The article deals with the 17th century autobiographic nun's characteristic vision of man as a being the relations between man and God. The 17th century was a time of rapid change all over Europe. In the 17th century arrived in Poland from Netherlands the first caramel’s nuns. There were: Anna оf the Jesus (Jadwiga Stobieńska) - the first Polish caramel’s nun, then Teresa of the Jesus (Marianna Marchocka) etc. The autobiography of Jadwiga Stobieńska’s expresses the relations between man and (...) God, and mystical inspirations (particularly St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross). The article presents the religious direct experiences of Jadwiga Stobieńska. There are many images, motifs taken from the great tradition of religious literature. The article shows influence mysticism of St. Teresa of Avila for the Jadwiga Stobieńska’s spiritual life. This article the particularly presents the personal experiences of Polish nun (dialogue with God, the love to Him and mystical unity with God). Jadwiga Stobieńska gave original the reason of relations a man with Absolute, and shoed metaphysical and mystical the way of soul to God. (shrink)

First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. (...) On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, we should move away from propounding a theory of action, and instead focus on a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational, towards a co-actional, model of action. (shrink)

Si la praxéologie mérite aujourd’hui notre attention, c’est parce qu’elle permet de remonter aux origines des « théories de l’action », des sociologies de l’action ou des philosophies de l’action qui ont marqué le xxe siècle. Que veut dire, au fond, étudier l’action, en proposer ensuite une théorie, à visée soit descriptive soit normative? Dans ce qui suit, on va étudier la question en compagnie de Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886-1981), philosophe analytique, et de Harold Garfinkel (1917-2011), sociologue hétérodoxe. Ce texte défend (...) l’idée selon laquelle parmi les conséquences les plus marquantes du travail de Garfinkel se trouve la démystification de la « théorie de l’action », et que certaines intuitions similaires sont déjà très présentes chez Kotarbiński (dont les travaux sur l’action constituent, selon Garfinkel, un « échec extrêmement important »). La praxéologie chez les deux auteurs n’est pas une discipline, mais une façon de voir la pratique étudiée comme un tout, à l’instar des recherches menées par les théoriciens de la Gestalt. La dimension athéorique de l’étude de l’action humaine proposée ici permet d’espérer qu’un jour, les phénomènes qui nous entourent vont pouvoir être étudiés pour ce qu’ils sont, et non pas pour ce qu’une théorie élégante permet d’en dire. (shrink)

This paper argues that the function of moral education in the biomedical context should be exactly the same as in a general, philosophical framework: it should not provide ready-to-use kits of moral principles; rather, it must show the history, epistemology and conceptual structure of moral theories that would enable those who have to make decisions to be as informed and as responsible as possible. If this complexity cannot be attained, an incomplete product—i.e. bioethics or bioethical principles—should not be seen as (...) a viable substitute. This theoretical position is subsequently illustrated by a case study involving research ethics committees. It is argued that within these committees, that are carefully formed multidisciplinary bodies, what makes competent decision-making possible is not a bioethical theory, nor even a sound philosophical ethics, but the dynamics of the discussion of a number of experts coming from different disciplines. This multidisciplinary expertise is necessary and sufficient to undertake the challenges of complex decisions in the biomedical context. (shrink)

Both many critics of abortion and many defenders of abortion have suggested that artificial wombs could end the abortion debate. If the fetus is removed from the uterus, women have an end to an unwanted pregnancy. If the living fetus is then put in an artificial uterus for ectogenesis, there is no termination of the life of the fetus. Joona Räsänen challenges this view in his article, Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the fetus. Räsänen provides three (...) arguments for a right to secure the death of the human being in utero, namely the ‘right not to become a biological parent argument’, the ‘right to genetic privacy argument’, and the ‘right to property argument’. This article critiques these three arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. (shrink)

Nabataean history is significantly overlooked in the works of ancient historians. Josephus is an exception to this, as he includes several important events from Nabataean history in De Bello Judaico and Antiquitates Judaicae. However, his retelling of these events differs between the two works. In this paper, I argue that Josephus became more “pro-Roman” over time and eventually overshadowed an accurate portrayal of Nabataean history in his later narrative. He undermined moments of tension between Rome and Nabataea in order to (...) showcase Roman power in the Near East, even beyond reality. In support of this argument, I analyze the Nabataean sections of Josephus’ works, as each passage has overlapping details, but significantly different emphasis, characterization, and perspective through variations in terminology, imagery, and tone. Though problematic, Josephus has preserved a unique look into Roman-Nabataean relations in the two centuries prior to the incorporation of Nabataea into the Empire. (shrink)

In Valuing Health, Dan Hausman argues that well-being is not measurable, at least not in the way that science and policy would require. His argument depends on a demanding conception of well-being and on a pessimistic verdict upon the existing measures of subjective well-being. Neither of these reasons, I argue, warrant as much skepticism as Hausman professes.

Recent research has demonstrated an asymmetry between the origins and endpoints of motion events, with preferential attention given to endpoints rather than beginnings of motion in both language and memory. Two experiments explore this asymmetry further and test its implications for language production and comprehension. Experiment 1 shows that both adults and 4-year-old children detect fewer within-category changes in source than goal objects when tested for memory of motion events; furthermore, these groups produce fewer references to source than goal objects (...) when describing the same motion events. Experiment 2 asks whether the specificity of encoding source/goal relations differs in both spatial memory and the comprehension of novel spatial vocabulary. Results show that endpoint configuration changes are detected more accurately than source configuration changes by both adults and young children. Furthermore, when interpreting novel motion verbs, both age groups expect more fine-grained lexical distinctions in the domain of endpoint configurations compared to that of source configurations. These studies demonstrate that a cognitive-attentional bias in spatial representation and memory affects both the detail of linguistic encoding during the use of spatial language and the specificity of hypotheses about spatial referents that learners build during the acquisition of the spatial lexicon. (shrink)

In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves two related yet (...) distinct debates: (i) that between the particularist and the generalist on the status of moral principles; and (ii) that between holists and atomists on the nature of reasons. This division of labour has no correlate within the aesthetic particularism–generalism debate, and I will show how the ideas developed in relation to meta-ethics illuminate a difficulty with Sibley's view. I argue that we should understand Sibley as subscribing to both particularism and a version of holism about aesthetic reasons. (shrink)

This article reviews the book The Philosophy of Early Christianity, by George E. Karamanolis.

The article aims at challenging the very idea of bioethics. Starting with a thought experiment which puts into perspective relations between law and ethics, a reflexion on founding moments of bioethics as a distinctive discipline will be proposed in order to contest some of its assumptions. Less traditional ways of seeing the field will be subsequently analyzed, yet the conclusion of this exploration will remain critical: we should rather think of an alternative way of seeing moral expertise in the biomedical (...) sphere, founded on plural knowledge of diverse agents who leave their moral presuppositions aside as much as this is possible. (shrink)

The concept of enhypostaton was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates, and aimed to elucidate the orthodox doctrine of the unity of two natures in the singular hypostasis of Christ. In spite of the fact that the conceptual content of the term is recognized by contemporary scholarship as pertaining to the core of Christology, the notion of enhypostaton is often described as obscure and not clearly defined. The coining of the term is often ascribed to Leontius of (...) Byzantium, whereas in fact he only followed and developed solutions already introduced into Christological discourse by John the Grammarian. The article aims to clarify the notion by offering a philosophical account of the meaning and theoretical origins of “enhypostaton,” as introduced by John the Grammarian in the context of his discussion of substance as en-hypostatical being. Enhypostaton emerges as the proper way of describing the ontological complements of a particular entity. This seems to be a significant development in the philosophical explanation of substance. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, by Marcus Plested.

The patterns of physical growth (stature, BMI, subscapular and arm fat-fold thickness, upper and lower extremity length, chest circumference, arm, and hip breadth, and age at menarche) were studied in 857 of Maya and Mestizo girls and 1314 of Creole girls aged 6-18 years. Data were collected between 1998-2001 in primary, secondary, and high schools of Merida, Capital City of the Yucatan State, Mexico. The ethnicity of girls was defined using their two surnames (from the father and mother side). The (...) results show that Creoles are taller, have more abundant fat tissue, and greater BMI, especially at the age of 11 years, which means that they are better prepared to start pubertal spurt. Maya girls have relatively longer upper extremities to lower ones, greater biacromial breadth, and chest circumference to stature than Creoles, which shows their more stocky body build. The adolescent (pubertal) spurt in height starts earlier in Creoles (9-10 years) and its rate is greater (max. = 7.48 cm/ year) than in Maya and Mestizos girls (10-11 years; max. = 6.25 cm/year). In Mayas and Mestizos, there is only a slight difference between the rate of changes before and during the pubertal spurt. There are no significant differences in age at menarche between girls from both ethnic groups (11.96 in Mayas and Mestizos and 12.04 in Creoles), but there are statistically significant differences between age at menarche of studied girls and their mothers (12.4 for both groups) in each ethnic group. There is evidence that the onset of pubertal spurt in height and its rate may depend on ethnicity. Creoles may lead to a more “westernized” style of life than the Maya and Mestizos girls. (shrink)

Scholars have offered various critiques of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article, ‘After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ My book The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice presents four such critiques. First, Giubilini and Minerva argue from the deeply controversial to the even more controversial. Second, they presuppose a false view of personal identity called body-self dualism. Third, their view cannot secure human equality. And fourth, their account of harm cannot account for (...) harm found in some cases of murder. In the article, ‘Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’, J. Räsänen examines and finds wanting these four critiques. This essay responds to Räsänen's defense of infanticide and argues that his responses to the four objections fail. (shrink)

Fazekas and Overgaard () present a novel, multidimensional model that explains different ways in which conscious representations can be degraded. Moreover, the authors discuss possible mechanisms that underlie different kinds of degradation, primarily those related to attentional processing. In this letter, we argue that the proposed mechanisms are not sufficient. We propose that attentional mechanisms work differently at various processing stages; and factors that are independent of attentional ones, such as expectation, previous experience, and context, should be accounted for if (...) we are aiming to construct a comprehensive model of conscious visual perception. (shrink)

Are emotions, feelings, sentiments not the stuff of literature? There it is where they project their inner logic of aesthetic transmutation; there, beyond the instrument of language that they command. This collection explores how the lyrical virtualities of life-experience and the elegiac style in literature share a common core, lifting the human significance of life from abysmal vitality to esoteric heights, from abysmal grief to a serene reconciliation with destiny. The elegiac sequence in the play of emotions, feelings and sentiments (...) brings together life and literary creativity in its transformatory power. (shrink)

Among the multiple, subliminal passions that inspire our life in innumerable ways, literature shows us one that seems to play a particularly penetrating role in human concerns. This passion, which Tymieniecka calls an `esoteric passion', finds its projection and crystallization in space: it is the esoteric passion for space. This subliminal passion, investigated through literature, allows the philosopher to reach beneath the fallacious separations of nature, humanness and the cultural world, restoring the wholeness of experience that has become lost in (...) the artificial one-sidedness of contemporary approaches, confined to language as they are. The elemental passion for place is investigated here in the literary fruits of creative imagination. Unravelled from the very depths of the primogenital, onto-poietic unfolding of life, the passion for place is revealed as projecting into the flux of life: it is a `station' of life-significance. This collection presents papers from two conferences of the International Society of Phenomenology and Literature held in Cambridge, MA in 1993/4. (shrink)

Philosophy has been always received or bypassed for its resonance or aloofness with the spirit of the time. Should not philosophy/phenomenology of life be expected to do more to ascertain its validity? Should it not pass the pragmatic test, that is to respond directly to the life-concerns of its time? What is the role of the philosopher and philosophy today? Due to the ever-advancing scientific, technological, social and cultural changes that are shaping human life and the life-world-in-transformation, we are desperately (...) seeking a measure to estimate life's unfolding, a compass to stir the course between Scylla and Charibda to maintain human-hood and creative insight for laying the cornerstones for the unforeseeable unfolding of life dynamisms. It is this challenge which philosophy/phenomenology of life meets with underlying ontopoietic unraveling of the hidden logoic concatenations of beingness-in-becoming. The present collection of essays offers contributions to answer this challenge by focusing upon measure, sharing-in-life, intersubjectivity and communication, societal equilibrium, education, and more. It will be of great interest to those working in the fields of Phenomenology, Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and Contemporary Philosophy. (shrink)

Some might ask "Why Locke's theory of knowledge now?" Though appreciated for his social philosophy, Locke has been criticized for his work in the field of epistemology ever since the publication of the Essay. It is even as if Locke serves only as an example of how not to think. When people criticize Locke, they usually cite the hostile commen taries of Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, or Sellars. But, one might ask, are they not all so eager to show the excellence (...) of their own epistemo logical views that they distort and underestimate Locke's thought? Russell aptly noted in his History of Western Philosophy that: No one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consis tent. Locke aimed at credibility, and achieved it at the expense of consistency. Most of the great philosophers have done the opposite. A philosophy which is not self-consis tent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that very reason have been partially true. There is no reason to suppose that a self consistent system contains more truth than one which, like Locke's, is obviously more or less wrong. (B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 613. ) Here Russell is uncommonly charitable with Locke. (shrink)