Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is the renewal of (...) theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl made (...) it possible. They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious (...) legitimacy of the science of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Though, the tradition of Muslim religious-scientific work in the Indian Subcontinent can be traced back to 12th century, especially Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, Shaykh Abd al-Haqq Muhaddith Dihlawī, Shaykh Abdur Rahim and Shah Waliullah are the most important figures of 18th century and later. Examined carefully the works on aqaid and ‘ilm al-kalām written by these scholars of Sunni tradition, in the light of the method adopted by them, it is seen that they are either regarded as traditionalist, modernist or (...) rationalist. Meanwhile, Shiism, which was already present in the Subcontinent since the rise of the Safavid Dynasty with scholars from Ithnā ‘Ashariyah (Twelver Shiites) and Ismā‘ilīyah, is also influential in the region with their thoughts and works. Similarly, considering the works of later Shiite scholars, it can be said that some are considered to have a traditionalist perspective while others to have modernist. Apart from all these, Qādiyānīs, except Lahor branch, took also place in the history of Indian Subcontinent thought as a heretic formation within the Islamic tradition. The aim of this study which was prepared via the data obtained by the support of Erciyes University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit under grant number 8217 is to present a bibliographical survey of the works on aqâid and ‘ilm al-kalām focusing on the development of Islamic thought in the Indian Subcontinent, especially after Shah Waliullah. (shrink)

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should be no possibility of this knowledge (...) to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

The need for renewal felt in various fields with the Tanẓīmat, and the changes and modernization activities realized in accordance with it, and the nature and boundaries of these activities are important issues that determine the period's intellectual agenda. Some of the proposals for a solution to save the state are related to the renewal of religious thought. The bad situation in the Ottoman Empire stems from the way religion is understood, not from religion itself, and one of the names (...) that produce ideas about the necessity of changing this way of thinking is Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri. He believes that Fiqh and Exegeticsshould be based on the work of updating the content of Islamic Sciences within the framework of contemporary needs. Claiming that the basic need of society is not Science of Kalām but Catechism, Kadri claims that the attempt of the science of Kalām, regulated to respond to the needs of the age will not result in even will cause religious conflict among people. In this article, Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri'sintellectual background, his suggestions for the renewal of religious thought and his objection to the new Science of Kalām are discussed.Summary: What defines the history of late Ottoman period is the concept called change. There have been reform attempts in order to canalise the military, economic, socio-cultural change and transformation due to political turmoil starting from the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century. Basic argument regarding these reforms finds its base on Qanūn al-Qadīm and the idea of returning to Sharia. Along with the Declaration of the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Edict of Gulhane) the previous reforms which were made earlier changed dimension and westernization became a government policy. During the ongoing process, the change in terms of Westernization became a current issue within every segment of Ottoman society. Need for innovation in various areas, and therefore the change and modernization movements and accordingly these movements’ nature and boundries set the intellectual agenda of the era. Some of the suggestions are associated with renewal of the religious thought which are to keep the State from difficult situation it is in. Solutions proposed in this context creates a rich intellectual discussion environment within Western, Islamist, and Turkist intellectuals. Islamists in general terms are of the opinion that the difficult situation Ottoman is in does not stem from the religion itself but the way of understanding religion; and they are of the opinion that this way of thinking should be altered; when they bring about their suggestions, it is seen that the way of thinking is their starting point. What causes the Islamists fall apart within themselves is the nature of renawal. Islamist intellectuals, supporting the idea which is the content of islamic knowledge should be updated according the needs of era, suggest various ideas in terms of which dicipline should be in charge for the needs in question. While some intellectuals are of the opinion Kalām should be prioritised, some are of the opinion Fiqh and Exegetics should be prioritised. Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri, who wrote under the pseudonym of Shaykh Muḥsin-i Fānῑ ez-Ẓāhirῑ, is one of these intellectuals coming up with an idea. Kadri suggests a renawal in thinking based upon Fiqh and ExegeticsḤüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis one of the most prominent intellectuals of Constitutional Period. Working as a governor of an Ottoman province, deputy, and minister and engaging in journalism, Kadri compiles a series of work in religion, language and agriculture. All of his efforts are to find ways of saving Ottoman from its difficult situations. Thus, Kadri questions the quality of the knowledge which was brought about in religious thinking and proposes solutions. What lies under his solution is the need for a dicipline for society’ s practical problems. He bases his opinion on opposition to new theology movement. According to Kadri, ever since Kalām was codified, it has never been useful to Muslims, on the contrary it has impaired the Muslims. Renowation of Kalām creates nothing but problem. In his opinion, due to using Greek philosophy content and method, Kalām is not a dicipline authentic to Muslims, besides it is a harmful dicipline which aims to damage the essence of Islam.One of the reasons why Kalām is out of Islamic thinking tradition is because of the Mu'tazila wises are the founders of this dicipline. Kadri is of the opinion that the wises/intellectuals belonging to this school and their theories regarding to understand the existence do not contribute to the field of faith. Admitting the function of Ahl-al Sunnah school generated after the Mihna Period, Kadri states the insufficient side of that function. To him, hence the subjects such as substance (cevher) –accident (araz), hudûth-eternality, wujud (vücûd)-nothingness (adem) etc have been discussed but at that time the subject in question could not be renovated in regard to needs. Another criticism of Kadri raised against Kalām is he considers this field the reason why Muslims are divided. Especially during the times when Muslims need to be in unity and solidarity, Kadri is worried about new discursion which will occur due to the renovation of Kalām attempts. This concern of Kadri causes him to object Kalām with a pragmatic motive.Kalām which is called Usulu'd-Din is another reason why Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis against Kalām. In his opinion, theologians complicates the subjects such as amalgation and adjectives of Allah instead of making it clear with ijtihad. Kadri who considers offering proof in terms of faith as faithlessness is of the opinion that faith is not a matter of reason but a matter of sense which has no doubt among people. Criticising the struggle for the enquiry of faith, Kadri puts an emphasis on the significance of the reinterpretation of the principles, for example in the field of Fiqh which deals with the practical area and says it is the most prominent religious duty. He also criticises the imitation of the past and remarks the importance of reason in Fiqh. As an alternative to Ilm-i Kalām, he claims a new Catechism and adds, it is going to provide the religious knowledge people need. It is an ideological contrast of Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadrito think Kalām is the reason for all the misfortune Muslims encountered. This opposition causes him to ignore all the accumulation in Kalām field. Moreover, it is the reason why he makes emotional deductions conflicting with historical facts. Kalām plays a role just like the other fields who could not contribute to Islamic Thinking and its renovation process in accordance with the needs of time. However, it is not realistic and reasonable to think Kalām is the only one responsible. (shrink)

Following the formation of disciplines/sciences in different fields of Islamic thought, the specific concepts and terminologies of these disciplines/sciences began to emerge. Then the special meaning and the area of utilization for every concept in each discipline/science were further clarified by compiling specific epistles of definition (ḥudūd), which would contribute to this process of conceptualization. For the terminological meaning of the used concept to be determined primarily and thus for the followed theological/sectarian affiliation to be supported, works belonging to this (...) genre have been written specifically for the field of theology. Especially, the Muʿtazilī theologians undoubtedly made the greatest contribution. Thusly, specific treatises containing theological concepts were compiled by names such as al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), and his students Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. after 420/1029) and Ibn Sharwīn (fl. first half of the Vth/XIth century). Zaydī theologian and jurist Abū’l-Qāsim al-Bustī’s (d. 420/1029) Tahdhīb al-ḥudūd, which has no available copy, is also contemporary to the mentioned works. This tradition found its reflection in the Imāmī-Muʿtazilī line in Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 460/1067) al-Muqaddimah fī l-madkhal ilá ṣināʿat ʿilm al-kalām, which could be seen as a concise theological work in terms of its construct and the explanations which it comprises, and in the work called al-Ḥudūd wa-l-ḥaqāʾiq, which is attributed to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍá (d. 436/1044). Abū Jaʿfar al-Muqrī al-Nīsābūrī’s (d. mid-VIth/XIIth century [?]) al-Ḥudūd stands out as the most voluminous example in this tradition. The most important work belonging to this genre in the Muʿtazilī tradition, as it is the first among the available works, is the Ḥudūd al-alfāẓ of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, which is found together with some other important Zaydī-Muʿtazilī works in a compilation discovered by us and thought to be lost until recently. In this treatise, which generally includes theological concepts and partially includes the concepts of Islamic law and the history of sects, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār has put forward a language-based definition theory. His approach here is in line with the views he put forward on definition in his al-Mughnī. Accordingly, instead of definition (ḥadd) and description (rasm) carried out over five universals in classical logic, he adopted a method of lexical definition based on wording that agrees with the meaning of the concept in question and is clearer than it, and consequently gave a brief definition and explanation of the concept he deals with. This clearly shows that the previous Muʿtazilī theologians’ approach of language-based definition, which was used as an alternative to the conception of Aristotelian definition due to their distanced stance to philosophy was also inherited by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. The approach seen in some sources in the period following al-Qāḍī, such as Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī’s al-Ḥudūd, also indicates his influence. (shrink)

Kamal al-Dīn al-Andijānī is one of the lesser-known Māturīdī theologians who lived in the eighth century. He has a work titled Sıdḳ al-kalam fi ilm al-kalam that has survived. In the work, which was written within the framework of usul al-salase, answers are given to those who have opinions other than the Ahl as-Sunnah, and the views of the Ahl as-Sunnah are tried to be proven. In the work, subjects related to jinns are also included, and the subject is explained (...) with different examples and events. In this article, Andijani's views on jinn are discussed, and these views are tried to be evaluated in the light of classical and current sources. Not many studies have been done on Andijani. Therefore, the scientific world does not know him well enough. In addition, his views on jinn are perhaps not known at all. In this respect, we believe that our study will fill this gap to some extent. Literature review, comparison, and concept analysis methods have been used in the study, and the subject has been limited to Andijani's Sıdḳ al-kalam. Considering Andijani's claim that he dealt with the views of Ahl al-Sunnah with solid evidence and concisely, it is clear that his views reflect the views of both the Māturīdis of the time and the scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah in general. In order to evaluate Andijani's views in a correct way, first of all, the concept of jinn and the pre-Islamic jinn perception are mentioned in the article. The way in which the Qur'an deals with the subject of jinn and the determination of its purpose constitutes our most important pillar that gives the main perspective to our study. In this context, it can be said that the concept of jinn encompasses all beings that cannot be perceived by the five senses. It is seen that the pre-Islamic jinn perception affected people's lives in different layers, from fear to worship. Fear caused by lack of knowledge can either end with the elimination of incomplete knowledge or by taking shelter or worshiping the feared entity. In pre-Islamic societies, sheltering or worshiping the feared entity was preferred. This preference resulted in people seeing the jinn as superior to themselves, taking shelter in them or worshiping them. On the other hand, it is possible to say that the narratives in the Qur'an about jinn are aimed at creating a solid foundation of knowledge that removes people's fear of jinn. In this framework, when Andijani's views on jinn are evaluated, it can be determined that he focuses on two issues, namely the basic characteristics of jinn and their religious status. In Andjijani's understanding, it is seen that jinn are described as beings invisible to humans, able to enter human bodies, affect them, eat, drink and change shape. Andijani also announced opinions about the religious situation of the jinn. According to him, jinn can also belong to non-Islamic religions. In terms of belief and practice, they belong to many sects. Andijani expressed his views also on the situation of jinn in the hereafter. Even if sinful believers of the jinn die without repentance like humans, Allah can forgive them before or after punishment. According to Andijani, there is a difference of opinion among Hanafis and Māturīdis regarding the situation of the faithful believers of the jinn in the hereafter. Andijani includes the views of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yusuf and Imam Muḥammad, who put forward opposing views, and explains the evidences of both sides. He ends the subject without expressing his own opinion. When Andijani's views are considered in terms of the purpose of the Qur'an in dealing with the jinn, it is understood that he accepted this information as a kind of news "fâide-i haber", which is only to provide information and the first time heard by the addressee. However, the news of the Qur'an about jinn is of the type of news "lâzım-ı fâide-i haber", which aims to teach another lesson on the information that the addressee was previously aware of. Therefore, the purpose of the expression in the news about jinn is important, not the apparent purpose, but revealing another situation. It can be said that Andijani made evaluations on the mythological jinn perceptions of the Arabs and remained at that level, the information and evaluations he gave did not include the main message that the Qur'an wanted to give, and left many areas to be explained. The message that the Qur'an wants to convey through the beliefs of the Jahiliyya Arabs about jinn is to reinforce tawhid, to emphasize that humans are stronger beings than jinn. While there are messages brought by the Prophet Muḥammad, there is no need for news that are thought to be stolen by vile creatures such as jinn. (shrink)

Scholars of kalām have divided the knowledge into two as qadīm (eternal) and hādith (temporal) and correlated "al-‘ilm al-hādith" with humanbeings. They never regarded eternal and temporal knowledge as two distinct types of knowledge, rather they established the framework that eternal knowledge encompasses temporal knowledge. According to this definition, all the knowledge voluntarily emanate from humans are parts of "al-‘ilm al-hādith". Fundamental disciplines have emerged by addressing the same subject-matter from different perspectives and by using different methods. However, as (...) the knowledge these disciplines has accumulated, they became autonomous forgetting the epistemological axis to which they belonged and their interdisciplinary paradigm-based divergence has deepened gradually, resulting an epistemological disruption. Every discipline by starting a process of forming their own "reality", this divergence between the disciplines have deepened paving the way for the stage of "differentiation". This negative network of interrrelational structure between the disciplines has also affected the human interactions causing an institutionalisation in that regard. Throughout history, kalām has always sought to ensure an integration between different disciplines; therefore, it is obliged to put forth the disadvantages that were formed or will be formed by epistemological disruptions using its normative language. Thus, this work deals theoretically with the possibility of kalām being an epistemological axis for this regard. (shrink)

There are two widely accepted definitions of ilm al-tafsīr in the hāshiyahs on Anwār al-Tanzīl. The most accepted ones are as follows: Tafsīr is the science that investigates the states of the word of Allah in terms of signifying the will of Allah. This definition mainly belongs to al-Taftāzānī in his hāshiyah on al-Kashshāf. Despite the objections directed to it, the definition was accepted in the later phases and there were not any detailed discussions on it. From this point of (...) view, it can be concluded that there is a common tafsīr definition in Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs due to the fact that the majority concurred with this definition. The prevalence of this definition is also out of the question for al-Kashshāf hāshiyahs. Its prevalence in the following literature may be attributed to its implementation in accordance with the definition requirements. Because in the definitions made based on the subject, the subject is regarded as genus, and how this subject is addressed is also considered as a difference (fasl). Accordingly, in the above definition, the subject of the tafsīr is explained as the states of Kalam, and the direction in which it is addressed is expressed in terms of the will of Allah. Thus, the subject of tafsīr and its research direction were explained and its difference from other sciences researching the Qur’ān was also stated. According to the second most widespread definition in the hāshiyahs, tafsīr is a science in which the meanings of the Kalam of Allah are known in terms of human capacity/capability. This definition is more or less a description (rasm) compared to the previous one. Hence, it is a looser definition. For this reason, the definition does not allow tafsīr to be separated from other sciences. Because, the meanings of words in the Qur’ān, language sciences and religious sciences are also explored. However, in the other definition, the difference of tafsīr was taken into consideration by including the directional record and the will/intent expression more quickly. On the other hand, the second definition has a limitation of being based on human capacity/capability that reveals some features of the tafsīr more clearly. This limitation expresses that the research in tafsīr is based on suppositional data in one way and continuity in another. Both definitions in the hāshiyahs show that there are clear and common definitions of ilm al-tafsīr between the hijri 9th and 12th centuries. It is stated that with a few exceptions, in almost all of the hāshiyahs, the ilm al-tafsīr is divided into two parts as tafsīr and ta’wīl. The tafsīr here is based on narrative, and ta’wīl is based on reason. Explanation of both of them in this way can be seen in al-Kashshāf. Accordingly, it is understood that both concepts become evident in al-Kashshāf and Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs. However, when we look at some tafsīr introductions, and literature of ulūm al-Qur’ān, it is observed that vastly different explanations have been made about them. This gives the impression that there is no clear and widespread acceptance of them. However, by explaining as mentioned, their meaning becomes clear in the next literature. Because this explanation about them is essentially a statement that al-Māturīdī conveyed from his predecessors. Accordingly, an explanation about both concepts that was conveyed from the early period has gained acceptance and became widespread especially in the sharhs-hāshiyahs for the following process. Since al-Baydāwī associates both concepts with muhkam and mutashābih, the commentators also explained this relationship. They contain the definitions of the muhkam and mutashābih, which al-Baydāwī made in accordance with Shāfi‘ī method. Accordingly, muhkam are the ones that is clear in terms of what is meant, and do not need further explanation. Examples of muhkam are verses about shari‘a 'orders, inheritance distribution, transactions, and marriage issues. The provisions on these issues should be based on narrative, not reason. Thus, the explanation of muhkam becomes tafsīr. The mutashābih is interpreted since the meaning is not clear. In this case, their interpretation is also ta’wīl. The religious sciences that tafsīr benefits from are explained as being hadith, fiqh, theology, mysticism, and usūl al-fiqh, and this case expresses a general opinion. Literary sciences required for tafsīr are also described as glossary, derivation, morphology, grammar, bayān, ma‘ānī, and badī‘. However, there are two opinions about the knowledge of disciplines such as prosody, rhyme, qard al-shi‘r, khat, and inshā. According to one opinion, since these sciences are not related to the Qur’ān, it is not necessary to know them in order to interpret them. According to the other one, for a competent interpretation activity, these sciences must be known, and their data are thought to contribute to tafsīr. (shrink)

Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yusuf b. Muhammad al-Miklâtî is an Ash’arî scholar who lived between the years 550-626 (1155-1229). He has a work entitled Lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-uṣūl to defend the opinions of Ahl al-Sunnah by criticizing philosophical views. Miklātī is one of the most important figures who lived in the Muvahhidī state. He is a professor who contributed to learning of Ash’arī kalām system in the North Africa and Andalusia. But today it has not been demonstrated. (...) Therefore, in this article we looked at some theological views of Miklātī in the context of his criticism of the philosophical views.Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yûsuf b. Muhammad al-Miklātī is an Ash’arī scholar who lived in North Africa and Andalusia between the years 520-626 (1155-1229). He is one of the tutors working at madrasahs of the Muvahhidī state established by Ibn Tumart. Becoming meeting point of Salafī and philosophical understanding is one of the main factors which makes important the period and the region where he lived. Muvahhidīs on the one hand called for the returning to the Book and the Sunnah, and ordered to burn the works of Malikī fuqahā related to the branches (furūʿ) with the reason that they became distant from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. On the other hand, the last great represantatives of Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes wrote their most precious works at Muvahhidî palace.Only extant work of al-Miklâtî is Lubâb al-‘uqûl fî radd ‘alâ al-falâsifa fî ‘ilm al-uṣûl. In Lubâb al-‘uqûl, al-Miklâtî by giving a place to the philosophical opinions about theology, prophethood and the hereafter criticizes the viewpoints of Aristotle, from Periphatetic philosophers al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, from Mu’tazilah Abu Hudhayl al-‘Allaf and Qa’bî. He has benefited from the works of Ash’arî theologians like Baqillanî, al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazzâlî when he make criticism. Especially in the theology section, when he considers some subjects he has followed the method which al-Ghazzalî used in his Tahâfut which was written to criticize the philosophers. However, with the impact of the fuqahâ, who has Salafî understanding, and that of the Islamic philosopher Averroes, the ruler of the region ordered to burn the works of al-Ghazzâlî and notify that whoever has these works will be killed and whose wealth will be seized. In this regard al-Miklâtî’s work has an important contribution to the settlement of Ash’arî theology against Salafî and philosophical opposition.The main reason of the opposition of Salafî understanding towards the science of Kalâm is the claim that Kalâm has been established through outward impacts at a philosophical basement. The main reason of opposition of Averroes towards Kalâm is that Kalâm follows argumentative (jadalî) methods not instead of demonstrative ones (burhânî). This work of al-Miklâtî provides benefits to the establishment of Kalâm with the hands of Muslims and on the Qur’anic base and also has contributed to the development of a demonstrative tradition against philosophical opposition. Because according to him, the purpose of a theologian is to declare the demonstrative proofs which help for the soundness of the religious creed. Principles of the science of Kalâm are introduction, by which a theologian establishes his demonstrative proofs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology by Ramon HarveyArnold Yasin Mol (bio)Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology. By Ramon Harvey. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 280, Hardcover £90.00, isbn 978-1-4744-5164-2.When can it be claimed that a certain discipline is doing something so new and innovative, that it can be labeled as such? Or when is something so new and innovative that it can (...) no longer bear its original label? Either case signifies a level of discontinuity or rupture with the old ways of doing things. This is the fate of modern Islamic theology, which goes by the name kalām jadīd, New Theology.The discipline of Islamic philosophical or dialectical theology, ʿilm al-kalām, acquired its distinct methodology and themes in the first two centuries of Islam, becoming the defining intellectual voice of the Islamic worldview. Responding both to the developed theologies of Christianity and Zoroastrianism and other religions and philosophies, as well as responding to inner theological disputes, it combined comparative theology, philosophy of religion, and dogmatics. It developed its own indigenous rationalism, and integrated and adapted other philosophical ideas and methods, especially those of Aristotle and Neoplatonism. Islamicate civilization generated many native philosophers, like al-Kindī (d. 873) and al-Fārābī (d. 951), but it was Ibn Sīnā (Latin: Avicenna, d. 1037) who literally overturned metaphysical thought in such a radical way that theologians, including Jewish and Christian, speak of theology as before and after his influence.During the 750 years after the "Avicennian turn" many new philosophies have arisen, but none challenged the metaphysics of the Abrahamic theologies as much as Kant. Kalām can, similar to Christian Neo-Scholasticism, ignore the Kantian turn by restating their confidence in Peripatetic and Avicennian/Thomistic metaphysics, or it can integrate and adapt to it. The Muslim voices that have tried the latter are few but they have garnered more attention over the years. One of the biggest challenges of Kantian thought are towards retaining the classical proofs of God's existence, but also the possibility of speaking meaningfully of any type of metaphysical existence apart from empirical experience. The Ottoman theologian Muṣtafā Ṣabrī (d. 1954) emphasized that the Islamic ideas of prophethood and the unseen spiritual realm (ʿālam al-ghayb) would not fit the minimalistic metaphysics of Kant, as many Muslim modernists started to reject the idea of miracles, angels, and life after death. [End Page 1]Kalām jadīd, or (post-)Kantian kalām, has therefore the interesting challenge to either reconfigure Kantian metaphysics so that it can sustain traditional Islamic ideas to a certain degree, or the other way around. This challenge is not new as, although Peripatetic and Avicennian metaphysics provided the basis for proofs of God's existence, it also problematized Abrahamic theism, prophethood and resurrection of the body. Kalām jadīd can therefore learn much from its discursive tradition on how to deal with those challenges, if one's intent is to salvage the classical Islamic worldview.To this end, Ramon Harvey's Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology presents itself as a work of kalām jadīd but also as challenging important aspects of the discursive tradition it is using. When a discipline crystalizes into a certain epistemology and critical method, it attains a level of foundationalism whereby it becomes a tradition which is self-explanatory. This gives it a reasoning and stability which can be passed on over the centuries through certain core ideas and texts. Harvey sees this as the main problem explaining "why the kalām jadīd movement has been underwhelming." The Kantian turn upends the post-Avicennian foundationalism of kalam, forcing it to become an "open theology" that is "characterised by a receptiveness to diverse sources in its theological structure, prioritising meaning above systematic, foundationalist proof" (p. 5). The challenges for which a new theology has to be constructed are, according to Harvey, the developments in mathematics, logic, analytical philosophy, the phenomenological movement, and quantum mechanics (p. 2). Reality, and thinking about reality, are not the same anymore.The function of kalām is... (shrink)

The subject of this study will be to analyze the contribution of an important figure of the period known as the period of new ilm al kalām in the history of kalām, which started in the mid-nineteenth century and included the first periods of the Republic. This person is Mehmet Şerafettin Yaltkaya (1880-1947). Yaltkaya stands out with his original aspects such as being both a school and a madrasa student, representing his scholar and government bureaucrat personality together and (...) strongly, and his open support for the changes and transformation periods of Republican Turkey. It is known that difficult and troubled times in history have been the source of the emergence of rich intellectual movements. Yaltkaya was also nourished by such a political and intellectual hinterland. As is known, the changes in Western thought in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of atheist and materialist worldviews, which was one of the important reasons that caused us to open a new era in kalām. It has even been interpreted that the Ottoman scholars' work on the criticism of materialism was the main reason for the opening of this new era in kalām. In this regard, before discussing Yaltkaya's point of view and his contributions, we have tried to briefly discuss the historical conditions, changes and transformations of the new period of kalām, accompanied by the views of some of its representatives, which will help us to recognize the period. Secondly, we have endeavored to deal with the main dynamics of Şerafettin Yaltkaya's theological views, especially his scholarly and actional aspects that came to the fore in the course of his life, and in particular his up to date understanding of isbāt al-wājib regarding the existence of God and the social theory of kalām (ictimaī ilm al-kalām) about which the debates intensified. As far as we have been able to determine, Yaltkaya's theological views are actually a multiple-polarized structure that draws from all schools of kalām, philosophy, and Sufism. His interest in different disciplines of Islamic sciences and his curiosity in modern sciences also contributed to his vigorous personality. On the other hand, it must be said that he was also influenced by Western intellectuals and evaluated the possibilities of reason and instinct. Yaltkaya's support for Ottoman modernization and Republic reforms are among the significant aspects of Yaltkaya, both an Islamist and a kind of cultural nationalist. He made great contributions to the world of scholarship and thought of his time with his knowledge and works in different disciplines such as kalām, philosophy, literature, sufism history of sects and history of medicine. In addition, we believe that his lectures on kalām, philosophy and history of sects in important high schools and universities that were newly opened at the time and his position as the second head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs supported the background of his ideas that we highlight in this article. We have determined that Yaltkaya, who criticized the theological views of the traditional scholars, was also closely familiar with and influenced by Western scholars and philosophers who were his contemporaries. (shrink)

In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, mas̲h̲s̲h̲āʾiyyūn have been subjected to serious criticism in G̲h̲azālī’s (d. 1111) work Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, with the claim that their philosophical views are incoherent. Tahāfut, which pioneered the structural transformation of Islamic philosophy, is also the source of the tradition of Tahāfut in Islamic thought. Islamic philosophy in the Ottoman period presents a multidisciplinary structure in which the disciplines of ilm al-kalām, philosophy and taṣawwuf converge in terms of subject, purpose, and method. Besides, it (...) is the continuation of a tradition in which G̲h̲azālī’s thought is dominant in general. philosophy gained momentum with a competition for a work that Fatih Sultan Mehmed wanted to be written on G̲h̲azālī’s Tahāfut. In this competition, K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde’s (d. 1488) Tahāfut al-Falāsifa and Alāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 1482) Kitāb al-Zuhr competed and K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde’s work won the competition with major praise. This work of K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde entitled Tahāfut al-Falāsifa has an exceptional place in terms of its contribution to both the Islamic philosophy tradition and the tradition of tahāfut. This work, in terms of its theoretical approach, which has a feature that offers insight and method of addressing the issues systematically, is a typical example to the Islamic philosophy of the Ottoman period and gained a considerable reputation at that time. The original name of K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde’s work is Kitâb al-Tahāfut fi'l-Muhākama Bayna'l G̲h̲azālī wa'l Falāsifa. The work consists of twenty philosophical issues. K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde explained his views on all philosophical issues in these twenty-two issues, and also discussed the issues on which G̲h̲azālī conflicted with the philosophers. Three issues that have become important in the tradition of thought after al-G̲h̲azālī denounced the philosophers constitute the main subject of the work. The instructions and annotations written on this work made a great contribution to the development of philosophy in the tradition of Ottoman thought, and moreover, in a sense, it provided the revival of the dusty volume of tahâfut discussions. In this article, by using literature and data analysis methods, the tradition of tahāfut reflecting the course of Islamic philosophy in the Ottoman period and the place and importance of K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde’s tahāfut in this tradition will be revealed. Another aim of this study is the possible relations between K̲hōd̲j̲ā-Zāde's intellectual personality and the structural features of the Ottoman thought tradition. (shrink)

This chapter aims to draw on the critical threads of those vibrant theological conversations within the formative years of Islamic thought in considering the different theological models of the Divine within the broader Islamic tradition under the purview of classical theism as it is understood today in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In doing so, it makes reference to the major strands within the theological (‘ilm al- kalām & atharī scripturalism) and philosophical (falsafa) schools of the Islamic tradition. It (...) aims to consider how these different trends, schools, and thinkers construct a model of God in light of the classical and neo-classical theistic model of God. (shrink)

Abu Muhammad Ali b. Ahmed b. Hazm al-Andalusi (d. 456/1064), the greatest exponent of the Ẓahiriyya school, was a scholar producing important works with his identity as a jurist, hadith scholar, historian, literary man, and poet. He also persistently defended the understanding of Ahl as-Sunna against the sects that emerged within Islamic thought as he defended the superiority of Islam against other religions. In his works, he covered almost every topic of the kalam science; in this context, he was especially (...) interested in topics related to the possibility of prophethood, the prophethood of Muhammad and his being the last representative of the prophethood chain. Therefore, this study, based mainly on his works such as al-Fasl, al-Usul wa'l-Furu, ad-Durr fi ma Yecibu i'tikaduhu and Ilm al-Kalam ala Mazhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'a, deals with the topics of the possibility of prophecy, the prophethood of Prophet Muhammad, and the role and importance of miracles in proving it in the view of Ibn Hazm. Almost all Islamic scholars have based their systems for recognizing prophets on the evidence of miracles. According to them, a person who claims to be a prophet must bring extraordinary evidence to confirm his claim, and it is necessary for him to do so in order to make his opponents religiously responsible. For an event to be considered evidence that confirms the prophet's claim and to be called a miracle, it must have some characteristics, such as: it must be a divine act; it must appear in an extraordinary manner; it must occur together with the claim of prophecy and challenge; and it must occur immediately after the claim of the prophet. Therefore, it is believed that evidence that possesses these characteristics can prove the correctness of the claimant without needing any other evidence. The kalam scholars only call those events as miracles, which have the characteristic of challenging the dozens of evidences that prove the prophet's truthfulness. Therefore, it is without a doubt that the concept of miracle is a special concept invented by kalam scholars. When looking at Ibn Hazm’s views on the subject, which form the backbone of the study, it is necessary to state the following: Firstly, Ibn Hazm explains that prophecy is possible, that God chooses and sends messengers among the people, and that there is no difference among the prophets in terms of belief principles. Ibn Hazm emphasizes the role of miracles in identifying prophets and bases his system on this principle. However, he does not show much care in using the term "miracles" in the way that Kalam scholars accept it and does not aim to explain or list the characteristics or attributes of miracles as seen in Kalam books. He uses the term "miracles," which have been conceptualized over a long period of time, for every extraordinary event that belongs to the prophets, without considering these sensitivities. The most striking aspect of Ibn Hazm's understanding of miracles is that he does not consider the attribute of challenge, which is defined as a condition of a miracle, as necessary. He criticizes those who accept the attribute of a challenge as an essential part of miracles and argues that such an understanding would limit the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad. If the attribute of the challenge is accepted as a condition, then extraordinary events such as the blessing of food and drink, the moaning of wood in the mosque, and some animals coming and expressing their complaints would be excluded from the scope of miracles. This would mean limiting the evidence of Prophet Muhammad's prophecy. According to him, the creator of extraordinary events is God, and He creates them only to confirm His messengers. The events that occur in the hands of a person who claims to be a prophet should be considered a miracle. Therefore, he has named every event that occurred through the prophets as a miracle, regardless of its context and nature. In conclusion, according to Ibn Hazm, there are two types of events that occur in nature: Normal events and miraculous events. He refers to the latter as miracles and limits them to only occurring in the hands of prophets. He believes that events that occur in the hands of prophets, whether they possess the characteristic of tahaddî or not, should be referred to as miracles. Events that occur in the hands of people other than prophets do not possess the characteristics of miraculous events. If such events are claimed to be miraculous, the evidence of the prophets will be damaged. Therefore, Allah creates these events only for His messengers. Therefore, in the view of Ibn Hazm, concepts such as miracles of saints (karamat), magic, and divine help (maunat) do not have a counterpart. In fact, his attitude coincides with the Mu'tazilite tradition. He tries to prevent criticism that can be directed at miracles by assigning miraculous events only to prophets. (shrink)

Ethics; Islamic ethics; Islam and humanism; Islamic law; psychological and philosophical aspects.

It is widely acknowledged that two methods of writing have emerged in the history of usūl literature: Juristic method (usūl al-fuqahā) and theological method (usūl al-mutakallimīn). Although there are some attempts to determine the typical features of these methods, we do not have a comprehensive explanation regarding the criteria of this distinction, the motivation behind it and the period when these methods have become prevalent. This paper aims to shed light to certain dimensions of the issue and focuses especially on (...) the impact of juristic disputations and khilāfiyāt on the emergence of juristic method. The discussions about the sources and methods of religious knowledge were a significant part of the heated intellectual debates in the early period of Islamic scholarships. These discussions made by scholars interested in theological matters in kalām context were the matters of usūl, which would have turned into a separate discipline thereafter. The aforementioned period also witnessed Hanafīs completing the first fiqh compilation by recording the body of masā’il in fiqh that they had developed and codified. Hanafīs then involved in the methodological discussions of theologians in the context of justifying their juristic views. The tradition of scholarly discussion that had widely contributed to the earlier period took a new dimension by the introduction of jadal to the Islamic world. First theologians and later jurists adopted the method of jadal in their debates and scholarly works. By the 4th and 5th centuries AH, fiqh became popular more than ever and promoted the juristic disputations in such a way that those disputations turned into a common and significant performance among Islamic intellectuals. Meanwhile, the khilaf genre, in which the disputed juristic matters have been discussed and justified, improved in those centuries as well. Consequently, a new method of usūl writing, namely the method of fuqahā, which can be applied in the justification of the masā’il and in juristic disputations, emerged. Thus, the first and most typical work of that method, Taqwīm al-Adilla by Dabūsī, perfectly addressed the needs of the disputation tradition in the era, by including many chapters that could be regarded as related to the substantial law and many examples from substantial law, by treating the jadal topics in qiyas and ‘illa chapters in detail and by avoiding the speculative theological disputes. Later, the method developed by Dabūsī attracted attention and many jurisprudents wrote usūl works adopting the method before the end of 5th century AH. Especially the usūl work of Bazdawī served as a model for the later Hanafī usūl literature. However, the juristic method lost its popularity when the Islamic scholarships fell under the influence of philosophy and logic after al-Gazālī and al-Rāzī. Jadal and ‘ilm al-bahth wa’l-munāzara have been treated under the discipline of logic afterwards. Nevertheless, even after the evolution of the usūl perspective, some Hanafīs still wrote usūl works by juristic method and some of them, despite adopting the new philosophical perspective, referred to the usūl of Bazdawī in their “mamzūj” (combined) usūl works. (shrink)