ABSTRACT:We discuss workers’ dignity in hierarchical organizations. First, we explain why a conflict exists between high-ranking individuals’ authority and low-ranking individuals’ dignity. Then, we ask whether there is any justification that reconciles hierarchical authority with the dignity of workers. We advance a communitarian justification for hierarchical authority, drawing upon Confucianism, which provides that workers can justifiably accept hierarchical authority when it enables a certain type of social functioning critical for the good life of workers and other involved parties. The Confucian (...) communitarian perspective shows that promoting workers’ good life or well-being is an important condition for protecting their dignity. (shrink)

E-Z Reader is a highly successful model of eye-movement control, employing the notion of a serial-sequential attentional spotlight switched from word to word. Evidence of parallel processing of words in text calls this notion into question. Modifications to the model to accommodate this evidence are possible but will not address the fundamental objection that reading should not be seen as “surrogate listening.”.

I hold up my hand and I count five fingers. I take it on faith that the mapping from fingers onto numbers is recursive in the sense of the mathematician’s definition of the informal concept, “human calculability following a fixed routine.” I cannot prove the mapping is recursive—there is nothing to prove! Of course, mathematicians can prove many theorems about recursiveness, moving forward, so to speak, once the definition of the concept “recursive” has been isolated. Moving backwards is more difficult (...) and this is as it should be: for how can one possibly hope to prove that a mathematical definition captures an informal concept? This paper is about just that one word, capture, or more precisely the rela- tion “x captures y,” and the question, if y is taken to be computability, definabil- ity or provability, does there exist an adequate and unique choice of x? (shrink)

Between 1860-1920 a number of distinguished Scottish theologians grappled with the problems of reconciling a biblical faith with current philosophical and theological trends. Alan Sell has selected eight of these: John Kennedy of Dingwall ; Robert Flint ; John Caird ; A. B. Bruce ; James Iverach ; James Orr ; D. W. Forrest ; and James Denney. The book is not only of historical interest; many of the issues confronted by these scholars are also of contemporary interest. (...) Professor James Torrance comments: 'This study is invaluable in keeping alive the authentic tradition that Scotland has produced great theologians,... but perhaps supremely in the period covered by this eminently readable book.'. (shrink)

The legal consensus that has evolved through adjudication and legislation since the Karen Quinlan case in 1976 is founded on the premise that there is a bright line between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Indeed, the term passive euthanasia is often eschewed in favor of less emotionally-laden terminology such as "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" or "terminating life support" so as to further sever any possible connection with active euthanasia. Legal approval has been bestowed upon passive euthanasia under certain circumstances while active (...) euthanasia is routinely condemned. This consensus was put to a test in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court ruled on the Cruzan case. However, the Court's narrow decision did not upset the consensus, and in the most significant appellate decisions handed down by state courts since Cruzan, there has been a reaffirmation-and possibly even an extension-of the consensus. Two other threats to the legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment have begun to manifest themselves: the increasing pressure for mercy killing and "futility" cases. Both of these challenge the fundamental premises on which the consensus is grounded. (shrink)

The Pittsburgh protocol relies heavily on traditional moral distinctions, particularly the principle of double effect, to justify "managing" the dying process of a prospective organ donor in order to yield viable organs for transplantation. These traditional moral distinctions can be useful, particularly in casuistic or case-specific moral analysis, but their invocation here is unpersuasive, and potentially dangerous. The protocol relies on elaborate apologetics to avoid a candid confrontation with the moral challenge it poses—society's willingness to bring about the death of (...) one patient (in isolation and with potential discomfort) in order to benefit another patient. Not only will this protocol fail to solve the problem it purports to address, it threatens to undermine the delicate social accommodations by which we distinguish the living from the dead, permissible "allowings to die" from impermissible killings, and those from whom organs may be removed from those whose bodies must remain inviolate. (shrink)

'Quality' is a widely invoked concept in healthcare, and 'quality improvement' is now a central part of healthcare service delivery. However, these concepts and their associated practices represent relatively uncharted territory for applied philosophy and bioethics. In this paper, we explore some of the conceptual complexity of quality in healthcare and argue that quality is best understood to be conceptually plural. Quality is widely agreed to be multidimensional and as such constitutively plural. However, we argue that quality is plural in (...) two further senses. First, quality is competitively plural : that is, different high-level conceptions of quality can be appropriately invoked in different contexts and serve... (shrink)

Surveillance plays a crucial role in public health, and for obvious reasons conflicts with individual privacy. This paper argues that the predominant approach to the conflict is problematic, and then offers an alternative. It outlines a Basic Interests Approach to public health measures, and the Unreasonable Exercise Argument, which sets forth conditions under which individuals may justifiably exercise individual privacy claims that conflict with public health goals. The view articulated is compatible with a broad range conceptions of the value of (...) health. (shrink)

The right to withdraw from participation in research is recognized in virtually all national and international guidelines for research on human subjects. It is therefore surprising that there has been little justification for that right in the literature. We argue that the right to withdraw should protect research participants from information imbalance, inability to hedge, inherent uncertainty, and untoward bodily invasion, and it serves to bolster public trust in the research enterprise. Although this argument is not radical, it provides a (...) useful way to determine how the right should be applied in various cases. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Efficiency is often overlooked as an ethical value and seen as ethically relevant chiefly when it conflicts with other values, such as equality. This article argues that efficiency is a rich and philosophically interesting concept deserving of independent normative examination. Drawing on a detailed healthcare case study, we argue that making assessments of efficiency involves value-laden, deliberative judgments about how to characterize the functioning of human systems. Personal and emotional resources and ends are crucial to system functioning but are (...) often discounted in favor of a relatively narrow set of financial inputs and institutional or procedural outputs. Judgments about efficiency tend to advantage (or disadvantage) different parties, depending on the resources and ends considered. Different constructions of efficiency can therefore promote or neglect the perspectives and interests of differently placed actors. Models of efficiency do not merely embody contestable ethical standpoints but—put to use—can unwittingly reify and reproduce them. (shrink)

: American society traditionally has assumed a univocal notion of "death," largely because we have only one word for it and, until recently, have not needed a more nuanced notion. The reality of death-processes does not preclude the reality of death events. Linguistically, "death" can be understood only as an event; there are other words for the process. Our death vocabulary should expand to reflect multiple events along the process from sickness to decomposition. Depending on context, some death-related events may (...) constitute a more obvious discontinuity than others and more justifiably may be considered "death" within that context. There is no reason to assume a priori that there must be an overarching, unitary concept of death from which all diagnostic criteria must derive. Regarding organ transplantation, the relevant question is not "Is the patient dead?" but rather "Can organs X, Y, Z . . . be removed without causing or hastening death or harming the patient?". (shrink)

Prevailing ethical thinking about informed consent to clinical research is characterized by theoretical confidence and practical disquiet. On the one hand, bioethicists are confident that informed consent is a fundamental norm. And, for the most part, they are confident that what makes consent to research valid is that it constitutes an autonomous authorization by the research participant. On the other hand, bioethicists are uneasy about the quality of consent in practice. One major source of this disquiet is substantial evidence of (...) the “therapeutic misconception”—the tendency of patient-subjects in clinical trials to confuse participating in research with receiving personalized medical care. This .. (shrink)

: Common morality theory must confront apparent counterexamples from the history of morality, such as the widespread acceptance of slavery in prior eras, that suggest core norms have changed over time. A recent defense of common morality theory addresses this problem by drawing a distinction between the content of the norms of the common morality and the range of individuals to whom these norms apply. This distinction is successful in reconciling common morality theory with practices such as slavery, but only (...) at the cost of underscoring the limits of common morality theory, in particular its inability to resolve disputes about the moral status of entities. Given that many controversies in bioethics center on the disputed status of various entities, such as embryos and nonhuman animals, this is an important limitation. Nonetheless, common morality theory still can be a useful resource in diminishing moral conflict on issues that do not involve disputes over moral status. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gonzales v. Oregon and the Politics of MedicineRonald A. Lindsay (bio)Throughout 2005, the morbid joke on Capitol Hill was that the twin inevitabilities of "death and taxes" had been replaced by "death politics and taxes." There seemed to be some truth in this observation given the highly publicized intervention by some members of Congress in the Schiavo case and the continuing controversy over government regulation of end-of-life care. The (...) Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Oregon (74 U.S.L.W. 4068 (17 January 2006)) has resolved one of the critical issues relating to this controversy by holding that a physician may prescribe controlled substances to provide assistance in dying if such a practice is authorized by state law and not expressly prohibited by federal law. However, other issues remain. In fact, the Court's decision has underscored some of the reasons why there is not only continuing controversy over end-of-life care, but also over other aspects of the practice of medicine. First, it is apparent there is no consensus among health care professionals about the precise boundaries of the legitimate practice of medicine. Second, the regulation of the practice of medicine traverses ill-defined legal territory. In particular, there is significant uncertainty concerning the implications of some regulations as well as the allocation of regulatory authority between and within state and federal governments. This uncertainty leaves substantial room for political maneuvers.Before discussing the politics of medicine, it is worth looking at the regulation of controlled substances in some detail both because this review will provide the necessary background for understanding the ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon and because it will illustrate the uncertainty resulting from multiple sources of regulatory authority.Federal and State Regulation of Controlled SubstancesSince the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the federal government has regulated certain aspects of the distribution and administration of drugs deemed susceptible to abuse. The current primary vehicle for federal regulation is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, enacted in 1970, of which Title II is known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.). A [End Page 99] "controlled" substance is just that, a substance that is regulated under the CSA. The CSA classifies controlled substances in five categories or schedules based on their potential for abuse, their accepted medical use, and the risks associated with their use under medical supervision. Schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse and have no currently accepted use in medical treatment. Schedule II-V substances are approved for medical use but are subject to a descending hierarchy of restrictions on their use. To give a lawful prescription for a controlled substance, a physician must be registered with the appropriate federal agency, currently the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Moreover, to be valid, such a prescription must be issued for "a legitimate medical purpose" (21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii)).There is little dispute that the primary purposes of the CSA are to control drug abuse and to eliminate illicit trafficking in drugs. In accomplishing these objectives, there is a division of responsibility among various federal agencies, in particular the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice. Of particular relevance to the controversy in Gonzales v. Oregon is the Attorney General's authority to revoke a physician's registration for prescribing controlled substances if the physician's registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.All 50 states have their own statutes and regulations that address various aspects of the distribution and administration of controlled substances. Most states have adopted versions of the model Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which largely mimics federal law, but several states have placed additional restrictions on a physician's ability to prescribe controlled substances, including time limits on the validity of a prescription and limits on the quantity of a drug that can be prescribed. States are the primary, but by no means the exclusive, source of regulation of medical practice in general. States license physicians, establish boards and agencies to regulate the actions of physicians, and promulgate rules and guidelines to which physicians... (shrink)

: There is a concern that genetic engineering will exacerbate existing social divisions and inequalities, especially if only the wealthy can afford genetic enhancements. Accordingly, many argue that justice requires the imposition of constraints on genetic engineering. However, it would be unwise to decide at this time what limits should be imposed in the future. Decision makers currently lack both the theoretical tools and the factual foundation for making sound judgments about the requirements of justice in a genetically transformed society. (...) Moreover, focusing on the uncertain inequities of the future may result in failure to give priority to more pressing inequities of the present. Especially in a country that recently has enacted tax legislation that will widen existing wealth disparities, concern about the distant threat of a genetic aristocracy appears misplaced. (shrink)

: Urban bioethics seeks to broaden the traditional focus of bioethics to encompass questions about the interplay of individuals with family, group, community, and society. Urban bioethics will need to deal with cultural diversity, issues of equity, and the conflict between individual rights and the public good. Encouraging a multicultural ethical discernment, fostering an appreciation of the political, economic, sociological, and psychological issues that inform the question of urban moral choice, urban bioethics is essentially a multi-disciplinary, synthesizing enterprise. Several theoretical (...) models including social contract, rule utilitarian, communitarian, and feminist paradigms offer complementary conceptual frameworks. This paper is offered as a proposal, a road map for future study to place current bioethical analysis into a broader context. (shrink)

What is new here is the detailed discussion of several important results in the classical foundations of mathematics and of the relation of logic to mathematics. As regards logical questions, the central thesis of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is well known, both from the earlier posthumous volume and from the writings of his many disciples. In the Investigations the thesis is applied to the "logic of our expressions" in everyday contexts; here he discusses in the same spirit the more specialized language (...) used in talking about the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

Asks why current practices of technology negatively impact humans and the earth and how we can gain a holistic understanding so technology practices can be changed to support the environment.

We have benefited from conversations with Archon Fung, Brian Jacob, Todd Pittinsky, Peter Schuck, Ani Satz, Andrew Williams, and students in a joint class on statistics and ethics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government in October 2002. We are also grateful to our audience at the conference “The Priority of Practice,” organized by Jonathan Wolff at University College London in September 2003, and to Arthur Applbaum, Miriam Avins, Frances Kamm, Simon Keller, Frederick Schauer, Alan Wertheimer, and (...) the Editors of Phi- losophy & Public Affairs for insightful comments. We have benefited from prepublication reading of Schauer’s work on profiling, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). We thank Avedis Koutoujian for research assistance. (shrink)

The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.

The authors develop an axiomatic theory of nonexistent objects and and give a formal semantics for the language of the theory.

After nearly three and a half -- rather too exciting -- years as a young war-time sailor, Alan Peacock expected to return to a life of quiet contemplation. Instead he became an activist economist frequently engaged in controversies about the conduct of economic policy lasting all his professional life. His earlier experiences at trying to 'do good' will resonate with all those who have attempted to influence political action, but the account is also designed to inform and entertain those (...) who are curious to know whether economists are actually human. The author has lived long enough to have become a Fellow of both the British Academy and Royal Society of Edinburgh and was knighted for public service in 1987. (shrink)

Explores Russell's activities as a polemicist, agitator, educator, and popularizer and discusses the evolution of his moral philosophy and its application, including his final battle against American intervention in Vietnam.

Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the machine, since only experiences count for personal welfare. I argue that both are wrong, that either choice can be rational or not, depending on the central desires of the subjects choosing. This claim is supported by the empirical evidence, which shows an almost even split between (...) those who would enter and those who would not. If we interpret those on both sides as making rational choices to maximize their personal well-being, and if such rational choice tends to enhance well-being, then the experience machine thought experiment supports neither experientialism nor its denial, but instead a rational desire satisfaction account of personal well-being. Unlike objective list and perfectionist accounts, the desire satisfaction account of well-being easily accommodates rational choices on both sides, depending on the motivational sets of the choosers. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the program of L. Laudan et al for empirically testing historiographical philosophies of science ("the VPI program") does not succeed in providing a consistent naturalist program in philosophy of science. In particular, the VPI program endorses a nonnaturalist metamethodology that insists on a hypothetico-deductive structure to scientific testing. But hypothetico-deductivism seems to be both inadequate as an account of scientific theory testing in general and fundamentally at odds with most of the historiographic philosophies under (...) test. I sketch an account of testing historiographic philosophies of science more consistent with the views about scientific testing of those philosophies and argue that such a program is neither viciously circular nor necessarily self-refuting. (shrink)