Having distinguished essentially fictional characters from inessentially fictional ones and having identified Anna Karenina as an inessentially fictional character, Barrie Paskins solves the problem I posed in ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ thus: ‘our pity towards the inessentially fictional is, or can without forcing be construed as, pity for those people if any who are in the same bind as the character in the fiction’. Making a similar point in a footnote, ‘our (...) emotions towards fictional characters are directed towards those real people, if any, who are in essentially the same situation’, he continues in the text, ‘This possibility is neglected by Radford and Weston.’. (shrink)

Glen Hartz argues, that neuroscience reveals that persons moved or frightened by fictional characters believe that they are real, so such behaviour is not irrational. But these beliefs, if they exist, are not rational and, in any case inconsistent with our conscious rational beliefs that fictional characters are not real. So his argument fails to establish that we are not irrational or incoherent when moved or frightened by such characters. It powerfully reinforces the contrary view.

A familiar question in the literature on emotional responses to fiction, originally put forward by Colin Radford, is how such responses can be rational. How can we make sense of pitying Anna Karenina when we know there is no such person? In this paper I argue that contrary to the usual interpretation, the question of rationality has nothing to do with the Paradox of Fiction. Instead, the real problem is why there is a divergence in our normative assessments (...) of emotions in different contexts. I argue that explaining this divergence requires a more nuanced account of the rationality of emotion than has previously been proposed. One advantage of my proposal over alternatives is that it helps to explain one way we can learn emotionally from fiction and imagination. (shrink)

This important new book by one of the world's leading political theorists boldly questions the moral justification for organizing our world as a territorial states-system and proposes major changes to states' sovereign powers.

Conceptual primitives and semantic universals are the cornerstones of a semantic theory which Anna Wierzbicka has been developing for many years. Semantics: Primes and Universals is a major synthesis of her work, presenting a full and systematic exposition of that theory in a non-technical and readable way. It delineates a full set of universal concepts, as they have emerged from large-scale investigations across a wide range of languages undertaken by the author and her colleagues. On the basis of empirical (...) cross-linguistic studies it vindicates the old notion of the "psychic unity of mankind", while at the same time offering a framework for the rigorous description of different languages and cultures. (shrink)

According to some, there is a problem concerning the emotions we feel toward fictional entities such as Anna Karenina, Werther and the like. We feel pity, fear, and sadness toward them, but how is that possible? “We are saddened, but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do know that no one has suffered or died?” (Radford, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1975). This (...) is the paradox of fiction which is based on the assumption that emotions, to be genuine and rational, should be directed toward existent beings. But if beliefs about existence are necessary for us to be rationally moved by something, and such beliefs are lacking when we are moved by fiction (because we do not believe fictional characters and events to be real), then our capacity for an emotional response to fiction is irrational. Consequently, our emotional attitude toward future generations should be considered as irrational as well. But is this really the case? Are there good arguments to consider future and fictional entities as similar from this point of view? Or would it be better to distinguish the two? Is there such a thing as a paradox of the future? If so, how does it relate to the more famous paradox of fiction? (shrink)

Why is it that we respond emotionally to plays, movies, and novels and feel moved by characters and situations that we know do not exist? This question, which constitutes the kernel of the debate on »the paradox of fiction«, speaks to the perennial themes of philosophy, and remains of interest to this day. But does this question entail a paradox? A significant group of analytic philosophers have indeed thought so. Since the publication of Colin Radford's celebrated paper »How Can (...) We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« (1975), the number of proposals to solve, explain, reformulate, dismiss or even revitalize this apparent paradox has continued to proliferate. In line with recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, in this paper I will argue against the sustainability of the paradox, claiming that the only reasonable way to continue our discussions about it consists in using it as a heuristic tool to shed light on problems regarding our involvement with fiction. Against this background, I will then focus on one of the problems related to how our emotional responses to fiction contribute to our appreciation of it. The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section shows the parallel evolution of the paradox of fiction and the analytic philosophy of emotion. Here I claim that, although the paradox is epistemically flawed, since one of its premises is rooted in a limited view on the emotions typical of early cognitiv-ism, the discussions it provokes are still epistemically useful. As Robert Stecker (2011, 295), among others, has pointed out, the paradox was formulated during the heyday of cognitive theories of the emotions in which emotion necessarily requires belief. Today, however, only few authors would endorse this premise. If emotion does not always require belief (as the majority of authors in the contemporary debate admit), let alone belief about the existence of the object towards which it is directed, then there is no reason to speak of a paradox. From this first conclusion, however, it does not follow that the paradox is completely without use from the epistemic point of view. A glimpse at the topics touched on during the discussions about how to solve, reformulate, or negate the paradox reveals their value in shedding light on the interrelation between emotion and fiction. The second section elaborates a phenomenologically inspired cognitive account of the emotions by focusing on their cognitive bases, their influence on Emotion in the Appreciation of Fiction 205 cognitions, and their cognitive function. In this model, emotions are responsible for indicating values, for showing what matters to us, and for being appropriate to their objects. My claim is that this view applies not only to reality, but also to our involvement with fiction. In the final section I draw on this account to focus on one kind of appreciation of fiction which necessarily requires our emotional involvement. Following an idea put forward by Susan Feagin (1996, 1), I employ the concept of »appre-ciation« to refer to a set of abilities exercised with the aim of extracting value from the work. There is a long tradition in aesthetics that condemns any focus on the emotions in the appreciation of art and fiction, and defends the necessity of aesthetic appreciation without emotional influence. To refer to this negative attitude towards the emotions, I will borrow an expression coined by Susan Feagin (2013, 636), who refers to »the intellectualized view of appreciation«. Against this widespread view, I will argue that some aspects of the fiction can only be appreciated with the help of our emotions. The cognitive approach developed in the previous section can explain how the emotions might in fact play a significant role in the appreciation of art and fiction. Attention will be paid to three activities involved in appreciation, for all of which emotion is crucial: processing relevant information about the fictional world, understanding aspects of it, and becoming acquainted with the values it presents. My aim here is to argue that there are particular aspects of the fictional world that can only be appreciated if recipients have the appropriate emotions. (shrink)

"Grande fut au XIXe siècle la confusion des termes et l'incertitude des objectifs dans les théories morales concurrentes. En réaction, naquit une discipline nouvelle, la métaéthique, requérant qu'on commençât par soumettre la réflexion morale à des contraintes épistémologiquement plus rigoureuses. Ainsi émergèrent des travaux portant sur la signification des énoncés moraux et sur leurs conditions de vérité, sur les éléments constitutifs de l'éthique, sur la tension entre ce qu'on peut connaître et décrire et ce qu'on peut plutôt sentir et exprimer (...) dans la sphère morale. Le présent volume réunit des textes qui ont marqué leur époque et qui sont devenus des références essentielles dans le paysage métaéthique contemporain. La première partie du volume présente l'effort qui fut fait de saisir dans un cadre réaliste les notions fondamentales de l'éthique, la deuxième oppose à cette entreprise qui se veut scientifique la critique parfois sceptique, la troisième met en cause certains présupposés actifs dans les deux partis, et propose de nouvelles lectures du réalisme moral."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

The patterns of physical growth (stature, BMI, subscapular and arm fat-fold thickness, upper and lower extremity length, chest circumference, arm, and hip breadth, and age at menarche) were studied in 857 of Maya and Mestizo girls and 1314 of Creole girls aged 6-18 years. Data were collected between 1998-2001 in primary, secondary, and high schools of Merida, Capital City of the Yucatan State, Mexico. The ethnicity of girls was defined using their two surnames (from the father and mother side). The (...) results show that Creoles are taller, have more abundant fat tissue, and greater BMI, especially at the age of 11 years, which means that they are better prepared to start pubertal spurt. Maya girls have relatively longer upper extremities to lower ones, greater biacromial breadth, and chest circumference to stature than Creoles, which shows their more stocky body build. The adolescent (pubertal) spurt in height starts earlier in Creoles (9-10 years) and its rate is greater (max. = 7.48 cm/ year) than in Maya and Mestizos girls (10-11 years; max. = 6.25 cm/year). In Mayas and Mestizos, there is only a slight difference between the rate of changes before and during the pubertal spurt. There are no significant differences in age at menarche between girls from both ethnic groups (11.96 in Mayas and Mestizos and 12.04 in Creoles), but there are statistically significant differences between age at menarche of studied girls and their mothers (12.4 for both groups) in each ethnic group. There is evidence that the onset of pubertal spurt in height and its rate may depend on ethnicity. Creoles may lead to a more “westernized” style of life than the Maya and Mestizos girls. (shrink)

This paper argues that the function of moral education in the biomedical context should be exactly the same as in a general, philosophical framework: it should not provide ready-to-use kits of moral principles; rather, it must show the history, epistemology and conceptual structure of moral theories that would enable those who have to make decisions to be as informed and as responsible as possible. If this complexity cannot be attained, an incomplete product—i.e. bioethics or bioethical principles—should not be seen as (...) a viable substitute. This theoretical position is subsequently illustrated by a case study involving research ethics committees. It is argued that within these committees, that are carefully formed multidisciplinary bodies, what makes competent decision-making possible is not a bioethical theory, nor even a sound philosophical ethics, but the dynamics of the discussion of a number of experts coming from different disciplines. This multidisciplinary expertise is necessary and sufficient to undertake the challenges of complex decisions in the biomedical context. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increasing focus on a crucial aspect of the ‘meeting of minds’ problem :160–165, 2013), namely the ability that human beings have for sharing different types of mental states such as emotions, intentions, and perceptual experiences. In this paper I examine what counts as basic forms of ‘shared experiences’ and focus on a relatively overlooked aspect of human embodiment, namely the fact that we start our journey into our experiential life within the experiencing body (...) of a second person, i.e. our mothers. For example, Zahavi and Rochat recently draw on phenomenological insights and developmental studies in order to support the idea that empathy must be considered a central precondition for experiential sharing. Here I suggest that the defence of the primacy of empathy over experiential sharing might reveal how we are often mislead in our understanding of more basic forms of shared experiences. I argue that while previous approaches mainly defined experiential sharing by using the case of visual experience as a paradigmatic example of ‘togetherness’, it is fruitful to consider the case of pregnancy and intersubjective touch in early infancy as a more basic model of experiential sharing in general. I conclude that shared experiences are phenomena emerging first and foremost from a ‘meeting of bodies’ rather than of minds and as such they precede rather than presuppose empathetic abilities. (shrink)

The concept of “enhypostaton” was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates with the aim of justifying the unitary subjectivity of Christ by reclassifying Christ’s human nature as ontically non-independent. The coinage of the term is commonly ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium. Its conceptual content has been recognized by contemporary scholarship as relevant to the core issues of Christology, as well as possessing significance for such philosophical questions as individuation and the nature of individual entityhood. Even so, despite (...) its role in the formation of classical Christological thought, the notion of “enhypostaton” is often regarded as obscure and not clearly defined. This paper aims to shed some light on the meaning of Leontius’ conception of it, in respect of its specifically philosophical import. (shrink)

De nos jours, les avocats et les juristes chinois sont très friands d'Internet. Pourtant, leur utilisation de la Toile n'a pas encore été l'objet de recherches. Cet article veut apporter un regard nouveau sur le lien entre avocats, internautes et société civile chinoise. Les juristes ont trouvé en Internet, en particulier sur les blogs, un lieu d'information et d'échange où ils peuvent se dédier aux sujets qui les intéressent . Les multiples démarches qu'ils ont initiées au sein du Réseau ont (...) abouti à une mobilisation des moyens numériques, permettant de mieux communiquer et informer sur le système légal et judiciaire chinois. Leur utilisation d'Internet a-t-elle catalysé l'initiative personnelle des utilisateurs et mobilisé l'opinion publique ? Cet article s'attache à démontrer comment par le biais d'Internet les avocats ont pu être des acteurs du développement de la société civile et participer ainsi à l'émergence d'une « communauté de critères » relevant du droit.Nowadays, lawyers and jurists Chinese are very fond of the Internet. However, their use of the Internet has not yet been investigated. This article will provide a new perspective on the relationship between lawyers, surfers and Chinese civil society. Lawyers found in the Internet, especially on blogs, a place to exchange information and where they can devote themselves to topics that interest them . Multiple steps they have initiated within the network led to a mobilization digital means to better communicate and inform the Chinese legal and judicial system. Internet use did catalyzed users personal initiative and mobilized public opinion? This article aims to demonstrate how through Internet lawyers have been involved in development of civil society and thus contribute to the emergence of a "community standards" under the law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rita Gross as Pioneer in the Study of Women and ReligionRosemary Radford RuetherRita Gross has been a pioneer in shaping both the theory and practice of women and religion and in Feminist theology. Her pathbreaking work in these fields has received insufficient recognition among both feminists and scholars of religion. This session at the 2010 AAR meeting devoted to her work is a small rectification of this neglect. (...) Rita has written more than 150 articles and written or edited around ten books. Three of these volumes—Beyond Androcentrism (1977), Feminism and Religion (1996), and A Garland of Feminist Reflections: Forty Years of Religion Explorations (2009)—span her writing career and exemplify her contributions to the field of women and religion.As Rita Gross makes clear, she went to the University of Chicago in the 1960s to explore the field of comparative religion, not to study women in religion explicitly. She was forced into this focus on women and has continued to return to this concern because of the resistance of the scholars in this field to paying attention to the ways in which half of humanity—women—participates in religion. Her concerns with women's roles in religion were shaped in response to the attitude of her mentors at the University of Chicago who insisted that what women did in religion was unimportant and was, in any case, covered by studying what men did in religion. One of these mentors ridiculed her by asking if she did not realize that the masculine is generic for humanness as a whole and so "includes the feminine." At most one might mention men's view of women. What women themselves think and do is irrelevant. At that time there were very few women in doctoral studies in religion at Chicago, and their teachers made clear that any concern with women as subjects of religion was a sure way to terminate their careers in the field.It was in responding to these kinds of messages from her teachers that Rita began to craft, in the late 1960s and 1970s, a fundamental shift in the methodology of religious studies. This would shape her decision to write her doctoral thesis on women in Australian Aboriginal religion, to edit a group of essays in her 1977 volume, Beyond Androcentrism, as well as doing pioneering work with Nancy Falk in the volume Unspoken Worlds, where they demonstrated the transformative understanding of religions that opens up when scholars focused on women's roles.This methodological shift, which Rita Gross has returned to again and again [End Page 75] through her writings, she called the movement from androcentrism to androgyny. Androcentrism as a bias in religious studies, or any other field, means quite simply the assumption that the male (usually the elite male) is the normative human being. To understand the "essence" of the human in any field it is sufficient to study what this elite male thinks and does. For Rita this is not only an injustice to women, but it also means turning a blind eye to at least half of what is actually going on in this or any other field. In other words, what is wrong about androcentrism as a way of doing study in religion is that it gives one a partial and distorted picture of reality. It is bad empiricism.The shift to androgyny means really looking equally at what women are doing as subjects of religion, not simply adding information about what men think of women. It is not that this information is totally absent or impossible to get. Often it is right there in the primary data, but is ignored by the scholars because of their androcentric bias. Bringing in women's activities and viewpoints as equal does not merely add a missing corner to the picture; it means transforming the whole picture. What men are thinking and doing is relativized and put in a larger context. For example, in understanding Australian Aboriginal religion one discovers not only that are women excluded from men's key rituals, but also that men are excluded from women's key rituals. The whole religion shifts from being understood as male dominant to being... (shrink)

Following SOX, financial restatements increased dramatically. Prior research suggests that how investors respond to restatements, particularly those involving fraud, may mitigate or exacerbate damage suffered. We extend both accounting and management research by examining the joint effects of pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions in response to a restatement on nonprofessional investors’ judgments. We find that pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions jointly influence investors’ managerial fraud prevention assessments, which mediate their trust (...) in management. These trust perceptions in turn affect investors’ investment and CEO retention judgments. Our results have implications for firms that are concerned with lessening the negative consequences associated with issuing a restatement. (shrink)

Quantitative research has called attention to the burden associated with informal caregiving in home nursing arrangements. Less emphasis has been placed, however, on care recipients’ subjective feelings of being a burden and on caregivers’ willingness to carry the burden in home care. This article uses empirical material from semi‐structured interviews conducted with older people affected by multiple chronic conditions and in need of long‐term home care, and with informal and professional caregivers, as two groups of relevant others. The high burden (...) of home‐care arrangements is unanimously stressed by all three groups involved in the triangle of care. An empirical‐ethical investigation of what can be legitimately expected from family members and informal caregivers, informed by Frith's symbiotic empirical ethics approach, was undertaken. Key tenets from the special goods theory and nursing professionalism are used as analytical tools. The study concludes that the current situation may hinder professional development and can reinforce feelings of being a burden to relevant others. (shrink)

How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? By asking this question, Colin Radford introduced the paradox of fiction, or the problem that we are often emotionally moved by characters and events which we know don’t really exist (1975). A puzzling element of these emotions that always resurfaced within discussions on the paradox is the fact that, although these emotions feel real to the people who have them, their difference from ›real‹ emotions is that they (...) cannot motivate us to perform any actions. The idea that actions towards fictional particulars are impossible still underlies recent work within the philosophy of fiction (cf. Matravers 2014, 26 sqq.; Friend 2017, 220; Stock 2017, 168). In the past decennia, however, the medium of interactive fiction has challenged this idea. Videogames, especially augmented and virtual reality games, offer us agency in their fictional worlds: players of computer games can interact with fictional objects, save characters that are invented, and kill monsters that are clearly non-existent within worlds that are mere representations on a screen. In a parallel to Radford’s original question, we might ask: how can we be moved to shoot zombies, when we know they aren’t real? The purpose of this article is to examine the new paradox of interactive fiction, which questions how we can be moved to act on objects we know to be fictional, its possible solutions, and its connection to the traditional paradox of fictional emotions. (shrink)

In this paper, I revisit Kimberlé Crenshaw's argument in “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex” (1989) to recover a companion metaphor that has been largely forgotten in the “mainstreaming” of intersectionality in (white-dominated) feminist theory. In addition to the now-famous intersection metaphor, Crenshaw offers the basement metaphor to show how—by privileging monistic, mutually exclusive, and analogically constituted categories of “race” and “sex” tethered, respectively, to masculinity and whiteness—antidiscrimination law functions to reproduce social hierarchy, rather than to remedy it, denying (...) Black women plaintiffs legal redress. I argue that in leaving the basement behind, deployments of “intersectionality” that deracinate the concept from its origins in Black feminist thought also occlude Crenshaw's account of the socio-legal reproduction of hierarchical power. (shrink)

A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis, is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be that (...) of specifying the form that the semantic component of a generative grammar must take. Then in the 70s linguistic semantics took a curious turn. Without rejecting GGH, linguists turned away from the task of characterizing the semantic component of a generative grammar to pursue instead the Montague-inspired project of providing for natural languages the same kind of model-theoretic semantics that logicians devise for the artificial languages of formal systems of logic, and “formal semantics” continues to dominate semantics in linguistics. This essay argues that the sort of compositional meaning theory that would verify GGH would not only be quite different from the theories formal semanticists construct, but would be a more fundamental theory that supersedes those theories in that it would explain why they are true when they are true, but their truth wouldn’t explain its truth. Formal semantics has undoubtedly made important contributions to our understanding of such phenomena as anaphora and quantification, but semantics in linguistics is supposed to be the study of meaning. This means that the formal semanticist can’t be unconcerned that the kind of semantic theory for a natural language that interests her has no place in a theory of linguistic competence; for if GGH is correct, then the more fundamental semantic theory is the compositional meaning theory that is the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and if that is so, then linguistic semantics has so far ignored what really ought to be its primary concern. (shrink)

My topic is the relation between nonsense and intelligibility, and the contrast between nonsense and falsehood which played a pivotal role in the rise of analytic philosophy. I shall pursue three lines of inquiry. First I shall briefly consider the positive case, namely linguistic understanding. Secondly, I shall consider the negative case—different breakdowns of understanding and connected forms of failure to make sense. Third, I shall criticize three important misconceptions of nonsense and unintelligibility: the austere conception of nonsense propounded by (...) the New Wittgensteinians ; the “no nonsense position” which roundly denies that there are cases of nonsense—Chomsky’s semantic anomalies or Ryle’s category mistakes–that are grammatically well-formed, without even having the potential for being used to make a truth-apt statement ; the individualistic conception of language and of semantic mistakes championed by Davidson. All three positions, I shall argue, ignore or deny combinatorial nonsense, the fact that perfectly meaningful sentence-components can be combined in a way that may be grammatical, yet without resulting in a sentence that is itself “meaningful”, i.e. endowed with linguistic sense. At a more strategic level, the first and the third position deny or ignore that natural languages are communal historical practices that go beyond idiolects and the employments of expressions in specific contexts and that are guided by semantic rules—standards for the meaningful use of words. (shrink)

Elucidates the theological and historical understanding of church as a community of liberation from sexism, describes a complete revisioning of the sacramental fundamentals of baptism and eucharist, and details women's liturgies and sacramental forms.

This paper aims to critique the phenomenon of advanced patient autonomy and choice in healthcare within the specific context of self-testing devices. A growing number of self-testing medical devices are currently available for home use. The premise underpinning many of these devices is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management of their health. Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. We take issue with this assumption and argue that self-testing provides a (...) specific example how increased patient autonomy and choice within healthcare might not best serve the patient population. We propose that current interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are based on negative accounts of liberty to the detriment of a more relational understanding. We also propose that Kantian philosophy is often applied to the healthcare arena in an inappropriate manner. We draw on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support these claims. We conclude by offering an alternative account of autonomy based on the interrelated concepts of relationality, care and responsibility. (shrink)

This commentary argues that the question of metalanguage is a key issue in emotion research. Izard (2010) ignores this issue (and all the earlier literature relating to it, including the debate in Emotion Review, 2009, 1[1]), and thus falls into the old traps of circularity, obscurity, and ethnocentrism. This commentary rejects Izard’s claim that “emotion” defies definition, and it offers a viable definition of “emotion” formulated in simple and universal human concepts, using the English version of the universal conceptual lingua (...) franca called Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). Once again, this commentary draws attention to the centrality of the question of language in emotion research. (shrink)

The volume aims to show the variety of research currents of the Lvov-Warsaw School and the ways in which these currents are developed today. The content of the book is divided into three parts: “Logic and Semiotics”, “Metaphysics and Ontology”, and “Psychology and Sociology”.

Emotions Caused by Untrue Propositions: A Broader View of the Paradox of Fiction Ever since Colin Radford wrote his article ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ in 1975, philosophers have tried to solve the so-called paradox of fiction, or the question how we can be moved by objects of which we know they don’t really exist. What is striking about discussions on the paradox of fiction is that they often present fictional works as (...) collections of untrue statements and focus on the content of these works, without regard for their form or mode of presentation. In this paper, I argue for a re-examination of the paradox of fiction, in which the work of fiction is treated as a complex of form and content. In this regard, I propose to expand Peter Lamarque’s thought theory, which he explicitly formulated to solve the paradox of fiction, with his later developed concept of opacity, which states that the content of the imaginings we form when reading fiction are fundamentally connected to the specific descriptions within the fictional work. (shrink)

Different immunotherapeutic approaches are in the pipeline for the treatment of drug dependence. “Drug vaccines” aim to induce the immune system to produce antibodies that bind to drugs and prevent them from inducing rewarding effects in the brain. Drugs of abuse currently being tested using these new approaches are opioids, nicotine, cocaine, and methamphetamine. In human clinical trials, “cocaine and nicotine vaccines” have been shown to induce sufficient antibody levels while producing few side effects. Studies in humans, determining how these (...) vaccines interact in combination with their target drug, are underway. However, although vaccines can become a reasonable treatment option for drugs of abuse, there are several disadvantages that must be considered. These include i) great individual variability in the formation of antibodies, ii) the lack of protection against a structurally dissimilar drug that produces the same effects as the drug of choice, and iii) the lack of an effect on the drug desire that may predispose an addict to relapse. In addition, a comprehensive overview of several crucial ethical issues has not yet been widely discussed in order to have not only a biological approach to immunotherapy of addiction. Overall, immunotherapy offers a range of possible treatment options: the pharmacological treatment of addiction, the treatment of overdoses, the prevention of toxicity to the brain or the heart, and the protection of the fetus during pregnancy. So far, the results obtained from a small-scale experiment using vaccines against cocaine and nicotine suggest that a number of important technical challenges still need to be overcome before such vaccines can be approved for clinical use. (shrink)

Il cosiddetto “paradosso della finzione” nasce dal tentativo di spiegare quale tipo di emozioni proviamo verso quegli oggetti che troviamo nei romanzi e nei film e che sappiamo perfettamente essere fittizi. Si tratta di un paradosso classico, tornato alla ribalta nel 1975 dopo la pubblicazione di un articolo di Colin Radford che partiva precisamente dall’interrogativo riguardante le lacrime che versiamo per ciò che non è reale (come un personaggio fittizio, appunto). Perché ci commuoviamo per il suicidio di Anna (...) Karenina se sappiamo che non esiste? Che differenza c’è tra piangere per Anna Karenina, piangere per una bugia, piangere per la depressione e fare finta di piangere perché si vuol fare credere a chi ci guarda che siamo sinceramente commossi? In Piangere e ridere davvero (2009) Maurizio Ferraris offre un’interessante proposta teorica per dissolvere il paradosso in questione e si sofferma su alcune distinzioni fondamentali riguardanti le nostre reazioni emotive a stimoli reali e fittizi. In questo saggio si prende spunto dalla teoria di Ferraris e ci si propone di chiarire che cosa significhi fare finta di rispondere emotivamente a qualcosa nella vita di tutti i giorni e quale sia la differenza tra queste “finte” emozioni e quelle che invece proviamo durante la fruizione di opere che sappiamo essere di finzione. Saranno scelti come esempi paradigmatici il caso Fenaroli (al centro della cronaca italiana alla fine degli anni Cinquanta), Il vedovo di Dino Risi e Scusate il ritardo di Massimo Troisi. (shrink)

Le chimérisme permet d’élargir le concept d’« intelligence artificielle » vers celui de « cognition synthétique » − une approche qui met en question la dualité entre « artificiel » et « authentique », amplifie les méthodes de cognition non-humaines, et anticipe les modes de symbiose entre les dichotomies imposées. En subvertissant ce que l’on pourrait considérer comme naturel, le chimérisme permet de démêler l’« artificiel » dans l’intelligence artificielle et de mettre en avant la notion de « synthétique ».

Authors of chapters: J. Blanc, D. Blitman, F. Couturier, P. Fasula, R. Lamarche-Perrin, D. Ross, R. Sandoz, S. Troubé .