This paper deals with one of Plutarch’s favourite subjects - the relation between human beings and animals. In order to gain new insight into this topic, a three-step approach is chosen: First, the paper investigates some of the essential ideas concerning animals (their soul, their emotions and intellectual capacities) to be found in Plutarch’s work and the vocabulary he employs. Secondly, the paper focuses on Plutarch’s unique style of writing and his skillful use of the Socratic method to guide his (...) audience. Thirdly, Plutarch’s personal opinion will be analyzed. In the first part of this paper, Plutarch’s work serves as a lens to unfold the nature of contemporary discourses on the relation between man and animal (with broad agreement on some points and controversies about others) as well as the different notions associated with the terms theria and zoa. A special focus is placed on the ‘Gryllos’ (mor. 985 d-992 e). Plutarch’s treatise ‘Whether the creatures of the land or the creatures of the sea have more phronesis’ (mor. 959 b-985 c) is an important contribution to the field of animal ethics and the subject of the second part of this paper. The ingenious structure of said text illustrates Plutarch’s qualities as a writer and how carefully he employs maieutic methods to support his readers in developing their own point of view. The third part of this paper is devoted to passages from Plutarch’s oeuvre which illustrate his personal position in the debate on the relation between human beings and animals. He is clearly aware that life on earth is inextricably interwoven with acts of killing and destruction, yet he also believes that observing animals has some lessons to offer to mystery religions. Plutarch describes animals as ‘clearer mirrors to the divine’, thereby illustrating that he perceives creatures - whether tiny or large - as a unique chance to gain a better understanding of the miracle of life. In this capacity animals provide a way for human beings to improve their insight into the nature of the divine. (shrink)

Widowhood is common in old age, can be accompanied by serious health consequences and is often linked to substantial changes in social network. Little is known about the impact of social isolation on the development of depressive symptoms over time taking widowhood into account. We provide results from the follow-up 5 to follow-up 9 from the longitudinal study AgeCoDe and its follow-up study AgeQualiDe. Depression was measured with GDS-15 and social isolation was assessed using the Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS-6). (...) The group was aligned of married and widowed people in old age and education through entropy balancing. Linear mixed models were used to examine the frequency of occurrence of depressive symptoms for widowed and married elderly people depending on the risk of social isolation. Our study shows that widowhood alone does not lead to an increased occurrence of depressive symptoms. However, "widowed oldest old", who are also at risk of social isolation, have significantly more depressive symptoms than those without risk. In the group of "married oldest old", women have significantly more depressive symptoms than men, but isolated and non-isolated do not differ. Especially for people who have lost a spouse, the social network changes significantly and increases the risk for social isolation. This represents a risk factor for the occurrence of depressive symptoms. (shrink)

In this paper, I first outline the view developed in my recent book on the role of idealization in scientific understanding. I discuss how this view leads to the recognition of a number of kinds of variability among scientific representations, including variability introduced by the many different aims of scientific projects. I then argue that the role of idealization in securing understanding distances understanding from truth, but that this understanding nonetheless gives rise to scientific knowledge. This discussion will clarify how (...) my view relates to three other recent books on understanding by Henk de Regt, Catherine Elgin, and Kareem Khalifa. (shrink)

It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...) generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

The concept of hierarchical organization is commonplace in science. Subatomic particles compose atoms, which compose molecules; cells compose tissues, which compose organs, which compose organisms; etc. Hierarchical organization is particularly prominent in ecology, a field of research explicitly arranged around levels of ecological organization. The concept of levels of organization is also central to a variety of debates in philosophy of science. Yet many difficulties plague the concept of discrete hierarchical levels. In this paper, we show how these difficulties undermine (...) various implications ascribed to hierarchical organization, and we suggest the concept of scale as a promising alternative to levels. Investigating causal processes at different scales offers a way to retain a notion of quasi-levels that avoids the difficulties inherent in the classic concept of hierarchical levels of organization. Throughout, our focus is on ecology, but the results generalize to other invocations of hierarchy in science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge (...) to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. (shrink)

In recent years, philosophy of science has witnessed a significant increase in attention directed toward the field’s social relevance. This is demonstrated by the formation of societies with related agendas, the organization of research symposia, and an uptick in work on topics of immediate public interest. The collection of papers that follows results from one such event: a 3-day colloquium on the subject of socially engaged philosophy of science (SEPOS) held at the University of Cincinnati in October 2012. In this (...) introduction, we first survey the recent history of philosophy of science’s social involvement (or lack thereof) and contrast this with the much greater social involvement of the sciences themselves. Next, we argue that the field of philosophy of science bears a special responsibility to contribute to public welfare. We then introduce as a term of art “SEPOS” and articulate what we take to be distinctive about social engagement, with reference to the articles in this collection as exemplars. Finally, we survey the current state of social engagement in philosophy of science and suggest some practical steps for individuals and institutions to support this trajectory. (shrink)

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

The future of health research will be characterised by three continuing trends: rising demand for health data; increasing impracticability of obtaining specific consent for secondary research; and decreasing capacity to effectively anonymise data. In this context, governments, clinicians and the research community must demonstrate that they can be responsible stewards of health data. IRBs and RECs sit at heart of this process because in many jurisdictions they have the capacity to grant consent waivers when research is judged to be of (...) particular value. However, several different terms are used to refer to this value, indicating a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the appropriate test for access to health data for research without consent. In this paper we do three things. First we describe the current confusion and instability in terminology relating to public interest in the context of consent waivers. Second we argue for harmonisation of terminology on the grounds of clarity, transparency and consistency. Third we argue that the term ‘public interest’ best reflects the normative work required to justify consent waivers because it is the broadest of the competing terms. ‘Public interest’ contains within its scope positive and negative implications of a study, as well as welfare, justice and rights considerations. In making this argument, we explain the normative basis for consent waivers, and provide a starting place for further discussion about the precise conditions in which a given study can be said to advance the public interest. Ipsos MORI study found that: … the public would be broadly happy with administrative data linking for research projects provided Those projects have social value, broadly defined. Data are de-identified. Data are kept secure. Businesses are not able to access the data for profit. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.

One of biology's fundamental aims is to generate understanding of the living world around—and within—us. In this chapter, I aim to provide a relatively nonpartisan discussion of the nature of explanation in biology, grounded in widely shared philosophical views about scientific explanation. But this discussion also reflects what I think is important for philosophers and biologists alike to appreciate about successful scientific explanations, so some points will be controversial, at least among philosophers. I make three main points: (1) causal relationships (...) and broad patterns have often been granted importance to scientific explanations, and they are in fact both important; (2) some explanations in biology cite the components of or processes in systems that account for the systems’ features, whereas other explanations feature large-scale or structural causes that influence a system; and (3) there can be multiple different explanations of a given biological phenomenon, explanations that respond to different research aims and can thus be compatible with one another even when they may seem to disagree. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...) about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this article, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states. (shrink)

Philip Woodward's review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality (PBI) raises objections to the specific version of the phenomenal intentionality theory proposed in PBI, especially to identity PIT, representationalism, the picture of derived mental representation, some tentative proposals regarding intentional structure, and the matching theory of truth and reference. In this reply, I argue that the version of PIT defended in PBI can withstand these objections.

It is a common thought that mathematics can be not only true but also beautiful, and many of the greatest mathematicians have attached central importance to the aesthetic merit of their theorems, proofs and theories. But how, exactly, should we conceive of the character of beauty in mathematics? In this paper I suggest that Kant's philosophy provides the resources for a compelling answer to this question. Focusing on §62 of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, I argue against the common view (...) that Kant's aesthetics leaves no room for beauty in mathematics. More specifically, I show that on the Kantian account beauty in mathematics is a non-conceptual response felt in light of our own creative activities involved in the process of mathematical reasoning. The Kantian proposal I thus develop provides a promising alternative to Platonist accounts of beauty widespread among mathematicians. While on the Platonist conception the experience of mathematical beauty consists in an intellectual insight into the fundamental structures of the universe, according to the Kantian proposal the experience of beauty in mathematics is grounded in our felt awareness of the imaginative processes that lead to mathematical knowledge. The Kantian account I develop thus offers to elucidate the connection between aesthetic reflection, creative imagination and mathematical cognition. (shrink)

My chapter aims to advance the debate on a problem often raised by philosophers who are skeptical of implied narrators in movies. This is the concern that positing such elusive narrators gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 2006: 179-180). -/- Friends of the implied cinematic narrator reply that the questions critics raise about the workings of the implied cinematic narrator are "silly ones" to ask. -/- I examine how the "absurd imaginings" problem arises for all the central (...) arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss why the questions critics pose about this narrator are legitimate ones to ask. (shrink)

(2001). Fruits, Apples, and Category Mistakes: On Sport, Games, and Play. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 151-159. doi: 10.1080/00948705.2001.9714610.

Recent philosophy of science has witnessed a shift in focus, in that significantly more consideration is given to how scientists employ models. Attending to the role of models in scientific practice leads to new questions about the representational roles of models, the purpose of idealizations, why multiple models are used for the same phenomenon, and many more besides. In this paper, I suggest that these themes resonate with central topics in feminist epistemology, in particular prominent versions of feminist empiricism, and (...) that model-based science and feminist epistemology each has crucial resources to offer the other's project. (shrink)

When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention (...) neglected areas of overlap, as well as a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well-illustrated by—and particularly valuable for—game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the nature and sense of legal reasoning as reasonableness, i.e. as judgement and equilibrium between normativity and factuality, and as constant approximation between these two dimensions. By phrasing the intertwinement between legal hermeneutics and the nature and function of writing, the structure of the article is constructed so that the focus is on the changes currently occurring with the so-called ‘digital revolution’: in imagining a juridical system administrated through data analysis and algorithms, some contradictions emerge, (...) especially concerning the nature, sense and task of legal hermeneutics. The current shift of paradigm should be first of all addressed starting from the grammatological nature of the revolution at stake. Only from this perspective can the shift be entirely grasped and, at the same time, only from this perspective can the methodological conundrum be deconstructed. (shrink)

Opponents of abortion have traditionally responded to Judith Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion” by denying that her example of the unconscious violinist is analogous to a pregnancy that results from rape. In this article, I argue that this strategy does not work. Although there are differences between Thomson’s violinist and pregnancies that result from rape, the differences are not morally relevant. The appropriate strategy for the opponent of abortion, I argue, is to simply bite the bullet: the opponent of abortion (...) should simply reply that Thomson’s innocent victim is not free to unplug himself from the violinist. (shrink)

Executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) are key cognitive skills for socio-emotional adjustment. Executive function develops considerably between 3 and 7 years of age, and fosters the development of social cognition skills such as ToM. Studies with adults have shown a link between EF and prejudice, as well as between empathy and prejudice. Moreover, the relationship between EF, cognitive and affective ToM and prejudice has barely been studied in children. In this study, we aimed at examining the relationship (...) between individual differences in EF, cognitive and affective ToM and prejudice toward the Romany ethnic minority. We expected a positive association between EF and ToM skills, and a negative association between EF and prejudice. We also predicted a negative association between ToM and prejudice. A total of 86 preschool (5–6 years old, N = 43) and third-grade (8–9 years old, N = 43) children participated in the study. Results showed a negative relationship between EF and prejudice, as well as between affective ToM and prejudice, after controlling for intelligence. Moreover, we found that EF significantly predicted prejudice. Exploratory correlational analyses suggested age-related differences in the EF skills underlying prejudice regulation. These findings suggest a distinctive contribution of cognitive and affective components of ToM to prejudice, and highlight the central role of EF in social behavior regulation. (shrink)

O Transtorno do Espectro Autista (TEA) é caracterizado pela presença de déficits persistentes na comunicação e interação social, além de padrões restritos e repetitivos de comportamentos, interesses e atividades. Como forma de viabilizar a inclusão das crianças autistas no ambiente escolar, a orientação dos professores que atuam com este público é de suma importância. O objetivo do estudo é apresentar a experiência de orientação feita para os professores que lecionam para alunos autistas, acompanhados pelo Núcleo de Atenção ao TEA, da (...) cidade de Monte Alto-SP, no período de junho de 2022 a junho de 2023. Trata-se de um estudo descritivo, do tipo relato de experiência, embasado na ciência ABA (Análise do Comportamento Aplicada) e relacionado às vivências com os professores em orientações, realizadas mensalmente. Como resultado, observou-se a dificuldade dos docentes em acolher estes alunos, direcionar atividades, lidar com comportamentos disruptivos e no manejo das atividades de vida diária. Discute-se a importância de uma ferramenta de apoio para proporcionar aos docentes maior respaldo teórico à prática com alunos autistas, para contribuir na inclusão, aprendizagem e socialização no ambiente escolar. Esta experiência ampliou as vivências sobre a perspectiva do professor na inclusão escolar de crianças com TEA, lançando luz sobre a necessidade de formação teórica e instrumentalização dos docentes, considerando as particularidades de neurodesenvolvimento e comportamento desta população e contribuindo para a maior eficácia da assistência educacional inclusiva. (shrink)

Resumen: El diálogo fallido entre Estado y pueblo mapuche se enraíza en la formación misma del Estado chileno promovido por una elite que construye una institucionalidad a su imagen y semejanza, ilusamente homogénea e invisibilizadora de las diferencias. No obstante, el mismo espíritu “civilizador” que espera integrar a estas minorías asimilándolas, facilita la inserción de estas minorías en el diálogo postmoderno acerca de la interculturalidad, en el cual se enfrentan a la perspectiva multiculturalista que no da cuenta del acto de (...) reconocimiento que implica convivir con la otredad. (shrink)

Hume’s account of the origin and nature of our ideas of space and time is generally thought to be the least satisfactory part of his empiricist system of philosophy. The main reason is internal in that the account is judged to be inconsistent with Hume’s fundamental principle for the relationship between senses and cognition, the copy principle. This paper defends Hume against the inconsistency objection by offering a new systematic interpretation of Hume on space and time and illuminating more generally (...) the role of the copy principle in his philosophy. Humes Theorie des Wesens und des Ursprungs unserer Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit wird generell zu den am wenigsten befriedigenden Teilen seiner empiristischen Philosophie gezählt. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist werkimmanent: Die Raum- Zeit-Theorie einerseits und Humes „copy principle“ andererseits – d.h. dasjenige Fundamental-Prinzip, das die Relation zwischen unseren Sinnen und unserem Denken regelt – werden als miteinander inkonsistent erachtet. Dieser Beitrag bietet eine neue, systematische Interpretation der Raum-Zeit-Lehre Humes und eine umfassendere Darstellung der Rolle des „copy principles“ in seiner Philosophie an. Auf diese Weise wird Hume gegen den Vorwurf der Inkonsistenz verteidigt. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 2, April 2020, Page 201-205.

Our goal in this article is first to give a broad outline of some of Hume’s major positions to do with justice, sympathy, the common point of view, criticisms of social contract theory, convention and private property that continue to resonate in contemporary political philosophy. We follow this with an account of Hume’s influence on contemporary philosophy in the conservative, classical liberal, utilitarian, and Rawlsian traditions. We end with some reflections on how contemporary political philosophers would benefit from a more (...) explicit consideration of Hume. (shrink)

One of the central aims of science is explanation: scientists seek to uncover why things happen the way they do. This chapter addresses what kinds of explanations are formulated in biology, how explanatory aims influence other features of the field of biology, and the implications of all of this for biology education. Philosophical treatments of scientific explanation have been both complicated and enriched by attention to explanatory strategies in biology. Most basically, whereas traditional philosophy of science based explanation on derivation (...) from scientific laws, there are many biological explanations in which laws play little or no role. Instead, the field of biology is a natural place to turn for support for the idea that causal information is explanatory. Biology has also been used to motivate mechanistic accounts of explanation, as well as criticisms of that approach. Ultimately, the most pressing issue about explanation in biology may be how to account for the wide range of explanatory styles encountered in the field. This issue is crucial, for the aims of biological explanation influence a variety of other features of the field of biology. Explanatory aims account for the continued neglect of some central causal factors, a neglect that would otherwise be mysterious. This is linked to the persistent use of models like evolutionary game theory and population genetic models, models that are simplified to the point of unreality. These explanatory aims also offer a way to interpret many biologists’ total commitment to one or another methodological approach, and the intense disagreements that result. In my view, such debates are better understood as arising not from different theoretical commitments, but commitments to different explanatory projects. Biology education would thus be enriched by attending to approaches to biological explanation, as well as the unexpected ways that these explanatory aims influence other features of biology. I suggest five lessons for teaching about explanation in biology that follow from the considerations of this chapter. (shrink)

Avant 1812, l'actuelle République de Moldavie, partie intégrante de la région roumaine appelée Moldavie, avait comme modèle et débouché culturel la France. Après cette date, rattachée à l'Empire Russe, elle a dû rentrer, sous le nom de Bessarabie dans un tout autre giron culturel, à la frontière des civilisations. Aujourd'hui, le discours relatif à la culture et à l'identité est-il double ou dédoublé ? Certains Moldaves plaident pour leur identité roumaine, d'autres pour leur identité moldave et ceci sur un fond (...) à nombreuses touches multiculturelles. Un représentant du quartier général d'une organisation internationale a demandé à un collaborateur moldave son avis quant à la nationalité qu'il faudrait indiquer sur la liste des employés. Puisqu'au moment où, pour les ressortissants de la République de Moldavie, il a été écrit «moldave», le représentant roumain a objecté que cette nationalité n'existe pas. Si vous étiez le représentant moldave, que répondriez-vous?Before 1812, the current Republic of Moldova, then a territory of the Rumanian region called Moldova, chose France as a cultural model and outlet. After this date, the territory became part of the Russian Empire under the name of Basarabia and thus entered a completely different cultural space at the border of civilizations. Nowadays, is the discourse related to culture and identity doubled or divided? Some Moldavans opt for a Rumanian identity and others a Moldovan one in a context with many multicultural aspects. A representative of the headquarters of an international organization asked a Moldavian colleague under which nationality he should be put down on a list of employees. “Moldavian” was chosen for citizens of the Republique of Moldova only for the Rumanian representative to object that this nationality did not in fact exist. What would have been your answer to this question had you been the Moldovan representative? (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Normative fragment of natural language make up sentences that express acts and describe norms. In this fragment there are criteria of logic thuth and relation of consequence between sentences which constitute a natural deontic logic. This paper adopts at ranslation function from the set of sentences of the normative fragment of natural language in to the set of formulae in the (...) formal language and claims that such function translates logically true sentences of the natural language into provable formulae of the formal calculus. With Von Wright's deontic calculus (1951), it does not fit and generates paradoxes, which are known as Prior's paradoxes. Cruz's paraconsistent deontic propositional calculus, D 1 (1993) avoids some paradoxes, except that generated by the formula OB-O (A- B). One builds a relevant deontic propositional calculus that aims to avoid these paradoxes and keeps intact all other fundamental features of deontic operators, since the formula B - (A - B) is improable in some relavant calculi.  . (shrink)

Although scholars agree that Aquinas believed the pagan could possess “true but imperfect” virtues, there is deep disagreement over the question of how these “true but imperfect” virtues should be understood. Some scholars argue that Aquinas believed the pagan’s imperfect virtues are nonetheless ordered to a genuinely good end (his natural good) and are connected by acquired prudence. Other scholars argue that Aquinas believed that any virtues that the pagan possesses are considerably more limited: they are more akin to dispositions (...) than habits, and they are not connected. This paper argues that this latter position is incoherent. If one is willing to concede that the pagan can perform genuinely good actions, then one must concede that the pagan can possess genuine (albeit imperfect) virtues that are connected by acquired prudence. (shrink)