In a series of essays published from the late 1920s up to the mid-1960s, Hans Kelsen carried out a radical critique of natural law theory. The present paper purports to provide an analytical reconstruction and critical assessment of such a critique. It contains two parts. Part one surveys the fundamentals of Kelsen’s argumentative strategy against natural law and its theorists. Part two considers, in turn, two critical reactions to Kelsen’s criticisms: by Edgar Bodenheimer, on behalf of traditional natural law theory; (...) by Robert P. George, on behalf of “the new natural law theory”. As the analysis suggests, Kelsen’s critique stands up to the criticisms. (shrink)

V nizu razprav, objavljenih med koncem dvajsetih in sredino šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, je Hans Kelsen v naravnopravniško teorijo uperil radikalno kritiko. Avtor te razprave skuša to kritiko analitično obnoviti in kritično ovrednotiti. Njegov zapis je sestavljen iz dveh delov. V prvem se posveča temeljem Kelsnove argumentacijske strategije zoper naravno pravo in naravnopravniške teoretike. V drugem delu pa se osredotoči na dva kritična odgovora na Kelsnov napad. Enega je v imenu tradicionalne naravnopravniške teorije podal Edgar Bodenheimer, drugega pa je v (...) imenu »Nove naravnopravniške teorije« izoblikoval Robert P. George. Avtorjeva analiza nakazuje, da se Kelsnova kritika uspešno zoperstavlja tem kritičnim odgovorom. (shrink)

Alf Ross je želel izoblikovati »pristno« realistično teorijo prava. To pomeni, da naj bi bila ta sposobna po eni strani razrešiti probleme, s katerimi sta se soočali tako Kelsnova normativistična teorija kot teorija ameriških realistov, po drugi strani pa poustvariti njihove razprave na znanstveni način. Rossova izvirnost tiči v njegovem pojmu pristojnostnih norm, ki jih je pred vsemi drugimi obravnaval kot »konstitutivna pravila«. V nasprotju s trditvami mnogih komentatorjev takšen pojem konstitutivnih norm ni neskladen z Rossovo realistično teorijo (...) prava. V luči njegovih zgodnjih zapisov je mogoče kompetenčne norme razumeti kot racionalizacije, ki lahko izrazijo nagnjenost naslovnikov norm, da določena dejstva prepoznajo kot pravo. Zato je mogoče Rossa šteti za prehodnika postpozitivizma. (shrink)

U ovom radu raspravljamo odnos Rawlsovog političkog liberalizma i istine. Budući da je politički liberalizam teorija koja izbjegava sva kontroverzna epistemološka i metafizička pitanja, jednako tako izbjegava i pitanje svoje istinitosti i koncept istine uopće. Usredotočili smo se na tri autora koji tvrde da politički liberalizam ne može izbjeći pitanje istine. Prvi autor je perfekcionist, Joseph Raz, koji pokušava pokazati da je Rawlsova teorija nekoherentna ukoliko se ne bavi pitanjem istinitosti neke moralne doktrine na kojoj mora počivati. Drugi, (...) David Estlund, tvrdi da je teorija filozofski neodrživa ako se ne poziva na istinitost svog fundamentalnog načela. Treći, Joshua Cohen, pokazuje nemogućnost izbjegavanja nekog koncepta istine ako se u političkoj teoriji pozivamo na vjerovanja i opravdanje. Nastojimo dokazati tvrdnju o praktičko-političkoj i filozofskoj ograničenosti njihove kritike Rawlsove teorije. Temeljna intencija članka je opovrgnuti kritike koje se upućuju Rawlsu te time ojačati njegov prijedlog političkog liberalizma. Pri tome nastojimo i nadopuniti nedorečenosti u Rawlsovom prijedlogu te zbog toga nudimo preciznije određenu sliku političkog liberalizma u odnosu na njegovu izvornu.In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal. (shrink)

Članek obravnava pravno teorijo, ki je prisotna v končnem delu Vebrovega spisa Etika. Prvi poizkus eksaktne logike nagonske pameti. Veber se le mimogrede ukvarja s teorijo prava, vendar njegov prispevek ni zanemarljiv. Vebrova Etika je logika nagonske pameti: Veber, gledano iz čistega predmetnoteoretičnega vidika, ne sestavlja zbirke moralnih zapovedi, ampak namerava orisati najsplošnejša formalna načela, ki določajo pravilnost nagonskega doživetja. Tega, kaj mora posameznik narediti v danem trenutku, logika nagonske pameti ne more povedati, ker je le formalna veda. »Most« med (...) formalnim in materialnim pristopom nravnemu problemu Veber najde v glasu vesti, ki svetuje posamezniku, kaj naj naredi v konkretnem delovanju. V soglasju s tem mora biti državno pravo osnovano na načelih nagonske logike, ker bi bilo drugače brez vsake veljavnosti. Pravo velja, v kolikor je utemeljeno na logiki, ki orisuje imanentna načela človeške narave; cilj prava je pospeševanje čim bolj pravilnega življenja posameznikov in družbe. Z druge strani vsebina tega prava ni enkrat za vselej določena in napisana, ampak vsakič izhaja iz hermenevtike, ki jo posamezniki in družba morajo izvršiti o sebi in o svoji naravi. Etika »zdravega razuma« in »povprečnega človeka« je po Vebru najboljši model za materialno izpopolnenje formalne nagonske logike. (shrink)

Istraživanja povijesnog razvoja bioetike rijetko su kao predmet svog interesa imala fenomen bioetičkih institucija.U prvom dijelu rada se iznosi pregled povijesnog razvoja bioetike, nakon čega slijede glavne teze najvažnijih teorija institucija . Središnji dio rada obrađuje teoriju institucija Arnolda Gehlena, prema kojoj su institucije društvene činjenice u kojima se zajednički prihvaćaju i provode životne svrhe, a koje čovjek stvara s ciljem odterećenja od neizvjesnosti vlastite egzistencije, subjektivne motivacije i trajne improvizacije u odlučivanju.U zaključnom dijelu rada analiziraju se mogućnosti i (...) ograničenja aplikacije teorije institucija Arnolda Gehlena u istraživanju razvoja bioetičkih institucija.The research of historical development of bioethics has rarely had the phenomenon of bioethics institutions as the focus of its interest. In the first part of the present paper a historical overview of bioethics is exposed.Subsequently, the major theses of the most important theories of institutions are discussed. The central part of the paper deals with the theory of institutions by Arnold Gehlen. According to that theory, institutions are social constructs in which life purposes are collectively accepted and realized. The man creates those constructs aiming at alleviation from uncertainty of his own existence, subjective motivation, and continuous improvization in decision making.Concluding part of the paper provides an analysis of the potentials and limitations of the application of Arnold Gehlen’s theory of institutions in an attempt of investigating the phenomenon of bioethics institutions. (shrink)

Cilj ovog rada je razmatranje onih aspekata Bolcanove teorije utemeljivanja koji su značajno anticipirali savremene rasprave o utemeljivanju, i koji su dodatno dali podsticaja da se Bolcanov rad ponovo „otkrije“. Stoga ćemo svaki izneti segment njegovog učenja dovesti u vezu s paralelnim idejama u savremenim teorijama utemeljivanja. Na kraju ćemo razmotriti pitanja o značaju i mestu Bolcanovih uvida u kontekstu recentnih rasprava o istoriji pojma utemeljivanja.

The topic of this paper is a presentation of an alternative theory in the field of philosophy of mind, which was created by the development of cognitive sciences and computer technologies of the twentieth century. Of particular importance is Turnig’s machine whose study at the logical level has contributed to new ways of understanding the mental. A theory such as functionalism (Putnam) does not study the mental in the same way as dualists and materialists do in the philosophical tradition. The (...) Mental has to be described in a generally logical manner (“higher level” of description), i.e. its function is described (input-output ratio), and is created by drawing a parallel between man and machine (known as a computer metaphor). (shrink)

Šis straipsnis naujai interpretuoja mimezės teoriją, pateiktą Platono dialoge Kratilas, tirdamas, kaip kalba veikia kaip atvaizdas, mėgdžiojantis savo objektus. Skirtingai nei didžioji dauguma tyrimų, teigiančių, kad Sokratui nepavyksta suderinti natūralizmo ir konvencionalizmo, šis straipsnis teigia, kad Sokrato pasiūlyta natūralizmo forma pripažįsta susitarimo vaidmenį. Natūralizmas, parodydamas santykį tarp atvaizdų ir originalų, atskleidžia, kad žmonių kalba yra dvilypio pobūdžio. Per instrumentalizmą ir garso simbolizmą Sokratas įsivaizduoja kalbą kaip tobulą instrumentą daiktų formoms imituoti, o skirtumas tarp atvaizdų ir originalų neišvengiamai veda prie klaidų (...) formuojant ir vartojant kasdienę kalbą. Tikrasis mimezės teorijos tikslas yra apginti pažinimo ir kalbos galimybę, oponuojant sofistų tėkmės doktrinai. (shrink)

sv.1. Učenje o sadržajima prava -- sv. 2. Učenje o oblicima prava-dogmatska teorija o pravu.

Prema hjumovskoj teoriji motivacije, motivacijski se proces sastoji od dva međusobno nezavisna mentalna stanja , što znači da subjekt ne može biti u potpunosti motiviran na djelovanje ako mu jedno od tih stanja nedostaje. U prvom dijelu članka prikazujem središnja obilježja ove teorije, a potom pokazujem da prihvaćanje Humeove distinkcije između divljih i tihih strasti može biti vrlo koristan alat za obranu ovog modela od nekih standardnih prigovora.

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war (...) theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)