ausdrücklich als notwendige Alternative zu der s. E. unhaltbaren realistischen Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit versteht. In einer Kritik der Habermasschen Konsenstheorie wird jedoch zu zeigen versucht, daß die Plausibilität dieser Theorie gerade auf der Inanspruchnahme nicht explizit gemachter realistischer Voraussetzungen beruht. Es wird argumentiert, daß sich realistische Prämissen in den Habermasschen Überlegungen ebenso in der Explikation des Begriffs "Konsenstheorie" nachweisen lassen wie in der Annahme nicht-konventioneller Methoden (...) zur Überprüfung empirischer Aussagen und in der Verwendung des Begriffs Kompetenz ebenso wie in der Theorie der idealen Sprech-situation. (shrink)

As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states (...) with the same causal r. (shrink)