Fairness of Artificial Intelligence decisions has become a big challenge for governments, companies, and societies. We offer a theoretical contribution to consider AI ethics outside of high-level and top-down approaches, based on the distinction between “reality” and “world” from Luc Boltanski. To do so, we provide a new perspective on the debate on AI fairness and show that criticism of ML unfairness is “realist”, in other words, grounded in an already instituted reality based on demographic categories produced by (...) institutions. Second, we show that the limits of “realist” fairness corrections lead to the elaboration of “radical responses” to fairness, that is, responses that radically change the format of data. Third, we show that fairness correction is shifting to a “domination regime” that absorbs criticism, and we provide some theoretical and practical avenues for further development in AI ethics. Using an ad hoc critical space stabilized by reality tests alongside the algorithm, we build a shared responsibility model which is compatible with the radical response to fairness issues. Finally, this paper shows the fundamental contribution of pragmatic sociology theories, insofar as they afford a social and political perspective on AI ethics by giving an active role to material actors such as database formats on ethical debates. In a context where data are increasingly numerous, granular, and behavioral, it is essential to renew our conception of AI ethics on algorithms in order to establish new models of responsibility for companies that take into account changes in the computing paradigm. (shrink)

L'expérience de théorisation d'Edgar Morin a été, pour nous sociologues, bien plus qu'un témoignage exemplaire. Elle a aidé à entamer un parcours épistémologique ; la discipline sociologique peut, en effet, apparaître comme une partition à plusieurs voix au travers d'une discussion non seulement sociologique, mais aussi, anthropologique et philosophique, et ce, en trois temps : la rupture, la construction et la constatation. Ce livre est, ainsi, conçu comme un "aide à penser", d'une part, la genèse de la sociologie, en revisitant (...) les auteurs canoniques (Marx, Durkheim, Weber) et les théories sociologiques contemporaines, et, d'autre part, la complexité des défis culturels, sociaux et politiques, dans nos sociétés. L'expérience d'une pensée aussi rigoureuse que la complexité ne peut se faire par procuration. Il fallait contribuer à l'initiation à la sociologie et beaucoup d'attention pour oser penser par soi-même. L'ouvrage porte sur des problèmes de "théorie", mais tous s'appuient sur des données ethnographiques (enquêtes de terrain). Enfin, l'ouvrage d'Ali Aït Abdelmalek s'inscrit dans son projet de création, à l'Université de Rennes 2, d'un Groupement d'intérêt scientifique "Institut de la complexité : Territoire, Identité, Patrimoine et Politique", en collaboration avec la Fondation Edgar Morin."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Après les guerres du siècle dernier qui ont remis en cause l'idée de progrès, devant les formes multiples des guerres actuelles, peut-on encore penser la paix aujourd'hui? A l'encontre des idées conservatrices de la paix où cette dernière, conçue comme ordre et stabilité, a souvent été le corrélat des Etats policiers, la pensée de la paix, telle que l'élabore Levinas, relève d'une critique de l'autoritarisme politique et permet d'élaborer un nouveau concept de liberté affranchi de la tutelle des Etats. La (...) paix n'est pas ici une idée abstraite mais porte le sujet hors de toutes les formes de confort moral ou de conformisme politique. C'est à un Levinas neuf que nous avons ici à faire : tout en dialoguant avec la tradition moderne et contemporaine de la philosophie politique, il nous montre que la paix est une forme d'insubordination qui aspire à "désembourgeoiser la révolution". Une lecture intranquille de Levinas. (shrink)

Algorithms used in the public sector, e.g., for allocating social benefits or predicting fraud, often require involvement from multiple stakeholders at various phases of the algorithm’s life-cycle. This paper focuses on the communication issues between diverse stakeholders that can lead to misinterpretation and misuse of algorithmic systems. Ethnographic research was conducted via 11 semi-structured interviews with practitioners working on algorithmic systems in the Dutch public sector, at local and national levels. With qualitative coding analysis, we identify key elements of the (...) communication processes that underlie fairness-related human decisions. More specifically, we analyze the division of roles and tasks, the required skills, and the challenges perceived by diverse stakeholders. Three general patterns emerge from the coding analysis: (1) Policymakers, civil servants, and domain experts are less involved compared to developers throughout a system’s life-cycle. This leads to developers taking on the role of decision-maker and policy advisor, while they potentially miss the required skills. (2) End-users and policy-makers often lack the technical skills to interpret a system’s output, and rely on actors having a developer role for making decisions concerning fairness issues. (3) Citizens are structurally absent throughout a system’s life-cycle. This may lead to unbalanced fairness assessments that do not include key input from relevant stakeholders. We formalize the underlying communication issues within such networks of stakeholders and introduce the phase-actor-role-task-skill (PARTS) model. PARTS can both (i) represent the communication patterns identified in the interviews, and (ii) explicitly outline missing elements in communication patterns such as actors who miss skills or collaborators for their tasks, or tasks that miss qualified actors. The PARTS model can be extended to other use cases and used to analyze and design the human organizations responsible for assessing fairness in algorithmic systems. It can be further extended to explore communication issues in other use cases, design potential solutions, and organize accountability with a common vocabulary. (shrink)

Against the backdrop of a recent history of ongoing efforts to institutionalize ethics in ways that also target corporate environments, we asked ourselves: How do company representatives at the automatica 2022 trade fair in Munich respond to questions around ethics? To this end, we started an exploratory survey at the automatica 2022 in Munich, asking 22 company representatives at various booths from various industrial sectors the basic question: “Is there somebody in your company working on ethics?” Most representatives were responding (...) positively and tried to connect the term to pre-existing practices, processes, or organizational entities in their respective companies. Mostly, they either located ethics as being relevant to their organization on an institutional level, on a cultural level, on an inter-company level, or on a product level. This exploratory investigation has also shown that the ongoing debates and regulatory efforts about ethics in AI have not yet become a major selling point for company representatives at the trade fair. (shrink)

While rapid advances in artificial intelligence hiring tools promise to transform the workplace, these algorithms risk exacerbating existing biases against marginalized groups. In light of these ethical issues, AI vendors have sought to translate normative concepts such as fairness into measurable, mathematical criteria that can be optimized for. However, questions of disability and access often are omitted from these ongoing discussions about algorithmic bias. In this paper, I argue that the multiplicity of different kinds and intensities of people’s disabilities (...) and the fluid, contextual ways in which they manifest point to the limits of algorithmic fairness initiatives. In particular, existing de-biasing measures tend to flatten variance within and among disabled people and abstract away information in ways that reinforce pathologization. While fair machine learning methods can help mitigate certain disparities, I argue that fairness alone is insufficient to secure accessible, inclusive AI. I then outline a disability justice approach, which provides a framework for centering disabled people’s experiences and attending to the structures and norms that underpin algorithmic bias. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being used in disaster risk management applications to predict the effect of upcoming disasters, plan for mitigation strategies, and determine who needs how much aid after a disaster strikes. The media is filled with unintended ethical concerns of AI algorithms, such as image recognition algorithms not recognizing persons of color or racist algorithmic predictions of whether offenders will recidivate. We know such unintended ethical consequences must play a role in DRM as well, yet there is (...) surprisingly little research on exactly what the unintended consequences are and what we can do to mitigate them. The aim of this perspective is to call researchers working on fairness, accountability, and transparency to work with DRM and local experts—so we can ensure that disaster mitigation and relief is accountable, considers local values, and is not unintentionally biased. (shrink)

Although existing work draws attention to a range of obstacles in realizing fair AI, the field lacks an account that emphasizes how these worries hang together in a systematic way. Furthermore, a review of the fair AI and philosophical literature demonstrates the unsuitability of ‘treat like cases alike’ and other intuitive notions as conceptions of fairness. That review then generates three desiderata for a replacement conception of fairness valuable to AI research: (1) It must provide a meta-theory for (...) understanding tradeoffs, entailing that it must be flexible enough to capture diverse species of objection to decisions. (2) It must not appeal to an impartial perspective (neutral data, objective data, or final arbiter.) (3) It must foreground the way in which judgments of fairness are sensitive to context, i.e., to historical and institutional states of affairs. We argue that a conception of fairness as appropriate concession in the historical iteration of institutional decisions meets these three desiderata. On the basis of this definition, we organize the insights of commentators into a process-structure map of the ethical territory that we hope will bring clarity to computer scientists and ethicists analyzing Fair AI while clearing some ground for further technical and philosophical work. (shrink)

The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) to healthcare raises both hope and ethical concerns. Some advanced machine learning methods provide accurate clinical predictions at the expense of a significant lack of explainability. Alex John London has defended that accuracy is a more important value than explainability in AI medicine. In this article, we locate the trade-off between accurate performance and explainable algorithms in the context of distributive justice. We acknowledge that accuracy is cardinal from outcome-oriented justice because it helps (...) to maximize patients’ benefits and optimizes limited resources. However, we claim that the opaqueness of the algorithmic black box and its absence of explainability threatens core commitments of procedural fairness such as accountability, avoidance of bias, and transparency. To illustrate this, we discuss liver transplantation as a case of critical medical resources in which the lack of explainability in AI-based allocation algorithms is procedurally unfair. Finally, we provide a number of ethical recommendations for when considering the use of unexplainable algorithms in the distribution of health-related resources. (shrink)

Racial, Gender, and Intersectional Biases in AI / -/- Dominant View of Intersectional Fairness in the AI Literature / -/- Three Fundamental Problems with the Dominant View / 1. Overemphasis on Intersections of Attributes / 2. Dilemma between Infinite Regress and Fairness Gerrymandering / 3. Narrow Understanding of Fairness as Parity / -/- Rethinking AI Fairness: from Weak to Strong Fairness.

The use of predictive machine learning algorithms is increasingly common to guide or even take decisions in both public and private settings. Their use is touted by some as a potentially useful method to avoid discriminatory decisions since they are, allegedly, neutral, objective, and can be evaluated in ways no human decisions can. By (fully or partly) outsourcing a decision process to an algorithm, it should allow human organizations to clearly define the parameters of the decision and to, in principle, (...) remove human biases. Yet, in practice, the use of algorithms can still be the source of wrongful discriminatory decisions based on at least three of their features: the data-mining process and the categorizations they rely on can reconduct human biases, their automaticity and predictive design can lead them to rely on wrongful generalizations, and their opaque nature is at odds with democratic requirements. We highlight that the two latter aspects of algorithms and their significance for discrimination are too often overlooked in contemporary literature. Though these problems are not all insurmountable, we argue that it is necessary to clearly define the conditions under which a machine learning decision tool can be used. We identify and propose three main guidelines to properly constrain the deployment of machine learning algorithms in society: algorithms should be vetted to ensure that they do not unduly affect historically marginalized groups; they should not systematically override or replace human decision-making processes; and the decision reached using an algorithm should always be explainable and justifiable. (shrink)

To realize the coordinated and sustainable development of hydropower projects and regional society, comprehensively evaluating hydropower projects’ influence is critical. Usually, hydropower project development has an impact on environmental geology and social and regional cultural development. Based on comprehensive consideration of complicated geological conditions, fragile ecological environment, resettlement of reservoir area, and other factors of future hydropower development in each country, we have constructed a comprehensive evaluation index system of hydropower projects, including 4 first-level indicators of social economy, environment, safety, (...) and fairness, which contain 26 second-level indicators. To solve the problem that existing models cannot evaluate dynamic nonlinear optimization, a projection pursuit model is constructed by using rough set reduction theory to simplify the index. Then, an accelerated genetic algorithm based on real number coding is used to solve the model and empirical study is carried out with the Y hydropower station as a sample. The evaluation results show that the evaluation index system and assessment model constructed in our paper effectively reduce the subjectivity of index weight. Applying our model to the social impact assessment of related international hydropower projects can not only comprehensively analyze the social impact of hydropower projects but also identify important social influencing factors and effectively analyze the social impact level of each dimension. Furthermore, SIA assessment can be conducive to project decision-making, avoiding social risks and social stability. (shrink)

McCradden et al. propose to close the “AI chasm” between algorithms and clinically meaningful application using the norms of evidence-based medicine and clinical research, with the rat...

As a retired professor, I join in the growing concerns among educators, and others, about plagiarism, especially now that AI tools like ChatGPT are so readily available. However, I feel more caution is needed, regarding temptations to rely on supposed automatic detection tools, like Turnitin, to solve the problems. Students can be unfairly accused if such tools are used unreflectingly. The Toronto Star's online version of this published Op Ed is available at the link shown below. The version attached here (...) is a pre-print, which also includes annotations for my references, which are not displayed in the published version. (shrink)

A growing number of studies on fairness in artificial intelligence (AI) use the notion of intersectionality to measure AI fairness. Most of these studies take intersectional fairness to be a matter of statistical parity among intersectional subgroups: an AI algorithm is “intersectionally fair” if the probability of the outcome is roughly the same across all subgroups defined by different combinations of the protected attributes. This paper identifies and examines three fundamental problems with this dominant interpretation of intersectional (...) fairness in AI. First, the dominant approach is so preoccupied with the intersection of attributes/categories (e.g., race, gender) that it fails to address the intersection of oppression (e.g., racism, sexism), which is more central to intersectionality as a critical framework. Second, the dominant approach faces a dilemma between infinite regress and fairness gerrymandering: it either keeps splitting groups into smaller subgroups or arbitrarily selects protected groups. Lastly, the dominant view fails to capture what it really means for AI algorithms to be fair, in terms of both distributive and non-distributive fairness. I distinguish a strong sense of AI fairness from a weak sense that is prevalent in the literature, and conclude by envisioning paths towards strong intersectional fairness in AI. (shrink)

Principles of fairness and solidarity in AI ethics regularly overlap, creating obscurity in practice: acting in accordance with one can appear indistinguishable from deciding according to the rules of the other. However, there exist irregular cases where the two concepts split, and so reveal their disparate meanings and uses. This paper explores two cases in AI medical ethics – one that is irregular and the other more conventional – to fully distinguish fairness and solidarity. Then the distinction is (...) applied to the frequently cited COMPAS versus ProPublica dispute in judicial ethics. The application provides a broader model for settling contemporary and topical debates about fairness and solidarity. It also implies a deeper and disorienting truth about AI ethics principles and their justification. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly relied upon by clinicians for making diagnostic and treatment decisions, playing an important role in imaging, diagnosis, risk analysis, lifestyle monitoring, and health information management. While research has identified biases in healthcare AI systems and proposed technical solutions to address these, we argue that effective solutions require human engagement. Furthermore, there is a lack of research on how to motivate the adoption of these solutions and promote investment in designing AI systems that align with values (...) such as transparency and fairness from the outset. Drawing on insights from psychological theories, we assert the need to understand the values that underlie decisions made by individuals involved in creating and deploying AI systems. We describe how this understanding can be leveraged to increase engagement with de-biasing and fairness-enhancing practices within the AI healthcare industry, ultimately leading to sustained behavioral change via autonomy-supportive communication strategies rooted in motivational and social psychology theories. In developing these pathways to engagement, we consider the norms and needs that govern the AI healthcare domain, and we evaluate incentives for maintaining the status quo against economic, legal, and social incentives for behavior change in line with transparency and fairness values. (shrink)

In this chapter, we integrate three distinct strands of thought to argue that the concept of “fairness” varies significantly across cultures. As a result, ensuring that human-AI interactions meet relevant fairness standards requires a deep understanding of the cultural contexts in which AI-enabled systems are deployed. Failure to do so will not only result in the generation of unfair outcomes by an AI-enabled system, but it will also degrade legitimacy of and trust in the system. The first strand (...) concerns the dominant approach taken in the technology industry to ensure that AI-enabled systems are fair. This approach is to reduce fairness to some mathematical formalism that can be applied universally, a quintessentially Western conception of fairness. The second strand concerns alternative conceptions of fairness that have their roots in philosophical traditions of the East, namely Confucian virtue ethics. Understanding how individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds perceive fairness—particularly their beliefs about fairness in human-to-human interactions—is crucial for understanding how they will interpret fairness in human-AI interactions. Building on these philosophical and behavioral differences, as highlighted by empirical research, the third strand integrates insights from political science and interdisciplinary studies. This perspective offers valuable guidance on designing AI-enabled systems to align with contextually relevant standards of fairness. Examining existing beliefs about fairness within the context of institutional decision-making provides valuable insights into what people expect from AI-generated decisions. These expectations often include key elements such as a sufficient degree of transparency, clear lines of accountability, and mechanisms to contest decisions made by the system—all of which are essential components of procedural fairness. Rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to ensuring fairness, the design and deployment of AI systems must carefully account for the operating environment, including the socio-political and cultural context, to ensure that the system aligns with the relevant standards of fairness. (shrink)

The literature addressing bias and fairness in AI models (fair-AI) is growing at a fast pace, making it difficult for novel researchers and practitioners to have a bird’s-eye view picture of the field. In particular, many policy initiatives, standards, and best practices in fair-AI have been proposed for setting principles, procedures, and knowledge bases to guide and operationalize the management of bias and fairness. The first objective of this paper is to concisely survey the state-of-the-art of fair-AI methods (...) and resources, and the main policies on bias in AI, with the aim of providing such a bird’s-eye guidance for both researchers and practitioners. The second objective of the paper is to contribute to the policy advice and best practices state-of-the-art by leveraging from the results of the NoBIAS research project. We present and discuss a few relevant topics organized around the NoBIAS architecture, which is made up of a Legal Layer, focusing on the European Union context, and a Bias Management Layer, focusing on understanding, mitigating, and accounting for bias. (shrink)

An increasing number of financial services (FS) companies are adopting solutions driven by artificial intelligence (AI) to gain operational efficiencies, derive strategic insights, and improve customer engagement. However, the rate of adoption has been low, in part due to the apprehension around its complexity and self-learning capability, which makes auditability a challenge in a highly regulated industry. There is limited literature on how FS companies can implement the governance and controls specific to AI-driven solutions. AI auditing cannot be performed in (...) a vacuum; the risks are not confined to the algorithm itself, but rather permeates the entire organization. Using the risk of unfairness as an example, this paper will introduce the overarching governance strategy and control framework to address the practical challenges in mitigating risks AI introduces. With regulatory implications and industry use cases, this framework will enable leaders to innovate with confidence. (shrink)

There have been repeated calls to ensure that clinical artificial intelligence (AI) is not discriminatory, that is, it provides its intended benefit to all members of society irrespective of the status of any protected characteristics of individuals in whose healthcare the AI might participate. There have also been repeated calls to ensure that any clinical AI is tailored to the local population in which it is being used to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose. Yet, there might be a clash between (...) these two calls since tailoring an AI to a local population might reduce its effectiveness when the AI is used in the care of individuals who have characteristics which are not represented in the local population. Here, I explore the bioethical concept of local fairness as applied to clinical AI. I first introduce the discussion concerning fairness and inequalities in healthcare and how this problem has continued in attempts to develop AI-enhanced healthcare. I then discuss various technical aspects which might affect the implementation of local fairness. Next, I introduce some rule of law considerations into the discussion to contextualise the issue better by drawing key parallels. I then discuss some potential technical solutions which have been proposed to address the issue of local fairness. Finally, I outline which solutions I consider most likely to contribute to a fit-for-purpose and fair AI. (shrink)

The increasing implementation of and reliance on machine-learning (ML) algorithms to perform tasks, deliver services and make decisions in health and healthcare have made the need for fairness in ML, and more specifically in healthcare ML algorithms (HMLA), a very important and urgent task. However, while the debate on fairness in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) and in HMLA has grown significantly over the last decade, the very concept of fairness as an ethical value has not (...) yet been sufficiently explored. Our paper aims to fill this gap and address the AI ethics principle of fairness from a conceptual standpoint, drawing insights from accounts of fairness elaborated in moral philosophy and using them to conceptualise fairness as an ethical value and to redefine fairness in HMLA accordingly. To achieve our goal, following a first section aimed at clarifying the background, methodology and structure of the paper, in the second section, we provide an overview of the discussion of the AI ethics principle of fairness in HMLA and show that the concept of fairness underlying this debate is framed in purely distributive terms and overlaps with non-discrimination, which is defined in turn as the absence of biases. After showing that this framing is inadequate, in the third section, we pursue an ethical inquiry into the concept of fairness and argue that fairness ought to be conceived of as an ethical value. Following a clarification of the relationship between fairness and non-discrimination, we show that the two do not overlap and that fairness requires much more than just non-discrimination. Moreover, we highlight that fairness not only has a distributive but also a socio-relational dimension. Finally, we pinpoint the constitutive components of fairness. In doing so, we base our arguments on a renewed reflection on the concept of respect, which goes beyond the idea of equal respect to include respect for individual persons. In the fourth section, we analyse the implications of our conceptual redefinition of fairness as an ethical value in the discussion of fairness in HMLA. Here, we claim that fairness requires more than non-discrimination and the absence of biases as well as more than just distribution; it needs to ensure that HMLA respects persons both as persons and as particular individuals. Finally, in the fifth section, we sketch some broader implications and show how our inquiry can contribute to making HMLA and, more generally, AI promote the social good and a fairer society. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to establish a set of criteria for understanding the meaning and sources of attributing (un)fairness to AI algorithms. To do so, we first establish that (un)fairness, like other normative notions, can be understood in a proper primary sense and in secondary senses derived by analogy. We argue that AI algorithms cannot be said to be (un)fair in the proper sense due to a set of criteria related to normativity and agency. However, we (...) demonstrate how and why AI algorithms can be qualified as (un)fair by analogy and explore the sources of this (un)fairness and the associated problems of responsibility assignment. We conclude that more user-driven AI approaches could alleviate some of these difficulties. (shrink)

Statistical fairness criteria are widely used for diagnosing and ameliorating algorithmic bias. However, these fairness criteria are controversial as their use raises several difficult questions. I argue that the major problems for statistical algorithmic fairness criteria stem from an incorrect understanding of their nature. These criteria are primarily used for two purposes: first, evaluating AI systems for bias, and second constraining machine learning optimization problems in order to ameliorate such bias. The first purpose typically involves treating each (...) criterion as a necessary condition for fairness. The second use involves treating criteria as sufficient conditions for fairness. Since the criteria are used for both roles, some researchers have treated them as both necessary and sufficient conditions, i.e., as definitions of algorithmic fairness. However, serious problems have been raised for the use of these fairness criteria. Under ordinary circumstances, it is impossible to satisfy multiple criteria at the same time. Moreover, there are counterexamples to both the sufficiency and necessity for fairness of each criterion. I argue that we should instead understand fairness criteria as merely providing evidence of fairness. In other words, satisfaction (or violation) of these criteria should be understood as potential evidence of fairness (or bias). Whether a criterion counts as evidence in a particular case will depend on stakeholders' background knowledge and the specific features of the system's task. This evidence account of fairness conditions provides guidance for recognizing both the appropriate uses and the limitations of fairness criteria. (shrink)

The increasing demand for transparency in AI has recently come under scrutiny. The question is often posted in terms of “epistemic double standards”, and whether the standards for transparency in AI ought to be higher than, or equivalent to, our standards for ordinary human reasoners. I agree that the push for increased transparency in AI deserves closer examination, and that comparing these standards to our standards of transparency for other opaque systems is an appropriate starting point. I suggest that a (...) more fruitful exploration of this question will involve a different comparison class. We routinely treat judgments made by highly trained experts in specialized fields as fair or well-grounded even though—by the nature of expert/layperson division of epistemic labor—an expert will not be able to provide an explanation of the reasoning behind these judgments that makes sense to most other people. Regardless, laypeople are thought to be acting reasonably—and ethically—in deferring to the judgments of experts that concern their areas of specialization. I suggest that we reframe our question regarding the appropriate standards of transparency in AI as one that asks when, why, and to what degree it would be ethical to accept opacity in AI. I argue that our epistemic relation to certain opaque AI technology may be relevantly similar to the layperson’s epistemic relation to the expert in certain respects, such that the successful expert/layperson division of epistemic labor can serve as a blueprint for the ethical use of opaque AI. (shrink)

As the use of AI systems continues to increase, so do concerns over their lack of fairness, legitimacy and accountability. Such harmful automated decision-making can be guarded against by ensuring AI systems are contestable by design: responsive to human intervention throughout the system lifecycle. Contestable AI by design is a small but growing field of research. However, most available knowledge requires a significant amount of translation to be applicable in practice. A proven way of conveying intermediate-level, generative design knowledge (...) is in the form of frameworks. In this article we use qualitative-interpretative methods and visual mapping techniques to extract from the literature sociotechnical features and practices that contribute to contestable AI, and synthesize these into a design framework. (shrink)

Using artificial intelligence (AI) to make decisions in human resource management (HRM) raises questions of how fair employees perceive these decisions to be and whether they experience respectful treatment (i.e., interactional justice). In this experimental survey study with open-ended qualitative questions, we examine decision making in six HRM functions and manipulate the decision maker (AI or human) and decision valence (positive or negative) to determine their impact on individuals’ experiences of interactional justice, trust, dehumanization, and perceptions of decision-maker role appropriate- (...) ness. In terms of decision makers, the use of human decision makers over AIs generally resulted in better perceptions of respectful treatment. In terms of decision valence, people experiencing positive over negative decisions generally resulted in better perceptions of respectful treatment. In instances where these cases conflict, on some indicators people preferred positive AI decisions over negative human decisions. Qualitative responses show how people identify justice concerns with both AI and human decision making. We outline implications for theory, practice, and future research. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that AI literacy should be added to the list of primary goods developed by political philosopher John Rawls. Primary goods are the necessary resources all citizens need to exercise their two moral powers, namely their sense of justice and their sense of the good. These goods are advantageous for citizens since without them citizens will not be able to fully develop their moral powers. I claim the lack of AI literacy impacts citizens’ ability to exercise (...) their sense of justice and their sense of the good. Without citizens having the ability to understand how AI technology works – including being aware of the social and political implications and the limits and possibilities of this technology broadly speaking – this could impact their ability to participate in a free, equal and fair society and their ability to carry out their conception of the good. Thus this paper is a call for AI literacy to be regarded as a basic good in a liberal constitutional democracy in order for citizens to be able to exercise their freedom and equality. (shrink)

Computer scientists have made great strides in characterizing different measures of algorithmic fairness, and showing that certain measures of fairness cannot be jointly satisfied. In this paper, I argue that the three most popular families of measures - unconditional independence, target-conditional independence and classification-conditional independence - make assumptions that are unsustainable in the context of an unjust world. I begin by introducing the measures and the implicit idealizations they make about the underlying causal structure of the contexts in (...) which they are deployed. I then discuss how these idealizations fall apart in the context of historical injustice, ongoing unmodeled oppression, and the permissibility of using sensitive attributes to rectify injustice. In the final section, I suggest an alternative framework for measuring fairness in the context of existing injustice: distributive fairness. (shrink)

In the last few years, we have witnessed a surge in scholarly interest and scientific evidence of how algorithms can produce discriminatory outcomes, especially with regard to gender and race. However, the analysis of fairness and bias in AI, important for the debate of AI for social good, has paid insufficient attention to the category of age and older people. Ageing populations have been largely neglected during the turn to digitality and AI. In this article, the concept of AI (...) ageism is presented to make a theoretical contribution to how the understanding of inclusion and exclusion within the field of AI can be expanded to include the category of age. AI ageism can be defined as practices and ideologies operating within the field of AI, which exclude, discriminate, or neglect the interests, experiences, and needs of older population and can be manifested in five interconnected forms: (1) age biases in algorithms and datasets (technical level), (2) age stereotypes, prejudices and ideologies of actors in AI (individual level), (3) invisibility of old age in discourses on AI (discourse level), (4) discriminatory effects of use of AI technology on different age groups (group level), (5) exclusion as users of AI technology, services and products (user level). Additionally, the paper provides empirical illustrations of the way ageism operates in these five forms. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence holds great promise for improved health‐care outcomes. But it also poses substantial new hazards, including algorithmic discrimination. For example, an algorithm used to identify candidates for beneficial “high risk care management” programs routinely failed to select racial minorities. Furthermore, some algorithms deliberately adjust for race in ways that divert resources away from minority patients. To illustrate, algorithms have underestimated African Americans’ risks of kidney stones and death from heart failure. Algorithmic discrimination can violate Title VI of the Civil (...) Rights Act and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act when it unjustifiably disadvantages underserved populations. This article urges that both legal and technical tools be deployed to promote AI fairness. Plaintiffs should be able to assert disparate impact claims in health‐care litigation, and Congress should enact an Algorithmic Accountability Act. In addition, fairness should be a key element in designing, implementing, validating, and employing AI. (shrink)

This paper delves into the significance and challenges of Artificial Intelligence (AI) ethics and justice in terms of Common Good and Well-being, fairness and non-discrimination, rational public deliberation, and autonomy and control. Initially, the paper establishes the groundwork for subsequent discussions using the Academia Sinica LLM incident and the AI Technology R&D Guidelines of the National Science and Technology Council(NSTC) as a starting point. In terms of justice and ethics in AI, this research investigates whether AI can fulfill human (...) common interests and welfare. Taking AI injustice as an example, I analyze the practical assessment of AI regarding regional, industrial, and social impacts. Further, this paper discusses the challenges of fairness and non-discrimination in AI, specifically addressing the issue of training on biased data, discussing the acquisition of bias by AI and post-processing supervision issues, and emphasizing the importance of rational public deliberation in this process. Then, this research examines the challenges and countermeasures the rational public faces in public deliberation, such as the importance of education in STEM scientific literacy and technological capabilities. Finally, in discussing AI and autonomy, I propose a 'Human-Centered Approach’ rather than relying solely on the 'Technological Utility Maximization' brought by AI to achieve substantial AI justice. -/- Keywords: AI Ethics and Justice, Fairness and Non-Discrimination, Biased Data Training, Public Deliberation, Autonomy, Human-Centered Approach . (shrink)

Typically, fair machine learning research focuses on a single decision maker and assumes that the underlying population is stationary. However, many of the critical domains motivating this work are characterized by competitive marketplaces with many decision makers. Realistically, we might expect only a subset of them to adopt any non-compulsory fairness-conscious policy, a situation that political philosophers call partial compliance. This possibility raises important questions: how does partial compliance and the consequent strategic behavior of decision subjects affect the allocation (...) outcomes? If k% of employers were to voluntarily adopt a fairness-promoting intervention, should we expect k% progress (in aggregate) towards the benefits of universal adoption, or will the dynamics of partial compliance wash out the hoped-for benefits? How might adopting a global (versus local) perspective impact the conclusions of an auditor? In this paper, we propose a simple model of an employment market, leveraging simulation as a tool to explore the impact of both interaction effects and incentive effects on outcomes and auditing metrics. Our key findings are that at equilibrium: (1) partial compliance by k% of employers can result in far less than proportional (k%) progress towards the full compliance outcomes; (2) the gap is more severe when fair employers match global (vs local) statistics; (3) choices of local vs global statistics can paint dramatically different pictures of the performance vis-a-vis fairness desiderata of compliant versus non-compliant employers; (4) partial compliance based on local parity measures can induce extreme segregation. Finally, we discuss implications for auditors and insights concerning the design of regulatory frameworks. (shrink)

Among the myriad of technical approaches and abstract guidelines proposed to the topic of AI bias, there has been an urgent call to translate the principle of fairness into the operational AI reality with the involvement of social sciences specialists to analyse the context of specific types of bias, since there is not a generalizable solution. This article offers an interdisciplinary contribution to the topic of AI and societal bias, in particular against the poor, providing a conceptual framework of (...) the issue and a tailor-made model from which meaningful data are obtained using Natural Language Processing word vectors in pretrained Google Word2Vec, Twitter and Wikipedia GloVe word embeddings. The results of the study offer the first set of data that evidences the existence of bias against the poor and suggest that Google Word2vec shows a higher degree of bias when the terms are related to beliefs, whereas bias is higher in Twitter GloVe when the terms express behaviour. This article contributes to the body of work on bias, both from and AI and a social sciences perspective, by providing evidence of a transversal aggravating factor for historical types of discrimination. The evidence of bias against the poor also has important consequences in terms of human development, since it often leads to discrimination, which constitutes an obstacle for the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies. (shrink)

Fueled by ever-growing amounts of (digital) data and advances in artificial intelligence, decision-making in contemporary societies is increasingly delegated to automated processes. Drawing from social science theories and from the emerging body of research about algorithmic appreciation and algorithmic perceptions, the current study explores the extent to which personal characteristics can be linked to perceptions of automated decision-making by AI, and the boundary conditions of these perceptions, namely the extent to which such perceptions differ across media, (public) health, and judicial (...) contexts. Data from a scenario-based survey experiment with a national sample (N = 958) show that people are by and large concerned about risks and have mixed opinions about fairness and usefulness of automated decision-making at a societal level, with general attitudes influenced by individual characteristics. Interestingly, decisions taken automatically by AI were often evaluated on par or even better than human experts for specific decisions. Theoretical and societal implications about these findings are discussed. (shrink)

With the increasing use of AI in high-stakes domains such as medicine, law, and defense, organizations spend a lot of time and money to make ML models trustworthy. Many books on the subject offer deep dives into theories and concepts. This guide provides a practical starting point to help development teams produce models that are secure, more robust, less biased, and more explainable. Authors Yada Pruksachatkun, Matthew McAteer, and Subhabrata Majumdar translate best practices in the academic literature for curating datasets (...) and building models into a blueprint for building industry-grade trusted ML systems. With this book, engineers and data scientists will gain a much-needed foundation for releasing trustworthy ML applications into a noisy, messy, and often hostile world. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence and robotics stand to change many aspects of our lives, including our values. If trends continue as expected, many industries will undergo automation in the near future, calling into question whether we can still value the sense of identity and security our occupations once provided us with. Likewise, the advent of social robots driven by AI, appears to be shifting the meaning of numerous, long-standing values associated with interpersonal relationships, like friendship. Furthermore, powerful actors’ and institutions’ (...) increasing reliance on AI to make decisions that may affect how people live their lives may have a significant impact on privacy while also raising issues about algorithmic transparency and human control. In this paper, building and expanding on previous works, we will look at how the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technology may lead to changes in identity, security, and other crucial values (such as friendship, fairness, and privacy). We will discuss what challenges we may face in the process, while critically reflecting on whether such changes may be desirable. Finally, drawing on a series of considerations underlying virtue ethics, we will formulate a set of preliminary suggestions, which—we hope—can be used to more carefully guide the future roll out of AI technologies for human flourishing; that is, for social and moral good. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence technologies become increasingly prominent in our daily lives, media coverage of the ethical considerations of these technologies has followed suit. Since previous research has shown that media coverage can drive public discourse about novel technologies, studying how the ethical issues of AI are portrayed in the media may lead to greater insight into the potential ramifications of this public discourse, particularly with regard to development and regulation of AI. This paper expands upon previous research by systematically analyzing (...) and categorizing the media portrayal of the ethical issues of AI to better understand how media coverage of these issues may shape public debate about AI. Our results suggest that the media has a fairly realistic and practical focus in its coverage of the ethics of AI, but that the coverage is still shallow. A multifaceted approach to handling the social, ethical and policy issues of AI technology is needed, including increasing the accessibility of correct information to the public in the form of fact sheets and ethical value statements on trusted webpages, collaboration and inclusion of ethics and AI experts in both research and public debate, and consistent government policies or regulatory frameworks for AI technology. (shrink)

This article examines ethical implications of the growing AI carbon footprint, focusing on the fair distribution of prospective responsibilities among groups of involved actors. First, major groups of involved actors are identified, including AI scientists, AI industry, and AI infrastructure providers, from datacenters to electrical energy suppliers. Second, responsibilities of AI scientists concerning climate warming mitigation actions are disentangled from responsibilities of other involved actors. Third, to implement these responsibilities nudging interventions are suggested, leveraging on AI competitive games which would (...) prize research combining better system accuracy with greater computational and energy efficiency. Finally, in addition to the AI carbon footprint, it is argued that another ethical issue with a genuinely global dimension is now emerging in the AI ethics agenda. This issue concerns the threats that AI-powered cyberweapons pose to the digital command, control, and communication infrastructure of nuclear weapons systems. (shrink)

Despite the increase in the research field of ethics in artificial intelligence, most efforts have focused on the debate about principles and guidelines for responsible AI, but not enough attention has been given to the “how” of applied ethics. This paper aims to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics by identifying how companies are applying those guidelines and principles in practice. Through a qualitative methodology based on 22 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups, (...) the goal of the current study is to understand how companies approach ethical issues related to AI systems. A structured analysis of the transcripts brought out many actual practices and findings, which are presented around the following main research topics: ethics and principles, privacy, explainability, and fairness. The interviewees also raised issues of accountability and governance. Finally, some recommendations are suggested such as developing specific sector regulations, fostering a data-driven organisational culture, considering the algorithm’s complete life cycle, developing and using a specific code of ethics, and providing specific training on ethical issues. Despite some obvious limitations, such as the type and number of companies interviewed, this work identifies real examples and direct priorities to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics, with a specific focus on Spanish companies. (shrink)

The popularisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has sparked discussion about their ethical implications. This development has forced governmental organisations, NGOs, and private companies to react and draft ethics guidelines for future development of ethical AI systems. Whereas many ethics guidelines address values familiar to ethicists, they seem to lack in ethical justifications. Furthermore, most tend to neglect the impact of AI on democracy, governance, and public deliberation. Existing research suggest, however, that AI can threaten key elements of western democracies (...) that are ethically relevant. In this paper, Rawls’s theory of justice is applied to draft a set of guidelines for organisations and policy-makers to guide AI development towards a more ethical direction. The goal is to contribute to the broadening of the discussion on AI ethics by exploring the possibility of constructing AI ethics guidelines that are philosophically justified and take a broader perspective of societal justice. The paper discusses how Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and its key concepts relate to the ongoing developments in AI ethics and gives a proposition of how principles that offer a foundation for operationalising AI ethics in practice could look like if aligned with Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (shrink)

Fairness in machine learning (ML) is an ever-growing field of research due to the manifold potential for harm from algorithmic discrimination. To prevent such harm, a large body of literature develops new approaches to quantify fairness. Here, we investigate how one can divert the quantification of fairness by describing a practice we call “fairness hacking” for the purpose of shrouding unfairness in algorithms. This impacts end-users who rely on learning algorithms, as well as the broader community (...) interested in fair AI practices. We introduce two different categories of fairness hacking in reference to the established concept of p-hacking. The first category, intra-metric fairness hacking, describes the misuse of a particular metric by adding or removing sensitive attributes from the analysis. In this context, countermeasures that have been developed to prevent or reduce p-hacking can be applied to similarly prevent or reduce fairness hacking. The second category of fairness hacking is inter-metric fairness hacking. Inter-metric fairness hacking is the search for a specific fair metric with given attributes. We argue that countermeasures to prevent or reduce inter-metric fairness hacking are still in their infancy. Finally, we demonstrate both types of fairness hacking using real datasets. Our paper intends to serve as a guidance for discussions within the fair ML community to prevent or reduce the misuse of fairness metrics, and thus reduce overall harm from ML applications. (shrink)

This book addresses the European Court of Human Rights’ fairness standards in criminal appeal, filling a gap in this less researched area of studies. Based on a fair trial immediacy requirement, the Court has found several violations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights at the appellate level by at least eighteen States of the Council of Europe in a vast array of cases, particularly in contexts of first instance acquittals overturning and of sentences increasing on (...) appeal. -/- On the one hand, the book critically engages this case-law with the law revisions it has recently inspired in European countries, as well as with the critiques and difficulties that it continues to raise. On the other hand, it interweaves insight from criminal procedure theory with new discoveries in the field of cognitive sciences (neuroscience of memory, philosophy of knowledge, AI), shedding an interdisciplinary light on the (in)adequacy and limits of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence is playing an increasingly prevalent role in our lives. Whether its landing a job interview, getting a bank loan or accessing a government program, organizations are using automated systems informed by AI enabled technologies in ways that have significant consequences for people. At the same time, there is a lack of transparency around how AI technologies work and whether they are ethical, fair or accurate. This paper examines a body of literature related to the ethical considerations surrounding the (...) use of artificial intelligence and the role of ethical codes. It identifies and explores core issues including bias, fairness and transparency and looks at who is setting the agenda for AI ethics in Canada and globally. Lastly, it offers some suggestions for next steps towards a more inclusive discussion. (shrink)

Fairness is central to the ethical and responsible development and use of AI systems, with a large number of frameworks and formal notions of algorithmic fairness being available. However, many of the fairness solutions proposed revolve around technical considerations and not the needs of and consequences for the most impacted communities. We therefore want to take the focus away from definitions and allow for the inclusion of societal and relational aspects to represent how the effects of AI (...) systems impact and are experienced by individuals and social groups. In this paper, we do this by means of proposing the ACROCPoLis framework to represent allocation processes with a modeling emphasis on fairness aspects. The framework provides a shared vocabulary in which the factors relevant to fairness assessments for different situations and procedures are made explicit, as well as their interrelations. This enables us to compare analogous situations, to highlight the differences in dissimilar situations, and to capture differing interpretations of the same situation by different stakeholders. (shrink)

To create fair and accountable AI and robotics, we need precise regulation and better methods to certify, explain, and audit inscrutable systems.

Since the launch of applications such as DALL-E, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion, generative artificial intelligence has been controversial as a tool for creating artwork. While some have presented longtermist worries about these technologies as harbingers of fully automated futures to come, more pressing is the impact of generative AI on creative labour in the present. Already, business leaders have begun replacing human artistic labour with AI-generated images. In response, the artistic community has launched a protest movement, which argues that AI (...) image generation is a kind of theft. This paper analyzes, substantiates, and critiques these arguments, concluding that AI image generators involve an unethical kind of labour theft. If correct, many other AI applications also rely upon theft. (shrink)

There is now a robust literature on the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) that pertains largely to non-military issues – issues of, among other things, bias, fairness, and unintended consequences. There is less published work, however, on how these lessons from industry and academia might inform the ethics of AI in the military context. In this article, I take small steps to demonstrate the ways in which the field of AI ethics might be relevant to military applications. Ultimately, I (...) argue that even though the outcomes of AI failures might look very different in the non-military context versus in the military context, the causes of those failures can be very similar; and addressing those potential causes of AI failures in the development of military AI systems will result in fewer ethical failures after deployment. (shrink)

AI-driven decisions can draw data from virtually any area of your life to make a decision about virtually any other area of your life. That creates fairness issues. Effective regulation to ensure fairness requires that AI systems be transparent. That is, regulators must have sufficient access to the factors that explain and justify the decisions. One approach to transparency is to require that systems be explainable, as that concept is understood in computer science. A system is explainable if (...) one can provide a human-understandable explanation of why it makes any particular prediction. Explainability should not be equated with transparency. To address transparency and characterize its relation to explainability, we define transparency for a regulatory purpose. A system is transparent for a regulatory purpose (r-transparent) when and only when regulators have an explanation, adequate for that purpose, of why it yields the predictions it does. Explainability remains relevant to transparency but turns out to be neither necessary nor sufficient for it. The concepts of explainability and r-transparency combine to yield four possibilities: explainable and either r-transparent or not; and not explainable and either not r-transparent or r-transparent. Combining r-transparency with ideas from the Harvard computer scientist Cynthia Dwork, we propose four requirements on AI systems. (shrink)