Property physicalism, reduction, and realization

In Martin Carrier & Peter Machamer, Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 303--321 (1997)
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Abstract

Ansgar Beckermann Once, a mind-body theory based upon the idea of supervenience seemed to be a promising alternative to the various kinds of reductionistic physicalism. In recent years, however, Jaegwon Kim has subjected his own brainchild to a very thorough criticism. With most of Kim’s arguments I agree wholeheartedly - not least because they converge with my own thoughts.2 In order to explain the few points of divergence with Kim’s views, I shall have to prepare the ground a little. In the course of this paper I will therefore do two things: At the start, I will try to sketch the logical topography of the „solution space“ of the problem Kim is concerned with. As a second step, I shall then comment on the concepts of identity, realization and reduction and attempt to show that Kim’s concept of realization is too narrow, because he is still very much in the grip of the traditional view with regard to what it means to show that a property _F _is identical with, or realized by, another property _G_

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Ansgar Beckermann
Bielefeld University

Citations of this work

Emergence: Non-deducibility or downwards causation?Jurgen Schroder - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):433-52.
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Emergence in physics.Andreas Hüttemann & Orestis Terzidis - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):267-281.

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References found in this work

Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.

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