The 2013 Rostock Symposium on Systems Biology and Bioinformatics in Aging Research was again dedicated to dissecting the aging process using in silico means. A particular focus was on ontologies, as these are a key technology to systematically integrate heterogeneous information about the aging process. Related topics were databases and data integration. Other talks tackled modeling issues and applications, the latter including talks focussed on marker development and cellular stress as well as on diseases, in particular on diseases of kidney (...) and skin. (shrink)

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such (...) concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in. (shrink)

Different people have different perceptions about artificial intelligence (AI). It is extremely important to bring together all the alternative frames of thinking—from the various communities of developers, researchers, business leaders, policymakers, and citizens—to properly start acknowledging AI. This article highlights the ‘fruitful collaboration’ that sociology and AI could develop in both social and technical terms. We discuss how biases and unfairness are among the major challenges to be addressed in such a sociotechnical perspective. First, as intelligent machines reveal their nature (...) of ‘magnifying glasses’ in the automation of existing inequalities, we show how the AI technical community is calling for transparency and explainability, accountability and contestability. Not to be considered as panaceas, they all contribute to ensuring human control in novel practices that include requirement, design and development methodologies for a fairer AI. Second, we elaborate on the mounting attention for technological narratives as technology is recognized as a social practice within a specific institutional context. Not only do narratives reflect organizing visions for society, but they also are a tangible sign of the traditional lines of social, economic, and political inequalities. We conclude with a call for a diverse approach within the AI community and a richer knowledge about narratives as they help in better addressing future technical developments, public debate, and policy. AI practice is interdisciplinary by nature and it will benefit from a socio-technical perspective. (shrink)

:Brain–computer interfaces are driven essentially by algorithms; however, the ethical role of such algorithms has so far been neglected in the ethical assessment of BCIs. The goal of this article is therefore twofold: First, it aims to offer insights into whether the problems related to the ethics of BCIs can be better grasped with the help of already existing work on the ethics of algorithms. As a second goal, the article explores what kinds of solutions are available in that body (...) of scholarship, and how these solutions relate to some of the ethical questions around BCIs. In short, the article asks what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs from looking at the ethics of algorithms. To achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief introduction into the algorithmic background of BCIs is given. Second, the debate about epistemic concerns and the ethics of algorithms is sketched. Finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs. (shrink)

In this paper, I review the motivation of connexive and strongly connexive logics, and I investigate the question why it is so hard to achieve those properties in a logic with a well motivated semantic theory. My answer is that strong connexivity, and even just weak connexivity, is too stringent a requirement. I introduce the notion of humble connexivity, which in essence is the idea to restrict the connexive requirements to possible antecedents. I show that this restriction can be well (...) motivated, while it still leaves us with a set of requirements that are far from trivial. In fact, formalizing the idea of humble connexivity is not as straightforward as one might expect, and I offer three different proposals. I examine some well known logics to determine whether they are humbly connexive or not, and I end with a more wide-focused view on the logical landscape seen through the lens of humble connexivity. (shrink)

An important argument against prohibiting organ sales is that it removes the best option available to individuals in dire circumstances. However, this line of reasoning fails to recognise that selling a kidney on a regulated market is only the best option in a very narrow comparison, where a regulated organ market is compared with banning organ sales. Once we acknowledge this narrowness, selling a kidney is not the best option. This paves the way for a distributive justice-based critique of the (...) ‘best option’ argument for organ markets, which illuminates that organ markets should be compared with a broader set of alternatives. If providing the option of selling a kidney is not the best option, but rather the best option we are willing to provide, and one which means that many people will remain in poverty and unjust circumstances, then this reflects poorly on those societies willing to offer only this option and not a better one. (shrink)

While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the moral wrongness of discrimination. This article presents (...) a vignette-based experiment to test empirically what, in the eyes of “folks”, makes discrimination wrong. Interestingly, we find that, according to folks, both disrespect and harm make discrimination wrong. Our findings offer some support for a pluralistic account of the wrongness of discrimination over both monist respect-based and monist harm-based accounts. (shrink)

Pollution, higher traffic noise, or a poisoned river are all examples of externalities---costs which are imposed by an action but which are not built in to the price of that action. One of the problems of economic theory is whether, when analysing the desirability of a new road, for example, the costs that occur as externalities can be fully incorporated into the price of that road. Dr Andreas Papandreou has provided a book which fully explains and analyses the ideas (...) lying behind the theory of externalities. Papandreou has made a survey of the various methodological approaches taken by economists to the issue of eternalities, and the failure of some markets to reconcile individual and social costs and benefits. He tackles the difficult issue of defining or characterizing externalities, surveys the current literature, and investigates the effect that externality theory has had on major economic issues. His major theme is an exploration of institutional inefficiency and the implications of incorporating organizational costs into economic models. Written in a non-technical style, this book is suitable not only for those economists who make a study of externalities, but for those who need to understand the theory for their own fields of research, and for postgraduate students. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding (...) harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails. (shrink)

According to David Lewis, the argument from temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’. I focus on eternalist endurantism, discussing three different ways the eternalist endurantist can try to avoid treating temporary intrinsics as relational. Two of them, generally known as ‘adverbialism’ and ‘SOFism’, are familiar and controversial. I scrutinize them and argue that Lewis’ scepticism about them is well founded. Then, I sketch a further, to some extent new, version of eternalist endurantism, where the key idea (...) is that intrinsic monadic properties had simpliciter by objects are eternal, time-transcendent properties in Fine’s sense, i.e., properties had by objects regardless of time. Eternal properties of an object are ipso facto sempiternal. When something is P at one time and not P at another, it is radically indeterminate whether it is Psimpliciter or not. I argue that an account along these lines is better placed to treat intrinsic monadic properties of changing objects than any other known alternatives insofar as it recognizes that something is Psimpliciter ; it is able to account for x’s being P at a time in terms of something’s being P simpliciter; it has an answer to the question ‘is \simpliciter?’ when x is P at one time and not P at another. I conclude that endurantism is no less at ease with intrinsics than perdurantism is. (shrink)

Is there a difference between human beings and those based on artificial intelligence that would affect their ability to be subjects of dignity? This paper first examines the philosophical notion of dignity as Immanuel Kant derives it from the moral autonomy of the individual. It then asks whether animals and AI systems can claim Kantian dignity or whether there is a sharp divide between human beings, animals and AI systems regarding their ability to be subjects of dignity. How this question (...) is answered depends crucially on one’s understanding of what constitutes human dignity and autonomy, and what requirements one places upon systems in order for them to be seen as morally autonomous. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti-Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti-Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on (...) the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible, and sometimes not. (shrink)

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such (...) trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive–approach, negative–avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive–avoid, negative–approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed. (shrink)

People usually regard algorithms as more abstract than the programs that implement them. The natural way to formalize this idea is that algorithms are equivalence classes of programs with respect to a suitable equivalence relation. We argue that no such equivalence relation exists.

A curious feature of Belnap’s “useful four-valued logic”, also known as first-degree entailment (FDE), is that the overdetermined value B (both true and false) is treated as a designated value. Although there are good theoretical reasons for this, it seems prima facie more plausible to have only one of the four values designated, namely T (exactly true). This paper follows this route and investigates the resulting logic, which we call Exactly True Logic.

The inapplicability of variations on theory reduction in the context of genetics and their irrelevance to ongoing research has led to an anti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of biology. One response to this situation is to focus on forms of reductive explanation that better correspond to actual scientific reasoning (e.g. part–whole relations). Working from this perspective, we explore three different aspects (intrinsicality, fundamentality, and temporality) that arise from distinct facets of reductive explanation: composition and causation. Concentrating on these aspects generates new (...) forms of reductive explanation and conditions for their success or failure in biology and other sciences. This analysis is illustrated using the case of protein folding in molecular biology, which demonstrates its applicability and relevance, as well as illuminating the complexity of reductive reasoning in a specific biological context. (shrink)

This paper discusses some remarks Kaplan made in ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice’ concerning empty names. I show how his objections to a particular view involving descriptions derived from Ramsification can be avoided by a nearby alternative framed in terms of discourse reference. I offer a treatment of empty names as variables carrying presuppositions concerning unique occupants of roles, or sets of properties, determined by the originating discourse.

The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, (...) a substantial simplification of the ranking information that is necessary to define revisions and contractions uniquely is achieved. This system is, furthermore, expressive enough to capture complex and non-trivial scientific examples. It is thus closely related to a novel research area within belief revision theory which addresses the dynamics of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Any two models of arithmetic can be jointly embedded in a third with any prescribed isomorphic submodels as intersection and any prescribed relative ordering of the skies above the intersection. Corollaries include some known and some new theorems about ultrafilters on the natural numbers, for example that every ultrafilter with the "4 to 3" weak Ramsey partition property is a P-point. We also give examples showing that ultrafilters with the "5 to 4" partition property need not be P-points and that (...) the main theorem cannot be improved to allow a prescribed ordering of lower skies. (shrink)

Dass sich jegliches Geschehen der operativ geschlossenen Verknüpfung von Ereignissen verdankt, ist sicherlich die theorieästhetische Provokation der Moderne. Die Dynamik der Geschlossenheit wird als eine Theoriefigur ins Spiel gebracht, welche die sich seit der Neuzeit entwickelnde Idee der Selbstbezüglichkeit radikalisiert und jegliche Beobachtung von einem Absoluten entlastet. Aus der theorieästhetischen Perspektive wird auch die kultur-phänomenologische Anthropologie Hans Blumenbergs unter dem Signum der operativen Geschlossenheit entfaltet. Indem mit Niklas Luhmann und Hans Blumenberg zwei Perspektiven ins Gespräch gebracht werden, die man sonst (...) nicht in einem Atemzug nennt, kann letztlich Blumenberg in einer innovativen Lesart nicht nur als Denker der Neuzeit, sondern auch als Beobachter der späten Moderne verstanden werden. (shrink)

We prove several theorems about the cardinal $\mathfrak{g}$ associated with groupwise density. With respect to a natural ordering of families of nond-ecreasing maps fromω toω, all families of size $< \mathfrak{g}$ are below all unbounded families. With respect to a natural ordering of filters onω, all filters generated by $< \mathfrak{g}$ sets are below all non-feeble filters. If $\mathfrak{u}< \mathfrak{g}$ then $\mathfrak{b}< \mathfrak{u}$ and $\mathfrak{g} = \mathfrak{d} = \mathfrak{c}$ . (The definitions of these cardinals are recalled in the introduction.) Finally, (...) some consequences deduced from $\mathfrak{u}< \mathfrak{g}$ by Laflamme are shown to be equivalent to $\mathfrak{u}< \mathfrak{g}$. (shrink)

In this paper Modern Essentialism is used to solve a problem of individuation of spacetime points in General Relativity that has been raised by a New Leibnizian Argument against spacetime substantivalism, elaborated by Earman and Norton. An earlier essentialistic solution, proposed by Maudlin, is criticized as being against both the spirit of metrical essentialism and the fundamental principles of General Relativity. I argue for a modified essentialistic account of spacetime points that avoids those obstacles.

“One person, one vote” is wedded to the idea of democracy to such an extent that many would hesitate to refer to a system, which deviated from this, as a democracy. In this paper, I show why this assumption is hard to defend. I do so by pointing to the importance of baseline in justifying a system of “one person, one vote.” The investigation will show that the reasons underlying the most prominent views on democratic inclusion cannot justify “one person, (...) one vote” robustly. This ultimately means that democrats should be less confident in their judgment that 1P1V is a necessary part of democracy. (shrink)

Als Philosoph steht Schleiermacher noch immer im Schatten seiner Zeitgenossen und auch seiner theologischen Werke. Das Buch will seinen eigenständigen Beitrag zur Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie sichtbar machen. Gefragt wird, worin das philosophische Gravitationszentrum der einschlägigen Texte, Entwürfe und Vorlesungen Schleiermachers besteht, mit welchen theoretischen Mitteln er dabei operiert und welche Stellung er in der philosophischen Bewegung seiner Zeit einnimmt. Als zentral erweist sich der Individualitätsgedanke, der aus einer eigenständigen, kritischen Aneignung Kants und Spinozas resultiert. Mit dieser Konzeption begegnet Schleiermacher Friedrich (...) Schlegel auf Augenhöhe und leistet einen eigenständigen Beitrag zur frühromantischen Philosophie, deren grundlegende Positionen er in seinen philosophischen Vorlesungen in Halle (1804-1806) und Berlin (seit 1808) kritisch durcharbeitet und systematisiert. Dies bringt Schleiermacher, wie schon den frühen Friedrich Schlegel, trotz aller gravierenden Unterschiede vielfach in die Nähe Hegels, so dass sich sein Verhältnis zu den philosophischen Zeitgenossen höchst komplex gestaltet. Schleiermacher erweist sich als eigenständiger Denker auf dem gemeinsamen Boden der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie. (shrink)

Definition of the problem In medicine, as well as in other disciplines, computer science expertise is becoming increasingly important. This requires a culture of interdisciplinary assessment, for which medical ethics committees are not well prepared. The use of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) methods (whether developed in-house or in the form of “tools”) pose further challenges for research ethics reviews. Arguments This paper describes the problems and suggests solving them through procedural changes. Conclusion An assessment that is interdisciplinary from (...) the outset appears to be more suitable than having two commissions with different expertise. However, this would require that the composition of medical ethics committees be altered. In addition, the article recommends initial measures to be taken during research ethics reviews of big data and AI projects in order to consolidate the review process and ensure standardization of the criteria. (shrink)

As a solution to the boundary problem, the question of who should take part in making democratic decisions, the all-affected principle has gained widespread support. An unexplored issue in relation to the all-affected principle is whether there is an asymmetry between being affected negatively and positively. Is it the case that only being negatively affected, and not positively affected, by a decision generates a claim to inclusion under the all-affected principle? I call this the question of asymmetry. Some answer the (...) question of asymmetry affirmatively. I believe they are wrong and argue, instead, that we must answer this question by looking at the reasons underlying the all-affected principle. I identify two main reasons that have been proposed to underlie the all-affected principle—(1) the opportunity for interest protection and (2) self-government—and show why both of them entail that answering the question of asymmetry affirmatively is unfounded. The upshot is that both being affected negatively and positively by a decision should generate a claim to inclusion on the all-affected principle. This makes a difference for democratic decision making on contemporary issues such as immigration, climate, and welfare policy. (shrink)

Quantum set theory (QST) and topos quantum theory (TQT) are two long running projects in the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) that share a great deal of conceptual and technical affinity. Most pertinently, both approaches attempt to resolve some of the conceptual difficulties surrounding QM by reformulating parts of the theory inside of nonclassical mathematical universes, albeit with very different internal logics. We call such mathematical universes, together with those mathematical and logical structures within them that are pertinent to (...) the physical interpretation, ‘Q-worlds’. Here, we provide a unifying framework that allows us to (i) better understand the relationship between different Q-worlds, and (ii) define a general method for transferring concepts and results between TQT and QST, thereby significantly increasing the expressive power of both approaches. Along the way, we develop a novel connection to paraconsistent logic and introduce a new class of structures that have significant implications for recent work on paraconsistent set theory. (shrink)

This study explores the underlying drivers of US public pension funds’ tendency to tilt their portfolios towards companies with stronger corporate social responsibility. Studying the equity holdings of large, internally managed US state pension funds, we find evidence that the political leaning of their beneficiaries and political pressures by state politicians affect funds’ investment decisions. State pension funds from states with Democratic-leaning beneficiaries tilt their portfolios more strongly towards companies that perform well on CSR issues, and this tendency is intensified (...) when the state government is dominated by Democratic state politicians. Moreover, we find that funds which tilt their portfolios towards companies with superior CSR scores generate a slightly higher return compared with their counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that funds align their investment choices with the financial and non-financial interests of their beneficiaries when deciding whether to incorporate CSR into their equity allocations. (shrink)

People often discriminate based on negative or positive stereotypes about others. Important examples of this are highlighted by the theory of ambivalent sexism. This theory distinguishes sexist stereotypes that are negative (hostile sexism) from those that are positive (benevolent sexism). While both forms of sexism are considered wrong towards women, hostile sexism seems intuitively worse than benevolent sexism. In this article, we ask whether the difference between discriminating based on positive vs. negative stereotypes in itself makes a morally relevant difference. (...) We suggest that it does not. By examining a number of prominent accounts of what makes discrimination wrong, we defend the Moral Irrelevance View according to which stereotype valence is irrelevant to the moral evaluation of discrimination, all else equal. (shrink)

The choice construct (choose x: φ(x)) is useful in software specifications. We study extensions of first-order logic with the choice construct. We prove some results about Hilbert's ε operator, but in the main part of the paper we consider the case when all choices are independent.

According to what may be called the Debt Model, blameworthiness is defined in terms of deserved suffering. The Debt Model has a significant implication: one is less blameworthy if one has experienced some of the suffering one deserves, and no longer blameworthy once one has experienced the full amount of suffering one deserves. Blameworthiness, according to the Debt Model, is not forever. In recent papers, Clarke (2022) and Howard (2022) independently criticize the Debt Model and argue for the opposite conclusion: (...) if one is blameworthy, one will remain blameworthy forever. In this paper, I respond to this criticism as well as a recent argument against the Debt Model from Tierney (2022). I then present a prima facie case for the Debt Model. I argue that Clarke’s attempt to accommodate the intuitions elicited by this and similar cases has unwelcome implications. I will end the paper with some remarks about what roles we want our conceptions of blameworthiness to play. If Clarke’s account were right, the fact that an agent is blameworthy would play a far less significant role in our moral life than we often tend to assume. The Debt Model, I will suggest, makes better sense of our blaming practices. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Paul Grice, in one way or another, has made an important contribution to the theory of speech acts} Grice, as far as I can see, never expressly addresses Austin’s theory in his published work. He hardly ever uses the speech act terminology of "illocution", "perlocution", etc.2 So what does the more or less implicit Gricean contribution to the theory of speech acts consist in'? There is more than one good answer to this question. I shall (...) concentrate on a particularly influential one, which goes back to Strawson (1964). It says that Austin, in his account of the nature of illocutionary acts, over-emphasized the role of conventions; that Austin went wrong in characterizing illocutionary acts as acts which are essentially conventional. The Gricean contribution to speech act theory, according to the envisaged answer, is twofold, both diagnostic and therapeutic. First, it helps us see where and why Austin went wrong in taking illocutionary acts to be essentially conventional. Second, it suggests an essentially intentional — instead of an essentially conventional- element in illocutionary acts. In his 1964 paper Strawson tried to bring out, as regards the interplay of convention and intention in illocutionary acts, both what can be conceded to Austin and what must be learnt from Grice. Austin (1962: 115) had said that "the performance of an illocutionaiy act involves the securing of uptake". Strawson (1964: 158 ff) interprets Austin as meani_ng to say that the performance of an illocutionary act involves understanding of illocutionary force. Understanding of illocutionary force involves, according to Strawson, grasping a "compleX [speaker’s] intention" (ib.: 160), and it is here, of course, where he brings Gricean ideas into _Austin’s scheme of what the essence of illocution is. He says. (shrink)

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on (...) matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws. (shrink)