While Merleau-Ponty’sPhenomenology of Perceptionrelies on the descriptive register of the body proper, his Sorbonne lectures on child psychology investigate the genesis of the experience of a body as one’s own. I demonstrate the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the narcissistic affect and sociality involved in this developmental process, distinguishing his account vis-à-vis Wallon’s and Lacan’s studies of the mirror stage. I conclude that in Merleau-Ponty’s account, (1) the experience of the body proper is not singular, but encompasses a (...) range of phenomenological variation; and (2) the genesis of the body proper is not confined to the mirror stage. The production of bodily boundaries is an ongoing process identified not only with its advent in childhood, but also with adult emotional life. The boundaries between inner and outer domains of perception are not merely discovered, but must be negotiated and cultivated in the intercorporeal affective dramas of adult life. (shrink)

My paper was commissioned by Journal of Philosophy to provide a piece adequately explaining the significance of the Lacanian Mirror stage within Lacan's larger work. -/- I focus on the transition from the mirror stage to the incorporation of the subject into the symbolic order. I argue that the mirror stage is transitional and that its significance lies in what of it is incorporated into and transformed within the more complex structures of the subject (...) and the unconscious. -/- Implicit in my claim is that "lacanian" theories which hypostatize the mirror stage into a determinate structure of adult consciousness are misinterpreting Lacan. I use Seminars 1 and 2 to make fuller sense the mirror stage as presented in his Ecrits. (shrink)

Drawing on the work of Irigaray and Levinas, this paper discusses the ethical limitations of Lacan's "mirror-stage" dynamic and interpolates a different interpretation of the material he uses to elaborate his theory. Close attention is paid to the significance of metaphors of vision and touch in the work of the three philosophers. The paper develops into an analysis of Irigaray's and Levinas's interpretations of touch as the differential site of ethics.

There are a variety of interpretations of Manet's Un Bar auxFolies Bergères, but there is no genuinely neutral standpoint from which to judge their seemingly opposed accounts. T. J. Clark's analysis involves placing the work in the context of critical commentary by the artist's contemporaries, and examining the exact place and role of the mirror. Just as Manet painted two versions of the picture, so Clark has published two analyses of it; and just as we can ask whether the (...) artist thus resolved the ambiguities of his first image, so an analogous question can be asked about Clark's commentaries. When we have two such pictures or texts, how do we understand their relationship? Perhaps the best way is to find a further commentary. A Lacanian interpretation is proposed. We may see in the picture a triangular structure of perception; between the gaze and the subject stands the screen on which the image is cast. This view, even more speculative than Clark's, offers a new suggestive way of grasping the relation between picture and texts interpreting it. (shrink)

Lacan ayna deneyiminin bizi cogito merkezli düşünme modelleriyle karşı karşıya getireceğini bildirir. Lacanyen kuramda öznenin varlık düzeni, kendini dolaysız kavrayabilen Kartezyen bilinç üzerinden değil, yanılsamalı bir benlik imgesiyle özdeşleşen bebeğin simgesel düzene kaydolma kapasitesi üzerinden temellendirilir. Bu çalışmada, ayna deneyimindeki sahte varlık imgesinin narsisistik sonuçları ile cogito’nun tekbenci sonuçları arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Lacan’a göre Kartezyen argüman boyunca cisimsel dünyanın kavranışı, aslen doğru bilgiyi koşulsuz aktaran -aldatıcı olmayan- bir Tanrı’nın var olduğunun gösterilmesiyle mümkündür. Buna karşın Lacan’ın imgeselin ötesinde gerçekliğin kurucusu olarak (...) işaret ettiği simgesel Öteki, dış gerçekliğin garantörü olarak “bildiği varsayılan Tanrı’dan” kategorik olarak ayrılır. Lacan, yalnızca imgesel ben yanılsamasını narsisistik bir tuzak olarak görmez; aynı zamanda imgesel bene kendi öznelliğini verme iddiası taşıyan bir bildiği varsayılan özne fikrini de en az onun kadar tehlikeli bulur. Lacan’ın cogito’ya yönelik bu yeni yaklaşımı, aynadaki imgesel kısa devrenin, Kartezyen cogito’da bilincin kısa devresi olarak yeniden değerlendirilmesini mümkün kılmaktadır. (shrink)

This article brings out certain philosophical difficulties in Lacan’s account of the mirror stage, the initial moment of the subject’s development. For Lacan, the “original organization of the forms of the ego” is “precipitated” in an infant’s self-recognition in a mirror image; this event is explicitly prior to any social interactions. A Hegelian objection to the Lacanian account argues that social interaction and recognition of others by infants are necessary prerequisites for infants’ capacity to recognize themselves in (...) a mirror image. Thus mutual recognition with another, rather than self-recognition in a mirror, is what makes possible subsequent ego-formation and self-consciousness. This intersubjective critique suggests that many of the psychoanalytic consequences that Lacan derives from the mirror stage (e.g., alienation, narcissism, and aggressivity) may need to be rethought. (shrink)

This essay draws on a wide range of feminist, psychoanalytic and other anti-racist theorists to work out the specific mode of space as ‘contained’ and the ways it grounds dominant contemporary forms of racism i.e. the space of phallicized whiteness. Offering a close reading of Lacan’s primary models for ego-formation, the mirror stage and the inverted bouquet, I argue that psychoanalysis can help us to map contemporary power relations of racism because it enacts some of those very dynamics. (...) Casting the production of subjectivity on the field of the visual, Lacan performs some of the fundamental conceptions of space and embodiment that ground the dominant forms of racism in these cultural symbolics. Namely, he articulates a body that is bound by skin, structured by a logic of containment, cathected through aggression and distance, and read primarily through the way it looks – both how it appears and how it beholds the appearances of other bodies. Unraveling this nexus of power relations, I argue that a fundamental anti-racist strategy is to interrupt, interrogate and re-deploy this interpellation of images. Key Words: ego-formation • embodiment • historicity • Lacan • ontological • phallus • race/racial difference/racism • space • visual • whiteness. (shrink)

In the article I compare the concept of the human “I” of Helmuth Plessner that underlies his philosophical anthropology with the theory of “mirror stage” by Jacques Lacan. Both they have been inspired by the experiment of Wolfgang Köhler in which a child and chimpanzee reacted differently to their image in a mirror. Plessner and Lacan drew different conclusions from this experiment. Plessner maintained that the child who recognizes its image in the mirror as its own (...) takes into account the possibility of its replacement by other “I” on the level of its social roles and functions. Yet, at the same time it knows very well that nobody will be able to replace its own individual “I.” While Lacan says that the ideal image of “I” has the status of the defence-symptom representing an alternative to the feeling of dismembered body that the child experiences in the early phase of its life. This image of “I” is not given forever but is always endangered by the possibility of destruction and regress on its early stage of the dismembered body. The telling testimony of this is the passage au acte by psychotics in which the ouburst of aggression is accompanied by the destruction of “I.” Or the cases in which the I assumes the pathologically exaggerated shape. This possibility of destruction of I that is inherently rooted in its structure has been misrecognized by Plessner. (shrink)

Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.

Opera is a performing art in which music plays the leading role, and the acting of singers has a synergistic effect with the music. The mirror neuron system represents the neurophysiological mechanism underlying the coupling of perception and action. Mirror neuron activity is modulated by the appropriateness of actions and clarity of intentions, as well as emotional expression and aesthetic values. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that an opera performance induces mirror neuron activity in the (...) audience so that the performer effectively shares an embodied performance with the audience. However, it is uncertain which aspect of opera performance induces mirror neuron activity. It is hypothesized that although auditory stimuli could induce mirror neuron activity, audiovisual perception of stage performance is the primary inducer of mirror neuron activity. To test this hypothesis, this study sought to correlate opera performance with brain activity as measured by electroencephalography in singers while watching an opera performance with sounds or while listening to an aria without visual stimulus. We detected mirror neuron activity by observing that the EEG power in the alpha frequency band was selectively decreased in the frontal-central-parietal area when watching an opera performance. In the auditory condition, however, the alpha-band power did not change relative to the resting condition. This study illustrates that the audiovisual perception of an opera performance engages the mirror neuron system in its audience. (shrink)

Through staged photographs in which she herself is often the lead actor or through appropriation of historical photographs, contemporary African American artist Carrie Mae Weems deconstructs the shaming of the black female body in American visual culture and offers counter-hegemonic images of black female beauty. The mirror has been foundational in Western theories of subjectivity and discussions of beauty. In the artworks I analyze in this article, Weems tactically employs the mirror to engage the topos of shame in (...) order to reject it as a way of seeing the self and to offer a new way of lovingly seeing the self. I use the work of Kelly Oliver, Helen Block Lewis, and bell hooks to articulate the relationships among the mirror, shame, and black female subjectivity in Weems's work. Weems's subjects often reckon with what Oliver calls “social melancholy” as they experience shame while standing before the mirror. However, Weems also shows that by looking again—a critical strategy I explain using Oliver's model of “the loving eye”—her subjects can use the mirror as a corrective to the social shaming gaze and make it a stage for establishing black female subjectivity, a gaze of self-love, and beauty. (shrink)

Re-encountering certain kinds of artworks in the present (re-listening to music, re- reading novels) can often occasion a kind of recollection akin to episodic recollection, but which may be better cast as ‘phasic’, at least insofar as one can be said to remember ‘what it was like’ to be oneself at some earlier stage or phase in one’s personal history. The kinds of works that prompt such recollection, I call ‘still lives’ - they are limited wholes whose formal properties (...) are stable over time. In the first part of the paper, I spell out a way of making sense of the peculiar power that certain artworks have to occasion such recollection – it is, as I explain, a power or ductus that derives from the form of the artwork, though possession of such a power is not limited to art. I then detail three dimensions along which episodic recollection and phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encountering ‘still lives’ differ: metaphysical, phenomenological, and descriptive. In the second half, I explore a challenge for my account of phasic recollection, which in turn helps make more vivid my proposal as well as the spectral analogy at the heart of it: Just as one can see regions behind one by looking in the direction of a mirror located in the same space in which one is, sometimes by re-encountering certain kinds of artworks now, past intervals or phases ‘behind one’ can be ‘made present’ in a way that the paper aims to make plain. I also explain to what extent phasic recollection might be understood as a form of mental time travel, and what the attendant phenomenology of ‘transportation’ involves. (shrink)

One of the more superficially perplexing features of Lacan’s notion of objet petit a is the fact that he simultaneously characterizes it as both non-specularizable (i.e., incapable of being captured in spatio-temporal representations) and specular (i.e., incarnated in visible avatars). This assignment of the apparently contradictory attributes of visibility and invisibility to object a is a reflection of this object’s strange position at the intersection of transcendental and empirical dimensions. Indeed, this object, which Lacan holds up as his central psychoanalytic (...) discovery, raises important philosophical questions about the transcendental-empirical distinction, arguably short-circuiting in interesting, productive ways this dichotomy and many of its permutations. This article seeks to achieve two aims: one, to clarify how and why Lacan situates object a between the specular and the non-specular; and, two, to extract from the results of this clarification a preliminary sketch of a post-Lacanian transcendentalism that is also thoroughly materialist. (shrink)

Is it not surprising that we look with so much pleasure and emotion at works of art that were made thousands of years ago? Works depicting people we do not know, people whose backgrounds are usually a mystery to us, who lived in a very different society and time and who, moreover, have been ‘frozen’ by the artist in a very deliberate pose. It was the Classical Greek philosopher Aristotle who observed in his Poetics that people could apparently be moved (...) even by the imitation of a person or an act. And although we are usually well aware that it is a simulacrum, not a real situation, it nevertheless sometimes seems as if we ourselves are standing there on the stage or in the painting, so intense and emotional is our response, even though we are just spectators. Aristotle concludes from this that we have intellectual capacities which allow us put ourselves in another’s place and consequently to react to simulated situations as though they are actually happening to us, here and now. In this process, he contends, observation, memory, imagination and emotions are crucial elements. In the past it was not customary to invoke human mental faculties to explain our response to works of art. The Ancient Greeks, after all, knew little about the human body or brain and usually referred to the extended world of the gods in their endeavours to comprehend the ‘inner world’ of human beings. In our time the situation is completely different—such an allusion to the brain no longer surprises us. Whether it is about the mystery of the consciousness, the question of free will or accounts of bizarre psychological aberrations or disorders, we have become accustomed to references to parts of the brain, to images of brain scans, to reports about neural networks and the like. However, because there are so many factors that play a part in our appreciation of works of art we need a complex explanation for it, and it is not enough to look only at certain properties of the brain that are determined by evolution. Those properties are shared by every human being, and so are rather useless in explaining people’s different reactions to the same work of art. Evidently the brains of individuals differ so much that they make it possible for people to respond differently to one and the same artwork. This, of course, raises questions concerning the painted emotions that can be seen in this exhibition. Virtually everyone, after all, is fascinated by such paintings and usually recognizes the emotions they represent. The reactions to these painted emotions are also often similar. This is probably why artworks like this are generally highly valued, then and now, here and elsewhere: from the enigmatically smiling Egyptian Queen Nefertiti and the startled Rembrandt to a seemingly despairing African mask. Aristotle observed that in the theatre players imitate actions that are associated with emotions in a number of ways and that these emotions are shared in a particular fashion by the playwright, the actors and the audience. The audience may even be carried away by these emotions to such an extent that they are in a sense purged of them and can subsequently leave the theatre relieved. Are such emotional reactions perhaps related to the fact that emotions are universal and that brains respond similarly to them? Is this why we can so readily identify painted emotions? May we therefore also assume that the properties of the brain determined by evolution help us to explain these emotions? In answering these questions we shall discuss a number of insights into emotions in psychology and brain science and explore some theories about the possible function of emotions and their expression. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that ideas in line with the world-outlook format of realism (as also those in the format of irrealism) come back already to Antiquity, it was not earlier than from the end of the 18th century that the metaphilosophical concept under discussion has begun to evolve. The initial becoming of the concept of philosophical realism during score of years from the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1801) (...) is just being dealt with in this paper. The term came about eighty years later than “idealism” (introduced in 1702 by Leibnitz), and Kant inaugurated it most likely to distance his system from that of Berke­ley to whom he was indebted, it seems, still more than to Hume (their congeniality is spe­cified in the article in the mirror of intercultural philosophy, i.e. in both systems, just as in the Buddhist vijňānavāda, our persuasion that we can perceive outer things as existing independently from our mind was regarded as the radical illusion of mind). The author stands up for Friedrich Jacobi by offering specification of the advantages of “the robust realism” over “feigned” Kantian realism. Meanwhile, he suggests also the distinction be­tween the transcendental idealistic doctrine of Kant and realistic potency of his philosophy, which, in his opinion, becomes more intelligible after Hilary Putnam’s theory of realism. In this context the Kantian term “transcendental realism” itself could acquire not negative but mostly affirmative connotations. The author also suggests actualization of Kant’s “re­alistic capacity” for today’s ontology by highlighting his implicit differentiation of the layers of reality. In contrast, Fichtean and Schellingean dialectical sports with cor­relations of idealism and realism could be of interest, in the author’s view, only to histori­ans of philosophy. (shrink)

"All life upon the stage"; the Theatrum Mundi. In this volume, a seventeenth century metaphor is revisited and is seen as applying to all art in all times. In the "magic mirror of art" the human being discerns the hidden spheres of human life and commemorates and celebrates its glorious victories and mourns its ignominious defeats. Let us rediscover Art as a witness to the human predicament as well as a celebrant of humanity's most sublime moments. This is (...) the invitation of this collection of studies by A-T. Tymieniecka, Hanna Scolnicov, Muella Erkilic, Matt Landrus, Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Monika Bakke, David Brubaker, Tammy Knipp, Howard Pearce, Ellen J. Burns, G. Backhaus, Ethan J. Leib, Lawrence Kimmel, Ingrid Scheibler, Gottfried Scholz, L.F. Werth, A. Carillo, M. Statkiewicz, K. O'Rourke, B. Meyler, H. Meltzer, Jiuan Heng, W.V. Davies. Art as mirror of life, human life as participating in a stage play, corresponds to the fervent search human being of the causes, reasons, puzzles of our existence which elude us in the concrete life. This XVII c. conception of Theatrum Mundi opens as this volume shows a fascinating field of investigation for our times. (shrink)

This article critically examines the relations between Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory and more conventional psychological ideas. It does so by concentrating on Lacan’s notion of the ‘mirror stage’. Lacan and some of his followers have suggested that psychoanalytic theory is ‘beyond psychology’. It is argued that Freud believed that psychoanalytic theory was beyond conventional psychology in a synthetic rather than rejectionist way. Lacan cited the work of orthodox psychologists such as Wolfgang Köhler, James Mark Baldwin and Charlotte Bühler as (...) providing evidential basis for his ideas about the mirror stage. The rhetoric of these citations is examined in detail. It is suggested that Lacan makes a distinction between the ‘facts’ of psychology and the interpretation of the facts. However, close rhetorical examination shows inaccuracies in his citations about the behaviour of children and chimpanzees in reaction to mirror images. Moreover, the evidential basis that he cites is neither supported by contemporary psychology, nor, more seriously, did it suggest what Lacan was claiming at the time of his writing. (shrink)

We focus on the evolution of action capabilities which set the stage for language, rather than analyzing how further brain evolution built on these capabilities to yield a language-ready brain. Our framework is given by the Mirror System Hypothesis, which charts a progression from a monkey-like mirror neuron system (MNS) to a chimpanzee-like mirror system that supports simple imitation and thence to a human-like mirror system that supports complex imitation and language. We present the MNS2 (...) model, a new model of action recognition learning by mirror neurons of the macaque brain and augmented competitive queuing, a model of opportunistic scheduling of action sequences as background for analysis of modeling strategies for simple imitation as seen in the great apes and complex/goal-directed imitation as seen in humans. Implications for the study of language are briefly noted. (shrink)

During COVID-19, private living spaces have become settings for activities usually taking place elsewhere. Work, education and leisure activities have moved in, while we have moved out and now frequently project our private interiors onto the screens of others when meeting online. We see ourselves reflected while reflecting each other, and we peek into the lives of strangers while staging our own for the world to see. If such virtual cross-extensions of public and private domains are not completely new, then (...) they have been taken to a whole new level during the pandemic. The article explores such projected interiors extended between screens and walls and the implications these have for the thinking and making of a future living space. It asks how in response to the current environmental crisis the experience of the pandemic interior might help project new spaces radically different from the ones of pre-pandemic times. Two versions of a drawing made in the early 1920s by the Swiss German artist Paul Klee evoke the experience of spatial relationships familiar from the pandemic house. Creative writing of an inflected space detected in the drawings identifies an opening in the fabric of the interior potentially leading us into a future. (shrink)

We commend Arbib for his original proposal that a mirror neuron system may have participated in language origins. However, in our view he proposes a complex evolutionary scenario that could be more parsimonious. We see no necessity to propose a hand-based signing stage as ancestral to vocal communication. The prefrontal system involved in human speech may have its precursors in the monkey's inferior frontal cortical domain, which is responsive to vocalizations and is related to laryngeal control.

This essay aims to shed new light on the stages of moral enlightenment in the Allegory of the Cave, of which there are three. I focus on the two stages within the cave, represented by eikasia and pistis, and provide a phenomenological description of these two mental states. The second part of the essay argues that there is a structural parallelism between the Allegory of the Cave and the ending of the Republic. The parallelism can be convincingly demonstrated by a (...) purely formal analysis, but additionally it complements and reinforces the original interpretation of the Cave, insofar as the ending of the Republic also mirrors, on the level of content, the previously adduced stages of moral enlightenment. (shrink)

The fictional regime of the photographic image allows Helena Almeida to stage a theatrical metamorphosis of her own body through displacements, expansions and dissimulations, placing photography at the heart of a pictorial transgression that undermines the disciplinary boundaries of visual media: the artist becomes ink, inhabits the empty canvas space, multiplies herself in mirror games that produce the unfolding of a body in deep crisis, thrown beyond its physical limits and identity. Moreover, in multimedia works such as Feel (...) me, Hear me and See me (1979–1980), as well as in some images of the series entitled The House (1982–1983), Almeida seems to move towards a radical linguistic and pictorial derangement, likely to break the traditional communicative and representative mechanisms. We seek to demonstrate, on the basis of these different aspects relating to photography’s effects of hybridization, and making use of the post-structuralist thought of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, that the artist moves towards the designation of a structural space that combines photography, writing and the reinvention of the body. Almeida’s work confronts us with a complex reconfiguration of ways of seeing, feeling and thinking the photographic act, as well as its discursive features. (shrink)

The relation between seeing, knowledge, and language has concerned philosophers and artists throughout history. The current article examines the relation between word, image, and knowledge in some prominent Renaissance artworks. It is argued that the shift from revelatory truth in the word to evidence in “seeing the real” as Leonardo da Vinci (1452 -1519) argues in his writings, marks a moment in history in which the human being takes center stage as the interpreter of knowledge. In the search for (...) perfect proportionality and beautiful harmony, Renaissance artists, therefore, did not just create an aesthetic dimension yet were central in a process leading to a reevaluation and alternative modes of knowledge about the human being. (shrink)

The article proposes looking at children's literature, particularly the form of the picture book, as an educational resource for producing body awareness in school. Eight reading steps for as many bodily actions aimed at naming the body, activating it, getting to know it and moving it in space, on and off the pages; between grounding, listening, breathing, playing and moving, the rediscovery of gestures and anatomical truths invites to deepen self-knowledge as a preliminary act to the encounter and relationship with (...) the other and with the environment. The picture books by their specificities of short form and cross-over, offer, even in non-fiction production, the possibility of bringing attention back to the body dimension within the school and educational debate, where it lives today in a state of malaise and oblivion. Meaningful conversations, explorations and relationships flow from the pages of the albums: research on language as a tool that gives dignity and value to each person, and encounters with the artistic representation of the world as an infinite mirror of its multiplicity and variety, constitute valuable opportunities for an education that is aware of the wholeness of learners and teachers and the integrated, erotic and embodied dimension of their relationship. (shrink)

The influence of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has extended into nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences—from literature and film studies to anthropology and social work. yet Lacan's major text, Ecrits, continues to perplex and even baffle its readers. In Reading Lacan, Jane Gallop offers a novel approach to Lacan's work based on his own theories of language. Lacan locates truth in the letter rather than in the spirit-in the ways statements are expressed rather than in their (...) intended meaning. Gallop here grapples with six of Lacan's essays from Ecrits: "The Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,' " "The Mirror Stage," "The Freudian Thing,'' "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious,'' "The Signification of the Phallus," and "The Subversion of the Subject." While other commentators have chosen not to confront Lacan's notoriously problematic style in their discussions of his ideas, Gallop addresses herself directly to the problem and the practice of reading Lacan. She takes her direction from Lacan's view of subjectivity and offers a deeply personal, feminist reading of Ecrits. Concentrating on the relation of desire and interpretation, she opens up the rich implications of Lacan's thought, for psychoanalytic theory, for the act of reading, and for knowledge itself. Forceful and revealing, yet utterly candid about its own areas of uncertainty, Gallop's book will be indispensable to readers of Lacan and to scholars and students who have felt his impact. (shrink)

Walt Disney’s animation film Bambi is transparently liberal, and in the post-1968 era could even be seen as post-modern and deep-ecological. The reading offered here, however, makes three counter-moves to this prevailing interpretation: First it follows in both broad technique and ultimate conclusion Žižek’s critique of The Sound of Music wherein he unmasks a fascist ideology encoded in this ostensibly liberal musical. Second, it introduces a gender lens via Silvia Plath’s autobiographical poem, “Daddy,” and third, it employs Lacan's Mirror (...) Stage as key to this construction of a gendered identity and hierarchy. These three moves combine to show that, far from a simple coming-of-age cartoon about a cute little deer, the perennial classic Bambi can be read decidedly other-wise. (shrink)

The Threshold of the Visible World advances a revolutionary new political aesthetic--Kaja Silverman explores the possibilities for looking beyond the restrictive mandates of the self, and the normative aspects of the cultural image-repertoire. She provides a detailed account of the social and psychic forces which constrain us to look and identify in normative ways, and the violence which that normativity implies. Accounting for these phenomena on both a conscious and an unconcious level, Silverman analyzes the psychic and textual conditions under (...) which our "field of vision" can be expanded. The title of this book is taken from Lacan's essay on the mirror stage. In that text, Lacan writes that "the mirror-image would seem to be the threshold of the visible world." He thereby suggests that the visible world has no existence as such until the infant subject has access to an image of self. Lacan intimates that the mirror provides the frame through which one relates to others within the domain of vision, stressing the priority of narcissism and the ego over all other libidinal transactions. The Threshold of the Visible World provides a psychic, social and political specification of Lacan's claim, and most particularly of its implications for the subject's relations to the social other. This is accomplished through examination of the ego, as well as two other categories at the center of Lacan's account of the mirror stage: ideality and identification. This book is an ethical-political project which leads to the re-elaboration of a number of crucial theoretical categories--Silverman offers an account of the bodily ego, of identification, of idealization, of the gaze, of the look, and of the "photographic." The Threshold of the Visible World leads as well to the formulation of a fresh model for conceptualizing sexual, racial and class "difference," and the terms under which it might be dismantled. This book thus seeks to apprehend the field of vision through the frame of a different kind of bodily ego, and discover the pleasures to be derived from corporeal transport. (shrink)

To understand Lacan’s thinking process on vision, the entirety of his teaching must be taken into consideration. Until the 60s, the visual field is the imaginary, the constitutive principle of reality in its phenomenal giving to the experience of a subject. This register is the opposite of the field of the word with the L schema and, subsequently, as subordinated to the symbolic system according to the model of the optical schema of the inverted flower vase of Bouasse. It is (...) only with the 1964 seminar that Lacan makes a daring turnaround through which the visual becomes a sign of the emergence of a real that is irreducible to both reality and the mediation of the subject of knowledge. The split that separates reality and the real is reproduced in Lacan within the visual field, which is, on the one hand, the cardinal principle of the consistency of the experience of reality, and on the other, it is an element of irreducibility to reality. This produces a cascade of consequences: first of all, the modification of the presentation of the mirror stage. Unlike the voice, which through prosody, tone, and volume, finds some strips with which anchor itself imaginatively to reality, the gaze, invisible and elusive, escapes the imaginary grasp. Captured in myths, it reveals its power and ability to annihilate—as in the myth of Medusa’s gaze—or to make people fall in love but only with a narcissistic love that leads inexorably to death as in the myth of Narcissus. The gaze is elusive because the subject is dependent on it in the field of desire. Like the voice, it is about the desire on which the subject is supported; it is one of the objects on which the phantom depends. In our opinion, thanks to this characteristic, the gaze object can make remote psychoanalytic treatment possible through easily accessible videoconferencing tools and, at the same time, create new conditions within it that should be carefully evaluated to understand its implications in the session itself. (shrink)

The present study aims to investigate the psychological mechanisms beneath the change in the facial expression of some of the beheaded characters in Caravaggio’s works, starting from The Head of Medusa, from the artist’s youth, and reaching David with the Head of Goliath, a mature workpiece, searching the continuity between them through a series of self-portraits/ self-insertions of the artist in his work. The psychodynamic analysis is limited by the constitution of its practice to the study of the process of (...) image production and the artistic imaginary, rather than to the investigation of man or the artist out of reach by means of figurative and symbolic language. This approach aims to highlight the drives of the unconscious, the structures of censorship and the technique of operating of the defensive mechanisms that ultimately could contribute to the production of such masterful images that are both seductive and confusing. The study incorporates and continues the contribution of authors such as Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit who applied Laplanche’s theory of generalized seduction theory in the analysis of Caravaggio’s works, but also the mirror stage of Lacan and the masterful study of Winnicott regarding the reflection of the baby in the mimics of his mother, an unconscious unclear image that will stand forever for the perception of the self. The change of the affective resonance, expressiveness and emotional relating to violence is natural in the course of human evolution. While not even the artist Caravaggio can elude it, his work can illustrate by deflection these transforma­tions of the dynamics of the mind, it can raise new questions and open new perspectives of understanding the artistic drive. (shrink)

Comme ses voisins, la Chine connaît depuis une quinzaine d'années une forte croissance des TIC. En même temps qu'elles ont favorisé la circulation de l'information et la liberté d'expression, elles ont contribué aux troubles de la personnalité chez les internautes chinois. On peut diviser ces derniers en introvertis et extravertis, correspondant éventuellement à la théorie lacanienne du stade du miroir. Dans un contexte où la tradition du collectivisme domine, les raisons de ce désordre sont analysées. Sans esprit de responsabilité ni (...) respect, les blogs sont remplis d'actes exhibitionnistes et de violence verbale, dépassant largement les limites habituelles des droits individuels. Le Web chinois est-il devenu le paradis de l'expression libre ou le cimetière de la démocratie?Like its neighbors, China has over the past fifteen years a strong ICT growth. At the same time they promoted the flow of information and freedom of expression, they have contributed to personality disorders among Chinese netizens. We can divide these into introverts and outgoing, corresponding possibly to the Lacanian theory of the mirror stage. In a context where the dominant tradition of collectivism, the reasons for this disorder are discussed. No sense of responsibility or respect, blogs are filled with exhibitionists and acts of verbal violence, far exceeding the usual limits of individual rights. The Web is China become a haven of free expression or the graveyard of democracy? (shrink)

The article substantiates the necessity of psychoanalytical and existential methodology in interpreting Lesia Ukrainka’s drama Kaminnyi hospodar, including the works of José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno on Don Quixote, Albert Camus on absurd characters, and Jacques Lacan’s The Mirror Stage. Biographical data testify to the critical attitude of the writer to world treatments of the legend. Her challenge to tradition was bold and conscious. It is regarded that the main point of Lesia Ukrainka’s polemics with (...) tradition concerns Don Juan apologetics, introduced by romantics and developed by modernists. Exploring Don Juan’s psychological makeup provides the opportunity to show that all participants of the legend have become victims of Don Juan apologetics. The Don Juan myth has played an integral role in the image of the Person being accepted by characters as a trustful image of the Self. Interpretation of the Mirror Image in The Stone Host and its crucial role in the final scene allows for justifying that the mirror serves the narcissistic characters’ admiration of themselves and shows them not only an attractive appearance but an ideal version of the Self, created by myth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.2 (2003) 480-484 [Access article in PDF] The Raymond Tallis Reader, edited by Michael Grant; xxx & 382 pp. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, $79.95. For some people, the name Raymond Tallis evokes theoretical controversy, oversimplified arguments, biting rhetoric, and bruised egos. For others, like the editor of The Raymond Tallis Reader, Michael Grant, he is a twenty-first-century man of Enlightenment who has the vision and the (...) courage to reveal the foibles of poststructuralist literary and cultural theory. It should come as no surprise that an overview of his work so far shows that both of these views are justified, though incomplete.This selection of Tallis's writings draws on most of his published works, aside from his clinical writings. Texts range from philosophical investigations into the nature of consciousness to close methodological critiques of poststructuralist (or what Tallis also calls post-Saussurean) theory. He has consistently argued that that such theories are fundamentally flawed by relativism, obscurantism [End Page 480] and anti-humanist concepts (such as the language-bound subject), and many of his views are shared by scholars such as Wendell V. Harris (Beyond Poststructuralism and Literary Meaning) and Paisley Livingston (Literary Knowledge). "It is poststructuralism," Tallis writes, "that has brought to a climax the anti-rationalist, anti-individualist and, indeed, anti-humanist strains of the Counter-Enlightenment thought" (p. 152). Tallis has done a valuable service in expressing the most common objections to such theorizing with clarity and vigor, and The Raymond Tallis Reader is useful in collecting his arguments in a single volume, with Grant's prefaces to each reading providing a clear view of the main points. The collection does, however, also bring into focus some of the problems involved in Tallis's critiques. He is an admirable synthesizer of thought, but does occasionally fall into the trap of unsupported generalizations he spends so much effort in trying to eradicate in the writings of others.The first of section of the book focuses on Tallis's conception of "the explicit animal," on rescuing the idea of consciousness and rational will from scientistic neurological theories. Such views may come as a surprise to those readers who have come to know Tallis as the champion of Enlightenment thinking. He argues, however, that even though neurology has been in many ways invaluable, it has not been able to explain the synchronic and diachronic unity of the self, which collects the various impulses experienced by a human being and which preserves a connection between them over time.The second section brings together writings concerning the nature of language. Again, the central concept is explicitness: Tallis emphasizes the way human language differs from animal signaling systems or natural signs by virtue of being composed of explicit signs—signs in the Saussurean sense of combining a signifier with a signified in an arbitrary fashion. What he absolutely denies, however, is that such a system of signs would be completely cut off from reality: "Because words do not mirror the world, it does not follow that discourse is cut off from the world" (p. 134). Those theorists who have taken the step from defining the relationship between the signifier and the signified as arbitrary to declaring the relationship between reality and the sign as a whole to be equally arbitrary, have moved from Saussurean theories to what Tallis calls post-Saussurean thinking. His main objection lies in the way such theories deny the existence and efficacy of individual, explicit and conscious human selves: "Our contemporary anti-Enlightenment figures see society, or one of its proxies such as history, socially mediated instincts or language, as being anterior to, and transcending, the individuals that make it up.... The post-Saussureans... saw selves vanish completely into nodes in sign systems or soluble fish in a boundless sea of discourse" (pp. 148-49). Tallis particularly opposes the Lacanian view of the language-bound psyche. When discussing Lacan's mirror stage he attacks not only Lacan's obscurantist style and undefined terminology, but also the self-contradictory and empirically unsupported theory of the child's entry into the Symbolic... (shrink)

Since Narcissus sees himself seeing himself, i.e., comes to self‑ consciousness and plunges into self‑destruction under the gaze, thinkers have problematized the Delphic maxim of “knowing thyself” from a visual perspective. In this trend, psychoanalysis joins the self‑criticism of phenomenology in subverting the “myth” of the self‑reflective consciousness. Whereas Lacan relegates the mirror stage to the Imaginary and interprets the gaze as objet a to account for the split in the subject, Merleau‑Ponty overcomes the narcissistic enclosure of the (...) tacit cogito by appealing to the self’s abandonment to the gaze of the other in an open‑circuit of the reversible flesh. Through the lens of the topological concept of parallax, this study illuminates the fundamental distinctions between these two perspectives and proposes a promising future of psychoanalytic phenomenology. (shrink)

This article is about the connection between envy and ressentiment. Both are understood as emotional strategies for dealing with desire. Ressentiment is understood as the perpetuation and radicalization of a strong form of envy. Lacan’s mirror stage as well as Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s theories of ressentiment serve as a frame of reference for the development of this thesis.

The article examines the unconscious uncontrolled side of the human psyche, analyzes approaches to determining the structure of the unconscious, its constituent elements and their relationships from the point of view of the concepts of prominent psychoanalysts Z. Freud, C. Jung and J. Lacan. The significance of the "mirror stage" described by Lacan is revealed. in the understanding of human self-consciousness. Particular attention is paid to Lacan's thesis that the unconscious is, first of all, language; and it is (...) he who acts as a manifestation of a structure that has clear patterns. It is through language that we can approach understanding of the connection of the unconscious with the conscious world in the context of Lacan's definition of the triad of "real", "imaginary" and "symbolic". The purpose of the study is to show the relationship between the concepts of the structure of the unconscious and the fusion of psychoanalysis with philosophical and linguistic structuralism, which gives rise to a variety of approaches and interdisciplinary research in understanding the essence of the unconscious and interpreting social phenomena through the linguistic structures of myth. (shrink)

In a recent article published in Theory, Culture & Society Michael Billig proposed a formal, rhetorical method of evaluating Lacanian theory, applying it in a critical reading of Lacan’s early work on the ‘mirror stage’. What is crucially at stake in this reading is Lacan’s citation practices: indeed, Lacan is credited with significant omissions. Central among them is the ‘repression’ of the work of the French psychologist Henri Wallon in Lacan’s article on the ‘mirror stage’. Furthermore, (...) it is also argued that such omissions have been instrumental in the creation and reproduction of a whole Lacan mythology, which is supposedly uncritically accepted by Lacanian scholars. What this note attempts is a brief assessment of this critical method and of its conclusions. Is Lacan’s ‘repression’ of Wallon as straightforward as it seems? What criteria should be employed in evaluating Lacan’s complex citation practices? Is the assumed complicity of Lacanian scholars in Lacan’s mythologization really representative of the current status of Lacanian bibliography? Billig’s own repressions seem to cast serious doubts on the validity of his proposed method of evaluating Lacan. But his critique does open a much-needed debate on issues of intellectual debt and repression, and on the relation between psychoanalysis and academic discourse. (shrink)

This essay argues that his encounter with the Lacanian claims about the imaginary and symbolic functions incited Merleau-Ponty to transform his early phenomenology. “The Mirror Stage Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” forced Merleau-Ponty to reconsider the primacy of the notion of Leib (corps propre) in his early phenomenology. The modification of his phenomenological starting point culminates in the revision of his position on the relation of the imaginary and the symbolic functions (...) to the real from The Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s focus on reversibility in The Visible and the Invisible should be read as an ontological elaboration of what is at the core of ‘The Mirror Stage,’ namely, the role of the imaginary and the symbolic functions in the formation of our corporeal visibility.Cet essai démontre que la convergence de Merleau-Ponty avec les revendications lacaniennes concernant l’imaginaire et les fonctions symboliques l’a incité à modifier sa première phénoménologie. « Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je telle qu’elle nous est révélée dans l’expérience psychanalytique » a forcé Merleau-Ponty à reconsidérer la primauté de la notion de Leib (corps propre) issue de sa première phénoménologie. La modification de son point de départ phénoménologique aboutit, depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception jusqu’à Le visible et l’invisible, à la révision de sa position sur la relation de l’imaginaire et des fonctions symboliques au réel. Je suppose que l’attention portée par Merleau-Ponty sur la réversibilité dans Le visible et l’invisible devrait être lue comme l’élaboration ontologique de ce qui est au coeur du « stade du miroir », à savoir le rôle de l’imaginaire et des fonctions symboliques dans la formation de notre visibilité corporelle.Il presente articolo avanza la tesi che l’incontro di Merleau-Ponty con la dimensione simbolica e la dimensione immaginaria descritte da Lacan, ha indotto il filosofo a trasformare la sua prima riflessione fenomenologica. “Lo stadio dello specchio come formatore della funzione dell’io” costrinse Merleau-Ponty a riesaminare il primato della nozione di Leib (corps propre), proprio della prima fase del suo pensiero e della sua adesione alla fenomenologia. La trasformazione del suo punto di partenza fenomenologico culmina in una revisione delle sue posizioni riguardo alla relazione delle funzioni immaginaria e simbolica rispetto al reale, che investe il passaggio da Fenomenologia della percezione al Visibile e l’invisibile. Attraverso questa lettura propongo di comprendere la nozione di reversibilità presente nel Visibile e l’invisibile, come una rielaborazione ontologica del nucleo centrale dello stadio dello specchio, ovvero il ruolo delle funzioni immaginaria e simbolica nella formazione della nostra visibilità corporea. (shrink)

When Jacques Lacan coined the term "méconnaisance" or "misrecognition," he was referring to the way in which a maturing subject comes to understand his or her encounter with his or her own reflection in the mirror—a psycho-developmental period also known as The Mirror Stage; this encounter, as Lacan theorized, leads to the emergence of an idealized projection of who the subject is. This "Ideal I" that emerges from this encounter with the virtual Other, that is nonetheless the (...) Self, produces both a recognition and a misrecognition of this "I".On the one hand, it produces a recognition of the Self as a coherent body in which this "I" is located. On the other hand, it takes us to a misrecognition of the... (shrink)

Jean Pierre Boulé's Sartre, Self Formation and Masculinities argues that we cannot adequately understand Sartre without taking account of the unique ways in which he negotiated the gender mandates of patriarchy. Taking Boulé's cue, I call on Lacan, Cixous and Beauvoir to interrogate Sartre's relationship to women, to his body and to writing. I argue for Boulé's approach but against several of his conclusions. Further, I credit Boulé with providing ammunition for challenging Lacan's universal account of the mirror (...) class='Hi'>stage, and for pushing me to read Beauvoir's "Must we Burn Sade?" as a critique of Sartre's betrayal of the erotic's ethical demands. (shrink)

As a reference to Lacan’s »mirror stage«, the »Mirror-Selfie-Stadium« show a reflexive turn within subjectification. The individualization of image production through digital and dating platforms is the starting point to reveal as such. In the article reference to so-called primitive accumulation (Marx) the origin of the internal rupture of the bourgeois subject shows that the individual subject in a capitalist society must be an interface for its own capitalist socialization and originates from this quandary situation. The actual (...) techniques of digitization continue this origin by forcing the subject to expand itself, but also its objects, by divisions, splits and valorizing. These divisions at once unleash the productive power of capitalist society. (shrink)

The animation-effect of the movement-image constitutes not only a form of life but also a machinic analogue for Husserl's and Kant's accounts of temporality, engendering what Bernard Stiegler calls ‘a cinematography of consciousness’. If autonomous movement is the hallmark of the living being as well as the inanimate mechanism, the movement-image likewise subtends scenes of human and artificial intelligence. Pairing a cybernetic reading of Lacan's mirror stage essay with reflections on the self-recognition dance of Machina Speculatrix (an early (...) example of a biomimetic robot), this essay considers how exosomatic feedback loops enable a kind of ipseity for machinic life as well as the human being as technical being. Despite adopting Derrida's ideas of originary prostheticity and automaticity, rendering living beings as always-already machinic life, Stiegler sets arche-cinema against arche-writing. (shrink)

This essay investigates the question of the birth of the subject through Lacan’s and Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the function of the mirror, specularity, and the speculative. The first section draws on the “duplication” of self-consciousness described by Hegel in the first pages of Phenomenology of Spirit. The question of the double and the mirror is then examined through the three main versions of Lacan’s mirror stage, interpreted in light of Merleau-Ponty’s own reflections. Finally, I draw on (...) passages from The Prose of the World and Eye and Mind to illustrate an original convergence with questions raised by Lacan’s late teachings. (shrink)