There exist two methods for finding the magnetic moment of the electron. The first method employed in quantum electrodynamics consists in calculating the energy of the electron placed in a constant magnetic field, the extra energy due to the field being proportional to the magnetic moment. It is also possible to use the second method proceeding from the fact that the asymptotic form of the vector potential at infinity is proportional to the magnetic moment. If the electron were point-like, both (...) the methods would yield identical results. In the present paper is studied the magnetic field created by the electron in hydrogen-like ions, which enables one to find the electron magnetic moment by the second method. The electron magnetic moment in this case proves to be different in different states of the electron in the Coulomb field of the ions and, moreover, is distinct from the magnetic moment calculated by the first method. The results of the paper show that the electron is not small and is deformable under action of external fields. (shrink)

The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he (...) attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness. (shrink)

The paper aims to show how in practice the requirement to maintain the coherence of the system of beliefs and the corresponding behavior of «spontaneous beliefs» within the concept of empirical knowledge by L. Bonjour can be correlated. The main example considered is P. Kosso’s arguments about the reliability of Thucydides’ «History» connected with the idea of possibility of justification restricted to a single source of evidence. As a heuristics we deal with the problem of how to establish the contextual (...) dependence of inference and, in general, of the structure of the justification of knowledge within the given situation. First, it is possible to extend L. Bonjour’s concept with the idea of the nonmonotonic nature of justification and coherence of the original system of beliefs. Such a step, in particular, will make it possible to abandon the need for the argument «from meta-justification». Second, the interpretation of «spontaneous beliefs», their justification and facts fixing whether these beliefs violate the coherence of the original system or not, as patterns (in the sense of the fundamental concept of existence by D. Ross) makes it possible (for example, due to the exact understanding of «interpretative perspective» and «functional role» of the projection) to meaningfully interpret the «context dependence» in each particular case. (shrink)

The development of string theory shows an unusual situation within the development of knowledge theory. Science achieves progress in understanding nature without direct empirical confirmation. Definitely, “an altered conception of scientific progress emerges” (R. Dawid). In our opinion, the only possibility to understand the new situation is to adopt some kind of naturalized epistemology. Naturalization viewed as declining of the a-prioriticity of philosophical knowledge, first, and reintroducing of psychology, second (P. Kitcher), gives many naturalized approaches in the realism debate field. (...) Is it possible to extend realism heritage into the ironic science like string theory? Yes, but of course we should be bothered by the semantics issue in such a case. As Michael Devitt noted, the main question is not even the question about the connection between realism and truth, but the question about the role of semantics in general. We think that Devitt’s interpretation of the semantics role allows to extend realism even into the ironic science. (shrink)

Jonathan Lowe believes that metaphysics should regain its central place in philosophy. It is an autonomous philosophical discipline, which task is to outline the realm of what is really possible by defining a system of fundamental ontological categories under which everything that exists falls, and relations of ontological dependence in which objects of various ontological categories are related to each other. Metaphysical categories are what gives meaning to our experience, however, unlike I. Kant, they are not the result of a (...) priori constraints – on the contrary, they are subject to revision in the face of experience. The question of why there is something in the world rather than nothing, is solved with a non-Wittgensteinian understanding of what the world is (world is the sum of all existing objects because world as “the totality of facts” lacks determinate identity-conditions), as well as an understanding that universals must be actually instantiated in particulars. Far from being an easy textbook in the proper sense, this book is a brilliant example of the return of Aristotle to modern metaphysics. Reflections on the book: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998. (shrink)

The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific (...) theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns. (shrink)

Laurence Bonjour believes that foundationalism is a dead end. Literally all possible reasons for basic beliefs have been analyzed – externalism, the doctrine of the given, and a priori justification. Externalism, where the basic factors of justification are tied up to the causal or nomological in nature relations between the subject and the world, cannot overcome skepticism and is the way for accepting belief as basic only for those who are aware of these relations. Direct apprehension of the given can (...) provide epistemic support only if the knowledge itself is constructed in such a way that this support is necessary. The appeal to the fact that basic beliefs, justified a priori, can stop the regress of empirical justification does not pick out the difference between justification and warrant. The conclusion is not comforting: there is no way in which basic empirical beliefs could be justified without their justification being dependent on other empirical beliefs that themselves require justification. The argument against the existence of basic empirical beliefs and the accompanying reception of the problems of justification of empirical knowledge in a line with classical epistemology (internalism, realism, correspondence theory of truth) are still the best examples of a corresponding philosophical reflection over the past forty years. The review is a detailed analysis of the first part of L. Bonjour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 1–4), dedicated to the criticism of foundationalism. (shrink)

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic (...) concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific real- ism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epis- temic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007. (shrink)

The key point of Laurence BonJour’s coherentist conception of the justification of empirical knowledge is the coherentist concept of observation, which (a) postulates that there is a special class of cognitively spontaneous beliefs with which the system’s beliefs must cohere in order to be considered justified; (b) their reliability is determined within the system as a consequence of our generalization on a set of facts when a belief appears, and it is highly likely to be true, and it is likely (...) to appear in a situation in which it will be true; and (c) the subject has the ability to reflexively grasp the approximate content of his own belief system. Among the main sources of inspiration used by L. BonJour, one can find the conceptions of “language-entry transition” by W. Sellars and “truth-sufficiency” by W. Alston. Much of the material is devoted to arguing for the final argument for cognitively spontaneous beliefs. The review is a detailed analysis of the second part of L. BonJour’s book «The Structure of Empirical Knowledge» (chapters 5–6), dedicated to foundations for a coherentist theory of justification of empirical knowledge. (shrink)

The article presents the results of the analysis of international legal regulation of the protection of freedom of speech, the right to freedom of expression within the UN and the Council of Europe. A comparative analysis of the definition of the right to express views and beliefs in various international legal acts was made. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases related to the exercise of the right to express one's views and beliefs on the (...) Internet was considered. The analysis of the legislation of foreign countries regulating the right to express views and beliefs online was carried out. The materials of the article are of practical value for scientists and practitioners dealing with the issues of legal regulation of freedom of speech, the right to express views and beliefs, for forecasting and planning scientific research, improving legislation, for higher education teachers in educational activities, as well as for all interested persons. (shrink)

The emphasis on the fact that the philosophy of science is not always the philosophy of physics, and the use of immunology as the main example makes it possible for Robert Klee to clearly demonstrate that the essence of introduction is not only and not so much to show the development of problems in a historical context, but to point out to the fact that even the most fundamental assumptions and basic intuitions are not immune to criticism. Wide coverage - (...) from formal presentation of theories, Duhem - Quine thesis and the problem of explanation to social constructivism and the feminist philosophy of science, together with the relentless justification of the need for scientific realism, makes the textbook one of the best in its genre. Reflections on the book: Klee R. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams. Oxford University Press, 1997. (shrink)

The critical scientific realism by I. Niiniluoto is one of the few concepts that speaks not only of scientific realism, but also of reality itself. Such an elements of the concept, like tropic realism - the minimal ontological realism (in the Putnam’s sense), stating that there is no single true description of reality, or the idea that the knowledge can be a subject of the analysis of false beliefs (by definition, truthlike beliefs do not have to be true) - are (...) the best ways to illustrate how I. Niiniluoto understands the contemporary trend to imply vagueness into definitions of the main philosophical categories like “ontological object”, “truth value”, etc. Reflections on the book: Niiniluoto I. Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press, 1999. (shrink)

The relationship between theory and reality in archeology is a classic example that illustrates the significance and diversity of the main problem of philosophy of science. From the epistemological point of view, the problem of the status of archaeological data is one of the examples of the problem of the theory-ladenness of observations within the corresponding naturalistic perspective. Trying to solve the problem of epistemic independence of the data, which corroborates the justification of the statements about the past, Peter Kosso (...) offers a concept of «weighted coherence». Reflections on the book: Kosso P. Knowing the Past: Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001. (shrink)

Using relevant encyclicals issued over the last 100 years, the author extracts those principles that constitute the underpinnings of Catholic Social Teaching about the employment relationship and contemplates implications of their incorporation into human resource policy. Respect for worker dignity, for his or her family's economic security, and for the common good of society clearly emerge as the primary guidelines for responsible human resource management. Dovetailing these three Church mandates with the economic objectives of the firm could, in essence, alter (...) the firm's nature because profit motivations would be constrained by consideration for worker and societal welfare. Integration of Church teaching with current corporate goals should therefore impact greatly on a variety of human resource policies. (shrink)

My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...) not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes. (shrink)

From the diverse work and often competing insights of women's human rights activists, Brooke Ackerly has written a feminist and a universal theory of human rights that bridges the relativists' concerns about universalizing from particulars and the activists' commitment to justice. Unlike universal theories that rely on shared commitments to divine authority or to an 'enlightened' way of reasoning, Ackerly's theory relies on rigorous methodological attention to difference and disagreement. She sets out human rights as at once a research ethic, (...) a tool for criticism of injustice and a call to recognize our obligations to promote justice through our actions. This book will be of great interest to political theorists, feminist and gender studies scholars and researchers of social movements. (shrink)

This paper addresses problems related to transferring market concepts to non-market domains. More specifically it is about fallacies following from the use of the commodity concept in environmental valuation studies. First of all, the standard practice tends to misconstrue the ethical aspects related to environmental choices by forcing them into becoming ordinary trade-off problems. Second, the commodity perspective ignores important technical interdependencies within the environment and the relational character of environmental goods. These are all properties that have made many such (...) goods escape the commoditisation pressure of markets in the first place. Further, it is shown that these interdependencies are the source of some of the ethical dilemmas observed. Finally, inherent characteristics of the environment tend to make the concept of the margin, so indispensable to economic calculus, either difficult or irrelevant to define. The commodity 'fiction' twists the perception of the environment from systems preservation to items use or transformation. This is a problem of increased importance as we approach potential systems perturbations. (shrink)

Moral education through service learning at post-secondary level is an important but under-researched field. Most existing studies center on its learning outcomes like academic progress, personal development, communication, and leadership skills, with only a few evaluating the moral development of college students participating in service-learning projects. The lack of study on moral development in service learning indicates a need for clarification of the theoretical underpinnings of service learning, John Dewey's ideas on moral growth, in particular his model of moral imagination (...) and the implications thereof, for current service-learning research and practice. We argue that Dewey's work here can help strengthen .. (shrink)

Because metaphysics aims for absolute generality, its primary job is to tell us what are the fundamental particulars, of which one may say that is ultimately all there is, and yet be assured of an unabridged version of reality. It should be clear that such a search for the fundamental particulars is totally different from the enterprise of determining which particulars are basic from the point of view of particular-identification, which though it has recently been labeled "metaphysics," albeit "descriptive metaphysics," (...) might less confusingly be called "descriptive epistemology.". (shrink)

As is well known, some paradoxes arise through inadequate analysis of the meanings of terms in a language, an adequate analysis showing that the paradoxes arise through a lack of separation of an object theory and a metatheory. Under such an adequate analysis in which parts of the metatheory are modelled in the object theory, the paradoxes give way to remarkable theorems establishing limitations of the object theory.Such a modelling is often accomplished by a Gödel numbering. Here we shall use (...) a somewhat different technique in axiomatic set theory, from which we shall reap a few results having the effect of comparing the strength of various axiom schema of comprehension for sets and classes. Similar results were obtained by A. Mostowski [7] using Gödel numbering. (shrink)

What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of (...) the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)