Reseña de Pontoriero, Esteban (2022). La represión militar en la Argentina (1955-1976). La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Posadas: Universidad Nacional de Misiones; Los Polvorines: Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, 267 pp.

El discurso que San Pablo dirige a los atenienses en el Areópago constituye el más claro ejemplo de inculturación que aparece en el Nuevo Testamento. Siendo el precedente inmediato de todo el esfuerzo que los Padres de la Iglesia realizarán por establecer un diálogo fecundo entre la filosofía y la revelación, entre la fe y la razón. Bajo un esquema histórico de «predicación kerigmática a los gentiles», San Lucas crea un relato donde vierte todo su saber filosófico y retórico. Aspecto (...) este último que puede ser percibido con claridad a la luz del De Doctrina Christiana de San Agustín. (shrink)

Este artículo investiga dos problemas principales en los conocidos argumentos de San Agustín en pro de la certeza, contra los escépticos. En realidad, son más bien dos niveles de una misma cuestión "metodológica": la interioridad del conocimiento y la reflexión, como vía de certeza. Conclusión principal de este estudio es que ambas dimensiones son correlativas: la reflexión supone interioridad, N la interioridad exige reflexión, como ría de certeza. La última parte del artículo examina la doctrina agustiniana de la reflexión, (...) en el contexto de su "filosofía del espíritu". La presente investigación intenta mostrar en este punto que, de hecho, San Agustín tematiza o supone, a lo largo de su obra tres grandes modos de reflexión, correspondientes a otros tantos modos de autoconocimiento del alma: el noticial, el cogitativo y el fenomenológico. (shrink)

Distensión de la finitud y belleza son paralelas en Agustín, su deducción y su calificación estética. Ontología de lo finito es, por ello, a la vez, discurso estético en tres grandes dimensiones: a) fundación y estructura de lo finito; b) sucesión temporal ; c) devenir histórico . Podríamos, sin reduccionismo alguno, interpretar su doctrina estética como >?.Distension of the finiteness and beauty are parallel in St. Augustine, its deduction and its aesthetic qualification. Ontology of finiteness is therefore, at the (...) same time, aesthetic thought in three dimensions: a) foundation and structure of the finetenesss; b) temporal succession ; c) historic becoming . Could we, with no reduction, interpret his aesthetic doctrine as >? (shrink)

The problem of absolute generality has attracted much attention in recent philosophy. Agustin Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano have assembled a distinguished team of contributors to write new essays on the topic. They investigate the question of whether it is possible to attain absolute generality in thought and language and the ramifications of this question in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Modal logicism is the view that a metaphysical possibility is just a non-absurd way for the world to be. I argue that modal logicists should see metaphysical possibility as "open ended'': any given possibilities can be used to characterize further possibilities. I then develop a formal framework for modal languages that is a good fit for the modal logicist and show that it delivers some attractive results.

Las Confesiones de San Agustín son una obra muy peculiar. Lectores e investigadores convienen en ello. No es fácil ‘definir’ ni comprender ese escrito. El presente estudio intenta una aproximación a su contenido mediante un examen de ciertos rasgos característicos de la obra que derivan de su propia singularidad. Y denunciamos también algunos impedimentos de comprensión y lectura. Confiemos en que esta mirada pueda ofrecer una guía inicial, pero orientadora, a la misma. Además, el estudio formal y temático revela (...) una dinámica interna, de su estructura misma, que va del relato autobiográfico a la reflexión , de lo narrativo al pensamiento. Este avance tendencial culmina al concluir el libro IX, donde la dimensión narrativa de la obra termina. Razón por la cual los libros X-XI alcanzan el vértice teorético de las Confesiones, con su investigación de la memoria y del tiempo. El presente estudio concluye con una breve exposición del problema agustiniano de la subjetividad o el yo, en la base de esos dos libros.t. Augustine’s Confessions is a very particular work. Readers and Scholarsagree upon it. Therefore, it’s ‘definition’ and understanding are not so easy. These paper tries to provide an approach to the contents of this difficult writing, by means of an examination of some main special traits, arising from the particular work’s kind. And we betray also some new difficulties for it’s reading and understanding. It is hoped that these brief look to the famous Augustinian writing could offer an initial but adviser guide to it. Moreover, the formal and thematic inquiry reveal an internal dynamics of it’s structure, which moves from the autobiographycal account to the reflection , from the story to the thinking. This aimed advance culminates at the end of the book IX, where the work’s narrative side concludes. That’s why the books X and XI reach the theoretical summit of the Confessions through their search for memory and time. Our paper ends with an exposition of the Augustinian inquiry on the human subiectivity, underlying both these books. (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of lexical words, i.e., words that contribute with content to the meaning of sentences. This debate has coincided with a renewal in the study of polysemy, which has taken place in the psycholinguistics camp mainly. There is already a fruitful interbreeding between two lines of research: the theoretical study of lexical word meaning, on the one hand, and the models of polysemy psycholinguists present, on the other. In this paper I aim at (...) deepening on this ongoing interbreeding, examine what is said about polysemy, particularly in the psycholinguistics literature, and then show how what we seem to know about the representation and storage of polysemous senses affects the models that we have about lexical word meaning. (shrink)

The human race has been socially organizing itself for probably about 1.8 million years. The first form of human organization was the hunter-gatherer, which was the form of organization in which man lived for about 99 % of his history. This mode of life caused humans to organize themselves into small groups and lead a nomadic life. The nomadic life ensured that these groups had no possessions and no wealth could be accumulated. In this manner, this form of human organization (...) ensured egalitarianism, a form of primitive communism. This changed dramatically with the development of agriculture in the so-called Neolithic Revolution in 10,000 BC. With the development of agriculture and the consequent development of technology, man became sedentary, the first towns were formed, and the class system made its appearance, that is, the separation between an administrative class and a productive class. The egalitarian and communist primitive society gave way to an increasingly centralized and hierarchical society. From network theory, they have been insisting for years on the benefits of the so-called scale-free networks, networks governed by certain privileged nodes called hubs. These networks are said to be slightly vulnerable and highly robust to errors. In this work, we perform a deep network analysis of a group of centralized-hierarchical networks and a group of decentralized-distributed networks. This work provides clear and compelling evidence that, contrary to what is maintained, decentralized-distributed networks are the least vulnerable and most robust networks, and are the networks that ensure an equitable and equal distribution of power and influence among their members. These results are analyzed in the context of network theory, and are discussed in relation to the theories of Jeremy Rifkin, Ernst Schumacher, Alexander Bogdanov and Aldous Huxley. (shrink)

A bold new synthesis of paleontology, archaeology, genetics, and anthropology that overturns misconceptions about race, war and peace, and human nature itself, answering an age-old question: What made humans so exceptional among all the species on Earth? Creativity. It is the secret of what makes humans special, hiding in plain sight. Agustín Fuentes argues that your child's finger painting comes essentially from the same place as creativity in hunting and gathering millions of years ago, and throughout history in making (...) war and peace, in intimate relationships, in shaping the planet, in our communities, and in all of art, religion, and even science. It requires imagination and collaboration. Every poet has her muse; every engineer, an architect; every politician, a constituency. The manner of the collaborations varies widely, but successful collaboration is inseparable from imagination, and it brought us everything from knives and hot meals to iPhones and interstellar spacecraft. Weaving fascinating stories of our ancient ancestors' creativity, Fuentes finds the patterns that match modern behavior in humans and animals. This key quality has propelled the evolutionary development of our bodies, minds, and cultures, both for good and for bad. It's not the drive to reproduce; nor competition for mates, or resources, or power; nor our propensity for caring for one another that have separated us out from all other creatures. As Fuentes concludes, to make something lasting and useful today you need to understand the nature of your collaboration with others, what imagination can and can't accomplish, and, finally, just how completely our creativity is responsible for the world we live in. Agustín Fuentes's resounding multimillion-year perspective will inspire readers—and spark all kinds of creativity. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to show the evolution of the relationship between nonmonotonic logic and logic programming. I think that there are two periods in the evolution of this relationship. The first one isthe point of contact between these two fields that had been developed independently. In the second period, as I will show, the motivation to propose three-valued nonmonotonic logic comes from the study of the relationship between these two fields, and not from the study of nonmonotonic (...) logic itself. (shrink)

My thesis consists of three self-contained but interconnected papers. In the first one, 'Word and Objects', I assume that it is possible to quantify over absolutely everything, and show that certain English sentences containing collective predicates resist paraphrase in first-order languages and even in first-order languages enriched with plural quantifiers. To capture such sentences I develop a language containing plural predicates . ;The introduction of plural predicates leads to an extension of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. I argue that theories (...) containing plural predicates can have plural ontological commitments in addition to singular ones. In this sense, I argue that the subject-matter of ontology is richer than one might have thought. ;Plural predicates turn out to be tremendously fruitful. For example, they provide us with natural formalizations for English plural definite descriptions and generalized quantifiers. They also allow us to state important set theoretic propositions, and give a formal semantics for second-order languages. Such a formal semantics is developed in the second paper, 'Toward a Theory of Second-Order Consequence', which is a collaboration with Gabriel Uzquiano. ;In the third paper, 'Frege's Unofficial Arithmetic', I consider an application of plural predicates to the philosophy of mathematics. By developing a suggestion of the later Frege, I show that any arithmetical predicate can be transformed into a plural predicate in such a way that the arithmetical predicate is true of the number of the Fs just in case the plural predicate is true of the Fs themselves. ;The transformation is important both because it can be put to use by nominalists about arithmetic and neo-Fregeans, and because it provides the foundations for an account of applied arithmetic. (shrink)

The by now famous exclusion problem for mental causation admits only one possible solution, as far as I can see, namely: that mental and physical properties are linked by a vertical relation. In this paper, starting from what I take to be sensible premises about properties, I will be visiting some general relations between them, in order to see whether, first, it is true that some vertical relation, other than identity, makes different sorts of causation compatible and second, whether physical (...) and mental properties can be pairs of such relation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to defend a conception of language that does not rely on linguistic meanings, and use it to address the Sorites and Liar paradoxes.

We very often discover ourselves engaged in inner speech. It seems that this kind of silent, private, speech fulfils some role in our cognition, most probably related to conscious thinking. Yet, the study of inner speech has been neglected by philosophy and psychology alike for many years. However, things seem to have changed in the last two decades. Here we review some of the most influential accounts about the phenomenology and the functions of inner speech, as well as the methodological (...) problems that affect its study. (shrink)

Examining homology in biological and cultural evolution is of great importance in investigations of humanity. The proposal presented in the target article retains substantial methodological weaknesses in the identification and use of “cultural traits.” However, with refined toolkits and the incorporation of recent advances in evolutionary theory, this overall endeavor can result in substantial payoffs for biological and social scientists.

ABSTRACT: According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legiti- mately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispo- sitional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall (...) within this model. That is, I will argue that we would miss some explanations if we were to forsake dispositional concepts and dispositional explanations. (shrink)

Physicalism is the claim that that there is nothing in the world but the physical. Philosophers who defend physicalism have to confront a well-known dilemma, known as Hempel’s dilemma, concerning the definition of ‘the physical’: if ‘the physical’ is whatever current physics says there is, then physicalism is most probably false; but if ‘the physical’ is whatever the true theory of physics would say that there is, we have that physicalism is vacuous and runs the risk of becoming trivial. This (...) article has two parts. The first, negative, part is devoted to developing a criticism of the so-called via negativa response to Hempel’s dilemma. In the second, more substantial, part, I propose to take the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma. However, I argue for a broad construal of ‘current physics’ and characterize ‘the physical’ accordingly. The virtues of the broad characterization of ‘the physical’ are: first, it makes physicalism less likely to be false; and second, it ties our understanding of ‘the physical’ to the reasons we have for believing in physicalism. That is, it fulfills the desideratum of construing our theses according to the reasons we have to believe in them. (shrink)

The renewed interest in concepts and their role in psychological theorizing is partially motivated by Machery’s claim that concepts are so heterogeneous that they have no explanatory role. Against this, pluralism argues that there is multiplicity of different concepts for any given category, while hybridism argues that a concept is constituted by a rich common representation. This article aims to advance the understanding of the hybrid view of concepts. First, we examine the main arguments against hybrid concepts and conclude that, (...) even if not successful, they challenge hybridism to find a robust criterion for concept individuation and to show an explanatory advantage for hybrid concepts. Then we propose such a criterion of individuation, which we will call ‘functional stable coactivation’. Finally, we examine the prospects of hybridism to understand what is involved in recent approaches to categorization and meaning extraction. 1 The Heterogeneity of Conceptual Representations2 Two Challenges for Hybrid Concepts: Individuation and Explanation2.1 The coordination criterion2.2 Concepts as constituents of thoughts3 Individuating Hybrids: Functional Stable Coactivation4 The Explanatory Power of Hybrid Concepts4.1 Categorization4.2 Meaning extraction4.2.1 Linguistic comprehension and rich lexical entries4.2.2 Polysemy and hybrid concepts5 Conclusion. (shrink)

I show that any sentence of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed with no loss of compositionality as a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and use this result to prove a completeness theorem for applied arithmetic. More specifically, I set forth an enriched second-order language L, a sentence A of L (which is true on the intended interpretation of L), and a compositionally recursive transformation Tr defined on formulas of L, and show that they have the following (...) two properties: (a) in a universe with at least [HEBREW LETTER BET] $_{n-2}$ objects, any formula of nth-order (pure or applied) arithmetic can be expressed as a formula of L, and (b) for any sentence $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$ of L, $\ulcorner \phi^{Tr} \urcorner$ is a second-order sentence containing no arithmetical vocabulary, and nth $\mathcal{A} \vdash \ulcorner \phi \longleftrightarrow \phi^{Tr} \urcorner$. (shrink)

Charles Travis has been forcefully arguing that meaning does not determine truth-conditions for more than two decades now. To this end, he has devised ingenious examples whereby different utterances of the same prima facie non-ambiguous and non-indexical expression type have different truth-conditions depending on the occasion on which they are delivered. However, Travis does not argue that meaning varies with circumstances; only that truth-conditions do. He assumes that meaning is a stable feature of both words and sentences. After surveying some (...) of the explanations that semanticists and pragmaticians have produced in order to account for Travis cases, I propose a view which differs substantially from all of them. I argue that the variability in the truth-conditions that an utterance type can have is due to meaning facts alone. To support my argument, I suggest that we think about the meanings of words (in particular, the meanings of nouns) as rich conceptual structures; so rich that the way in which a property concept applies to an object concept is not determined. (shrink)

Here is an account of logical consequence inspired by Bolzano and Tarski. Logical validity is a property of arguments. An argument is a pair of a set of interpreted sentences (the premises) and an interpreted sentence (the conclusion). Whether an argument is logically valid depends only on its logical form. The logical form of an argument is fixed by the syntax of its constituent sentences, the meanings of their logical constituents and the syntactic differences between their non-logical constituents, treated as (...) variables. A constituent of a sentence is logical just if it is formal in meaning, in the sense roughly that its application is invariant under permutations of individuals.1 Thus ‘=’ is a logical constant because no permutation maps two individuals to one or one to two; ‘∈’ is not a logical constant because some permutations interchange the null set and its singleton. Truth functions, the usual quantifiers and bound variables also count as logical constants. An argument is logically valid if and only if the conclusion is true under every assignment of semantic values to variables (including all non-logical expressions) under which all its premises are true. A sentence is logically true if and only if the argument with no premises of which it is the conclusion is logically valid, that is, if and only if the sentence is true under every assignment of semantic values to variables. An interpretation assigns values to all variables. (shrink)

Introduction: The many faces of human nature / Agustín Fuentes and Aku Visala Chapter 1. Off human nature / Jonathan Marks. Response I. On your marks... get set, we’re off human nature / James M. Calcagno ; Response II. Rethinking human nature : comments on Jonathan Marks’s anti-essentialism / Phillip R. Sloan ; Response III. Off human nature and on human culture : the importance of the concept of culture to science and society / Robert Sussman and Linda Sussman (...) Chapter 2. "To human" is a verb / Tim Ingold. Response I. Free and easy wandering : humans, humane education, and designing in harmony with the nature of the way / Susan D. Blum ; Response II. On human natures : anthropological and Jewish musings / Richard Sosis ; Response III. The humanifying adventure : a response to Tim Ingold / Markus Mühling ; Response IV. The ontogenesis of human moral becoming / Darcia Narvaez Chapter 3. Recognizing the complexity of personhood : complex emergent developmental linguistic relational neurophysiologicalism / Warren Brown and Brad D. Strawn. Response I. "Self-organizing personhood" and many loose ends / Lluis Oviedo ; Response II. A last hurrah for dualism? / Kelly James Clark ; Response III. Why the foundational question about human nature is open and empirical / Carl Gillett Chapter 4. Human origins and the emergence of a distinctively human imagination : theology and the archaeology of personhood / J. Wentzel van Huyssteen. Response I. Constructing the face, creating the collective : Neolithic mediation of personhood / Ian Kuijt ; Response II. Imago Dei and the glabrous ape / Douglas Hedley Chapter 5. What is human nature for? / Grant Ramsey. Response I. The difficulties of forsaking normativity / Neil Arner ; Response II. Some remarks on human nature and naturalism / Aku Visala Epilogues. Putting evolutionary theory to work in investigating human nature / Agustín Fuentes ; Moving us forward? / Celia Deane-Drummond. (shrink)

Polo es un nombre que describe la Universidad de Navarra en su comienzo. Es un ejemplo señero de pensamiento, ejemplo de universitario, inconformista; un filósofo teórico y práctico que busca la verdad que encamina a la Verdad; un maestro de vida coherente con esa búsqueda, siempre con buen humor.

BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM. PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL STYLE, AND REPRESENTATION, PALO ALTO, STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016.Agustin Cosovschi.

I propose a way of thinking aboout content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying In’ and ‘An Account of Possibility’.).

Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...) a lingering worry concerning such explanations of thought insertion: the "What is compared to what?" problem. Here I examine two ways to tackle this problem. First: thought insertion consists of the misattribution of strings of inner speech which are not attenuated (thought insertion is thus another name for auditory verbal hallucinations). Second: thought insertion is misattributed inner speech which exhibits the same phenomenological characteristics as normal inner speech. After explaining the types of problem that each of these potential solutions faces, I conclude with a set of open questions that the comparator theorist has to tackle. (shrink)

Plotinus’ thought is generally viewed as a “system”, the One’s system, wich embraces and considers the Totality as such, as a whole, ruled by the metaphysical law of the unity. Scholars as É. Bréhier, J. Moreau, G. Reale, J. Igal, A. H. Armstrong... agree to it. The present study tries to make explicit and interpret it, examining some basic features, or general traits, wich reveal the Plotinian doctrine from this same point of view. Therefore, the systematic side of Plotinus’ thought (...) is here viewed as the really suitable mode, way or “mothodology” to think the Totality as a supreme unity, and to express the One’s ontology as a perfect whole. According to this interpretation, the system reflects the “synoptical” view of its same content, and shows it as the One’s “presence” in the whole reality and in the Plotinus’ intuitive mind, developed through an ordered series of concepts, in view of the mystical experience, to the union with the One, as the final goal. (shrink)

Phenomenology is supposed to provide an intrinsic account of the possible types of conscious acts and of their relationship to each other. Husselr's enduring frame on this subject rests on the distinction between "objectifying acts" -representations- and "non-objectifying acts" -emotions and volitions-. But the sense of the dependence of every act on representations, suffered a deep change from Logical Investigations -the intentional reference of non-objectifying acts proceeds completely from cognitive reference- to Ideas -the peculiar emotional reference to values needs preferably (...) a doxic-objectifying modality-. Both theories remain, in the end, problematic. (shrink)

Se intenta poner de manifiesto, en este artículo, a través de un somero análisis de la biografía y de la obra de Santiago Ramón y Cajal, como su contribución a la historia de la histología no fue un fruto del azar, sino de una profunda investigación propiciada por su deseo de saber.