This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I develop a variety of motivations for this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.

Background Moral distress was first described by Jameton in 1984, and has been defined as distress experienced by an individual when they are unable to carry out what they believe to be the right course of action because of real or perceived constraints on that action. This complex phenomenon has been studied extensively among healthcare providers, and intensive care professionals in particular report high levels of moral distress. This distress has been associated with provider burnout and associated consequences such as (...) job attrition, with potential impacts on patient and family care. There is a paucity of literature exploring how middle and late career healthcare providers experience and cope with moral distress. Objectives We explore the experience of moral distress and the strategies and resources invoked to mitigate that distress in mid- and late-career healthcare providers practicing in paediatric intensive care, in order to identify ways in which the work environment can build a culture of moral resilience. Research design An exploratory, qualitative quality improvement project utilizing focus group and semi-structured interviews with pediatric intensive care front-line providers. Participants Mid-and-later career (10 + years in practice) pediatric intensive care front line providers in a tertiary pediatric hospital. Research context This work focuses on paediatric intensive care providers in a single critical care unit, in order to explore the site-specific perspectives of health care providers in that context with respect to moral distress coping strategies. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the Quality Management Office at the institution; consent was obtained from participants, and no identifying data was included in this project. Findings Participants endorsed perspective-building and described strategies for positive adaptation including; active, reflective and structured supports. Participants articulated interest in enhanced and accessible formal supports. Discussion Findings in this study resonate with the current literature in healthcare provider moral distress, and exposed ways in which the work environment could support a culture of moral resilience. Avenues are described for the management and mitigation of moral distress in this setting. Conclusion This exploratory work lays the groundwork for interventions that facilitate personal growth and meaning in the midst of moral crises in critical care practice. (shrink)

This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded as regularities in the behaviour of social agents, which the agents themselves tacitly create (...) to solve a wide variety of recurrent problems. The repetitive nature of the problems permits them to be described as a recurrent game or 'supergame.' The agents use these regularities as informational devices to supplement the information contained in competitive prices. The final chapter explores the applicability of this theory, first by relating it to previous work on the theory of teams, hierarchies, and non-maximizing decision theory, and then by using it to provide a new approach to a variety of questions both within and outside economics. (shrink)

Fake news sharing in 2016 was rare but significantly more common among older Americans. So-called “fake news” has renewed concerns about the prevalence and effects of misinformation in political campaigns. Given the potential for widespread dissemination of this material, we examine the individual-level characteristics associated with sharing false articles during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. To do so, we uniquely link an original survey with respondents’ sharing activity as recorded in Facebook profile data. First and foremost, we find that sharing (...) this content was a relatively rare activity. Conservatives were more likely to share articles from fake news domains, which in 2016 were largely pro-Trump in orientation, than liberals or moderates. We also find a strong age effect, which persists after controlling for partisanship and ideology: On average, users over 65 shared nearly seven times as many articles from fake news domains as the youngest age group. (shrink)

There are two kinds of time bias: near bias and future bias. While philosophers typically hold that near bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been leveled against both near bias and future bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this article we investigate whether there are forms of (...) arbitrariness that are common to both kinds of preferences and, hence, whether there are versions of the arbitrariness objection that are objections to both near bias and future bias. If there are, then this might go some way toward undermining normative hybridism and to defending thoroughgoing time-neutralism. (shrink)

This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.

White progressives in the U.S. are currently experiencing two profound reckonings that typically are assumed to be unrelated. On the one hand, the Dobbs verdict overturned the assumption that the right to choose with respect to abortion is too socially entrenched, juridically settled, or politically sacred to be denied. On the other hand, climatological conditions of possibility for comfortable existence are increasingly under threat in locales in which residents have come to expect to enjoy secure lives and livelihoods. This essay (...) highlights what Indigenous communities across the U.S. already know well. Namely, threats to reproductive freedom and climate crisis are neither new nor separable. Both phenomena have common colonial roots that continue to proliferate. Each is a result of the disruption and destruction of Indigenous kinship assemblages. Indeed, in aiming to remediate their current reckonings, white progressives routinely (if unthinkingly) support forms of settler state violence that perpetuate reproductive and climate injustice in Indigenous communities. We appeal to white progressives, notably including white feminists, to embrace the proposition that their reckonings cannot be properly understood, nor successfully addressed without prioritizing Indigenous futurity. We call for centering forms of Indigenous feminist praxis that facilitate robust Indigenous coalitions of anti-colonial resistance. (shrink)

We argue that four-dimensionalists should adopt a contextualist semantics, according to which ordinary speakers’ judgments may concern person-stages, person-segments or person-worms, depending on the context. We explain how context helps select the boundaries of the temporal parts we refer to or quantify over and show that contextualism offers the best treatment of ordinary predications and ordinary counting judgments. Contextualism implies an error theory; however, we explain why this error theory is less problematic than those entailed by the worm and stage (...) theories. (shrink)

One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximised when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...) past rather than the future, and positive ones in the future rather than the past. To have this preference is to be (at least apparently) future biased. If this explanation is correct, it would tend to confer rational justification upon these preferences. This paper empirically investigates this explanation. Our results suggest that, at most, this explanation might be a partial one of some people’s preferences some of the time, rather than a general explanation of future bias. In turn, this lends some indirect support to a competing explanation that appeals to temporal asymmetries in emotion and attention. Since that explanation would arguably tend not to confer rational justification upon (apparently) future-biased preferences, we argue that our findings provide some reason to be sceptical that these preferences are, in general, rationally justified. (shrink)

Empirical investigation of the conditions under which people prefer, or disprefer, causal explanation, has suggested to many that our judgements about what causally explains what are context-sensitive in a number of ways. This has led many to suppose that whether or not a causal explanation obtains depends on contextual factors: that causal explanation is context-sensitive. Surprisingly, most accounts of metaphysical explanation, by contrast, suppose it to be context insensitive. Only recently have accounts been developed of metaphysical explanation on which it (...) is context-sensitive. To date, however, there is no empirical evidence about the context sensitivity of metaphysical explanation. In what follows we test the judgements of non-philosophers, and find that amongst non-philosophers, at least, metaphysical explanations are context-sensitive. We then consider the implications of this finding for theorising about metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

What is it to interpret the outputs of an opaque machine learning model? One approach is to develop interpretable machine learning techniques. These techniques aim to show how machine learning models function by providing either model-centric local or global explanations, which can be based on mechanistic interpretations (revealing the inner working mechanisms of models) or non-mechanistic approximations (showing input feature–output data relationships). In this paper, we draw on social philosophy to argue that interpreting machine learning outputs in certain normatively salient (...) domains could require appealing to a third type of explanation that we call “socio-structural” explanation. The relevance of this explanation type is motivated by the fact that machine learning models are not isolated entities but are embedded within and shaped by social structures. Socio-structural explanations aim to illustrate how social structures contribute to and partially explain the outputs of machine learning models. We demonstrate the importance of socio-structural explanations by examining a racially biased healthcare allocation algorithm. Our proposal highlights the need for transparency beyond model interpretability: understanding the outputs of machine learning systems could require a broader analysis that extends beyond the understanding of the machine learning model itself. (shrink)

Kant talks about a transcendentally necessary mind and, less often, about an intelligible mind. The two characterizations of the mind have similarities. However, there are also important differences. The properties grouped under ‘transcendental’ are cognitive, those grouped under ‘intelligible’ are conative. The properties grouped under ‘transcendental’ are nearly all congenial to cognitive science. Many grouped under ‘intelligible are not.

Andrew Cooper presents the first systematic study of Kant's account of natural history. Cooper contends that Kant made a decisive contribution to one of the most explosive and understudied revolutions in the history of science: the addition of time to the frame in which explanations are required, sought, and justified in natural science. Through addressing a wide range of Kant's works, Cooper challenges the claim that Kant's theory of science denies a developmental conception of nature and argues instead that (...) it establishes a method by which natural historians can genuinely dispute historical claims and potentially come to consensus. This method, Cooper argues, can be used to expose serious flaws in Kant's own historical reasoning, including the formation and defence of his racist views. The book will be valuable to philosophers seeking to discern both the power and limitations of Kant's theory of science, and to historians of science working on the fractured landscape of eighteenth-century Newtonianism. (shrink)

The dependence solution claims that God’s foreknowledge is no threat to our freedom because God’s foreknowledge depends (in a relevant sense) on our actions. The assumption here is that those parts of the world which depend on our actions are no threat to the freedom of those actions. Recently, Taylor Cyr has presented a case which challenges this assumption. Moreover, since the case is analogous to the case of God’s foreknowledge, it would seem to establish that, even if God’s foreknowledge (...) somehow depends on our actions, our freedom is still threatened. This paper defends the dependence solution, first, by offering an error theory for the intuitions that drive Cyr’s case and, second, by pointing out some arguably mysterious implications of accepting those intuitions. These points taken in conjunction show that Cyr’s case, although quite fascinating, is not as challenging as it might at first seem. (shrink)

Before the end of the first year of life, infants begin to lose the ability to perceive distinctions between sounds that are not phonemic in their native language. It is typically assumed that this developmental change reflects the construction of language-specific phoneme categories, but how these categories are learned largely remains a mystery. Peperkamp, Le Calvez, Nadal, and Dupoux (2006) present an algorithm that can discover phonemes using the distributions of allophones as well as the phonetic properties of the allophones (...) and their contexts. We show that a third type of information source, the occurrence of pairs of minimally differing word forms in speech heard by the infant, is also useful for learning phonemic categories and is in fact more reliable than purely distributional information in data containing a large number of allophones. In our model, learners build an approximation of the lexicon consisting of the high-frequency n-grams present in their speech input, allowing them to take advantage of top-down lexical information without needing to learn words. This may explain how infants have already begun to exhibit sensitivity to phonemic categories before they have a large receptive lexicon. (shrink)

The mathematical prowess of pure mathematician J. E. Littlewood (1885-1977), and of his elder cousin the mathematical educator Philippa Fawcett (1868-1948), is illustrated in the context of the Mathematical Tripos examination at Cambridge. Littlewood’s brilliant though highly condensed treatment in his splendid Miscellany (1953) of a perplexing problem from an old Tripos paper – familiar to some as “The Paradox of the Second Ace” – is then expanded with reference to Coxeter’s treatment of it in his revision of Rouse Ball’s (...) Mathematical Recreations (1939) and ultimately explained in the light of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The discussion touches on the nature of mathematical supposition. (shrink)

This is a paper on the philosophical clinical psychology of PTSD. How best to improve our treatment plans for the disorder is the primary imperative in the clinical literature. Our failure to properly treat those suffering from PTSD up until now could be either the result of merely a problem in practice or, more seriously, a problem in principle. In this essay, I explore three possible accounts consistent with the supposition that what we have here is a problem in principle. (...) I call the first the “Somatic” hypothesis; the second, the “Memorial”; and the third, a “Rilkean” hypothesis of PTSD, which is inspired by the recent work of M. Rowlands. The first two have been more-or-less articulated previously; the third is introduced here for the first time. The primary argument of this essay is abductive: I argue in favor of a Rilkean Memory hypothesis of PTSD by comparing it to the other two accounts and showing that it possesses greater theoretical virtue than they do. I then conclude the essay by noting certain limitations with the account here sketched, nonetheless suggesting that this hypothesis can open up new avenues of clinical research and treatment options for the disorder. (shrink)

Our reasons for emotions such as sadness, anger, resentment, and guilt often remain long after we cease experiencing these emotions. This is puzzling. If the reasons for these emotions persist, why do the emotions not persist? Does this constitute a failure to properly respond to our reasons? In this paper we provide a solution to this puzzle. Our solution turns on the close connection between the rationality of emotion and the rationality of attention, together with the differing reasons to which (...) attention and emotion are properly responsive. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic raised questions about the viability of food chains and created new opportunities for small-scale producers. This study reports on findings from a project directed at investigating how niche meat farmers respond to external challenges and threats including those related to their position as small-scale producers and those that are pandemic-related. A purposeful sample (_N_ = 5) of local meat producers in NC, recruited through their producer network, were interviewed twice (in 2021 and again in 2022) via Zoom. (...) Informants were interviewed about the characteristics of their farm enterprises and households. The niche meat farmer informants in this study are diversified, values-based operations that utilize pasture-based production practices. They draw upon their farm enterprise and household assets, including the allocation of labor to farm, non-farm, and household activities, to meet economic production and social reproduction needs. Overall, our results show that the resiliency of the niche-meat producers flows from this integration of the farm enterprise and the household. While the data are based on a very limited sample, the results are consistent with literatures on women in agriculture and peasant economy. Therefore, we argue that future studies of how small-scale farms react to exogenous change, like the pandemic, include details on household composition and the gender division of labor for on-farm, off-farm, and social reproduction activities. (shrink)

Some concerns are raised for Ziff's proposals that an agent's effort-expending activities to express their thoughts (1) endows their thoughts with an "individuative" phenomenology and (2) is the distinctive contribution they make to their conscious thinking.

Here I offer a critical evaluation of modalism about essential properties. To that effect, I begin by rehearsing Fine’s now infamous counterexamples to pure modalism. I then consider two recent defenses of it, offered by Livingstone-Banks and Cowling, respectively. I argue that both defenses fail. Next I consider the most plausible variety of impure modalism – sparse modalism – which has recently been defended by Wildman and de Melo. Skiles has argued that sparse modalism fails too. I argue that Skiles’s (...) counterexamples misfire; nonetheless, his conclusion that, like pure modalism, sparse modalism is too broad, is on the right track. And so, I offer an original objection – the sparse modal propria counterexample – to show that this is so. I conclude by considering ways the modalist might once again modify her account to circumvent this new objection and improve the account’s extensional adequacy. (shrink)

Ancient Roman “technical memory” is not (as much of the modern specialist literature would have it) a generative technology of association. Rather it is (as a literal reading of the texts would suggest) a specialized tool for precise serial recall. Modern experimental evidence both confirms the fitness for the purpose of the technique and shows why that purpose is not trivial, as some have suggested. While the mechanism(s) by which the technique operates are not fully understood, a review of the (...) current literature suggests that it would have had the advantage over other mnemonic techniques by virtue of recruiting a variety of cognitive capacities. These likely include spatial/navigational mechanisms and possibly visual/imagery-based ones as well. Finally, small differences between the method as recorded in the ancient texts and similar methods that have been the subject of laboratory experiments are used to suggest possible directions for further experimentation. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the study of the nature of the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization. The authors study different approaches to estimating the probability of revolutionary events in an election year. Different types of revolutionary events are distinguished within the framework of the level of political violence. The primary reasons for the activation of the politically active part of the population, both in autocracies and in transitional political regimes, are identified, including the factionalization of (...) elites, the activation of "sleeping" institutions, the growth of political competence among individuals, the consolidation of the prodemocratic opposition and its institutionalization, electoral fraud and other manifestations of unfair political competition, greater emotional involvement of the population in political processes, and so on. The findings support the conclusion that elections promote peaceful revolutionary episodes and reduce the likelihood of armed uprisings. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization is considered in the regime context. The authors explore how elections affect violent or non-violent revolutionary actions in certain political regimes, according to Jack A. Goldstone's typology (full autocracies, partial autocracies, factional democracies, partial democracies and full democracies). The authors conclude that holding elections reduces the risks of armed revolutionary destabilization in all types of regimes, except for factional democracies. On the other hand, unarmed revolutionary action is more likely in an election year - in all regime types except full democracies. At the same time, holding elections primarily increases the risks of unarmed revolutionary uprisings in intermediate regimes / anocracies. However, even among anocracies, factional democracies stand out, where in the election year the risks of unarmed (as well as armed) revolutionary episodes increase significantly more than in partial autocracies and in partial non-factional democracies. At the same time, for consolidated democracies, holding elections is a factor that inhibits rather than provokes revolutionary destabilization. In full autocracies, the risk of unarmed revolutionary action increases in an election year, but not as much as in intermediate regimes. (shrink)

Connexive expansions of relevant logics tend to prove every negated implication formula. In this paper I discuss why they tend to satisfy this unsavoury property, and discuss avenues by which it can be avoided, providing logics which stand as proofs of concept that these avenues can be made to work.

Anne Conway (1631–1679) is sometimes said to be a Monist. I present several kinds of Monism and then investigate whether any of these adequately capture Conway’s theory of substance and individuals. I outline Conway’s reasons for postulating that there are three irreducibly distinct kinds of essence or substance, which by itself demonstrates that she is not an unrestricted Token Monist. I then examine her various remarks about created substance, which she sometimes refers to as “a creature” and other times as (...) “creatures.” Here I argue that, while the texts are ambiguous, there are compelling reasons—especially given her views about salvation and justice—to believe that she is merely a Type Monist at the level of created substances. I then examine two theses that result from her relativized Type Monism. First, there are no substantial barriers between, say, horses and humans, and thus all created things can convert into one another as they improve or regress morally. Second, there is no substantial difference between minds and bodies. I suggest that Conway’s arguments against Descartes’ Type Pluralism could easily be included as part of a more inclusive philosophy syllabus. (shrink)

Cognitive science gives computational explanations of the brain. Philosophers have treated these explanations as if they simply claim that the brain computes. We have therefore assumed that to understand how and why computational explanation works, we must understand what it is to compute. In contrast, I argue that we can understand computational explanation by describing the resources it brings to bear on the study of the brain. Specifically, I argue that it introduces concepts and formalisms that complement cognitive science's modeling (...) goals. This allows us to understand computational explanation without having to debate what it is to compute. (shrink)

This paper asks how representational notions figure into cognitive science, especially neuroscience. Philosophers have a way of skipping over that question and going straight to another: _what is neural representation?_ What is the property or relation that representational notions pick out? I argue that this is a mistake. Our ultimate questions, as philosophers of cognitive science, are about the function and epistemology of cognitive scientific explanations—in this case, explanations that use representational notions. To answer those questions we must understand what (...) representational notions contribute to science: what they enable scientists to do or explain, and how. But I show that we can do this without raising traditional and vexing questions about the definition of neural representation, or the nature of a property or relation that notion picks out. Taking this approach, I defend a realist account of representational explanation that underwrites important connections between philosophy and neuroscience. (shrink)

Reasons-responsiveness theorists often employ examples suggesting that agents paradigmatically exercise the responsiveness required for moral responsibility through reflective deliberation and conscious choice. However, given the fact that unreflective agency can be suitably responsive to reasons, we need an explanation for why reflection is a distinctive mark of being a responsible agent and why cases involving reflection might be regarded as paradigmatic instances of responsible agency. Here, I discuss recent attempts to meet this explanatory burden—in particular, the claim that while not (...) required for moral responsibility, the exercise of reflection should be regarded as a guiding normative ideal. After articulating this ideal in a bit more detail than its proponents have to date, I introduce the Daoist ideal of agency for productive contrast. This will both highlight additional helpful roles for reflection and raise important questions about the role of reflection in a normative ideal of agency. (shrink)

In the paper, a new syllogistic system is built up. This system simulates a massive-parallel behavior in the propagation of collectives of parasites. In particular, this system simulates the behavior of collectives of trematode larvae.

The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP) holds that the past is ‘fixed’ in evaluating what we are free to do, and it is frequently invoked by incompatibilists when arguing that freedom and determinism are incompatible. However, several authors have argued that incompatibilists ought to abandon FP for a different principle, sometimes called the Principle of the Fixity of the Independent (FI). According to this principle, it is not the past in its entirety that is fixed, but only (...) those parts of the past that are independent of our current choices. But a question remains: What about authors who are not friendly to incompatibilism in the first place? Is there any reason to think that compatibilists should also abandon their preferred interpretation of FP for something along the lines of FI? I examine perhaps the most influential version of (classical or leeway) compatibilism, David Lewis's ‘local-miracle compatibilism’. I argue that although Lewis's version of local-miracle compatibilism avoids being committed to anything like FI, his version faces a number of objections. Once we revise Lewis's version to avoid these objections, we arrive at a version of local-miracle compatibilism that is committed to FI, or at least something very close. (shrink)

The idea that religious belief is ‘almost inevitable’ is so forcefully argued by Justin Barrett that it can warrant justifiable concern – especially since he claims atheism is an unnatural handicap. In this article, I argue that religious belief in Homo sapiens isn’t inevitable – and that Barrett does agree when pushed. I describe the role played by a Hyperactive Agency Detection Device in the generation of belief in God as necessary but insufficient in explaining religious culture – I distance (...) myself from some common conceptions of HADD and the view I take of it is unorthodox. I point out that the conclusion to Barrett’s book, ‘Why Would Anyone Believe in God?’ is a fine example of the very hyperactive agency detection Barrett himself describes, and is therefore highly suspect. (shrink)

Boarding school is a major educational option for many students (e.g., students living in remote areas, or whose parents are working interstate or overseas, etc.). This study explored the motivation, engagement, and achievement of boarding and day students who are educated in the same classrooms and receive the same syllabus and instruction from the same teachers (thus a powerful research design to enable unique comparisons). Among 2,803 students (boardingn= 481; dayn= 2,322) from 6 Australian high schools and controlling for background (...) attributes and personality, we found predominant parity between boarding and day students in their motivation, engagement, and achievement. We also found that classroom-average motivation, engagement, and achievement was not significantly affected by the number of boarders (relative to day students) in the classroom. In addition, the effects of boarding were generally not moderated by students’ background or personality attributes. We conclude that boarders have academic opportunities and outcomes that are comparable to their day student counterparts. Implications for students, teachers, and parents are discussed. (shrink)

In The Altruistic Species, Andrew Michael Flescher and Daniel L. Worthen explore these questions through the lenses of four disciplinary perspectives—biology, psychology, philosophy, and religion.

Peter Abelard held two views that imply a form of Mereological Essentialism: first, a thing is nothing other than all its parts taken together and second, no thing has more parts at one time than it does at another. This paper situates Abelard’s theses within their historical context. The paper first examines Boethius’s suggestive remarks about the dependence of the whole upon its parts and it highlights several of the choices that were open to twelfth-century students of Boethius’s mereology. Then (...) there is a brief survey of Abelard’s understanding of Mereological Essentialism. Finally, the paper examines some of the more interesting challenges to Mereological Essentialism that were posed by Abelard’s contemporaries. The paper focuses in particular on a set of fragments that have been attributed to the school of Joscelin of Soissons. (shrink)

This is a study of possession offences, with the focus on those intended to penalise the risk of a serious harm. Offences of this kind are examined in the light of basic doctrines of the criminal law, and in the light of the proper limits of endangerment offences. They are found wanting in both respects, and are also found to pose particular sentencing problems. The conclusion is that many risk-based possession offences are unfair, save those that require proof of a (...) further intent or those aimed at a failure properly to safeguard a dangerous object. (shrink)

This is a commentary for a special issue on predictive processing and rational constructivist models of development. Mainly I use the opportunity to ask a bunch of questions about what these theoretical frameworks show us (and what they do not) and mostly where the open questions still are. To get meta for a moment, I thought these questions were the best way to maximize the value of my commentary: They have the highest probability of leading to the most uncertainty reduction (...) for our field in the long term. Please read in that spirit. (shrink)

This paper concerns the interface between relevant logics and recent developments in semantics for hyperintensional operators. In the latter area, the notion of topicality or aboutness has begun to play an explicit modeling role, with classes of models being studied which incorporate representations of topics, and of operations on topics. The idea is to use these topics in the evaluations of formulas including hyperintensional operators in order to explain why classically equivalent formulas may not be intersubstitutable in contexts using those (...) operators—though classically equivalent, if a pair of formulas can be interpreted to concern totally unrelated topics, then we should not be able to substitute one for the other in contexts which are sensitive to topics. Relevant logics, and the central relevance property of Variable Sharing, have been read as concerning something like topics in the past, and recently this angle on relevance has seen renewed interest. In this paper, I’ll develop and motivate a method for representing topics in the matrix models of logics, and apply this method to _R_ and its matrix models (given by De Morgan monoids) to argue that there is a clear semantic perspective on topicality according to which _R_ is topic-sensitive as a logic. (shrink)

TLRP's generic phase is believed to have been the largest ever UK investment in educational research. This paper describes the critique from which TLRP emerged, its strategic positioning and the roles of successive directors and their teams in its development. The paper offers an early stock take of TLRP's achievements from the perspective of the last Programme Director. The efficacy of the form of the Programme, once likened to 'a glider made of jelly', is discussed.

Centuries of scientific progress have been devoted to reducing uncertainty. Newtonian physics, introduced over 300 years ago, allowed for precise prediction of planetary and tidal motion, falling bodies and infinitely more, in addition to allowing the construction of the material world. The 20th century witnessed a revolution in our understanding of organ and cellular function and dysfunction, elucidation of pathways, mediators, receptors, and molecular interactions, and breakthroughs in the characterization of replication, transcription, and translation, all of which has been integral (...) to our understanding of human physiology and pathophysiology. Clinical epidemiology has had a revolutionary impact on our .. (shrink)

Генезис времени трактуется авторами в духе конструктивизма в сочетании с деятельностным подходом к познанию. Базовые временны́е категории настоящего, прошлого и будущего рассматриваются как система мыследействий — элементарных единиц деятельности, — структура которой обусловлена языковым семиозисом. Модель феноменологии времени Гуссерля применяется к анализу переживания субъектом собственных действий. Показано, что если переживаемое настоящее основано на совершаемых действиях, то прошлое и будущее конструируются рефлексивными мыследействиями в когнитивной сфере языка. Подчеркивается, что организация временнóго ряда, связывающего то, что есть, с тем, чего уже нет или (...) еще нет, возможна лишь в языковом семиозисе. Аналогия с гуссерлевской трехчастной структурой потока сознания-времени помогает понять триаду «настоящее — прошлое — будущее» как пример эпистемологической ловушки языка: прошлое и будущее — это мысленные конструкты, так же принадлежащие настоящему, как и любые другие акты мысли. (shrink)

The most comprehensive collection of its kind, this unique anthology presents fifty-four readings--many of them not widely available--by the most important and influential Christian, Jewish, and Muslim philosophers of the Middle Ages. The text is organized topically, making it easily accessible to students, and the large selection of readings provides instructors with maximum flexiblity in choosing course material. Each thematic section is comprised of six chronologically arranged readings. This organization focuses on the major philosophical issues and allows a smooth introduction (...) to the material. The topics covered are: (1) The Existence of God, (2) Ethics and the Problem of Evil, (3) God's Foreknowledge and Free Will, (4) Theology, (5) Political Philosophy, 6) Knowledge and Sensation, (7) Universals, (8) Logic and the Philosophy of Language and (9) Physics. Each text is preceded by a biographical note on the author and a brief analytical introduction. Unlike other anthologies, which present sources as a series of truncated excerpts, this collection avoids intrusive editing and includes many selections in their entirety, thus preserving the rich flavor of the medieval mind at work. (shrink)