This paper discusses the normative structure of principles that require belief-revision in the face of disagreement, the role of self-trust in our epistemic lives, and the tensions that arise between the two. Section 2 argues that revisionary principles of disagreement share a general normative structure such that they prohibit continued reliance upon the practices via which one came to hold the beliefs under dispute. Section 3 describes an affective mode of epistemic self-trust that can be characterised as one’s having an (...) attitude of optimism about the reliability of the practices via which one forms beliefs. The availability of affective self-trust is crucial to being able to rationally resist doubts about those practices. However, as argued in the final section of the paper, following revisionary principles of disagreement can render such trust psychologically unavailable. Consequently, attempts to follow such principles can have doxastic consequences that predictably exceed their normative implications. (shrink)

The desire to defend a state against attacks by a non-state actor requires thinking about counter-attacking without violating the sovereign equality of the territorial state because targeting a non-state actor on the territory of that state may violate its sovereignty. This paper evaluates the main views on self-defense by states against non-state actors by studying the Just War Theory and argues that self-defense against a non-state actor is allowed if the counter-attack complies with the principle of sovereign equality. Sovereign (...) equality is the prohibition of states from dominion over other states because states are equal to one another. This principle can be respected by allowing self-defense against non-state actors to occur only if the state consented to the use of force on its territory or if that state is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control the non-state actor. (shrink)

Certainly principles of criminal liability may be understood as rules or norms outlining orders or prohibitions and standing out among other norms with their weight, for legal culture, legal doctrine, etc. In such a classic approach they are norms defining basic rights and obligations in the applicable criminal law. However, is it the only possible and cognitively interesting meaning of the word “principle” in jurisprudence? From the semiotic point of view, they can occur in three forms: special-kind norms, teleological (...) directives, rules which constitute valid performance of conventional activities. In an extra-directival sense these principles may be understood as models-descriptions of shaping the system of criminal law. From a theoretical and practical point of view principles addressed to the legislator are extremely weighty—they can be called rules constructing the system of criminal liability. These all problems are discussed in the article. (shrink)

Preface gives a synopsis of Spinoza, his life, and where he was at during this time period. The book gives a huge depth into Cartesian Philosophy which is the philosophical doctrine of Rene Descartes. It also speaks of metaphysics in relation to Spinoza and Cartesian Philosophy. Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese Jewish origin. Revealing considerable scientific aptitude, the breadth and importance of Spinoza's work was not fully realized until years after his death. Today, he (...) is considered one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy, laying the groundwork for the 18th century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism. By virtue of his magnum opus, the posthumous Ethics, in which he opposed Descartes' mind-body dualism, Spinoza is considered to be one of Western philosophy's most important philosophers. Philosopher and historian Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel said of all modern philosophers, "You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all." All of Spinoza's works were listed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books) by the Roman Catholic Church. Spinoza lived quietly as a lens grinder, turning down rewards and honors throughout his life, including prestigious teaching positions, and gave his family inheritance to his sister. Spinoza's moral character and philosophical accomplishments prompted 20th century philosopher Gilles Deleuze to name him "the 'prince' of philosophers." Spinoza died at the age of 44 of a lung illness, perhaps tuberculosis or silicosis exacerbated by fine glass dust inhaled while tending to his trade. Spinoza is buried in the churchyard of the Nieuwe Kerk on Spui in The Hague. (shrink)

According to the Thomistic tradition, the Principle of Totality (TPoT) articulates a secondary principle of natural law which guides the exercise of human ownership or dominium over creation. In its general signification, TPoT is a principle of distributive justice determining the right ordering of wholes to their parts. In the medical field it is traditionally understood as entailing an absolute prohibition of bodily mutilation as irrational and immoral, and an imperfect obligation to use the parts of (...) one’s body for the perfection of the bodily whole. TPoT is thus a key element of the system of principles within which an individual exercises her right to life: it helps specify the nature, scope and limits of those actions by which an agent permissibly acts in order to preserve her life. While the Thomistic tradition and the Catholic Church have drawn clear conclusions from the principle regarding, e.g., direct sterilization and non-therapeutic experimentation on human subjects, less attention has been given to the implications of TPoT for non-therapeutic procedures that may positively impact biological functioning or supra-biological goals–that is, for human “enhancement.” We will explore the degree to which TPoT non-univocally guides our use of both artifacts and bodies. We will argue that a careful analysis of these distinct kinds of totalities suggests that the application of TPoT to artifacts and bodies is strongly isomorphic, which is what tempts advocates of the Principle of Autonomy to invalidly infer the absolute dominium of the individual over her body. The inference is invalid because this isomorphism also includes a principle of intrinsic value whose function is to resist the instrumentalization of both artifacts and bodies in some contexts; we are not even related to artifacts as advocates of absolute autonomy believe we are, let alone to our bodies. Rather, the limits of human dominium are determined by the nature and finalities, inherent or acquired, of the objects in question, and it will be argued that articulating these limits raises important, understudied, and fascinating questions about the permissibility of various kinds of human enhancement. (shrink)

The reductivist view of war holds that the moral rules of killing in war can be reduced to the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. Noam Zohar objects to reductivism on the grounds that the account of individual self-defence that best supports the rules of war will inadvertently sanction terrorist killings of non-combatants. I argue that even an extended account of self-defence—that is, an account that permits killing at least some innocent people to save one's own life—can support a (...) prohibition on terrorism, provided that it distinguishes between direct and indirect threats. What such an account cannot support is the blanket immunity of non-combatants to defensive killing. If a non-combatant is morally responsible for indirectly threatening in an unjust war, she can be liable to defensive killing. However, this gives us reason to revise our account of permissible killing in war, rather than to reject the reductivist account. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Intention and Wrongdoing: A Defense of the Principle of Double Effect by Joshua StuchlikMichael J. DegnanSTUCHLIK, Joshua. Intention and Wrongdoing: A Defense of the Principle of Double Effect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. xvi + 220 pp. Cloth, $99.99In this book Joshua Stuchlik vigorously defends the principle of double effect (PDE), which states, "There is a strict moral constraint against bringing about serious evil (harm) (...) to an innocent person intentionally, but it is permissible in a wider range of circumstances to act in a way that brings about serious evil incidentally, as a foreseen but non-intended side effect." After defining the terms of the principle and considering an intuitive case-based defense, he supports its truth based on a standard of solidarity. Since the PDE requires the distinction between intended consequences and nonintended side effects, he explains Elizabeth Anscombe's theory of intention, which supports the distinction's moral significance. He uses her theory to treat the closeness problem, the irrelevance of intention critique, and a challenge from Joshua Greene's empirical moral psychology that purports to undermine deontological constraints on causing harm.I present Stuchlik's grounding for the PDE followed by an uncontroversial example of its application. After this I consider two important objections to the PDE that Stuchlik critiques: the closeness problem and James Rachels's argument that intentions are irrelevant to judging the moral permissibility of actions. I conclude by examining Stuchlik's treatment of these challenges.Stuchlik interprets the PDE's very strict constraint against intentional killing or seriously harming the innocent as a near absolute prohibition, for he believes innocent persons are not suitable recipients of intentional harm. He grounds this constraint on the principle of solidarity. Being in solidarity with another is possessing concern for that other's sake. The ground for this concern is a shared human nature that enables members to think of themselves as making a "we." Human nature consists in the structured potentialities for knowing and freely choosing. Evidence of these rational potentialities is the human orientation toward the transcendent values of truth and goodness. Such embodied potentialities have inviolable worth.The scenarios of the precision bomber and the terror bomber illustrate the moral significance of the intended harm versus the nonintended but foreseen harm that Stuchlik adopts from Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory. Each bombers' goal is to help his country win a just war. The precision bomber pursues that goal by targeting a munitions factory. Though he foresees that many noncombatants will be killed or seriously [End Page 367] injured from the bomb, he does not necessarily intend these harms. By contrast, the terror bomber targets a civilian center necessarily intending harm for noncombatants. The PDE rules out his conduct.Anscombe's account of intention can lead to the problem of closeness in which the content of an intention is sufficiently fine-grained that an agent need not intend harm in almost any situation. Stuchlik illustrates the problem with Alexander Pruss's zookeeper scenario.An eccentric literalistic but always truthful magnate tells Sam he will donate to famine relief saving a hundred lives if and only if Sam follows his directions to the iota. Sam is to purchase a gun, sneak at night into a zoo owned by the magnate and kill the first mammal he sees. Sam sneaks into the zoo, sees a mammal in the distance, and forms the intention to shoot it. Then he notices that the mammal is human but shoots nonetheless on utilitarian grounds.In this case applying the PDE shows that Sam is simply intending that a mammal be killed. The fact that the mammal is a human is irrelevant, according to Anscombe's action theory.Stuchlik's response clarifies the scope of intention in the PDE. As stated above, the intention's content includes seriously harming an innocent human. However, if the intention ranges only over an intention to bring about an effect, E, and it turns out that E is a serious harm for an innocent human being, then applying the principle shows that Sam's action is wrong. The intended effect of killing the mammal is, as a matter of fact, an... (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is two-fold. It is, first, to reconstruct Kant's argument against self-murder, and, second, to analyze the function of the principle of self-preservation of reason with regard to the prohibition of self-murder. I argue that self-murder is contrary to the principle of self-preservation of reason and violates the trustee-relationship between the homo phaenomenon and the homo noumenon. The analysis shows that moral self-preservation in Kant is a rational principle which serves to secure (...) the possibility of moral faith and self-perfection. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I provide a comprehensive analysis of Kant's argument against self-murder by examining all of the relevant statements in his works, the Nachlass, as well as the lectures recorded by Herder, Powalski, Collins, and Vigilantius. Since self-murder violates a perfect duty to oneself, key-topics of the analysis are: the dual status of the duty of self-preservation as both inner duty of right and duty of virtue, the right and end of humanity, as well as Kant's model of self-possession in terms of proprietas. The analysis makes clear that self-murder destroys the moral self and must be distinguished from sacrificing one's life in order to preserve one's moral integrity. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I interpret the duty of self-preservation and the prohibition of self-murder in the context of Kant's doctrine of the faith of reason and the principle of self-preservation of reason. I first provide an overview of the debate on self-preservation and its implications for an understanding of modern rationality and summarize the different meanings of -preservation in Kant. I then argue that the "principle of self-preservation of reason" consists in what Kant calls "the maxim of healthy reason" and that it grounds the faith and the unity of reason. Against the background of this analysis, I interpret the trustee-relationship between the homo phaenomenon and the homo noumenon as a model of moral self-obligation. Entrusting the homo phaenomenon to the homo noumenon, I contend, means to entrust life to practical reason and to subject oneself to the moral law. (shrink)

Combined oral contraceptives have been demonstrated to have significant benefits for the treatment and prevention of disease. These medications also are associated with untoward health effects, and they may be directly contraceptive. Prescribers and users must compare and weigh the intended beneficial health effects against foreseeable but unintended possible adverse effects in their decisions to prescribe and use. Additionally, those who intend to abide by Catholic teachings must consider prohibitions against contraception. Ethical judgments concerning both health benefits and contraception are (...) approached in this essay through an overview of the therapeutic, prophylactic, untoward, and contraceptive effects of COC and discussion of magisterial and traditional Catholic teachings from natural law. Discerning through the principle of double effect, proportionate reason, and evidence gathered from the sciences, medical and moral conclusions are drawn that we believe to be fully compliant with good medicine and Catholic teaching. (shrink)

Advancement of modern agricultural biotechnology has brought various potential benefits to humankind, but at the same time ethical concerns regarding some applications such as genetically modified foods have been raised among the public. Several questions are being posed; should they utilize such applications to improve quality of their life, or should they refrain in order to save themselves from any associated risk? What are the ethical principles that can be applied to assess these applications? By using GMF as a case (...) study, this paper discusses possible answers to these questions from Islamic perspective. Such answers are based on the understanding of the Islamic concept of maslahah and mafsadah as well as the Islamic principles of priority. There is no specific GMF that has been declared as unlawful by Muslim scholars thus far. Nevertheless, they generally state that any GMF that contains unlawful substance is prohibited in Islam. Such statement can be understood since Islam puts highest priority to preserve shari’ah which prescribes the lawful and unlawful things in human life. Priorities have also been given to preserve human health and environment therefore any GMF that may inflict harm on both entities is also considered as unlawful. (shrink)

Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch’s Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Simester and von Hirsch 2011) is an important contribution to the philosophical debate over the nature and ethical limits of criminalisation. As they note in their reply in this symposium, one of the novel aspects of their account is that they do not advance one “unified, grand theory”. Rather, they analyse each ground of criminal prohibition—wrongfulness, harm-based, offense, and paternalistic prohibitions aimed at preventing self-harm—so (...) as to develop guiding principles for their use (or, in the case of paternalism, the absence of an independent principle that would underwrite its use).The result is a rich set of arguments that advance a number of debates across the field of criminalisation.However, that is not all: the participants share the view that, as Tatjana Hörnle puts it, “any theory of criminalization presupposes assumptions about the functions of the criminal law. The q. (shrink)

When should we make use of the criminal law? Suppose that a responsible legislature seeks to enact a morally justifiable range of criminal prohibitions. What criteria should it apply when deciding whether to proscribe conduct? Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs is a philosophical analysis of the nature, significance, and ethical limits of criminalisation. The authors explore the scope and moral boundaries of harm-based prohibitions, proscriptions of offensive behaviour, and 'paternalistic' prohibitions aimed at preventing self-harm. Their aim is to develop guiding principles (...) for these various grounds of state prohibition, including an analysis of the constraints and mediating factors that weigh for and against criminalisation. Both authors have written extensively in the field. In Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs they have reworked a number of well-known essays and added several important new essays to produce an integrated, accessible, philosophically-sophisticated account that will be of great interest to legal academics, philosophers, and advanced students alike"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Certain methods and weapons are traditionally considered to be?mala in se?, i.e. evil in themselves. Examples are mass rape campaigns and land mines. This article examines different interpretations of the principle that belligerents ought not to use such means. Some interpretations are reductionist in the sense that they see the principle as an instance of other principles regulating conduct in war, namely the principles of discrimination and proportionality. I suggest a horizontal and a vertical dimension of the latter. (...) Resort to violence can then be unjustified if the persons are not liable to be attacked because they bear no responsibility for the relevant threat, the amount of harm is disproportionate compared to what can be achieved by the resort to violent force, or the kind of harm is disproportionate by making individual persons suffer in ways that no one should have to endure. I defend the vertical dimension of proportionality as a key to understanding the principle of mala in se and consider whether it leads to an absolute prohibition against such means. (shrink)

Alan Donagan, in The Theory of Morality, famously claims that the principles of “common morality” (i.e., the morality of the Judeo-Christian tradition) form a consistent system that can be derived from a single fundamental principle: It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature. In particular, I want to show that the prohibition contained in the fundamental principle is interpreted by appeal to prior convictions about particular sorts of cases, (...) whether they involve the violation of “respect” or not, and that this has unfavorable consequences for Donagan’s claim that the principles of common morality form a truly deductive system of morality. (shrink)

The prohibition of commercialisation of the human body and its parts is not applied consistently and suffers from many exceptions in the human biological material (HBM) market. Examples include the possibility of patenting certain HBM-derived products and their commercial marketing or payments for blood donations. Thus, the current practice of marketing HBM-derived products makes the altruistic donor most vulnerable to exploitation while being deprived of benefits. There seem to be two ways to improve this state of affairs. The first (...) is to apply consistently the prohibition of commercialisation of the body and its parts to commercially marketed tissue and cell products as well. This would require limiting the possibility of financial gain associated with the processing, distribution and sale of HBM-based products. Such a solution, however, does not seem to gain wide acceptance or have a chance of implementation in the near future. Therefore, introducing more transparent rules and greater donor empowerment seems more reasonable by exempting HBM from the ban on commercialisation under certain conditions and with clear limitations. (shrink)

Nigel Walker’s first principle of criminalization declares that ‘Prohibitions should not be included in the criminal law for the sole purpose of ensuring that breaches of them are visited with retributive punishment’. I argue that we should reject this principle, for ‘mala prohibita’ as well as for ‘mala in se’: conduct should be criminalized in order to ensure (as far as we reasonably can) that those who engage in it receive retributive punishment. In the course of the argument, (...) I show why we should not see the criminal law as consisting in ‘prohibitions’; I explain different species of mala prohibita, and show how their commission does involve genuine wrongdoing; and I show the importance of distinguishing the question of regulation from that of sanction. (shrink)

The ‘tobacco-free generation’ policy, which bans cigarette sales based on birth year, presents a bold public health initiative but raises significant ethical and practical concerns. As behaviours like drug use become legal and criminal penalties are reduced, singling out smoking for generational restriction appears inconsistent within an increasingly permissive society. Kniess1 critiques this approach for creating inequities by selectively limiting freedoms, conflicting with principles of fairness and adult autonomy. A more balanced public health strategy could involve uniform restrictions on harmful (...) substances or prioritising informed personal choice, supported by harm reduction and education to encourage healthier alternatives. The generational smoking ban targets specific birth cohorts, prohibiting tobacco sales to those born after a certain year. Unlike universal bans, it creates two distinct adult classes—those permitted to smoke and those who are not—resulting in an apparently arbitrary division. Critics, including Schmidt,2 point to the ethical inconsistency of restricting liberties for some while leaving others untouched. This policy design has been defended as a pragmatic compromise, aiming to protect future generations without infringing on the established habits of current smokers (Grill and Voigt).3 Kniess1 evaluates this selective restriction through relational egalitarianism which emphasises the importance of equal social relationships. The cut-off, …. (shrink)

The non-discrimination principle is one of the essential principles in the area of European public and private law too. The importance of this principle also takes a great place in field of company law, especially in the area of “freedom of establishment of the companies” in the European Single Market. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the general concept of “free movement of people, capital, goods and services,” in ESM. In fact, freedom of establishment is (...) a substantive part of the process of creation the internal market in EU. The freedom of establishment is based on the Treaty of the functioning of EU. According to article 49 from TFEU, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. This prohibition also applies to restrictions on setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. In-depth exploration of this issue is conditioned by the interpretation of the Court of justice of European Union, which embodies the real legal regime of freedom of establishment. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the principles of healthy and fair competition and equal access of the companies too. This article seeks to elaborate fundamental theoretical aspects of this issue, considering certain case - study analyze of CJEU judgements. The main focus is on the non-discrimination principle, legal effects of the CJEU judgments, free market and competitiveness, and finally, determination of the concept of primary and secondary establishment of companies in EU. (shrink)

The principle of majority, which is an indispensable tool of election and decision-making in today's democracies, is one of the main indicators of its legitimacy, as well as having a superior position in the establishment and maintenance of political power. The aim of this research is to determine the relationship of the condition of “the caliph’s Quraysh” with this principle by revealing the analysis of the Islamic scholars on the importance of the majority principle in terms of (...) establishing political power and using the authority to order and prohibit. In the grounding of this aim, firstly, the dominant role of the majority in determining the political power was emphasized and the organic relationship between them was tried to be revealed, and the nature of the support provided by the majority to the administration in the use of political power authority and its effect on the possession of the means of coercion that sustain the state apparatus were examined in the light of the views of Fiqh and Kalam scholars. Then, the condition that the caliph should be from the Quraysh lineage, which has been the subject of debate since the 9th century, when the influence of non-Arab elements on the political administration became evident, was examined within the framework of the majority principle, and the evaluations of Islamic scholars about the widespread rumor that formed the basis of this were briefly examined. At the end of the study, it was concluded that Islamic scholars adopted the principle of “majority” in the establishment and maintenance of political power, and that they accepted the requirement that the caliph be Quraysh as a qualification condition, and that the narration, which is the basis of this, shows a historical and socio-political reality brought about by the conditions that emerged in a certain time period. (shrink)

This report seeks to discuss the threats to liberal democracy and explore how to devise a new path towards democratic transition and the challenges faced: civil war, sectarian and religious conflicts, ethnic and national tensions, international terrorism and regional wars, and societal violence. The impact on democratic transformation, especially the sense of threat, whether literal or theoretical, led to the tendency of demagogic towards a populist outlook in pluralistic societies, generating reactions across other societies suffering from external alienation and internal (...) tyranny. The world is currently faced with the decline of the core values of the concept of democracy at the global level which has led us to the following questions: the principle of the rule of law, peaceful trading of power, human rights, the principles of equality and sovereignty. The populists attempt to exploit the ideas of the stereotypical, especially on hatred of the other, and the xenophobia against foreigners when faced with the wave of asylum and migration seekers, diminishing freedoms and citizenship rights, coupled with the rejection of economic globalization, to the implementation of a protectionist policy. Victories such as Brexit or Donald Trump’s in the United States have brought forward scenes of fear and hatred of ‘the other’, encouraging intolerance and extremism. This led to a rise in policies against foreigners, migration, terrorism, Islam and protectionist economics. This report will look at a future beyond traditional democracy, discovering what the next stage in democracy will be, in terms of the survival of society, raising problematic questions: Is democracy, by virtue of their dynamics, able to respond to the changing realities, and whether it can renew itself and overcome some of its issues to invent new methods and literature? (shrink)

Halakha consists of a variety of laws that determine the halakhic status of various actions. Halakhic laws, by their very nature, have a general aspect in that they apply to all similar actions under similar conditions. In this paper, I examine, from a philosophical-analytical point of view, the relationship between the general aspect of the halakhic laws and the fact that these laws apply to particular actions. After the introduction, this paper is divided into three parts. First, I distinguish between (...) two competing theses regarding the "metaphysical order" between the general aspect of halakhic law and its individual cases. The first one, I call 'Halakhic Generalism', according to which the general aspect of Halakhic law has essential precedence. The second one I refer to as 'Halakhic Particularism', according to which the general aspect of the halakhic law is nothing more than a generalization of all its individual cases. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the particularist position has the power to justify a unique and puzzling halakhic principle. According to this principle, in cases of normative over-determination where the same action is forbidden due to two different halakhic laws, then "a prohibition does not apply to a prohibition". Finally, I compare the reasoning I offer for this principle to alternative justifications of said principle. I argue that, compared to the alternatives, the particularist position provides the best explanation for the principle. (shrink)

This essay explores classical rabbinic literature's understanding of the prohibition of bloodshed alongside its understanding that "the image of God" corresponds to the physically embodied individual. This conception generates radical implications so that, apart from the narrow instance of a direct aggressor with intent to kill or rape, it is never legitimate to cause the death of any person, even in pursuit of a supposed "greater good." While notions of war and execution are retained in principle, the requirement (...) of direct divine sanction for such actions neutralizes them in practice, removing them from the domain of human judgment and justification. (shrink)

John Harris criticises the European Parliament’s ‘waft in the direction of human rights and human dignity’ and rejects its suggestion that ‘human cloning violates the principle of equality since “it permits a eugenic and racist selection of the human race”’. He argues that, by parity of reasoning, so too do ‘pre-natal and pre-implantation screening, not to mention egg donation, sperm donation, surrogacy, abortion and human preference in choice of partner’. Conflating the techniques mentioned (ie, human cloning, egg donation, etc) (...) with human preference in choice of a partner, he holds that reproductive liberty must be the operative principle in determining what ought to be prohibited by law in the realm of human reproduction. This article challenges his two problematic assumptions. (shrink)

Abstract“Conscientious provision” refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors “conscientious objection,” which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually (...) associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument—the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens—justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals. (shrink)

This article critically re-examines the application of the principle of patient autonomy within bioethics. In complex societies such as those found in North America and Europe health care professionals are increasingly confronted by patients from diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. This affects the relationship between clinicians and patients to the extent that patients' deliberations upon the proposed courses of treatment can, in various ways and to varying extents, be influenced by their ethnic, cultural, and religious commitments. The (...) class='Hi'>principle of patient autonomy is the main normative constraint imposed upon medical treatment. Bioethicists typically appeal to the principle of patient autonomy as a means for generally attempting to resolve conflict between patients and clinicians. In recent years a number of bioethicists have responded to the condition of multiculturalism by arguing that the autonomy principle provides the basis for a common moral discourse capable of regulating the relationship between clinicians and patients in those situations where patients' beliefs and commitments do or may contradict the ethos of biomedicine. This article challenges that claim. I argue that the precise manner in which the autonomy principle is philosophically formulated within such accounts prohibits bioethicists' deployment of autonomy as a core ideal for a common moral discourse within multicultural societies. The formulation of autonomy underlying such accounts cannot be extended to simply assimilate individuals' most fundamental religious and cultural commitments and affiliations per se. I challenge the assumption that respecting prospective patients' fundamental religious and cultural commitments is necessarily always compatible with respecting their autonomy. I argue that the character of some peoples' relationship with their cultural or religious community acts to significantly constrain the possibilities for acting autonomously. The implication is clear. The autonomy principle may be presently invalidly applied in certain circumstances because the conditions for the exercise of autonomy have not been fully or even adequately satisfied. This is a controversial claim. The precise terms of my argument, while addressing the specific application of the autonomy principle within bioethics, will resonate beyond this sphere and raises questions for attempts to establish a common moral discourse upon the ideal of personal autonomy within multicultural societies generally. (shrink)

The presented enhanced version of Eriksen’s theorem defines an universal transform of the Foldy–Wouthuysen type and in any external static electromagnetic field reveals a discrete symmetry of Dirac’s equation, responsible for existence of a highly influential conserved quantum number—the charge index distinguishing two branches of DE spectrum. It launches the charge-index formalism obeying the charge-index conservation law. Via its unique ability to manipulate each spectrum branch independently, the CIF creates a perfect charge-symmetric architecture of Dirac’s quantum mechanics, which resolves all (...) the riddles of the standard DE theory. Besides the abstract CIF algebra, the paper discusses: the novel accurate charge-symmetric definition of the electric-current density; DE in the true-particle representation, where electrons and positrons coexist on equal footing; flawless “natural” scheme of second quantization; and new physical grounds for the Fermi–Dirac statistics. As a fundamental quantum law, the CICL originates from the kinetic-energy sign conservation and leads to a novel single-particle physics in strong-field situations. Prohibiting Klein’s tunneling in Klein’s zone via the CICL, the precise CIF algebra defines a new class of weakly singular DE solutions, strictly confined in the coordinate space and experiencing the total reflection from the potential barrier. (shrink)

Several liberal philosophers and penal theorists have argued that the state has a reason to prohibit acts that harm individuals. But what is harm? According to one specification of harm, a person P is harmed by an act (or an event) a iff, as a result of a, P is made worse off in terms of well-being. One central question here involves the baseline against which we assess whether someone is ‘worse off’. In other words, when a person is harmed (...) he is worse off, certainly—but what is worse off a variation from? A central part of the paper critically discusses different answers to this question based on versions of what we can call: the temporal baseline, the baseline from mankind and the counterfactual baseline. Essentially, it will be argued that the counterfactual baseline leaves us with a better understanding of harming than the other baselines discussed. The final part of the paper will describe some of the implications of our investigation for the application and evaluation of the view that harm matters in the justification of which type of acts should be criminalized by the state. The overall conclusion of the paper is that adherents of a view like the harm principle face a dilemma. Either they can accept the counterfactual baseline but then, they can do without the harm principle. Or they can reject the counterfactual baseline—but then they will have to formulate an alternative baseline which, as will be shown in the paper, is no easy task. (shrink)

Bataille's version of transgression and prohibition is based on two presuppositions: the first one is coupling of death and ecstasy on the level of energetic principle, which makes the combination of personally grounded experience of transcendence with the dispositions of the subject possible. The second one concerns making use of two existential forces: the will to survival and the will to transcendence. The counterbalance of life and its negation is the basis for understanding and identification of the social (...) function of prohibitions and of individual desire to break them. Bataille is thus consequent in applying the idea of original energetic balance of acceptance and dismissal, which makes all further differences, especially those of transgression and prohibition, possible. (shrink)

Mill’s Liberty Principle aims to protect ‘social’ freedom, which is traditionally understood as negative freedom. I argue that Mill’s conception of social freedom does not comfortably fit even a moralized conception of negative freedom, and that individuality, an ideal fundamental to On Liberty, is a robustly positive type of freedom. This raises the question of whether protecting social freedom involves an egalitarian, progressive state that ambitiously strives to create the social conditions of individuality. I consider the case for an (...) affirmative answer to that question, then argue that the ideal of individuality itself blocks interventions that some contemporary egalitarian, progressive liberals consider at least consistent with the Liberty Principle. These include autonomy-enhancing paternalism, and outright prohibition of as opposed to time, place, and manner regulation of the expression of some opinions that adversely affect protected minorities. Though not libertarian, the Liberty Principle is not an expression of this type of egalitarian liberalism, as evidenced inter alia by Mill’s emphatic rejection of state control of education, and his categorical case against prohibiting the expression of even the most extreme and insidious opinions. (shrink)

Libertarianism is a controversial political theory. But it is often presented as a resting upon a simple, indeed commonsense, moral principle. The libertarian “Non-Aggression Principle” (NAP) prohibits aggression against the persons or property of others, and it is on this basis that the libertarian opposition to redistributive taxation, legal paternalism, and perhaps even the state itself is thought to rest. This paper critically examines the NAP and the extent to which it can provide support for libertarian political theory. (...) It identifies two problems with existing libertarian appeals to the NAP. First, insofar as libertarians employ a moralized understanding of aggression, their principle is really about the protection of property rights rather than the prohibition of aggression. Second, the absolutist prohibition on aggression, which libertarians typically endorse and which is necessary to generate strongly libertarian conclusions, is grossly implausible. The paper concludes by setting forth a version of the NAP that does not suffer from these problems. It argues that this more moderate and defensible version of the NAP still has important libertarian implications, but that a full defense of libertarianism cannot rely upon appeals to non-aggression alone. (shrink)

As in every religious issue, the two main resources of Islām which are the Qur’ān and the Sunnah/ḥadīths are the first reference sources for deciding the things that are forbidden by Islam. There is no evidence in the Qur’ān that suggests specific types of animals are forbidden to eat except pork. Other than pork, only the animals which are slaughtered without the name of Allah, their blood and their carcass are forbidden to consume. Except these restricted ill-gotten meats, in the (...) Qur’ānic verses there are no other limitations referring to different animals. However, in Ḥadīth sources there are some narratives referring to the Prophet Muḥammad, implying that He named some other forbidden animals beside the ones specified in the Qur’ān. Collecting the narratives and evaluating them as a whole will contribute for a better understanding of the rules and principles of prohibitions that the Prophet Muḥammad imposed on this issue. Moreover, it will help to identify whether those rulings on some animals are unconditional and world-wide or cause-related and thus changeable according to the conditions. Furthermore, in this matter, although some animals‘ meat are not mentioned as forbidden in the Qur’ān, they are banned by the Prophet Muḥammad. This brings the need to highlight the importance of the capacity of the Prophet Muḥammad on deciding what is permissible (ḥalāl) and forbidden (ḥarām) in the religion.SummaryWhile the authority for determining what is ḥalāl (lawful) and what is ḥarām(forbidden) belongs essentially to Allah, the Prophet Muḥammad is also authorized to appoint what is ḥalāl-ḥarām by Allah.Authority of the Prophet Muḥammadrelated to the issue is not absolute and stems from the Qur’ān. Ḥalāland ḥarāmin the Qur’ān prescribed by Allah can be included in the concepts of maʿrūf (right) - munkar (wrong) andṭayyibāt (clean) - hkabāis (filthy). It is understood that the Prophet Muḥammadgrounded his commands in the concept of hkabāis.Prohibitions related to animal meats in the Qur’ānare limited to four: carcass, blood, pork and animals, which are not slaughtered in the name of Allah. However, in the Ḥadīth resources there are some narratives about the Prophet’s prohibition on consuming some types of animals other than the forbidden animals specified in the verses. These narratives can be classified in three titles:1. Animals, which are prohibited to be eaten 2. Animals, which are prohibited because of the way they are fed and slaughtered3. The matter of prohibition of the animals, which are commanded or forbidden to be slaughtered by the Prophet Muḥammad.At the end of the studies conducted based upon ḥadīth resources, in particular Kutūb al-Sittah (the well-known six ḥadīth books), it has been discovered that the animals, which are mentioned as not being permissible in the narratives, they are limited to domesticated donkey and the species of “predatory animals, predatory birds”, namely wolf, fox and cat. Even though the narratives about hyena imply as eatable, hyena is included in this article as it’s a predatory animal.The narratives regarding the prohibition of meat of domesticated donkey were transferred by approximately twenty Companions in respect to the time of the Battle of Khyber. This prohibition is generally stated in the ḥadīthresources as: “We were having dire hunger at the nights of Khyber. When the day for Khyber came, we encountered domesticated donkeys. We immediately slaughtered them. When we put the meat in the pot and started to boil it, crier of the Prophet Muḥammadcalled “Knock over the pots and don’t eat any of the donkey meat”. Regarding the issue there are such statements of some Companions like “we were banned from eating domesticated donkey”, “The Prophet banned the meat of domesticated donkey” among the narratives about the ban. In addition to a large number of narratives about the prohibition of domesticated donkey meat, there are two narratives related to permission of the Prophet for eating domesticated donkey and a narrative that Ibn ‘Abbās did not accept the ban. One of the said narratives is not among the narratives in the Kutūb al-Sittah while the other one is stated solely in the Sunanof Abū Dāwūd and thought to be acceptable by the traditionists. Even though this narrative’s authenticity is accepted, it is understood that there is an implication for the permission based on a necessity. According to the narrative, Ibn ʿAbbās referred to 145thverse of the surah al-An’am as a proof to his view saying “What ḥalālis what Allah allowed, what ḥaramis what Allah forbidden and the things about which there is no judgement of Allah are mubāḥ (permissible)”. As for us, the fact that Ibn ʿAbbās did not accepted the prohibition implies that he did not recognize the Prophet’s command related to the prohibition as an absolute prohibition. The conveyances of many Companions, which are consistent with each other, about the Prophet’s prohibition on eating domesticated donkey during the Battle of Khyber, proved that the prohibition was applied. Even though there is no dispute about prohibiting domesticated donkey, it is controversial whether the prohibition is absolute, constant or provisional based on certain reasons. It is more reasonable to accept that this prohibition was provisional and it was based on certain reasons. Because there are many narratives bearing information that this prohibition was due to several reasons and this is a situation which needs to be considered. Accordingly, there are three reasons, nearly all of which are attributed to judgement of the Companions. These were the facts that domesticated donkey was used in transportation; it used to eat filth and it was slaughtered/consumed without distributing booty/paying taxes. The seeking of the Companions for any reason for this prohibition indicates that they needed to comprehend this prohibition and that the prohibition is not absolute and constant.There is no explanation neither in the resources where the narratives are included nor in the annotation about when, where, why and in which context the prohibition regarding the predatory animals was realized. It is highly possible to assume that the Prophet prohibited these animal as they eat carcass. Another interesting issue within this regard is the fact that there are narratives and views indicating permissibility of eating hyena, which is a predatory, while predatory animals are forbidden in the narratives. Statements of the Prophet related to permissibility of eating hyena, which are considered authentic by traditionists and information about the Arabs who used to eat hyena and some of the Companions who praised eating hyena indicate that urf (custom) has a primary and decisive role about permissibility of eating meats. Regarding this matter about the hyenas, the narratives pointing out some Companions like ʿĀʾisha bint Abī Bakr and Ibn ‘Abbās who viewed prohibition of animals other than the prohibited animals in the Qur’an as inapplicable and other issues referring to the dispute indicate that prohibition of the Prophet Muḥammadfor predators can not be accepted as an absolute and unquestionable prohibition. Some of the prohibitions mentioned in ḥadīth narratives, except these animals, stem from the way of feeding and slaughtering of some animals. It is understood that consuming meat and milk of the animals that eat filth is prohibited in order to abstain from the things harming human health and mujassam (killing an animal with an arrow, etc. by fastening it as a target) is prohibited as carcass is banned and it is not permissible to torture and harm animals. Some of the prohibitions are related to the some animals, which were allowed and banned to slaughter by the Prophet. As the Prophet commanded some animals to be slaughtered and some animals not, meat of these animals was considered as forbidden. There is a dispute among the scholars, whilst there is not any statement of the Prophet about whether the animals included in this group can be eaten or not. It is seen that the Prophet ordered to slaughter some of the animals and prohibited to slaughter some other animals based on several reasons. (shrink)

When people learn normative systems, they do so based on limited evidence. Many of the possible actions that are available to an agent have never been explicitly permitted or prohibited. But people will often need to figure out whether those unspecified actions are permitted or prohibited. How does a learner resolve this incompleteness? The learner might assume if an action-type is not expressly forbidden, then acts of that type are permitted. This closure principle is one of Liberty. Alternatively, the (...) learner might assume that if an action-type is not expressly permitted, then acts of that type are prohibited. This closure principle would be one of Residual Prohibition (Mikhail, 2011). On the basis of principles of pedagogical sampling (e.g., Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014), we predicted that participants would infer the Liberty Principle (LP) when trained on prohibitions, and they would infer the Residual Prohibition Principle when trained on permissions. This is exactly what we found across several experiments. We also found a bias in favor of Liberty insofar as participants trained on both a prohibition and a permission rule tended still to infer the LP. However, we also found that if an action is potentially harmful, this diminishes the tendency to infer the LP. (shrink)

After nearly 76 years following the UN Charter, the dominant feature of the multilateral international order has shifted from a focus on states’ sovereignty to the rights of the individual. It is now widely accepted that human rights are not the province of any one state’s domestic affairs, but of importance to the entire international community. The UN Security Council sits atop the supra-state order, and holds the ultimate authority to initiate consensus-based, collective action so as to limit or prevent (...) gross human rights violations. Yet, many times the Security Council is slow to act, and consensus is exceedingly rare. This begs the question: in the face of gross human rights violations and Security Council inaction, is unilateral humanitarian intervention justified? The present state of international law on the matter is unsettled and controversial to many. What follows is a discussion on the development of international law relating to unilateral humanitarian intervention, the permissibility of intervention for gross human rights violations, and justification for intervention under existing international law. I conclude that under the present multilateral regime, unilateral humanitarian intervention is legally justified, despite fears that the principle may be invoked for the purposes of cloaking acts of aggression. (shrink)

The paper concerns the following two questions: (i) is the general exclusive norm a proper legal norm? (ii) if the general exclusive norm is a proper legal norm, is it universally valid? It will be held that the general exclusive norm is a proper legal norm and not a logical principle. Therefore, as a legal norm, it can be said to be valid or invalid. The answer to the second question will be negative: the general exclusive norm, as a (...) proper legal norm, is valid only in those legal systems in which it is positively established. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the principle of double effect and, to a lesser extent, the distinction between killing and letting die in the context of the Pittsburgh protocol for managing patients who may become non-heart-beating donors or sources of organs for transplantation. It notes several ambiguities and unresolved issues in the Pittsburgh protocol but concludes that neither the principle of double effect nor the distinction between killing and letting die (with the prohibition of the former and the allowance (...) of the latter under some circumstances) erects insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of the protocol. Nevertheless, the requirement of the principle of double effect that the intended good effects outweigh the unintended side effects necessitates careful attention to the probable overall impact of the proposed policy on organ procurement, particularly because public mistrust plays such a significant role in limiting the number of organ donations. (shrink)

For about five decades the phrase “sanctity-of-life“ has been part of the Anglo-American biomedical ethical discussion related to abortion and end-of-life questions. Nevertheless, the concept’s origin and meaning are unclear. Much controversy is based on the mistaken assumption that the concept denotes the absolute value of human life and thus dictates a strict prohibition on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. In this paper, I offer an analysis of the religious and philosophical history of the idea of “sanctity-of-life.” Drawing on biblical (...) texts and interpretation as well as Kant’s secularization of the concept, I argue that “sanctity” has been misunderstood as an ontological feature of biological human life, and instead locate the idea within the historical virtue-ethical tradition, which understands sanctification as a personal achievement through one’s own actions. (shrink)

The Revisions Task Force of the Ethics Committee of the American Psychological Association (APA) has proposed that prohibition of sexual intimacies with clients after termination of therapeutic relationships be made an explicit part of the new code. This decision was based on much careful deliberation and input from various individuals and groups. This article supports the proposed change and provides a rationale based on emerging theoretical positions and research findings regarding risks to clients, risks to professionals, and risks to (...) the various mental health professions. The revision would read, "Psychologists do not engage in sexual intimacies with current or former psychotherapy clients" (see "Ethical Principles Revised", 1990). (shrink)

One of the most important principles of the European Community law is the prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position based on Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of the abuse of a dominant position. It is likely that the world financial and economic crisis will lead to an increase in competition among the undertakings. The fact that some dominant undertakings seeking to sustain or increase their market share might decide to (...) engage in predatory pricing and that no comprehensive research on predatory pricing has been carried out by legal scholars in Lithuania and the European Union up to date, underlines the relevance of this study. To decide whether dominant undertaking has become a “predator”, it is necessary to evaluate several issues, such as the ability of the dominant undertaking to recoup its losses incurred during the alleged application of predatory pricing strategy. The judicial institutions of the European Union pay little attention to this issue and might recognize that predatory pricing took place even without the evidence on the possibility for the undertaking to recoup its predatory losses. This study analyses the recovery of predatory losses by the dominant undertaking and the importance of such recovery in determining whether or not the dominant undertaking engaged in predatory pricing. (shrink)

Catholic doctrine’s strict prohibition on abortion can lead clinicians or institutions to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion, although a legal duty to provide abortion would apply to anyone who refused. Conscientious refusals by clinicians to end a pregnancy can constitute murder or reckless homicide under American law if a woman dies as a result of such a refusal. Such refusals are not immunized from criminal liability by the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion or by statutes that (...) confer immunity from criminal homicide prosecution. Core principles of the rule of law require the state to protect the lives of all persons equally and to place the life and health of persons above any the interests of providers have in moral integrity or in respecting the moral status of prenatal humans. In some states criminal liability related to conscientious objection also applies to corporate hospital officials. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders whether Aquinas is rightly read as a double-effect thinker and whether it is right to understand him as concurring with Paul’s dictum that evil is not to be done that good may come. I focus on what to make of Aquinas’s position that, though the private citizen may not intend to kill a man in self-defense, those holding public authority, like soldiers, may rightly do so. On my interpretation, we cannot attribute to Aquinas the position that aiming (...) to kill in self-defense is prohibited where so aiming is the only way to stay alive. Instead, for the private citizen though not for the public authority, it is aiming to kill as an end in itself, over and above the aim of saving one’s life, that is prohibited. Accordingly, we also cannot attribute to Aquinas the third condition of the principle of double effect in its textbook formulation. (shrink)

The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm (...) as a means to bringing about the same good end. Does the principle of double effect play the important explanatory role that has been claimed for it? To consider this question, one must be careful to clarify just what the principle is supposed to explain. Three misinterpretations of the principle’s force or range of application are common. 1. To ensure that Double Effect is not misunderstood as principle issuing a blanket permission on causing any unintended harm that yields a benefit, applications must require that the agent seek to minimize the harm involved. 2. Since it is widely accepted that it is wrong to aim to produce harm to someone as an end, to rule this out is not part of double effect’s distinctive content. 3. Harms that were produced regretfully and only for the sake of producing a good end may be prohibited by double effect because they were brought about as part of the agent’s means to realizing the good end. (shrink)

The Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Clinical Translation, recently issued by the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR), include a number of substantive revisions. Significant changes include: (1) the bifurcation of ‘Category 3 Prohibited research activities’ in the 2016 Guidelines into ‘Category 3A Research activities currently not permitted’ and ‘Category 3B Prohibited research activities’ in the 2021 guidelines and (2) the move of heritable human genome editing research out of the ‘prohibited’ category and into the ‘currently not permitted’ (...) category. These changes are noteworthy because of the absence of a clear demarcation line between the two categories insofar as, by definition, that which is ‘prohibited’ is ‘currently not permitted’, and vice versa. Permanence is not part of the definition of ‘prohibition’. In principle, a prohibition can be rescinded at any time. This begs the question ‘Why make a policy change that has no apparent practical effect?’ One hypothesis is that the recategorisation of specific ‘prohibited’ research activities as ‘currently not permitted’ is meant to seed intuitions about which prohibited research activities should ‘soon’ be permitted subject to specialised scientific and ethics review and approval. (shrink)

Background Surgery for intersex infants should be delayed until individuals are able to decide for themselves, except where it is a medical necessity. In an ideal world, this single principle would suffice and such surgeries could be totally prohibited. Unfortunately, the world is not perfect, and, in some places, intersex neonates are at risk of being abandoned, mutilated or even killed. As long as intersex persons are at such high risk in some places, any ethical guidelines for intersex surgeries (...) will need to take these extreme risks of harm into account. Main text I therefore argue for five basic principles that ought to inform ethics guidelines for surgical interventions in intersex children, specifically in contexts in which such children are at risk of significant harm. What I set out to come up with is a set of principles that do not completely prohibit surgery, but only allow it where a strong case can be made for its necessity, in the best interests of the child, and where there is some kind of oversight to prevent misuse. The first principle is that interventions as drastic as these surgeries should only be performed when there is strong evidence that they are beneficial and not harmful. The second principle is that in surgeries should normally only be performed in cases of true medical necessity. Principle three is that surgeries should normally be delayed until such time as the intersex person is mature enough to assent to treatment or decide against it. Principle four is that the conventional ethical requirements regarding truth telling apply equally to intersex children as to anyone else. The final principle is that where physicians or parents think that surgery is in the best interests of the child, the burden of proof lies with them. Conclusion It is hoped that these principles might help medical teams and parents make better decisions about intersex surgeries on children, and they would make such surgeries very rare indeed, if they happen at all. (shrink)

Ribā/interest is one of the prominent regulations in Islam regarding commercial life. The commercial lives of Muslims and laws related to commerce were regulated in accordance with the prohibition of ribā, and by this a society that avoided ribā with sensitivity was created in practice. This sensitivity about ribā manifested in the principle that the suspicion of ribā is evaluated as ribā, and it is ruled as haram like riba. In fiqh sources, besides issues regarding ribā, issues involving (...) suspicion of ribā were also mentioned, and some rulings were justified with the presence of suspicion of riba. However, the logic of using the concept of ribā suspicion in fiqh sources may vary from case to case: the reasoning behind the use of riba suspicion in one case may not fit into another case, and thus a completely different reasoning of ribā suspicion may appear in another case. To clarify the framework of the concept of ribā suspicion, it would be noteworthy to study these each of the uses in the classical fiqh sources. The purpose of this article is to examine the use of the concept of ribā suspicion based on the cases in the Ḥanafī sources. Methodologically, first, the cases in which the concept of ribā suspicion is used are determined. Secondly, the reasoning made for each example is examined by considering the contextual framework of the case. Lastly, these uses are classified and presented to the reader with examples. The principle of evaluating “the suspicion of ribā like ribā” in Islamic law is indeed related to the rule of considering “any suspicion as certainty when it comes to harams or in matters where precaution is substantial”. Since ribā is a haram that Muslims should meticulously avoid, and therefore requires caution, its suspicion is subject to the same rulings as ribā itself. In the Hanafi fiqh books, the concept of suspicion of ribā is mostly referred in the following cases: - Not knowing whether there is equality between the subject matters in barter transactions where equality is stipulated. For example, when exchanging two batches of the same kind of ribawi goods, though quantities are unknown. - It is not known whether tariq al-itibār has taken place in changes that may be permissible through tariq al-itibār. For example, in the exchange of a silver-embroidered sword with silver, if the amount of silver in the ornamented part is not known, the suspicion of ribā arises. - The emergence of a situation similar to ribā because of a transaction that is normally permissible: While there are two legitimate sales in Bay' al-inah, the conclusion of being the same as an interest bearing loan is considered as ribā suspicion. - When the case has two different sides; from one side the act is ribā, but from other side it is not. For example, in the case of salam contract of ribawi goods, if goods of different quality are brought during delivery and the quality difference is requested from the customer; suspicion of ribā arises. Apart from these uses in the Hanafi fiqh books, it is seen that the concept of ribā suspicion is employed to prove an opinion disputed between schools of Islamic law. For example, to argue that ribā rules are also valid for goods sold by piece (adadiyyāt) or by length measures (zirāiyyāt), the Hanafis say that one of the two causes (illah) of ribā is found in the exchange of these goods by type, and the suspicion of ribā arises with just a single cause (illah). On the other hand, the Shafiis use the concept of suspicion of ribā to argue that determining the subjects (ta’yin) in the exchange of ribavi goods other than gold and silver is not sufficient. Another use of the term emerges because of the authors' preference for a cautious language. Some authors acted cautiously on some cases that were normally ribā and were described by other authors in this manner, and used the term "ribā suspicion" instead of ribā; probably as they both require the same ruling (harām). Another wrongly used (in our opinion) is the use of “suspicion of ribā” in some cases that are actually considered only as disliked acts (makruh). (shrink)

Paternalism has attracted new defenders in recent years. Such defenders typically either downplay the normative significance of autonomy or deny that we are sufficiently rational for paternalistic interventions to be objectionable.1 Both of these argumentative strategies constitute challenges to John Stuart Mill’s influential anti-paternalistic ‘harm principle’, which states that coercive interference with the liberty of competent adults is justifiable only if such interference prevents harm to non-consenting third parties (Mill, p. 23).2 In this journal, Wilkinson has provided a novel, (...) provocative defence of paternalism in the medical context—one that (provisionally) accepts rather than challenges Mill’s harm principle.3 Wilkinson’s argument is complex. But he begins with Parfit’s influential account of personal identity.4 According to Parfit, Alice at T1 can be the same person as Alice at T2, but the extent to which Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are similar depends on the extent to which there are ‘chains’ of strong psychological connections between Alice at T1 and Alice at T2. Strong psychological connections, in turn, are mental states such as intentions or beliefs, or psychological traits. For example, if Alice at T2 remembers very little about herself the day before, and the day before that, all the way to Alice at T1, Alice at T2 has completely different psychological traits than Alice at T1—for example, Alice at T1 was courageous, whereas Alice at T2 is cowardly—then Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are distinct persons. If the harm principle is correct and Alice is autonomous, it is permissible to interfere with Alice’s liberty only if it prevents harm to some non-consenting third party. But if we accept Parfit’s view on personal identity, then a novel defence of paternalistic intervention emerges: Alice at T2 may well be a distinct person from Alice at T1. So, …. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that the limits of compromise are identical with the moral principles that set limits to human action more generally. Moral principles that prohibit lying, stealing, or killing, for example, sometimes make it morally impermissible to accept a compromise proposal, for the simple reason that the proposal involves an act of lying, killing, or stealing. The same holds for any other moral principle that sets limits to human action. This may sound straightforward and, perhaps, trivial. (...) Yet in the philosophical literature, discussions of the limits of compromise have singled out more specific principles: Avishai Margalit proposes that the limits of compromise are set by the value of humanity, Simon May points at racial equality and more generally democratic legitimacy, Alexander Ruser and Amanda Machin appeal to the value of integrity, and a fourth at least initially plausible account invokes the idea of public justifiability. After discussing in greater detail what an account of the limits of compromise may be expected to do, the paper will show that none of these accounts is convincing. (shrink)

After revelations of participation by psychiatrists and psychologists in interrogation of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and Central Intelligence Agency secret detention centers, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association adopted Position Statements absolutely prohibiting their members from participating in torture under any and all circumstances, and, to a limited degree, forbidding involvement in interrogations. Some interrogations utilize very aggressive techniques determined to be torture by many nations and organizations throughout the world. This paper explains why psychiatrists and psychologists (...) involved in coercive interrogations violate the Geneva Conventions and the laws of the United States. Whether done with ignorance of professional ethical obligations or not, these psychiatrists and psychologists have crossed an ethical barrier that may best be averted from re-occurring by teaching medical students and residents in all medical specialties about the ethics principles stemming from the 1946–1947 Nuremberg trials and the Geneva Conventions, together with the Ethics Codes of the World Medical Association and the American Medical Association; and, with regard to psychiatric residents and psychological trainees, by the teaching about The Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry and the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, respectively. In this way, all physicians and psychologists will clearly understand that they have an absolute moral obligation to "First, do no harm" to the human beings they professionally encounter. (shrink)

Throughout human history, both lying and the coercion of someone's belief and will have been rejected through prohibitions that are a precondition for mutual understanding between people as well as for any agreement. Immanuel Kant contributed to the ethical formulation of these prohibitions, proving these universal claims through his method of transcendental formalism. Kant's theory of the categorical imperative is fruitfully developed by the ethics of discourse as the theory of the ultimate moral ground of earnest argumentation and consensus. I (...) examine the post-metaphysical transformation of the categorical imperative, as expressed in the works of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. Discourse ethics confronts the hermeneutical contextualist critique of universalism. This ethics develops a transcendental-pragmatic foundation for a universally valid principle of coresponsibility. It contributes to the search for a rationally grounded normative base for universal dialogue. (shrink)

This paper responds to Antje du-Bois Pedain’s discussion of the wrongfulness constraint on the criminal law. Du-Bois Pedain argues that the constraint is best interpreted as stating that φing is legitimately criminalised only if φing is wrongful for other-regarding reasons. We take issue with du-Bois Pedain’s arguments. In our view, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is wrongful in du-Bois Pedain’s sense. Rather, it is a necessary condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is (...) what we call bare wrongful —that is, that the reasons in favour of φing are defeated by the reasons against. Though du-Bois Pedain is critical of this view, we argue that her criticisms do not convince. (shrink)

Singer has argued against the permissibility of killing people on the grounds of the distinction between conscious and self-conscious animals. Unlike conscious animals, which can be replaced without a loss of overall welfare, there can be no substitution for self-conscious animals. In this article, I show that Singer's argument is untenable, in the cases both of the preference-based account of utilitarianism and of objective hedonism, to which he has recently turned. In the first case, Singer cannot theoretically exclude that a (...) self-conscious being's stronger preferences may only be satisfied by killing another self-conscious being. In the second case, he fails to demonstrate that the rules of ordinary morality, demanding that killing be strictly forbidden, could not frequently be overruled by the principles of esoteric morality. In both cases, his theory cannot solve the classical utilitarian problem of prohibiting the killing of people in secret. (shrink)