What happens to philosophy when philosophical activities migrate to the AI lab? My article explores the philosophical work that has gone into the machine simulations of language and understanding after Alan Turing. The early experiments by AI practitioners such as Karen Spärck Jones, Richard Richens, Yorick Wilks, and others at the Cambridge Language Research Unit (CLRU) led to the creation of the machine interlingua, semantic networks, and other technological innovations central to the development of AI in the 1950s–1970s. (...) I attempt to show how, in the midst of their computational work, the CLRU pioneers engaged with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, Rudolf Carnap, and other philosophers and developed startling new ways of formulating fundamental questions about language and human understanding. More significantly, their philosophical activities on the machine present an inclusive and culturally diverse picture of the world that profoundly negates the ethnocentric metaphysics of human-machine conundrums that John Searle and his critics represent in the Chinese Room debate. The familiar legacy of that debate has long distorted the narrative of AI origins through its simultaneous reiteration and repudiation of the Turing test. My study seeks to clarify those origins, but my primary goal is to demonstrate what it is like to practice philosophy on the machine and how the critique of metaphysics is made possible in the AI lab. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense-datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally (...) part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world. (shrink)

__Social Network Theory and Educational Change_ offers a provocative and fascinating exploration of how social networks in schools can impede or facilitate the work of education reform._ Drawing on the work of leading scholars, the book comprises a series of studies examining networks among teachers and school leaders, contrasting formal and informal organizational structures, and exploring the mechanisms by which ideas, information, and influence flow from person to person and group to group. The case studies provided in the book reflect (...) a rich variety of approaches and methodologies, showcasing the range and power of this dynamic new mode of analysis. An introductory chapter places social network theory in context and explains the basic tools and concepts, while a concluding chapter points toward new directions in the field. Taken together, they make a powerful statement: that the success or failure of education reform ultimately is not solely the result of technical plans and blueprints, but of the relational ties that support or constrain the pace, depth, and direction of change. This unique volume provides an invaluable introduction to an emerging and increasingly important field of education research. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to expose the influence of Francis Bacon on the philosophy of Thomas Reid. Reid was a self-professed Baconian who viewed the human mind as a subject which was amenable to scientific investigation. Reid attempts to develop his own theory of mind according to the method of induction and experiment and general philosophy of science of Bacon. Further, Reid's use of the Baconian idols in his attack on the theory of ideas is explored. In addition, it is argued (...) that this Baconian approach helps to illuminate Reid's direct realism in perception as well as Reid's indebtedness to Bacon in his treatment of sensations as a system of signs. Finally, Reid develops a theory of evidence and common sense which owes much to the legal discussion of the time. This again links Reid to Bacon who made a similar use of legal metaphors in defending his philosophy of science against scholastic apologists. By appealing to textual evidence in the works of both philosophers' writings and reconstructing Reid's positions in light of this influence, it is hoped that a better understanding of Reid's notion of common sense is ultimately reached as well as a solution to the problem of intentionality in Reid's theory of perception. (shrink)

Over the years there have appeared a number of theoretical and metatheoretical broadsides against Harry Frankfurt's familiar arguments denying that a free moral agent have alternatives in some real sense as a necessary condition for her moral responsibility. In what follows I will attempt to focus on a particular defensive strategy of Frankfurt's, which, when analyzed, yields evidence that such attacks, particularly the metatheoretical ones, are not misplaced.

In a detailed and spirited critique, Professor James M. Humber has found my defence of the ontological argument unconvincing. Humber's case rests upon his claim that my ‘error’ is due to my ‘having accepted an incorrect definition of “physically necessary being” … ’. Now I do indeed claim that God must be conceived as a factuall necessary being, i.e. as eternally independent. I take the notion of God's aseity or eternal independence to be relatively straightforward and uncontroversial; it is accepted (...) as an essential component of the concept God by many philosophers who also insist that there is no acceptable form of demonstrative theism. Thus, it is widely held that ‘God is a factually necessary being’ does not imply ‘God is a logically necessary being’; that God is eternally independent does not imply that he exists in all possible worlds. But it is precisely this view that I have argued is incorrect. While I concur that there is an intelligible concept of God as factually necessary, I deny that the existence of such a being is logically contingent, a mere matter of empirical fact. Indeed, a rigorous inspection of the concept of an eternally independent being reveals that whether that concept is instantiated, i.e. whether there exists a being exemplifying that concept, is knowable a priori . My claim is in fact stronger than this. I argue that the existence of an eternal, independent, omniscient and omnipotent being is demonstrable by conceptual analysis. It is Humber's contention that my alleged demonstration of God's existence crumbles upon the discovery of the unacceptability of my definition of ‘factually necessary being’. Let us see. (shrink)

Mammalian cells frequently depend on homologous recombination (HR) to repair DNA damage accurately and to help rescue stalled or collapsed replication forks. The essence of HR is an exchange of nucleotides between identical or nearly identical sequences. Although HR fulfills important biological roles, recombination between inappropriate sequence partners can lead to translocations or other deleterious rearrangements and such events must be avoided. For example, the recombination machinery must follow stringent rules to preclude recombination between the many repetitive elements in a (...) mammalian genome that share significant but imperfect homology. This paper takes a conceptual approach in addressing the homology requirements for recombination in mammalian genomes as well as the general strategy used by cells to reject recombination between similar but imperfectly matched sequences. A mechanism of heteroduplex rejection that involves the unwinding of recombination intermediates that may form between mismatched sequences is discussed. BioEssays 30:1163–1171, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

I Wish to reply to some of the objections raised by Mr. A. Hudson-Williams in Class. Quart., vol. xlvi , p. 27, to my notes on Martial in vol. xliv. In two places, on pp. 17 and 22, he corrects an error of mine, and in one or two other of his remarks he may well be right; but in many cases he does nothing more than repeat the traditional interpretation of a passage without commending it any more effectively than (...) the editors do. I do not think there would be much profit in restating my view on all these passages, but there are some points I wish to make in reply. (shrink)

lecture 1. The patriarch, an overview -- lecture 2. The education of a philosophe -- lecture 3. Philosophical letters, part I -- lecture 4. Philosophical letters, part II -- lecture 5. The years at Cirey -- lecture 6. From optimism to humanism -- lecture 7. Voltaire and the "philosophical tale" -- lecture 8. Voltaire at Ferney -- lecture 9. Voltaire and God -- lecture 10. Voltaire and history -- lecture 11. Voltaire and toleration -- lecture 12. Apotheosis.

Ruchkin et al.'s theoretical conclusions reflect two venerable fallacies. They confound an experimental paradigm with a theoretical concept, and they assume that features of the paradigm that are most readily detected by their methods provide an adequate account of the operation of the theoretical system. This results in a simplistic theory that does not do justice to the richness of the available data.

Summary The purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of a whole school behaviour management programme on teachers? use of encouragement in the classroom. Given that the performance of the school has become an important dependent variable in school effects research, it follows that interventions which address behaviour management and the improvement of academic performance, have also taken on a school?wide focus or orientation. In Australia, where this study was conducted, there has been an increased interest in the (...) use of school?wide behaviour management and discipline programmes, which are characterized by their focus on improving teachers? classroom management skills. In the present study randomly selected teachers from schools involved in a school?wide behaviour management programme participated in an experimental evaluation of the effects of the programme. Continuous data collection indicated that the majority of teachers made increases in their use of encouragement over the course of the intervention. However, observations conducted during a follow?up phase revealed reductions in levels of encouragement following the withdrawal of the intervention. (shrink)