Economists interpret global environmental quality to be a pure public good. Each country should contribute to its provision. However, this is hard to achieve because each government is tempted to take a free ride on the other governments' efforts. Not only has this dilemma been analysed with game theoretical methods but game theory has also been used to think about how to make amends. This paper reviews the game theoretical discussion on how international policy frameworks may be designed to improve (...) the chances for international cooperation. It is also shown that the evaluation of alternative environmental policy instruments deviates from the standard environmental economics model if applied to the international arena. For the benefit of an interdisciplinary readership, the evolution of the debate on global environmental policy is related to the recent history of economic thought. This history is taken to be materialised in the writings of economics' Nobel Prize laureates. (shrink)

The paper proposes a parallel reading of Albrecht Dürer’s engraving ›Melencolia I‹ (1514) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s notion of real abstraction. It argues for a constitutive link between the abstractions operative in ›Melencolia I‹, in commodity exchange, and in certain formations of psychological suffering, most notably described in the psychoanalytic conception of melancholia theorized by Sigmund Freud and the subsequent Lacanian tradition. With and against the iconographic analysis put forward by Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl in ›Saturn and (...) Melancholy‹ (1964), this paper understands the engraving’s polyhedron as a pivot point in Dürer’s artwork and in art history in general – namely, as a stumbling block that indicates the negativity of abstraction through its very positive existence. Abstraction, understood in this specific sense, and contrary to classical ontology and epistemology can in fact constitute a world of real material social relations instantiated through acts (and failures) of exchange. (shrink)

In his reflections on the spatiotemporal structuring of the life-world, Schütz distinguishes between two forms of intersubjectivity among contemporaries. Firstly, he points at actors sharing both space and time and experiencing a direct, immediate face-to-face communication; secondly, he indicates the intersubjectivity of indirect communication, lacking any commonalities of space and time, such as the correspondence by letter. Apart from the strict exchange of thoughts, the alternating writing gives one the chance to relate to the interpretive patterns and relevancies of the (...) correspondent and thereby to understand more clearly the intellectual position of the proponent. Reflecting on the specificity of the situation, Schütz claims: “The written communication forced upon us by the geographical distance between us should at least have the benefit of encouraging us to put our thoughts, as best we can, into a clear and orderly form” (p. 49). The correspondence between Alfred Schütz and Eri. (shrink)

Nietzsche's vision of modern democracy includes an aspect which many tend to neglect given the historical experience with totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. Precisely on account of its triumphant progress, 'irresistible' democracy, according to Nietzsche, tends to instrumentalize the activities of its enemies. This is a claim made by a philosopher whose work Alfred Baeumler and Georg Lukács considered an extreme political archaism. For a long time no serious objection was raised against this absurd verdict. The present article (...) attempts to show how Nietzsche's universalistic approach assigns a definite place to democratic systems and specifies why these systems are of special relevance for the universal-emancipatory development of humankind It argues that by stating the prophylactic character of the democratic system Nietzsche reaches the very core of his philosophy whereby he differs markedly and positively from other political philosophers. The difference lies precisely in the fact that for Nietzsche a given political system is not an ultimate value or objective, but simply an occasion to realize universal human ambitions. Nietzsche's political philosophy, therefore, establishes a distinction between various political systems evaluating them in terms of their prophylactic potential for the purposes of universal-emancipatory development. /// A visão nietzschiana da democracia moderna inclui um aspecto que muitos intérpretes tendem a esquecer devido à experiência histórica do século XX com sistemas totalitários. Para Nietzsche, é devido ao seu triunfante progresso que a democracia 'irresístivel' tende a instrumentalizar as actividades dos seus próprios inimigos. Curiosamente, esta é a pretensão de um filósofo cuja obra Alfred Baeumler e Georg Lukács consideravam como sendo uma forma extrema de arcaísmo politico, veredicto este contra o qual durante muito tempo nenhuma objecção se levantou. Objectivo dopresente artigo, porém, é precisamente mostrar até que ponto a abordagem universalista de Nietzsche atribui aos sistemas democráticos um lugar determinado e ao mesmo tempo especifica a razão pela qual estes sistemas ocupam um lugar privilegiado no que se refere ao desenvolvimento universal-emancipatório da humanidade. A tese do autor, com efeito, é a de que é precisamente ao afirmar o carácter profíláctico do sistema democrático que Nietzsche alcança o verdadeiro núcleo central da sua filosofia, facto esse mediante o qual ele claramente se distingue de outros pensadores polítcos. A diferença está precisamente no facto de para Nietzsche um determinado sistema político nunca constituir em si um valor último ou objectivo, antes encontra o seu valor na ocasião que porporciona para a realização de ambições humanas universais. A filosofia politica de Nietzsche, portanto, estabelece uma distinção entre uma diversidade de sistemas políticos propondo uma avaliação dos mesmos de acordo com o seu potential profiláctico no que se refere aos objectivos de um desenvolvimento universal e emancipatório. (shrink)

Nietzsche's fundamental vision of modern democracy includes an essential aspect which many tend to neglect given the indelible historical experience with totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. "Irresistible" democracy, precisely on account of its triumphant progress, also sets the course for, or, to use another contemporary expression, instrumentalizes the activities of its very enemies. It is, to say the least, quite striking to read such a claim made by a philosopher whose work Alfred Baeumler and Georg Lukäcs have labelled (...) as extreme political archaism, while for a long time no serious objection was raised against this absurd verdict. We can see that Nietzsche's universalistic approach assigns a definite place to democratic systems and also specifies why these systems are of special relevance for the universal-emancipatory development of humankind. By stating the prophylactic character of the democratic system in such a decisive fashion, Nietzsche reaches the very core of his philosophy. By doing so he differs markedly and positively from several other political philosophers. The difference lies in the fact that for Nietzsche a given political system is not an ultimate value or objective, but, as already mentioned, an opportunity to realize universal human ambitions. This is why his political philosophy establishes a principled distinction between various political systems while also evaluating them according to their prophylactic potential to be utilized for the purposes of universal-emancipatory development. (shrink)

Ernst Alfred Cassirer lebte vom 28. Juli 1874 bis zum 13. April 1945. Sein Tod jährte sich im Krisenjahr 2020 zum fünfundsiebzigsten Mal – die COVID-19-Pandemie hatte am 13. April in Deutschland gerade ihren Höhepunkt überschritten. Über Ernst Cassirers Pandemieerfahrung mit der Spanischen Grippe ist nichts überliefert.

The article honors aspects of George Psathas’ life achievement. In particular, it describes his commitment to “Human Studies” and places his social phenomenological research work in dialogue with Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel.

Claims about agents’ abilities—practical abilities—are common in theliterature on free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, personalautonomy, weakness of will, and related topics. These claims typicallyignore differences among various kinds or levels of practical ability. Inthis article, using ‘A’ as an action variable, I distinguish among threekinds or levels: simple ability toA; ability toAintentionally; and a morereliable kind of ability toAassociated with promising toA. I believe thatattention to them will foster progress on the topics I mentioned. Substan-tiating that belief—by making progress (...) on these topics in light of suchattention—is a project for other occasions. My aim here is to lay a partialfoundation for that project. (shrink)

Do sports fans really care about their team winning? According to several philosophers, the answer is no. Sports fans engage in fictional caring during the match, which involves a game of make-believe that the result is important. We will argue that this account does not provide a full account of the way in which fans relate to the teams they support. For many fans, the team they support forms a core part of their identity. The success or failure of their (...) team impacts the community they are a part of and around which they build a central part of their identity. For these fans, it really does matter whether their team wins or loses. We will finish by articulating a more limited role that fictional caring may play in sports fandom. (shrink)

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about free will: "Why do we, (...) or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom 'worth wanting'... and, if so, why?" A desire for "objective worth" has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire. (shrink)

The Northern Irish footballer James McClean chooses not to take part in the practice of wearing a plastic red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Armed Forces. Each year he faces abuse, including occasional death threats, for his choice. This forms part of a wider trend towards ‘poppy enforcement’, the pressuring of people, particularly public figures, to wear the poppy. This enforcement seems wrong in part because, at least in some cases, it involves abuse. But (...) is there anything else wrong with it? We will consider the various ways the existing literature on the ethics of commemoration might help us understand what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We will argue that this cannot provide a complete account of what is wrong with poppy enforcement. We then argue that such pressure can constitute two distinct forms of affective injustice, which are wrongs done to people specifically in their capacity as affective beings. In McClean’s case, we argue first that poppy enforcement is a violation of affective rights and second that he faces a particular type of affective injustice that we call emotional imperialism. (shrink)

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing (...) to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand (...) of internalist moral cognitivism. Philosophers discussed include Dancy, McDowell, McNaughton, and Nagel. (shrink)

In the first section, I will argue that the folk concept of necessary conditions for intentional action needs refinement. In the second and third sections, I will identify some additional issues one would need to explore in con- structing a statement of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for intentional action. I will conclude with a brief discussion of the conceptual analyst’s task.

It is sometimes suggested that if, whenever we act intentionally, we do, or try to do, what we are most strongly motivated to do at the time, then we are at the mercy of whatever desire happens to be strongest at the time. I have argued elsewhere that this is false (Mele 1987, ch. 5; 1992, ch. 4; 1995, ch. 3; 1996). This essay provides another route to that conclusion, but that is not my primary aim. The goal of this (...) paper is to display the bearing of some well-known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet on this issue. Philosophical discussion of these experiments has focused on Libet's claims about consciousness. The significance of these experiments for the topics of motivation and agential control also merits serious attention. (shrink)

As this passage from a recent book on the psychology of decision-making indicates, deciding seems to be part of our daily lives. But what is it to decide to do something? It may be true, as some philosophers have claimed, that to decide to A is to perform a mental action of a certain kind – specifically, an action of forming an intention to A. (Henceforth, the verb ‘form’ in this context is to be understood as an action verb.) Even (...) if this is so, we are faced with pressing questions. Do we form all of our intentions? If not, how does forming an intention differ from other ways of acquiring one? Do we ever, in fact, form intentions, or do we rather merely acquire them in something like the way we acquire beliefs or desires? These are some of the questions that will occupy me here. My aim is to clarify the nature of deciding to act and to make a case for the occurrence of genuine acts of intention formation. (shrink)

. I find it impossible to imagine that this book will not remain indefinitely the very best book of its sort."—Review of Metaphysics "The confrontation or conjunction of Ayer and Russell is a notable event and has produced a remarkable ...

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Autonomy, as I understand it, is associated with a family of freedom concepts: free will, free choice, free action, and the like. In much of the philosophical literature discussed in this chapter, issues are framed in terms of freedom rather than autonomy, but we are talking about (aspects of) the same thing. Libertarians argue that determinism precludes autonomy by, for example, precluding an agent's being ultimately responsible for anything. Some compatibilist believers in autonomy argue that libertarians rely on indeterminism in (...) a way that deprives us of autonomy-level control over our decisions. Theorists who contend that no human being is autonomous can benefit from arguments on both sides, alleging that libertarians decisively reveal the ordinary person's notion of autonomy, an incompatibilist notion, and that compatibilist critics of libertarianism show that the notion is incoherent or unsatis-fiable. Is there a way to use the resources both of libertarianism and of compatibilism in defending the following thesis: The claim that there are autonomous human beings is more credible than the claim that there are none? -/- I believe that the answer is “yes.” I defended that answer in Autonomous Agents. Part of my strategy was to develop an account of an ideally self-controlled agent (where self-control is understood as the contrary of akrasia [roughly, weakness of will]), to argue that even such an agent may fall short of autonomy, and to ask what may be added to ideal self-control to yield autonomy. I offered two answers, one for compatibilists and another for libertarians. I then argued that a certain disjunctive thesis involving both answers (identified in Section 4 below) is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. (shrink)

This collection of essays ranges from phenomenological descriptions of the beautiful in science to analytical explorations of the philosophical conjunction of ...

John Christman, in 'Autonomy and Personal History,' advances a novel genetic or historical account of individual autonomy.1 He formulates 'the conditions of the [i.e., his] new model of autonomy' as follows: (i) A person Pis autonomous relative to some desireD if it is the case that P did not resist the development of D when attending to this process of development, or P would not have resisted that development had P attended to the process; (ii) The lack of resistance to (...) the development of D did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection; and (iii) The self-reflection involved in condition (i) [sic] is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. (11) Although Christman makes a telling case for the relevance of personal history to personal autonomy, I shall argue that he has gone too far in that direction. (shrink)

Probably the most challenging issue in science and advanced technology is the ever increasing complexity. The term complexity refers to the experience that the complex whole is more than the sum of the parts. Emergence of new properties is observed at all levels, from relatively simple physical systems up to high-end evolution in biology or state-of-the-art microprocessors in technology. In this study an effort is made to arrive at an understanding of the underlying ontological basis in terms of the classical (...) philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas. In addition, the value of philosophy is emphasized as a means to develop the capacity for intuition. Only with this capacity it is possible to acquire an understanding of the great variety of concepts needed in the multidisciplinary approach to complex systems. (shrink)

From a discussion of Einstein’s theories to an analysis of meaning, the philosopher offers a fascinating collection of essays on a wide range of topics. This is a collection of many of Whitehead’s papers that are scattered elsewhere. It was the penultimate book he published, and represents his mature thoughts on many topics. Philosophical Library has done a great service by publishing a representative collection of his writings on the subjects of Philosophy, Education and Science. The portion on Philosophy includes (...) five papers: “Immortality”, “Mathematics and the Good”, “Process and Reality”, “John Dewey and His Influence” and the “Analysis of Meaning.” The first three chapters consist of Whitehead’s personal reflections illumined by flashes of his lively humor. They are picturesque and amusing. The remainder of the book consists of chapters on Philosophy, Education, and Science. They cover in depth his positions on many scientific and philosophical matters in an extraordinarily unified way. The final section of the book is devoted to excellent surveys of Geometry and Mathematics as well as a paper on Einstein’s theories. (shrink)

Changing Perspectives – From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of “History and Philosophy of Science” (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. (...) The so‐called “experimental turn” of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely “How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?” Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. – Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind‐independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the view according to which human actions are explained teleologically and, therefore, all causal accounts of action explanation are, in a sense, rivals. This view is referred to here as “anticausalist teleologism” (AT). Teleological explanations of human actions are explanations in terms of aims, goals, or purposes of human agents. After providing some background on AT, an objection raised by Mele to a proposal George Wilson makes in developing his version of AT is presented and dissected. Scott (...) Sehon’s recent reply to Mele’s objection is then presented, after which, Donald Davidson’s challenge to anticausalists about action explanation comes next. In conclusion, this chapter presents a reply to this challenge proposed by Sehon, which is explained in detail. (shrink)

Contemporary American medical ethics was born during a period of social ferment, a key theme of which was the espousal of individual rights. Driven by complex cultural forces united in the effort to protect individuality and self-determined choices, an extrapolation from case law to rights of patients was accomplished under the philosophical auspices of ‘autonomy’. Autonomy has a complex history; arising in the modern period as the idea of self-governance, it received its most ambitious philosophical elaboration in Kant's moral philosophy. (...) In examining the Kantian construction, it is evident that neither his universal moral imperative nor his rigorous application of self-legislated ethical action can sustain our own notions of moral agency in a pragmatic, pluralistic society. But the Kantian position is useful in highlighting that self-governance is not equivalent to ‘autonomy’, and this distinction defines the limits of autonomy in the clinical setting. A critique of Engelhardt's idea of ‘principle of permission’ is used to illustrate autonomy's eclipse as a governing principle for medical ethics. (shrink)

This article offers a contrast between European and US-American approaches to the convergence of enabling technologies and to associated issues. It identifies an apparently paradoxical situation in which regional differences produce conflicting claims to universality, each telling us what can and will happen to the benefit of humanity. Those who might mediate and negotiate these competing claims are themselves entangled in the various positions. A possible solution is offered, namely a universalizable strategy that aims to disentangle premature claims to unity (...) and universality as in the case of the greater "efficiency" of nanomedicine. This is the strategy by which Science and Technologies Studies (STS) can analytically tease apart what it has helped produce and sustain in the first place. The virtues and limits of this strategy are briefly presented, deliberation and decision-making under conditions of productive disillusionment recommended. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile conspiracies have always been with us, conspiracy theories are more recent arrivals. The framing of conspiracy theories as rooted in erroneous or delusional belief in conspiracies is characteristic of “positive” approaches to the topic, which focus on identifying the causes and cures of conspiracy theories. “Critical” approaches, by contrast, focus on the historical and cultural construction of the concept of conspiracy theory itself. This issue presents a range of essays that cut across these two broad approaches, and reflect on (...) the problematic relationship between conspiracy theory and democratic politics. (shrink)

I will argue that close attention to deciding casts doubt on the simple view and the single phenomena view of intentional action. That is my thesis. My aim is much broader—to improve our understanding of deciding and of the bearing of the phenomenon of deciding on free will and moral responsibility.