The forces of freedom are challenged everywhere by a newly energized spirit of tyranny, whether it is Jihadist terrorism, Putin's imperialism, or the ambitions of China's dictatorship, writes Waller R. Newell in this engaging exposé of a thousand dangers. We will see why tyranny is a permanent threat by following its strange career from Homeric Bronze Age warriors, through the empires of Alexander the Great and Rome, to the medieval struggle between the City of God and the City of Man, (...) leading to the state-building despots of the Modern Age including the Tudors and 'enlightened despots' such as Peter the Great. The book explores the psychology of tyranny from Nero to Gaddafi, and how it changes with the Jacobin Terror into millenarian revolution. Stimulating and enlightening, Tyrants: Power, Injustice, and Terror will appeal to anyone interested in the danger posed by tyranny and terror in today's world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Tyrant’s Writ: Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient GreeceThomas ColeDeborah T. Steiner. The Tyrant’s Writ: Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. xiv + 279 pp. Cloth, price not stated.Literacy, as the author correctly points out in her introduction (5), tends to be seen nowadays as “a tool of cultural progress, of rational thought, of scientific analysis, a critical marker (...) that separates the developing from the developed world”; and so the spread of literacy in the Greek world of the Archaic and Classical periods is almost inevitably treated as an event that “heralds in a new rational, skeptical and objective approach,” leading to “advances... in logic, science and technology.” What follows this observation—by way of supplement or corrective to the communis opinio—is an attempt to show that for the Greeks themselves—insofar as their attitude can be documented down to the early fourth century B.C.—writing was something rather different: a multivalent and at times mysterious system of signifiers only partially differentiated from the nonalphabetic symbols and signs that preceded its introduction (chap. 1), a talismanic means of giving greater solemnity and efficacy to the contents of oaths, curses, prayers, and oracles (chap. 2), a frequent source of a “conservative and backward looking” vehicle (metaphor) for carrying on psychological and cosmological speculation (chap. 3), and a medium highly suspect as being the one preferred by tyrants, Greek or oriental, when communicating with their subjects or deputies (chap. 4) and by various types of subversives (conspiring oligarchs, religious fanatics, apolitical shunners of assembly and agora) when communicating among themselves (chap. 5).The attempt, though carried out with energy and imagination, strikes me as ultimately unsuccessful—inconclusive at best and at times dedicated to establishing theses which are refuted by the very evidence that has been assembled to support them. This is especially apparent in chapter 3, which suffers from a failure to allow for the existence of highly traditional modes of argumentation such as metaphor alongside the use of metaphorical vehicles in conjunction with highly “progressive” or revolutionary tenors. The habit of comparing perception, remembering, and forgetting to the inscribing, preservation, and erasure of texts on the wax tablets of the mind (100–5) is surely inseparable from the development both of an empiricist psychology and epistemology and of a materialistic view of the soul; and the atomist analogy between letters and the basic constituents of the cosmos (116–22) stands in equally close relationship to the concern of the scientist—be he ancient or modern—to draw distinctions between primary and secondary sensory qualities and to produce an accounting for the apparently qualitative differences between phenomena in ultimately quantitative terms.While not actually refuting the author’s theses, chapter 2 reveals the existence [End Page 145] of a fairly strong argumentum ex silentio against them. Its discussion is based almost entirely on inferences as to the attitudes whose existence might be posited to explain the frequency with which writing is used in certain contexts, and this frequency is, to my mind, more efficiently and plausibly accounted for as the result of nothing more mysterious than a general recognition of the superiority of written to verbal texts in situations where permanence, transportability, visibility, or reliability and authenticity are called for. We are still far from the skepticism, rationalism, and objectivity posited by the modern communis opinio, but much nearer to that than the obscurantism and authoritarianism of the alternative vision offered here. One would certainly not be surprised if, “as documents came to supplement and then to replace symbolic objects,” the former came to acquire some of the sacral character of the latter, and Steiner cites evidence (63 n. 8) to suggest that this actually occurred in medieval England. Parallels can also be cited from medieval Tibet, where monks sought to secure to themselves the spiritual benefits of Buddhist scriptures by wadding pages from the texts in question into small pellets and swallowing them; or even twentieth-century America, where college students seem to derive comparable reassurance from the photocopies of unread articles that line their bookshelves. But nothing in the evidence Steiner cites... (shrink)

According to Tacitus, Petronius' last act was to send to Nero a list of the latter's sexual partners and activities. Petronius' list in Annals 16 illuminates the structure of the Book, which conveys the tyranny of Nero's last years as a list of deaths and punishments. The nature of these lists—series of elements whose connection their authors decline to spell out—mirrors the arbitrary nature of imperial power under Nero and Domitian, which punishes according to no legitimate judicial logic. Tacitus' interest (...) in Petronius extends beyond the latter's list to his function as Nero's elegantiae arbiter, a seemingly superficial position that Tacitus suggests actually illustrates the important function of pleasure in the principate. (shrink)

In recent decades, the philosopher William Desmond (1951-) has offered both insightful readings of individual tragedies and a striking reformulation of old Aristotelian standbys like hamartia and catharsis. This reformulation grows out of his wider philosophy of the “between,” which stresses humans’ fundamental receptivity or “porosity.” For Desmond, tragedy strips away characters’ self-determination and returns them to porosity. The audience is returned to porosity as well, a process of exposure that can be harrowing, and at times leads to despair, but (...) that can also lead, in Desmond’s take on catharsis, to a renewed sense of the worth of fragile beings. Both tragic “being at a loss” and catharsis are important for philosophy because they resist determinate conceptualization. Tragedy reminds philosophy of its limits, and it challenges philosophy to attend to the intimate and the singular. This essay situates, synthesizes, and extends Desmond’s many reflections on tragedy. It focuses in particular on Shakespeare's Macbeth and King Lear. (shrink)

This article considers a longstanding problem: what does the word τύραννος mean? And if it means ‘bad / tyrannical ruler’, why are good rulers called tyrants? The solution proposed here is that tyranny is not a fixed state of being, or not being, but instead a gradual process of development. To be called a tyrant, a ruler need not embody all the stereotypical traits of tyranny. If tyranny is, by definition, unconstitutional and illegitimate rule, then there may be no (...) clear moment at which one ceases to be a general or king and becomes a tyrant, only a process by which the tyrant gradually strengthens his rule and develops the negative attributes associated with absolute and illegitimate power. A strong trend in not only the political theory of Plato and Aristotle, but also Greek poetry and historiography in general, is to trace the decline of tyrannies from initially good and popular governments to ones that are despotic and unpopular: the tyrant’s progress. (shrink)

The word ‘tyrant’ was not originally Greek, but borrowed from some eastern language, perhaps in western Asia Minor. On the other hand, tyranny as it developed in the Greek cities in the archaic age would seem to have been initially an indigenous growth, independent of any intervention by foreign powers. It then became a constantly recurring phenomenon of Greek political and social life, so long as the Greeks enjoyed an independent history.

This chapter discusses the role played by guardians and tyrants in Star Wars. The Jedi align themselves with the light side of the Force, while the Sith align themselves with the dark side. Although the Jedi are guardians of the galaxy, they refrain from ruling directly, acting as willing servants of the Old Republic. In Attack of the Clones, Anakin Skywalker and Senator Amidala demonstrate the trajectory of Plato's thinking when they engage in a semi‐serious debate about the politics (...) of the Republic. Plato's views in the Republic mirror the different types of rule in the Star Wars galaxy surprisingly well: democracy is vulnerable, tyrants only care about their own interests, and guardians of peace and justice are the state's best chance for flourishing. While democracy fails, allowing the Emperor to become a malevolent tyrant, the Jedi Council is cut off in its service to the Republic. (shrink)

What is the significance of the recurring link between tyranny and philosophy in Plato? Often, Plato’s treatment of tyranny is discussed either in the context of moral psychology—as a problem of agency, moral choice and akrasia — or political science, where it is the limit case of political decline. It is suggested, however, that a close inspection of the myth of Er and an elucidation of its neglected links, not just with the rest of the Republic but also with dialogues (...) such as the Philebus and the Symposium, shows that Socrates’ fascination with tyrannical characters points to a deeper theme — nature, and specifically the problem of its benevolence to our purposes and its very ambiguous relation to human excellence and degradation. Philosopher and tyrant, for all the radical differences between them, both illuminate the internal instability of the human being in Plato’s thought. (shrink)

Athenian democracy is rightly recognized for its extensive network of accountability institutions. This essay focuses instead on popular unaccountability in democratic Athens: ordinary citizens participating but not speaking in the Courts and the Assembly were unaccountable. I explore possible justifications of popular unaccountability, including arguments from democratic sovereignty and epistemic arguments, and stress the importance of a third strand: the identification of jurors and assemblymen with deservedly unaccountable, because comparatively weak and powerless, idiōtai (private citizens), whose political activity failed to (...) reach a level requiring intense scrutiny and control. Nonetheless, such a justification was always tenuous in light of the power jurors and assemblymen collectively wielded in the city. As I show through a reading of Aristophanes’s Wasps, it was always possible to destabilize the juror idiōtēs identity and replace it with a much more troubling image: the identification of the juror with the dangerously unaccountable tyrant. (shrink)

At Quaestiones Graecae 32.298c–d, Plutarch raises the question, τίνες οἰ ειναται παρᾰ Μιλησίος, ‘Who were the Perpetual Sailors among the Milesians?’ he frames the circumstances of his answer using a genitive absolute clause: τν περ Θόαντα κα Δαμασήνορα τυράννων καταλυθέντων. In the absence of any other mention of these men in the extent sources, these words—especially the appellation τυράνων—have caused concern among editors and commentators of Plutarch. In the Teubner edition of 1935 Titchener changes τυράνων to the accusative τυράννους, while (...) Halliday in his Oxford commentary suggests that the word should be deleted as a gloss. Each of these suggested changes to the received text is motivated by the occurrence here of the common idiom οἵ πεί ⁺ Accus. nominis proprii. This expression is, from the time of Polybius on, frequently used by Greek historians to indicate succinctly a group or faction, especially one centred around an important personage. Furthermore, a rather odd periphrastic usage of this phrase has been identified by scholars of Greek grammar as common from at least the Roman period. In this usage, οἱ περί τινα I serves as the equivalent of the simple proper name. Thus τν περ Θόαντα κα Δαμασήνορα may be a periphrasis for Thoas and Damasenor alone. (shrink)

According to classical and postclassical sources, the early Greek turannoi were, by definition, illegitimate rulers who overturned existing political arrangements and installed rogue monarchic regimes in their place. And on this one fundamental point at least, modern observers of archaic turannides seem to have little quarrel with their ancient informants. To this day, it remains axiomatic that Cypselus, Peisistratus, and the rest were autocrats who gained power by usurpation. Whatever their individual accomplishments, they were still, in a word, "tyrants." (...) Relying mostly on evidence from the contemporary literary and material records, my paper aims to challenge this time-honored conventional wisdom and restore the first turannoi to the political mainstream. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed light upon Bitinna's reference to a goddess who is described as ‘tyrant’ in Herondas 5.77. Light is also shed on the delineation of Bitinna's character and social status in terms of the immediate context of mimiamb 5 as well as of the wider Alexandrian cultural context of Herondas' work. Bitinna's reference is for the first time examined in relation to the depiction of her character and it is shown that the goddess-tyrant must (...) be Aphrodite. (shrink)

Wreathed in myrtle, my sword I'll conceal Like those champions devoted and brave, When they plunged in the tyrant their steel And to Athens deliverance gave. (Edgar Allan Poe, ‘Hymn to Harmodius an...

This essay examines the two means by which Machiavelli thought republics could address the political problem of predatory socio-economic elites: Healthy republics, he proposes explicitly, should consistently check the “insolence of the nobles” by establishing constitutional offices like the Roman tribunes of the plebeians; corrupt republics, he suggests more subtly, should completely eliminate overweening oligarchs via the violent actions of a tyrannical individual. Roman-styled tribunes, wielding veto, legislative and accusatory authority, contain the oppressive behavior of socio-economic elites during normal republican (...) circumstances. By contrast, having overthrown a republic grown corrupt through oligarchic encroachment on the commonweal, Machiavelli suggests that Greek-styled tyrants lay the foundation for a more robust—that is, more egalitarian and martial—republic down the road by eliminating elites entirely and by instituting economic redistribution and military reforms. (shrink)

This article argues against the long-enduring practice of Josephan scholarship to treat the termsτύραννος(‘tyrant’) andλῃστής(‘brigand’) as a collocation, or as undistinguished terms of invective employed by Josephus against various Jewish antagonists in hisBellum Judaicum(=BJ). Towards this aim, the article first examines the frequency in which these two terms appear together throughout the text of theBJ, before turning to a critical examination of particular passages that feature the terms, in order to prove that they are, in fact, not used as undistinguished (...) terms of invective but as terms pertaining to two distinct classes of people: renegade aristocrats vying with their peers for absolute power (the ‘tyrants’) and their gangs of foot soldiers comprising men from the lower classes (the ‘brigands’). The article concludes that Josephus used these terms in this manner in order to convey to his readership, which largely consisted of Roman aristocrats, that the ringleaders of the Judaean revolt which raged betweena.d.66–73 were akin to renegades who periodically wreaked havoc on Rome's own aristocracy, often with devastating consequences for class and country alike. (shrink)

The article argues for a Straussian interpretation of Tacitus’ Agricola by showing that Tacitus’ explicit praise of the life of Agricola and criticism of the Stoic martyrs are undermined by his implicit comparisons to other lives within the text and by his allusions to other works of Socratic political philosophy, especially Xenophon’s. The popular teaching of the Agricola is that Agricola’s policy of political quietism is the best way of life for an ambitious young Roman living under a tyrannical emperor, (...) while the Stoic’s political extremism is not beneficial for the common good. The philosophic teaching, by contrast, is that a ‘serious and wise man’ will pursue a kind of Xenophontic approach to politics because he recognizes that the philosophic life is the highest life, but that it is necessary for the philosopher to advise the tyrant if the conditions for a philosophic life are going to be possible. (shrink)

"If being a humanitarian imperialist means advocating that the hegemon use its might to advance freedom, human rights, and democracy, then I am a humanitarian imperialist.".

Plato's Republic presents the characters of the philosopher and the tyrant as similar. Strongly focused by indiscriminate erotic motivation, both defy convention and lack familiar emotional responses, which make them appear to be mad. This essay argues that Plato put forward these parallels partly in order to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the young, partly to present a possible way to overthrow the current regime and partly to show the ineffectiveness of democracy. The very best leaders may look (...) like tyrants; it is only through proper philosophical education that their true natures can be discerned. (shrink)

This essay argues that Callicles is depicted by Plato in the Gorgias as a potential tyrant from a psychological standpoint. To this end I will contend that the Calliclean moral psychology sketched at 491e-492c points towards the analysis of the tyrannical individual pursued by Plato in books VIII and IX of the Republic based upon the tripartite theory of the soul. I will thereby attempt to show that (i) in the Gorgias, Callicles does not actually personify the ideal of the (...) superior person advocated by himself insofar as he is still susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a); and that (ii) looking forward to the Republic, he can be understood for this same reason as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Herodotus and Images of Tyranny:The Tyrants of CorinthVivienne J. GrayIntroductionThis paper considers Herodotus' presentation of the tyrants of Corinth (3.48–53, 5.92) and some recent readings of the same.1 The speech that Herodotus puts into the mouth of Socles of Corinth (5.92) is a main source for the tyranny of Cypselus and Periander, and also for the relations of the Spartans with their Peloponnesian allies and Athens, for (...) it seems to persuade the allies to oppose the Spartans in their desire to reimpose tyranny on Athens by offering a negative paradigm of tyranny.2 Yet historians agree that what Socles says about Cypselus and Periander is cast in the form of patterned stories of questionable value for "real history" and that the image of tyranny does not in all respects meet the aims of the persuasion.3 Socles has called tyranny "more unjust [End Page 361] and more murderous" than anything else in the world, yet they believe that he offers a sympathetic portrayal of the early history of Cypselus, the founder of the dynasty. The oracles that seem to say that he will bring justice to Corinth and the story of his survival as a babe, saved from death only by his smile, the pity of those sent to butcher him, and his mother's actions, should be explained, since they do not seem appropriate to a denunciation of tyranny. The usual explanation is that Herodotus has given too free a rein to his liking for a good story and has not succeeded in making Socles say what he ought to be saying. "The fairy–tale and the friendly oracles agree very ill with the general tendency of Herodotus' account, and we can best explain their presence in his text by supposing that they were already traditional elements in the stories before his time, and that he took them over without quite noticing how they told against his speaker's view of Cypselus."4 John Gould reads the speech as "narrative as persuasion," in which the narrative parts company with the persuasion and takes on an independent life of its own. Socles starts at the beginning and explains how the tyranny came to be, instead of proceeding to an ordered denunciation of its injustice.5 The general precedent for the practice is Homeric: Phoenix's use of the story of Meleager to persuade Achilles to return to battle seems to part company from the persuasion in similar ways (Iliad 9.527–99).6 The portrayal of Periander is generally agreed to serve the denunciation better, but even here the stripping of the women of Corinth has struck some as [End Page 362] anti–climactic.7 Gould believes that the narrative story of Periander and Lycophron, which is the other main evidence for the tyrants of Corinth (3.48–53), also drifts free of its author and context: "The story has a scale and a power and a weight out of all proportion to its overt function as an explanatory link in the larger narrative, and in this it resembles a whole range of other Herodotean stories."8 Christiane Sourvinou–Inwood finds it to be so patterned by mythic consciousness that the historical data are almost irrecoverable.9The first aim of this paper is to offer a reading of the speech of Socles in which the persuasion does not part company with the narrative, but remains firmly tied to it. The images of tyranny in the story of Cypselus, as in that of Periander and Lycophron, which has not had the same critical attention, are shaped by their context. The method will be to note the similarities and differences between their stories and other stories of similar pattern in Herodotus.10 Comparison will illuminate the adaptations that Herodotus has made to fit the pattern to the requirements of the various contexts and more clearly demonstrate the influence of context on the images of tyranny which they produce.The second aim of the paper is to emphasise the difficulties that the influence of context poses for the idea of a stereotype of tyranny in Herodotus. There is scholarly interest in whether Herodotus... (shrink)

In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the playwright depicts the punishment of Prometheus by the tyrannical Zeus. Zeus’ subordinates understand his tyranny to be characterized by an absolute freedom of action. Yet the tyrant’s absolute freedom as ruler is called into question by insecurity of his position and by his dependence on Prometheus’ knowledge. We find in the Prometheus Bound a model of tyrannical rule riddled with contradictions: The tyrant’s claim to total control and absolute freedom is in tension with a reality (...) characterized by insecurity, impotence, and constraint. We contrast this model of rule with the model found in Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens, in which the King, agreeing to be bound by the wishes of his subjects, nevertheless preserves for himself a certain freedom of action that the tyrannical ruler lacks. (shrink)

Shelley’s Swellfoot the Tyrant has recently begun to gain the concerted attention of critics, who have noted the play’s signature blend of low and high, of ephemeral, late Regency politics with the classic genres of Sophoclean tragedy, Aristophanic comedy, and mock epic. But Austin Warren’s famous and widely accepted definition of mock epic as “not mockery of the epic but elegantly affectionate homage, offered by a writer who finds [the serious epic] irrelevant to his age” does not describe Shelley’s earnest (...) goal of immediate political reform in authoring Swellfoot. Instead, the play evinces Shelley’s unique, conscious reconfiguration of four conventions characteristic of the high, classical epic: the “prosperous breeze”; the epic simile; katabasis or descent into the underworld; and divine intervention. I argue that Shelley’s comic adaptation of these epic conventions reflects his serious aim of helping effect reform through Swellfoot and embodies his absorption of the concept of Shakespeare’s history plays as an experimental hybrid of dramatic forms with epic subjects, gained during his earlier reading of A. W. Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature. Though the immediate suppression of Swellfoot prevented its relevance in its own historical moment, it comprises a singular hybrid of Aristophanic satire and Sophoclean tragedy with high epic conventions, while ironically also identifying Shelley as a proponent of the French neoclassical theory of the epic’s consciously didactic purpose propounded by Le Bossu. (shrink)

In recent years, most political theorists have agreed that shame shouldn't play any role in democratic politics because it threatens the mutual respect necessary for participation and deliberation. But Christina Tarnopolsky argues that not every kind of shame hurts democracy. In fact, she makes a powerful case that there is a form of shame essential to any critical, moderate, and self-reflexive democratic practice. Through a careful study of Plato's Gorgias, Tarnopolsky shows that contemporary conceptions of shame are far too narrow. (...) For Plato, three kinds of shame and shaming practices were possible in democracies, and only one of these is similar to the form condemned by contemporary thinkers. Following Plato, Tarnopolsky develops an account of a different kind of shame, which she calls "respectful shame." This practice involves the painful but beneficial shaming of one's fellow citizens as part of the ongoing process of collective deliberation. And, as Tarnopolsky argues, this type of shame is just as important to contemporary democracy as it was to its ancient form. Tarnopolsky also challenges the view that the Gorgias inaugurates the problematic oppositions between emotion and reason, and rhetoric and philosophy. Instead, she shows that, for Plato, rationality and emotion belong together, and she argues that political science and democratic theory are impoverished when they relegate the study of emotions such as shame to other disciplines. (shrink)

The following is an attempt at something new, an experiment in micro-criticism that proposes to solve the conundrum of Aristotelian catharsis in fewer than two hundred words. Reference is made to Oedipus Tyrannus.According to Aristotle, the catharsis of pity and fear is a primary goal of tragedy.1Pity is a response to “unmerited misfortune”.Fear depends upon pity—with the spectator fearing that he, too, may be subject to unmerited misfortune.Unmerited misfortune is an abomination, a condition suggestive of a defective moral order.Aristotle regards (...) Oedipus Tyrannus as an exemplary tragedy.Sophocles, by showing Oedipus behaving in ways that merit... (shrink)

In certain contemporary theories of the politics of shame, shame is considered a pernicious emotion that we need to avoid in, or a salutary emotion that serves as an infallible guide to, democratic deliberation. The author argues that both positions arise out of an inadequate notion of the structure of shame and an oversimplistic opposition between shame and shamelessness. Plato's dialogue, the Gorgias, actually helps to address these problems because it supplies a deeper understanding of the place of shame in (...) democratic politics in ways that address our contemporary dilemmas. It does this first, by avoiding the simple opposition between shame and shamelessness and secondly, by articulating three different kinds of "politics of shame" that can characterize democratic deliberations. Finally, Plato's treatment of shame extends upon contemporary ethical and psychoanalytic notions of shame in ways that are directly relevant to the our contemporary political situation. (shrink)

As one might expect of an author of the complexity of John of Salisbury, there is little scholarly agreement regarding the proper interpretation of the major features of his social and political thought. The twelfth-century church-man has always been a controversial figure. Since the late Middle Ages, the ideas contained in his main contribution to political theory, the Policraticus , have been widely analyzed and interpreted. In more recent years, controversy has raged about the nature and significance of many of (...) his main doctrines , his source materials, and his attitudes towards contemporary events and people. (shrink)

This is the final part of a series of two papers that have examined the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide. While Part I focused on the classical, medieval, and liberal justifications for tyrannicide, Part II aims to provide the tentative outlines of a contemporary model of tyrannicide in world politics. It is contended that a reinvigorated conception of self-defence, when coupled with the modern understanding of universal human rights, may provide the foundation for the normative validity of (...) tyrannicide in contemporary world politics. (shrink)

This volume, with contributions from scholars in political science, literature, and philosophy, examines the mutual influence of reason and religion at the time of the American Founding.

This paper examines the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide. It posits that the political philosophy of tyrannicide can be categorised into three distinct periods or models, the classical, medieval, and liberal, respectively. It argues that each model contained unique themes and principles that justified tyrannicide in that period; the classical, through the importance attached to public life and the functional role of leadership; the medieval, through natural law doctrine; and the liberal, through the postulates of social contract (...) theory. Subsequent analysis of these different models however, reveals that these historical models are unable to provide a sufficient philosophical basis for a contemporary justification of tyrannicide. In Part II, it will be contended that a reinvigorated conception of self-defence, a theme common to all three models, when coupled with the modern notion of universal human rights, may provide the foundation for a contemporary theory of tyrannicide. (shrink)

This paper discusses David Gauthier’s attempt to refine the theory underlying constrained maximization so that it ceases to have a certain implication that he regards as objectionable. It argues that the refinement Gauthier introduces may be initially appealing, but actually does his theory more harm than good.

In book IX of the Republic, Socrates offers a strange mathematical calculation, which claims to prove that the tyrant lives exactly 729 times less pleasantly than the king. For the first time, a complete and detailed reconstruction of this difficult text and its underlying structure is offered in the present article. It thereby proves that the distinction between ‘pleasure’ and the ‘image of pleasure’ is one among the keys to understanding the passage. It is furthermore shown how the whole calculation (...) is based on Plato’s ontology of dimensions and therefore proves that this theorem can be taken into account at least already for the time of the Republic. (shrink)

Solon's fragments 9–11 are preserved in three late authors: frr. 9 and 11 by Diodoros Sikelos , 9.20.2, Plutarch , Solon 3.6 and 30.3 respectively, and Diogenes Laertios , 1.50 and 1.51 respectively; and fr. 10 by Diogenes Laertios alone, 1.49. They are all quoted in the context of Solon's reaction to Peisistratos. Stories on this theme were circulating by the time of the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia , and Rhodes' scepticism about them is well founded. Its author did not garnish (...) his version of events with these poems, nor indeed with any Solonian utterance, and he explicitly states that myth-making on this subject had already resulted in two stories about Solon and Peisistratos which were chronologically impossible. (shrink)

El artículo es un estudio detallado del panfleto “An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex” (1696). Ofrece una reconstrucción de su estructura argumentativa y un análisis de sus estrategias retóricas. El marco teórico y metodológico empleado es histórico y sistemático: buscamos contextualizar el escrito en el campo intelectual de la ilustración británica en los albores del siglo xviii, así como también interponer una perspectiva de género contemporánea para la examinación de los argumentos empleados, del despliegue retórico del discurso y (...) de las conclusiones filosóficamente más robustas. En especial, el artículo defiende la emergencia de una dicotomía naturaleza-historia que permite a la autora, por un lado, desenmascarar una situación de dominio masculino críticamente reconocible como antecedente directo de las discusiones feministas contemporáneas y, por el otro, ofrecer una vía retórica para la conformación y reconfiguración de un ethos y un pathos femenino. (shrink)