The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to (...) emphasize the attributes or welfare of a particular individual organism. Already, this classic conflict provides for some challenging theoretical clashes between environmentalists and animal liberationists. The question of moral considerability is complicated, however, by recent developments in genetic engineering. Some animals, like pigs and fish, have been genetically modified by humans to grow organs that can then be transplanted into humans. If environmental arguments for the moral consideration of species are correct, then we are released from our obligations to morally consider those animals that we have genetically modified, since they are by their nature always an “invader species.” If, instead, the welfare of the animal is of penultimate importance, then there is a case for strengthening the moral considerability of GM animals over “naturally-occurring” animals, since they bear a closer relationship to humans. This would appear to be an intractable problem, a “bad marriage,” as Mark Sagoff once proposed. This paper argues that the case of invasive transgenic animals exposes weaknesses in this classic conflict, and particularly, in the framing of this conflict. To remedy this framing problem, this paper argues for a reconceptualization of the term “moral considerability,” instead urging a strong distinction between moral considerability, moral relevance, and moral significance. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with ethical implications arising from animal biotechnology. I analyse some general questions surrounding the production of transgenic animals through a specific case study: the oncomouse. In particular, I explore ethical factors involved in the production of oncomice. This is because biologists genetically modify animals’ germ cells and refuse to modify human germ cells. I will underline how the international community has thus far justified this ‘ethical difference’.

We present an annotated bibliography of peer reviewed scientific research highlighting the human health, animal welfare, and environmental risks associated with genetic modification. Risks associated with the expression of the transgenic material include concerns over resistance and non-target effects of crops expressing Bt toxins, consequences of herbicide use associated with genetically modified herbicide-tolerant plants, and transfer of gene expression from genetically modified crops through vertical and horizontal gene transfer. These risks are not connected to (...) the technique of genetic modification as such, but would be present for any conventionally produced crops with the same heritable traits. In contrast, other risks are a direct consequence of the method used in gene manipulation. These come about because of the unstable nature of the transgene and vectors used to insert it, and because of unpredictable interactions between the transgene and the host genome. The debate over the release of genetically modified organisms is not merely a scientific one; it encompasses economics, law, ethics, and policy. Any discussion on these levels does, however, need to be informed by sound science. We hope that the scientific references provided here will provide a useful starting point for further debate. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Values Micro‐organisms and Plants Animals Humans Patents References.

The ability to transfer genes from one species to another provides a powerful method to study genetic regulatory differences between species in a homogeneous genetic background. A survey of several transgenic animal experiments indicates that the vast majority of regulatory differences observed between species are due to differences in the cis‐acting elements associated with the genes under study. A corollary is that in almost all cases the host species provides the necessary regulatory proteins for expression of the transgenes (...) in specific tissues in which the endogenous homolog is not expressed. Although the details of the cis‐acting differences are unknown for most cases, it appears that these differences may consist of the acquisition or loss of unique elements or subtle variation of conserved elements. It is unknown whether much of this variation is directly related to adaptive evolution. The identification of the promoter enhancer elements responsible for these differences is an important first step in examining the functional significance of this variation. (shrink)

The primary responsibility of the US Food and Drug Administration is to protect public health by ensuring the safety of the food supply. To that end, it sometimes conducts risk assessments of novel food products, such as genetically modified food. The FDA describes its regulatory review of GM food as a purely scientific activity, untainted by any normative considerations. This paper provides evidence that the regulatory agency is not justified in making that claim. It is argued that the (...) FDA’s policy stance on GM food is shaped by neoliberal considerations. The agency’s review of a genetically engineered animal, the AquAdvantage salmon, is used as a case study to track the influence of neoliberalism on its regulatory review protocol. After that, an epistemic argument justifying public engagement in the risk assessment of new GM food is outlined. It is because risk evaluations involve normative judgments, in a democracy, layperson representatives of informal epistemic communities that could be affected by a new GM food should have the opportunity to decide the ethical, political or other normative questions that arise during the regulatory review of that entity. (shrink)

New techniques for the genetic modification of organisms are creating new strategies for addressing persistent public health challenges. For example, the company Oxitec has conducted field trials internationally—and has attempted to conduct field trials in the United States—of a genetically modified mosquito that can be used to control dengue, Zika, and some other mosquito-borne diseases. In 2016, a report commissioned by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine discussed the potential benefits and risks of another strategy, using (...) gene drives. Driving a desired genotype through a population of wild animals or insects could lead to irreversible genetic modification of an entire species. The NASEM report recommends community, stakeholder, and public engagement about potential uses of the technology, and it argues that the engagement should occur as research advances, well before gene drives are deployed. Yet what “engagement” means in practice is unclear. This article seeks clarity on this problem by offering a justification for community engagement and drawing out implications of this argument for the implementation and desired outcomes of community engagement. Community engagement is essential when it comes to research that would release genetically modified insects or animals into the environment. By contrast, obtaining informed consent from people who live near such a proposed field trial is neither necessary nor sufficient. Drawing on the epistemic and moral arguments for deliberative democracy, I propose two discrete mechanisms of community engagement: community advisory boards and deliberative forums, neither of which has been systematically incorporated into research governance. The proposed mechanisms would engender respect for persons who live near field trials, even when the results of deliberation override some individuals’ preferences. Community engagement foregrounds the community in our thinking about humans’ relationship to nature, and it implies that deciding to release genetically modified insects or animals into the wild ought to be a collective decision, not one made by product developers, policy-makers, private companies, research funders, or scientists alone. (shrink)

In recent years, humans’ ability to selectively modify genes has increased dramatically as a result of the development of new, more efficient, and easier genetic modification technology. In this paper, we argue in favor of using this technology to improve the welfare of agricultural animals. We first argue that using animals genetically modified for improved welfare is preferable to the current status quo. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against pursuing gene editing for welfare is that there are alternative approaches (...) to addressing some of the challenges of modern agriculture that may offer ethical advantages over genetic modification; namely, a dramatic shift towards plant-based diets or the development of in vitro meat. Nevertheless, we provide reasons for thinking that despite these possible comparative disadvantages there are important reasons for continuing the pursuit of welfare improvements via genetic modification. (shrink)

New possibilities to modify function and direct repair in the central nervous system (CNS) have been established by the merger of gene transfer technology with neural transplantation. Rapid advances in viral‐mediated DNA‐delivery procedures permit the study of novel gene expression in neurons and glial cells. Foreign genes, transferred by a virus vector, can be used to generate new cell lines, identify transplanted cells, and express growth factors or enzymes for neurotransmitter synthesis. In addition to CNS cell types, non‐neural cells are (...) also being studied with transgene technology in the nervous system. Functional effects have been obtained with grafts of genetically modified cells in animal models of several nervous system disorders, and the recent results set the stage for potential application of these techniques to human CNS gene therapy. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to examine how the recent themata developments in Social Representations Theory can be linked with the classical process involved in the construction of social representations—anchoring—, as well as with the communicative modalities that are part of the theory since its inception. This was done through a study of the representation of GMOs in the Portuguese press, taken as an opportunity for addressing the issues related to the role played by old categories in rendering (...) new meanings and in establishing new categories.A further objective of the study, more applied in nature, was to explore whether the central characteristics of the representations of biotechnology in European countries were also present in Portugal.All articles that included the expressions Genetically Modified/Genetic Modification/Manipulation or Transgenics, were collected, in five Portuguese newspapers, during the years of 1999, 2000 and 2001. Content analysis of the 239 articles collected showed that their thematical organisation re-constitutes the Red/Green dichotomy found in most European countries. The Red/health discussion is structured around such themata as health/disease, risk/safety, benefits/problems, and anchors in categories like science and progress. The nature/culture opposition emerges, in turn, in the Green/food discussion, which anchors on categories like ideology and employs Propaganda as a communicative modality—a set of indicators configuring a more polemic debate. The conclusions discuss the relevance of linking themata with anchoring and the importance of devising more fine-grained tools for the analysis of Diffusion. (shrink)

Food products with genetically modified ingredients are common, yet many consumers are unaware of this. When polled, consumers say that they want to know whether their food contains GM ingredients, just as many want to know whether their food is natural or organic. Informing consumers is a major motivation for labeling. But labeling need not be mandatory. Consumers who want GM-free products will pay a premium to support voluntary labeling. Why do consumers want to know about GM ingredients? (...) GM foods are tested to ensure safety and have been on the market for more than a decade. Still, many consumers, including some with food allergies, want to be cautious. Also, GM crops may affect neighboring plants through pollen drift. Despite tests for environmental impact, some consumers may worry that GM crops will adversely effect the environment. The study of risk and its management raises questions not settled by the life sciences alone. This book surveys various labeling policies and the cases for them. It is the first comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of the debate about labeling genetically modified food. The contributors include philosophers, bioethicists, food and agricultural scientists, attorneys/legal scholars, and economists. (shrink)

The creation of transgenic animals has application in the following areas of pharmaceutical and biomedical research: the production of biopharmaceuticals for human use; the production of organs for xenotransplantation; and the generation of animal models for human genetic diseases. Nuclear transfer technology offers a more precise and efficient way of performing genetic modification and creating transgenic animals than the more traditional method of pronuclear microinjection. This paper will review nuclear transfer as ameans of producing transgenic animals; (...) introduce advantages nuclear transfer technology offers in the field of animal transgenesis; and highlight some of the animal welfare issues and ethical concerns raised by the generation and use of transgenic animals in the aforementioned fields of study. Finally, the influence of objectifying language and terminology used to describe transgenic animals will be considered, and the impact of phrases such as “living bioreactor” and “spare part supplier” examined. (shrink)

I examine the process and outcomes of animal genetic manipulation (‘transgenesis’) with reference to its morally salient features. I consider several objections to transgenesis. I examine and reject the alleged intrinsic wrongness of ‘deliberate genetic sequence alteration’, as I do the notion that transgenesis may lead to human genetic manipulation. I examine the alleged wrongness of killing inherent in transgenesis, and suggest that the concept of ‘replaceability’ successfully justifies such killing, although not for entities deemed to possess ‘personhood’. I (...) examine ‘significant suffering’ associated with transgenesis and propose the radical conclusion that, although it would be wrong to prohibit animal genetic manipulation per se, utilitarians ought to support a ‘default prohibition’ on transgenic experiments that entail significant suffering. (shrink)

By many accounts, CRISPR gene-editing technology is revolutionizing biotechnology. It has been hailed as a scientific game changer and is being adopted at a break-neck pace. This hasty adoption has left little time for ethical reflection, and so this paper aims to begin filling that gap by exploring whether CRISPR is as much an ethical game changer as it is a biological one. By focusing on the application of CRISPR to non-human animals, I argue that CRISPR has and will continue (...) to result in significant shifts in the ethical debate landscape. For instance, the fact that many CRISPR edits are non-transgenic has important implications for the ethical debate, particularly the popular objection to genetic engineering that it objectionably involves “crossing species boundaries,” as well as the regulatory debate in the United States, where currently only transgenic organisms are officially genetically modified organisms. I also explore various impacts CRISPR may have on animal welfare, suggesting that although the improved precision of CRISPR suggests fewer unintended welfare problems in comparison to past techniques, the greater versatility means that more animals than ever will be engineered. Finally, I end my discussion of animal welfare issues by exploring the possibility of using CRISPR to directly improve animal welfare, for instance through introducing disease resistance. (shrink)

Transgenic animals—animals with genes added to their deoxyribonucleic acid —will no longer be limited by the gene pool of their parents. Such animals are slated to be created expressly to provide vital and novel benefits for human beings. These animals can have desirable characteristics or traits from virtually any gene pool and may also possess properties not present in nature or available through conventional breeding. They will be created for the production of new medical and pharmaceutical products and to (...) enhance meat, dairy, and fiber production efficiency. (shrink)

The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering is (...) seen as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or telos) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning. (shrink)

By conducting a critical discourse analysis of a scientific research article that claims additional potential for using transgenic marmosets in biomedical experiments, this article critiques instrumental approaches to scientific progress as they are expressed in scientific research that uses nonhuman animal experiments. Following an analysis that focuses on issues associated with access to publication, assertions about scientific breakthrough and scientific facts, and the construction of science as impartial, the article concludes that manipulating the genetics of nonhuman animals to (...) engineer a predisposition to the development of feared human health hazards represents moral deterioration rather than progress. (shrink)

Biotechnology might contribute to solving food safety and security challenges. However, gene technology has been under public scrutiny, linked to the framing of the media and public discourse. The study aims to investigate people’s perceptions and acceptance of food biotechnology with focus on transgenic genetic modification versus genome editing. An online experiment was conducted with participants from the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The participants were presented with the topic of food biotechnology and more specifically with experimentally varied vignettes on (...) transgenic and genetic modification and genome editing. The results suggest that participants from both countries express higher levels of acceptance for genome editing compared to transgenic genetic modification. The general and personal acceptance of these technologies depend largely on whether the participants believe the application is beneficial, how they perceive scientific uncertainty, and the country they reside in. Our findings suggest that future communication about gene technology should focus more on discussing trade-offs between using an agricultural technologies and tangible and relevant benefits, instead of a unidimensional focus on risk and safety. (shrink)

This article contends that the environmental release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with heritable traits that are patented will present a challenge to the efforts of nations and indigenous peoples to engage in self‐determination. The environmental release of such animals has been proposed on the grounds that they could function as public health tools or as solutions to the problem of agricultural insect pests. This article brings into focus two political‐economic‐legal problems that would arise with the environmental release of (...) such organisms. To address those challenges, it is proposed that nations considering the environmental release of GE animals must take into account the underlying circumstances and policy failures that motivate arguments for the use of the modified animals. Moreover, countries must recognize that the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights place on them an obligation to ensure that GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released without the substantive consent of the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected. (shrink)

The current debate about labeling genetically engineered (GE) food focuses on food derived from GE crops, neglecting food derived from GE animals. This is not surprising, as GE animal products have not yet reached the market. Participants in the debate may also be assuming that conclusions about GE crops automatically extend to GE animals. But there are two GE animals - the Enviropig and the AquAdvantage Bred salmon - that are approaching the market, animals raise more ethical issues (...) than plants, and U.S. regulations treat animal products differently from crops. This paper therefore examines the specific question of whether there should be mandatory labeling on all food products derived from GE animals. We examine the likely regulatory pathways, salient differences between GE animals and GE crops, and relevant social science research on consumers’ attitudes. We argue that on any of the likely pathways, the relevant agency has a democratic obligation to require labeling for all GE animal food products. (shrink)

This paper is the result of a contribution between ethics and law, which will be used as thought-process tools, to address the complex issue of legal and ethical statuses of GM fish. To find answers, we propose to consider this issue from a wider angle, looking at the relations between the human, animal, and living worlds. We show that it is possible to construct other forms of intellectual logic that, without setting these worlds in opposition, do not lapse into (...) relativism where boundaries are blurred. In this sense, we submit the hypothesis that ordered pluralism should help us to move past a mere Man–Animal relationship to reveal the entire complexity of relationships within mankind and between mankind and other (non-human) worlds alongside it and to which it belongs: the animal and living worlds. With this new logic, “animal ethics” and “animal law” are re-embedded into a set of relationships. This logic emerges from a new consideration: the nature of the contemporary objects we are dealing with. We shall call objects like genetically modified fish “relational objects” in the sense that in order to be apprehended, they utilize a set of relationships of which there are just as many as the dimensions forming them, not as predicates but as primary constituents. Experimentally, in the case of GM fish, we translate this by proposing to typologize legal and ethical considerations induced by multiple relations connected to this object. According to the type of relationship in question, the GM fish will not have the same status; it is a changing object that must be suitably apprehended. (shrink)

Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how the societal debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in terms of actors involved and concerns reflected. It is argued that the implementation of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed a “complex of concerns.” In this complex, distinctions between environmental, agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the confusion between the wider debate on genetic modification and the risk (...) assessment of transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientific dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more “sensible” way, whilst making “sense” of the different stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to move from a merely scientific evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially more robust evaluation that takes the “non-scientific” concerns at stake in the GMO debate seriously. (shrink)

Via a historical reconstruction, this paper primarily demonstrates how the societal debate on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gradually extended in terms of actors involved and concerns reflected. It is argued that the implementation of recombinant DNA technology out of the laboratory and into civil society entailed a “complex of concerns.” In this complex, distinctions between environmental, agricultural, socio-economic, and ethical issues proved to be blurred. This fueled the confusion between the wider debate on genetic modification and the risk (...) assessment of transgenic crops in the European Union. In this paper, the lasting skeptical and/or ambivalent attitude of Europeans towards agro-food biotechnology is interpreted as signaling an ongoing social request – and even a quest – for an evaluation of biotechnology with Sense and Sensibility. In this (re)quest, a broader-than-scientific dimension is sought for that allows addressing the GMO debate in a more “sensible” way, whilst making “sense” of the different stances taken in it. Here, the restyling of the European regulatory frame on transgenic agro-food products and of science communication models are discussed and taken to be indicative of the (re)quest to move from a merely scientific evaluation and risk-based policy towards a socially more robust evaluation that takes the “non-scientific” concerns at stake in the GMO debate seriously. (shrink)

This article examines problems that may arise when addressing liability resulting from the genetic modification of microbes, animals, and plants. More specifically, it evaluates how uncertainties relating to the outcomes of these biotechnological innovations affect—or may affect—the courts' application of the reasonable foreseeability requirement and, hence, liability under the tort of negligence. The article also examines how concern expressed by society about injuries feared to result from these genetically modified products could have an impact on the way the (...) courts assess reasonable foreseeability in this area. (shrink)

Ao desenvolver a ciência biológica, o ser humano logrou obter novas variedades de animais e de plantas, a partir das silvestres. Quando as técnicas de engenharia genética se aplicaram a êstes organismos, obtiveram-se êxitos que se traduziram em dezenas de animais e de plantas com modificações genéticas agora hereditárias. Segundo o artigo, da análise bioética dos organismos modificados geneticamente e da sua utilizaçéo surgem várias propostas: 1) o direito do consumidor a ser informado em termos que possa entender acerca da (...) natureza das mudanças genéticas realizadas nos alimentos, 2) o direito do consumidor a decidir livremente se os quer consumir ou não e, 3) os deveres morais e científicos dos cientistas e das indústrias agro-alimentares para demonstrar a inocuidade destes animais e plantas transgénicos para o ser humano, o meio ambiente e a biodiversidade. /// Through the development of biological science, humankind was able to obtain new varieties of animals and plants in a process beginning with the wild species. When genetic engineering techniques were applied to these organisms, several dozens of transgenic organisms were obtained including plants and animals with specific inheritable changes, which are now transgenic foods. From the bioethical analysis of genetically modified organisms the article argues in favor of the right of the consumer to be informed in terms he or she can understand on the nature of genetic changes induced in foods, as well as in favor of the right of consumers to choose between standard or modified food. Finally, the article also argues in favor of the moral and scientific duties of scientists and food industries to demonstrate that genetically modified foods are not dangerous to human beings or noxious to the environment or biota. (shrink)

Genetic engineering evokes a number of objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. The concept of animal integrity is often invoked to articulate these kind of objections. Moreover, in reaction to the advent of genetic engineering, the concept has been extended from the level of the individual animal to the level of the genome and of the species. However, the concept of (...) class='Hi'>animal integrity was not developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the assumption that the concept of integrity, including its extensions to the level of the genome and the species, is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed at the genetic engineering of animals. (shrink)

I claim that differences in the importance attached to economic liberty are more important in debates over the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture than disagreements about the precautionary principle. I will argue this point by considering a case study: the decision by the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to grant nonregulated status to Roundup Ready soy. I will show that the unregulated release of this herbicide-resistant crop would not be acceptable morally (...) unless one places a very high premium on economic liberty. This is true even if one takes a sound science attitude to unknown risks, rather than a precautionary attitude. I concede that it may not have been within APHIS’s legislative mandate to regulate Roundup Ready soy further, but for those of us who do not put a high premium on economic liberty, this only calls for extending regulatory oversight of GMOs. (shrink)

In this article I will explore the problem of 'forbidden knowledge' on the basis of my own experience in the Netherlands with the development of a regulative framework for all research involving the production and use of genetically modified animals. Although it is not yet definitely settled, this regulative framework is based on what is called the 'no, unless'-principle. The 'no, unless' policy has been defined by Brom and Schroten in the following way.

Genetic engineering evokes a number of objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. The concept of animal integrity is often invoked to articulate these kind of objections. Moreover, in reaction to the advent of genetic engineering, the concept has been extended from the level of the individual animal to the level of the genome and of the species. However, the concept of (...) class='Hi'>animal integrity was not developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, the aim of this paper is to critically examine the assumption that the concept of integrity, including its extensions to the level of the genome and the species, is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed at the genetic engineering of animals. (shrink)

In Drosophila, the genetic approach is still the method of choice for answering fundamental questions on cell biology, signal transduction, development, physiology and behavior. In this approach, a gene's function is ascertained by altering either the amount or quality of the gene product, and then observing the consequences. The genetic approach is itself polymorphous, encompassing new and more complex techniques that typically employ the growing collections of transgenes. The keystone of these modern Drosophila transgenic techniques has been the Gal4 (...) binary system. Recently, several new techniques have modified this binary system to offer greater control over the timing, tissue specificity and magnitude of gene expression. Additionally, the advances in post‐transcriptional gene silencing, or RNAi, have greatly expanded the ability to knockdown almost any gene's function. Regardless of the growing experimental intricacy, the application of these advances to modify gene activity still obeys the fundamental principles of genetic analysis. Several of these transgenic techniques, which offer more precise control over a gene's activity, will be reviewed here with a discussion on how they may be used for determining a gene's function. BioEssays 26:1243–1253, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The concept of intrinsic value is often invoked to articulate objections to the genetic engineering of animals, particularly those objections that are not directed at the negative effects the technique might have on the health and welfare of the modified animals. However, this concept was not developed in the context of genetic engineering. Given this external origin, this paper critically examines the assumption that the concept of intrinsic value is suitable to articulate and justify moral objections more specifically directed (...) at the genetic engineering of animals. I discuss four different theories of intrinsic value, two of which defend a moral concept of intrinsic value and two a non-moral one. I conclude that only a particular non-moral concept of intrinsic value is suitable to express specific objections to genetic engineering, because these objections can only be defended in the form of indirect duties regarding animals. (shrink)

Intrinsic value and animal integrity are two key concepts in the debate on the ethics of the genetic engineering of laboratory animals. These concepts have, on the one hand, a theoretical origin and are, on the other hand, based on the moral beliefs of people not directly involved in the genetic modification of animals. This ‘external’ origin raises the question whether these concepts need to be adjusted or extended when confronted with the moral experiences and opinions of people directly (...) involved in the creation or use of transgenic laboratory animals. To answer this question, 35 persons from the practice of biomedical research who are directly involved in genetic engineering (scientists, biotechnicians, animal caretakers and laboratory animal scientists) were interviewed. They were asked to give their moral opinion on different aspects of the genetic engineering of animals and to react to statements about the concepts of intrinsic value and animal integrity. Analysis of the interviews showed that, contrary to what is often assumed, the respondents embraced these concepts, even those senses that (more) specifically apply to genetic engineering. And although the respondents raised some objections that go beyond issues of animal welfare, these objections could quite well be expressed in terms of the concepts of intrinsic value and animal integrity. In short, the results of the present study strongly suggest that these concepts do not have to be adjusted or extended in the light of the moral experiences and opinions from practice. (shrink)

The Convention on Biological Diversity opens the possibility to negotiate a legally binding Biosafety Protocol to assess and minimize risks in the field of transboundary transfer, handling, and use of organisms modified by genetic engineering. Two principles— the Precautionary Principle and the Principle of Familiarity—guiding the risk assessment as basis of import decisions on such organisms are discussed. Developing and European industrialized countries favor the Precautionary Principle. The U.S., Australia, Japan, and some others call for the Principle of Familiarity. (...) These two principles exhibit opposite effects on scientific progress in general and on scientific methodology of risk assessment in particular. With the example of risk assessment by the U.S. company Monsanto discussed below, it could be illustrated that the Principle of Familiarity opens the way for superficial evaluations based on citing arbitrary references while the Precautionary Principle is an incentive for developing and applying sound methodology in experimental risk assessment. on the transboundary transfer of such LMOs, for example, on the international exchange of and trade with transgenic seeds, grains, animals, or bacteria. The negotiations are based on Articles 19.3 and 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, elaborated during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, and on Decision II/5 of the Second Conference of the Parties to this Convention in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1995 (see the appendix; for more documents, see www.biodiv.org). Until the Fourth Conference of the Parties in 1998, 172 states ratified this convention. This conference decided to finish the Biosafety Protocol in February 1999. In 1998, transgenic crops were allowed to be planted in eight (75%) countries of the world. As the country with the largest acreage of transgenic crops and as the main trader of LMOs, the United States cannot become a member of the protocol until it has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity. (shrink)

Research at the intersections of feminism, biology and philosophy provides dynamic starting grounds for this discussion of genetic technologies and animals. With a focus on animal bodies, I will examine moral implications of the genetic engineering of “domesticated” animals—primarily pigs and chickens—for the purposes of human consumption. Concepts of natural and artificial, contamination and purity, integrity and fragmentation and mind and body will feature in the discussion. In this respect, Margaret Atwood’s novel, Oryx and Crake, serves as a cogent (...) medium for exploring these highly contentious practices and ideas as it provides hypothetical narratives of possibility. Moreover, it is used to highlight contemporary hegemonic assumptions and values in ways that make them visible. Particular attention is paid to issues of growing human organs in pigs for xenotransplantation (resulting, for Atwood, in “pigoons”) and the ultimate end of the intensive factory farming of chickens through the genetic engineering of ‘mindless’ chicken tumours (or, as Atwood calls them, “ChickieNobs”). Integral to these philosophical considerations is the provocative question of the genetic modification of animal bodies as a means to end the suffering of domestic food animals. The ultimate implications of this question include an ongoing sensory and moral deprivation of human experience, potentially resulting in a future mechanomophosis, the extreme manifestation of an existing mechanomorphism. (shrink)

Artificial genetic constructs that direct the synthesis of self‐replicating RNA molecules are used widely to induce gene silencing, for bioproduction, and for vaccination. Interestingly, one variant of the self‐replicon has not been discussed in the literature: namely, transgenic organisms that synthesise alien replicons. For example, plant cells may be easily genetically modified to produce bacteriophages or insect viruses. Alien replicon‐producing organisms (ARPOs) may serve as a unique tool for biocontrol or to selectively influence the characteristics of a (...) target organism. The ARPO approach would have to meet strict biosafety criteria, and its practical applications are problematic. However, a discussion on ARPO applicability would be valuable to outline the full set of options available in the bioengineering toolbox. In this paper, RNA replicons for bioengineering are reviewed briefly, and the ARPO approach is discussed. (shrink)

The coexistence of genetically modified (GM) crops and non-GM crops is a myth because the movement of transgenes beyond their intended destinations is a certainty, and this leads to genetic contamination of organic farms and other systems. It is unlikely that transgenes can be retracted once they have escaped, thus the damage to the purity of non-GM seeds is permanent. The dominant GM crops have the potential to reduce biodiversity further by increasing agricultural intensification. There are also potential (...) risks to biodiversity arising from gene flow and toxicity to nontarget organisms from herbicide-resistant (HT) and insect-resistant (Bt) crops. Unless whole regions are declared GM agriculture free, the development of distinct systems of agriculture (GM and non-GM) will be impossible as GM agriculture emerges at the expense of all other forms of production. (shrink)

Public policy on the development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has mainly been concerned with defining proper strategies of risk management. However, surveys and focus group interviews show that although lay people are concerned with risks, they also emphasize that genetic modification is ethically questionable in itself. Many people feel that this technology “tampers with nature” in an unacceptable manner. This is often identified as an objection to the crossing of species borders in producing transgenic (...) organisms. Most scientists reject these opinions as based on insufficient knowledge about biotechnology, the concept of species, and nature in general. Some recent projects of genetic modification aim to accommodate the above mentioned concerns by altering the expression of endogenous genes rather than introducing genes from other species. There can be good scientific reasons for this approach, in addition to strategic reasons related to greater public acceptability. But are there also moral reasons for choosing intragenic rather than transgenic modification? I suggest three interrelated moral reasons for giving priority to intragenic modification. First, we should respect the opinions of lay people even when their view is contrary to scientific consensus; they express an alternative world-view, not scientific ignorance. Second, staying within species borders by strengthening endogenous traits reduces the risks and scientific uncertainty. Third, we should show respect for nature as a complex system of laws and interconnections that we cannot fully control. The main moral reason for intragenic modification, in our view, is the need to respect the “otherness” of nature. (shrink)

Intrinsic value and animal integrity are two key concepts in the debate on the ethics of the genetic engineering of laboratory animals. These concepts have, on the one hand, a theoretical origin and are, on the other hand, based on the moral beliefs of people not directly involved in the genetic modification of animals. This ‘external’ origin raises the question whether these concepts need to be adjusted or extended when confronted with the moral experiences and opinions of people directly (...) involved in the creation or use of transgenic laboratory animals. To answer this question, 35 persons from the practice of biomedical research who are directly involved in genetic engineering (scientists, biotechnicians, animal caretakers and laboratory animal scientists) were interviewed. They were asked to give their moral opinion on different aspects of the genetic engineering of animals and to react to statements about the concepts of intrinsic value and animal integrity. Analysis of the interviews showed that, contrary to what is often assumed, the respondents embraced these concepts, even those senses that (more) specifically apply to genetic engineering. And although the respondents raised some objections that go beyond issues of animal welfare, these objections could quite well be expressed in terms of the concepts of intrinsic value and animal integrity. In short, the results of the present study strongly suggest that these concepts do not have to be adjusted or extended in the light of the moral experiences and opinions from practice. (shrink)

Turning animals into art through genetic manipulation poses many questions for how we think about our relationship with other species. Here, I explore three rather disparate sets of issues. First, I ask to what extent the production of such living “artforms” really is as transgressive as advocates claim. Whether or not it counts as radical in terms of art I cannot say: but it is not at all radical, I argue, in terms of how we think about our human place (...) in the world. On the contrary, producing these animals only reinforces our own sense of our importance. The second theme I explore is the extent to which making transgenic organisms for any purposes is radical in terms of complexity. Here, I focus on the idea of complexity as a concept in developmental biology; genetic manipulation may be successful to commercial companies, but it is deeply troubling to many biologists who consider that its deeply entrenched reductionism is enormously problematic. What risks do we run by ignoring nature’s own complexity—and creativity? And—in particular—what risks do we run of damaging or compromising animal welfare? The third theme turns to public perceptions of these new technologies (whether in science or art), and notes the extent of public unease. This unease is not simply a question of public ignorance about the technology, but reflects the enormously rich ways in which we make meanings about animals, and relate to them. These are, I suggest, a far more potent source of creativity than simply moving genes around to make photogenic animals. (shrink)

The potential for genetically modified (GM) crops to threaten biodiversity conservation and sustainable agriculture is substantial. Megadiverse countries and centers of origin and/or diversity of crop species are particularly vulnerable regions. The future of sustainable agriculture may be irreversibly jeopardized by contamination of in situ preserved genetic resources threatening a strategic resource for the world—s food security. Because GM crops are truly biological novelties, their release into the environment poses concerns about the unpredictable ecological and evolutionary responses that (...) GM species themselves and the interacting biota may express in the medium and long term. One of the consequences of these processes may be a generalized contamination of natural flora by GM traits and a degradation and erosion of the commonly owned genetic resources available today for agricultural development. GM plants carrying pharmaceutical and industrial traits will pose even more dangerous risks if released in the environment. (shrink)

One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and environmental deprivation. To minimise the impact of these factors, we (...) propose the following option for consideration—ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancementifit becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be eliminated by other means. Despite not being a morally ideal ‘solution’, itismorally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available. (shrink)

The paper argues that we should not genetically engineer hogs to suit the preferences of farmers and consumers.

As a first step, the arguments for and against the use of animals for medical purposes in general were reviewed. These arguments are summarized briefly in the first part of the article; Secondly, even if people accept in principle the use of animals in medicine and medical research, their use in xenotransplantation mayraise particular difficulties. There are three key issues in the debate over the use of animals in xenotransplantation. The first is whether as a matter of principle, it is (...) considered to be morally acceptable to use animals as organ or tissue source; the second is the ethical acceptability of the use of primates to supply transplant material; the third is the ethical issues raised by the use of genetically modified animals to provide organs for xenotransplantation. If it is agreed to be acceptable in principle, there are then questions to address regarding the welfare of animals within any xenotransplantation program. Finally, the author makes an attempt to discuss these ethical issues in Chinese cultural context. (shrink)

A growing number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are considering legalizing the growth of genetically modified organisms. Furthermore, several projects are underway to develop transgenic crops tailored to the region. Given the contentious nature of GMOs and prevalent anti-GMO sentiments in Africa, a robust ethical analysis examining the concerns arising from the development, adoption, and regulation of GMOs in sub-Saharan Africa is warranted. To date, ethical analyses of GMOs in the global context have drawn predominantly on Western (...) philosophy, dealing with Africa primarily on a material level. Yet, a growing number of scholars are articulating and engaging with ethical theories that draw upon sub-Saharan African value systems. One such theory, Ubuntu, is a well-studied sub-Saharan African communitarian morality. I propose that a robust ethical analysis of Africa's agricultural future necessitates engaging with African moral theory. I articulate how Ubuntu may lead to a novel and constructive understanding of the ethical considerations for introducing GMOs into sub-Saharan Africa. However, rather than reaching a definitive prescription, which would require significant engagement with local communities, I consider some of Ubuntu's broader implications for conceptualizing risk and engaging with local communities when evaluating GMOs. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of using local moral theory in bioethics by considering how one might negotiate between universalism and particularism in the global context. Rather than advocating for a form of ethical relativism, I suggest that local moral theories shed light on salient ethical considerations that are otherwise overlooked. (shrink)

This paper traces the history of the Animal Research Station, Cambridge from its establishment in 1932 to its closure in 1986. The author worked there for forty years and was Director from 1979. Originally set up as a field station for Cambridge University’s School of Agriculture, the Station was expanded after World War II as the Agricultural Research Council’s Unit of Animal Reproduction. Beginning with semen and artificial insemination, research at the Station soon embraced superovulation and embryo transfer (...) in farm animals. Many other technologies were also developed here, including IVF in pigs, cloning by nuclear transplantation of early embryonic cells, and the first genetically modified farm animals in Britain. This account recalls the Directors of the Station and their research teams together with details of their pioneering contribution to reproductive biology. (shrink)