A version of the so?called paradox of analysis is enunciated which involves two principles of synonymy, referred to respectively as that of substitution and that of triviality. It is argued that for most ?familiar? concepts of synonymy the former principle can be maintained whereas the latter one has to be rejected. I deal with some solutions to the paradox that have been proposed or discussed by Carnap, Lewy, Feyerabend and Hare, and adhere to Carnap's view that the puzzle arises from (...) the use of unclarified and imprecise notions of synonymy. (shrink)

Comment raconter un mythe : généalogie, mythologie, mythographie. Cet article étudie le registre linguistique de la mythographie de l’époque classique afin d’identifier la fonction de ces textes. Au moyen de la sociolinguistique, de la narratologie et d’une brève analyse des circonstances énonciatives des textes, il suggère qu’il s’agissait bien d’œuvres de référence, à la manière des productions de la mythographie plus tardive. Cette conclusion a des implications importantes pour le statut contemporain de la mythologie.This article investigates the linguistic register of (...) Classical mythography in order to infer the purpose for which these works were composed. Using sociolinguistics, narratology, and a brief analysis of the enunciative circumstances of the texts, it suggests that the texts were works of reference much like those of later mythography. This has important implications for the contemporary status of mythology. (shrink)

La présente contribution propose une analyse d’un type particulier d’élément initial, celui des commentaires énonciatifs, dans un corpus composé d’articles de recherche économique, en français et en anglais. Le postulat de départ est que leur emploi peut être très dépendant à la fois du contexte précis de production et de la langue concernée. Sont pris en compte la composition syntaxique des éléments initiaux de commentaires, leurs valeurs sémantiques précises, la nature du sujet grammatical qu’ils précèdent (groupe nominal, pronom personnel, pronom (...) impersonnel), leur rang et leur agencement dans le cas de séquences de plusieurs éléments initiaux ainsi que leurs fonctions discursives et pragmatiques. L’approche fait ressortir un certain nombre de variations dans les emplois de cette catégorie d’élément initial par les auteurs anglophones et francophones dans leurs articles. (shrink)

Commentators on the four trends in contemporary African philosophy as enunciated by H. Odera Oruka frequently focus on the merits and demerits of each trend. However, many of them are obblivious to the way in which sagacity emancipates African philosophy by putting reason in its rightful pivotal position. This article argues that while the professional philosophers accused ethno-philosophers of doing disservice to African philosophy, they too stand accused of the same. This is due to the fact that both ethno-philosophy and (...) professional philosophy function within the Western grid and therefore in the interest and service of theWestern world. Philosophic sagacity, the article argues, discards the undesirable elements of ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy, while retaining desirable ones, namely, the Africanness in ethno-philosophy and the objectivity in professional philosophy. Because philosophic sagacity is African and objective, it is a desired tool of change in Africa. It can, for example, be used to address negative aspects of ethnicity that bedevil Africa. There lies the most important contribution by H. Odera Oruka to philosophy in general and African philosophy in particular. (shrink)

While most commentators believe that the print book will survive the advent of the ebook, it is at the same time hard not to think that the fundamental technological changes ushered in by the digital revolution will fail to have profound effects on the forms of the book. Arguing that literary forms have always depended on the “material conditions of their enunciation,” the French author François Bon uses historical examples to suggest the book will undergo major, if yet unforeseen, transformations. (...) He maintains that it is urgent for writers to experiment with the possibilities brought about by the digital revolution, lest the actual developments be decided by the commercial interests of large technology entities. In his own experiments with the form of the book in the digital environment -- in his “novel” Tumulte, which consists of daily blog posts that mix fiction, memoir, criticism, and other genres, and in a series of digital remediations of his early novel, Limite -- Bon imaginatively explores the limits of the concept of the book. Yet while these experiments are suggestive, it is less clear that they represent viable avenues for the book’s development, since their main appeal is arguably for scholars and theoreticians. Focusing on the means of organization and delivery, and the ontological ambiguities arising from the multiple versions of the same text, Bon’s experiments skirt the core power of the book: the sustained arrangement of words that has been the principle means whereby books have conveyed content and sustained intellectual culture. (shrink)

This work deals with Mollā Gūrānı̄’s critique (d. 813/1488) of Qāḍı̄ al-Bayḍawı̄ (d. 596/1200) and Zamakhsharı̄ (d. 538/1144). The Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara sūras in his manuscript tafsı̄r “Ghāyat al-Amānı̄” are chosen as the texts to examplify Mollā Gūrānı̄’s critique. His criticism is mostly related to language, qirāʾa (recitation and vocalization of Qur’ānic text), conceptual meaning and disagreement in interpretations of the Qur’ānic verses in question. Gūrānı̄ primarly criticisez Qāḍı̄ due to his reputation among Ottoman scholars. Guranı̄ has not only criticized (...) Kādı̄ and Zamahsharı̄ in the commentary of the surahs Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara but also Taftāzānı̄ and Kavāshı̄. This clearly shows thah he is a well-versed scholar in researching especially in comperative analysis. In this study, our investigation is limited to, however, Zemakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄. This stuyd shows that Zemakhsharı̄ is strictly bound to Ahl al-Sunnah. Moreover, the hadith reports are considerably important for him in understanding and interpreting the Qur’ānic verses. He closely follows the interpretive traditions of early Muslim scholars, especially on the matters that Muslim scholars had an argeemnet.Summary: This study discusses the criticism of Mollā Gūrānı̄ (d. 813/1488), one of the Ottoman commentary scholars, against Qāḍı̄ al-Bayḍāwı̄ (d. 685/1286) and Zamakhsharı̄ (d. 538/1144). The two Qur’ānic Surahs Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara are chosen from his critiques in a manuscript of his commentary called Ghāyat al-Amānı̄. Mollā Gūrānı̄’s manuscript is registered in Sulaymāniye Library, Dāmād Ibrāhı̄m Pasha Section at number 146 and consists of 352 pages in total. This copy is one of the oldest among other its existent copies. The main reason of our preference of this copy is that it is both legible and at the end of the book (the farāgh part), it writes that it was proofread by his author himself and that handwriting notes at the margins of the pages belonged to the author. We have examined this copy by comparing another copy which is again in the Sulaymāniye Library, Haji Maḥmūd Efendı̄ section at number 162, consisting of 484 pages in total, comparatively. We have examined critiques of 41 verses in total from Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara surahs.Gūrānī’s critiques of Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄ are too wide to be discussed within the limits of an article. Therefore, we have tried to briefly introduce these critiques. While presenting the commentators views, we tried to make their inexplicit expressions clear and furthermore elaborate their purposes by making use of some other resources. We have to say that we also used bracketed explanatory statements while giving commentators opinions.Most of the critiques of Gūrānı̄ are aimed at Qāḍı̄ since the latter’s commentary was one of the favourite ones among Ottoman intellectual circles. Therefore, in writing his commentary manuscript, Gūrānı̄ ambivalently both followed and criticized Qāḍı̄’s commentary. When Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara surahs are used as a base, it is evident that Gūrānı̄’s commentary Ghāyat al-Amānı̄ is a reason-based (dirāyah) in line with those of Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄ as commentary methodology. Gūrānı̄ modelled himself so much on Qāḍı̄ in this commentary of his that it seems as an abridged copy of Qāḍı̄’s. Ghāyat al-Amānı̄ as a commentary example of Ottoman era shows that the commentary methodology of the time did not change even four hundred years after Zamakhsharı̄.It is possible to say that Gūrānı̄ criticized Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄ in this commentary in a meticulous manner. Although many of his critiques are disputable, his rigorous approach to texts and his courage of critique, instead of imitative attitude, of Qāḍı̄’s commentary, which was held in high esteem in madrasahs of the time, and of commentary of Zamakhsharı̄, who was competent in Arabic language, is of great significance. Gūrānı̄ used a comparative scientific methodology and was a prominent. When his commentary manuscript examined it can be seen that it was not only Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄ but also Taftāzānı̄ (d. 792/1390) and Kavāshı̄ (d. 680/1281) who got their shares from his critiques. Most of Gūrānı̄’s critiques were on the subtleties of Arabic language. He sometimes expressed his criticism using Arabic grammar rules and sometimes rhetoric requirements. His other critiques involved topics such as, conceptual meaning, verses integrity, recitation and some interpretations of verses that he disagreed with. His critical method was based on the integrity of the Qurʾān, interpretive traditions, Salaf’s views and logical contradictions. We ought to mention that Gūrānı̄ showed his strong commitment to his predecessors and scholars for matters on which they had consensus. We comprehend this commitment on occasions when he rejected the claim that, for instance, a given form of qirā’a from Salaf was wrong according to Arabic grammar in favour of Salafı̄ reciter. The aim of this study is to give an idea about commentary understandings and methods of commentators in Ottoman era and to make contribution to introducing Gūrānı̄, who criticized Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄, two prominent commentators competent in their field, to researchers in terms of his attribute as a critic. An earlier study on his critiques made in this commentary of Gūrānı̄ only covered his critiques of Qāḍı̄ for some of his interpretations in Fātiḥ̣a and Baqara surahs. Therefore, another important factor leading to this study was to cover all critiques he made against the views and comments of both Zamakhsharı̄ and those shared by Zamakhsharı̄ and Qāḍı̄. Hence, this study aims to contribute to the fiedl as an analytical study or a translation made by researchers on this concise and handwritten manuscript.Some conspicuous features are seen in Gūrānı̄’s critiques. As he pointed out in his reviews, in case of subjects with availability of narratives (rivāyah) and of suitability of the literal meaning of verses, he did not prefer allegorical interpretation. He gives the impression that he based his reviews on Ahl al-Sunnah, and he took pains to follow Ashaʿrı̄te school of thought. Although Gūrānı̄, did not see harm in sharing the same things with Zamakhsharı̄, opposing Qāḍı̄ as regards Arabic language, he was always in opposition with Zamakhsharı̄ in relation to commitment to sectarian view and Ḥadı̄ths. It can also be said that Gūrānı̄ did not favour esoteric-allusive commentary style.It can also be said that Gūrānı̄ had sound and deep knowledge in the field of Kalām. This can be deduced from his considering Qāḍı̄’s arguments to criticize Muʿtazila as insubstantial and sometimes from his criticism of Qāḍı̄ for his careless selection of phrases he used in theological issues. Meanwhile, Gūrānı̄ criticized some views which did not belong to Qāḍı̄. For example, it is seen that he criticized Qāḍı̄ for his citation of an opinion through the phrase “it is said that” as if it was his own view by writing an annotation on the margin that it was Qāḍı̄ who said it. In our opinion, the most important thing that the critique of Gūrānı̄ shows is his scholarly identity and his outspoken character of enunciating of what he believed scholarly and conscientiously. This, also, shows the existence of critical thinking in Ottoman scholarship tradition. (shrink)

Footnote: My thanks to Zvi Biener and Balazs Gyenis for comments. 1. What is the relationship between philosophy and physics? What should the relationship be? To someone who does not work in philosophy of physics, it can be hard to distinguish what a theoretical physicist does from what a philosopher of physics does. The differences lie in two areas: their goals and their methods. The highest goal of theoretical physicists is to find the next theory. That profoundly colors the (...) way they approach foundational ideas. Any idea that aids in finding the next theory is deemed useful. Sometimes the most suggestive ideas are so because they are on the edge of plausibility. However if they show promise of opening new pathways, physicists are quite willing to suspend critical scrutiny. There is no point abandoning a goose about to lay a golden egg because you suspect it may be a turkey! Gold is gold. As a result they may put up with what seems like patent nonsense to a philosopher. For philosophers of physics, the goal is different. The basic questions remain those asked by philosophers for milennia: What is the nature of space? What is the nature of time? What is the nature of matter? How are things in the world connected? And so on. They seek answers from our best understanding of space, time and matter -modern physics. There is no room for tolerance of fringe thinking for that would compromise the project. They ask: What is our understanding now on the basis of our best science? Philosophy of physics also differs from physics in its method. Philosopher of physics bring the sensibilities of philosophy to physics. To those outside physics, philosophy is synonymous with gazing in wonder at intractable mysteries. To the professional philosopher, the project is just the reverse. It is to take things that are conceptually puzzling and, through rigorous analysis, render them simple and transparent so that the original sense of mystery evaporates. Their method looks to the traditional demands of philosophy that theses must be clearly enunciated and defended by clear and cogent argumentation; and that these demands cannot be compromised.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence LINDA L. McALISTER FRANZBRnrCrXr~O,in his important early work Psychologie vom empirischen Stand, punkt (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena,x It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the Psychologie, he devotes him.self to this task, (...) and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction. After enumerating examples of men~l phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several charac, teristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one whdch has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence," 2 (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rathor location, indicating existence in the mind). As examples of mental phenomena Brentano lists first ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen), whether sensory or issuing from the imagination, and by this he meam not the objects which are presented or which one has before one's mind, but rather the condition or, what Brentano; broadly speaking, calls the act of having such an idea or presentation.3 Thus the acts of hearing something, or seeing or perceiving something would be mental phenomena regardless of whether the object which is, e. g., seen, ds perceived through the visual organs or seen in the mind's eye, so to speak. Other examples are acts of judgment, amongwhich Brentano includes ~:emembering, inferring, believing, doubting; and emotions.such as being happy or sad, lovi~,g and hating, along with which Brentano includes such things as willing, intending, choosing, etc.4 i Oskar Kraus, e.d.,2nd ed. (Leipzig,1924),I, 109. Psych. I, 137. Psych. I, 111. " Psych. I, 112. [423] 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ExamFles of physical phenomena which Brentano mentions are "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I perceive; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination." s It appears from the examFles, then, that mental phenomena are all mental acts, in a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of sensible qualities, the inclusion of "a landscape" being, apparently, a slip on Brentano's part, as his student, friend and editor Oskar Kraus points out. 6 As mentioned above, Brentano thought that there is one partieula~ mark of mental phenomena which characterizes them better than any other: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affmned or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.7 Commentators, perhaps not surprisingly, have disagreed as to the precise nature of the view which Brentano is enunciating in this passage,s Some have supposed that since you can think of, hate, or judge, etc., things which do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, then the immanent object of which Brentano speaks i,s not Pegasus but a "thoughtof Pegasus" (gedachtes Pegasus) which exists in one's mind whenever someone th'mks of Pegasus. Apparently H6fler interpreted the doctrine in this way in a paper which he presented to the Fifth International Psychology Congress in 1905.9.In the light of some passages from Brentano's early writings it appears to be a plausible interpretation. Consider, for example, the following passage: There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely.... The two concepts are not identical but they... (shrink)

O presente ensaio inspirado na semiologia barthesiana tem por objetivo tematizar alguns desafios implicados no gesto aparentemente extemporâneo de escutar a escrita materializada no curso foucaultiano A Hermenêutica do sujeito. Trata-se de um exercício especulativo que, situando a educação no contexto das artes de viver, aborda o interesse crescente nas aulas ministradas por Foucault dedicadas à genealogia do sujeito implicada nas técnicas de si. Nesse percurso, defendemos que a atenção à escuta da voz que vem da escrita dessas aulas interfere (...) diretamente na recepção crítica da ética do cuidado de si. No limite, o que se busca enfatizar é como o tema do cuidado de si emerge inseparável de um gesto pedagógico que resulta de um estado singular de enunciação do pensamento. Palavras-chave: Hermenêutica do sujeito; Foucault; Artes de viver; Aula. For a pleasurable semiology of Hermeneutics of the Subject Abstract: The present essay, inspired by Barthesian semiology, aims to discuss some of the challenges involved in the apparently extemporaneous gesture of listening to the writing materialized in the Foucauldian course The Hermeneutics of the Subject. This is a speculative exercise that, placing education in the context of the arts of living, addresses the growing interest in the classes taught by Foucault dedicated to the genealogy of the subject implicated in the techniques of the self. In this course, we argue that attention to listening to the voice that comes from the writing of these classes interferes directly in the critical reception of the ethics of the care of the self. In the limit, what we seek to emphasize is how the theme of the care of the self emerges inseparable from a pedagogical gesture that results from a singular state of enunciation of thought. Key-words: Hermeneutics of the subject; Foucault; Arts of living; Class. Pour une sémiologie du plaisir de L'Herméneutique du sujet Résumé: Le présent essai, inspiré de la sémiologie barthésienne, vise à thématiser certains des enjeux du geste apparemment extemporané d'écoute de l'écriture matérialisée dans le cours foucaldien L'Herméneutique du sujet. Il s'agit d'un exercice spéculatif qui, plaçant l'éducation dans le contexte des arts de vivre, aborde l'intérêt croissant pour les cours de Foucault consacrés à la généalogie du sujet impliqué dans les techniques du soi. Dans ce parcours, nous soutenons que l'attention portée à l'écoute de la voix qui émane de l'écriture de ces classes interfère directement avec la réception critique de l'éthique du souci de soi. A la limite, ce que nous cherchons à souligner, c'est comment le thème du souci de soi émerge inséparable d'un geste pédagogique qui résulte d'un état singulier d'énonciation de la pensée. Mots-clés: Herméneutique du sujet ; Foucault ; Arts de vivre ; Leçon. Data de registro: 26/06/2022 Data de aceite: 04/11/2022. (shrink)

There is in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit a relatively brief passage at the beginning of Chapter IV, “Self-Consciousness,” which may well be one of the most difficult passages in the whole Hegelian corpus, but which is also of supreme importance for coming to grips with the movement of Hegel’s thought, not only in the Phenomenology but in the entire “system.” It is precisely the difficulty of the passage, it would seem, that explains why it has not been given by commentators (...) an attention proportionate to its significance. So much attention has been focused on the “independence of self-consciousness,” expressed in the sections on “Lordship and Bondage,” “Stoicism and Skepticism” and “The Unhappy Consciousness” — which are, it is true, important and which lend themselves most readily to extended interpretation — that not enough attention has been given to the introductory section, entitled “The Truth of the Certainty of Self,” in which are enunciated the principles which regulate the whole movement of Hegel’s thought. The section might be described as the indispensable transition from those forms of consciousness, which are merely “objective” yet try to give themselves off as authentic knowing, to what Hegel considers to be the only possible way of authenticating the objectivity of human consciousness, i.e., the self, which claims to know, progressively coming to know itself, a self-knowing which will be knowing at all only if it culminates in “absolute knowing.” Only in the light of this section will the preface be intelligible; only in its light will the whole of the Phenomenology hang together. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14.1 (2004) 97-114 [Access article in PDF] Stem Cell Research in the U.S. after the President's Speech of August 2001 Cynthia B. Cohen On 9 August 2001, in a nationally televised speech, President Bush addressed the contentious question of whether to provide federal funds for human embryonic stem cell research (White House 2001).1 This research involves taking the primordial cells found in embryos and (...) transforming them into certain specialized cells, such as those of the heart, nerves, and muscles, with the ultimate goal of transferring these cells into patients to repair damaged cells and tissues. In his remarks, the President authorized funding for research only on stem cells already harvested from remaining embryos at in vitro fertilization (IVF) centers as of 9 August 2001, the date of the speech. In a "Fact Sheet" about embryonic stem cell research, he added the ethical requirements that (1) the donors of embryos gave informed consent to the derivation of stem cells from their embryos, (2) the embryos were created solely for reproductive purposes, and (3) no financial inducements were given to the embryo donors. The President also prohibited federally funded research on embryonic stem cells derived from embryos after 9 August 2001, as well as the creation of embryos for research purposes and the cloning of human embryos for both reproductive and research purposes. He did not seek to ban the pursuit of embryonic stem cell research with private funds. "This allows us to explore the promise and potential of stem-cell research without crossing a fundamental moral line by providing taxpayer funding that would sanction or encourage further destruction of embryos," the President stated (White House 2001).The President's speech stirred intense controversy. Many applauded the new policy because it allowed some embryonic stem cell research to proceed, thereby raising hope that treatments might be developed for those suffering from such conditions as Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, and diabetes. Others supported it on grounds that it would discourage the future destruction of embryos in stem cell research. They maintained that although it was wrong to have derived stem cells from embryos, this wrong was no longer remediable and it therefore was justifiable to allow research using such embryos to proceed. Some, however, objected to the new policy because they held that it unduly limited the [End Page 97] number of embryonic stem cells available for federally funded research. Still others opposed it on grounds that it made the federal government complicit in what they took to be the wrongful destruction of human embryos that had taken place prior to 9 August 2001. The President established the President's Council on Bioethics by executive order in November 2001 and charged it, among other tasks, with monitoring stem cell research and recommending guidelines and regulations for biomedical innovations.Questions about the moral status of human embryos have so captured public attention since the President issued his remarks that other significant ethical and policy issues raised about stem cell research inside the Beltway have remained in the shadows. A number of individuals and organizations—legislators, scientists, patient groups, the President's Council on Bioethics, ethicists, religious task forces, and social commentators—have attempted to bring these other issues to legislative and public attention. They also have revisited the more publicly prominent question of what sorts of protections we owe to human embryos. In response, Congress has attempted to address several of these newly emerging issues at hearings and in legislation. I review these efforts, consider developing issues and arguments, and conclude by exploring possible future directions for federal and private sector stem cell policy. The Availability of Embryonic Stem Cell Lines to Federally Funded Researchers President Bush, in developing his stem cell research policy, accepted a distinction between the "derivation" and the "use" of embryos enunciated by the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services toward the end of the Clinton administration. This distinction was adopted to avoid contravening the Dickey-Wicker Amendment (added... (shrink)

‘Saepe stilum vertas’, says Horace; and he had excellent company in his friend Virgil, who wrote the Aeneid at the rate of only about 900 lines a year, and spent hours in licking his verses into shape. It would have been instructive to sit at the elbow of these two poets, to see what they altered and what they rejected. It is clear, e.g., that there were certain caesural arrangements which Virgil deliberately affected and others which he as deliberately avoided. (...) But what of the care taken by these and other classical authors in arranging sounds in relation to mood or idea? This present incomplete essay is written frankly with scepticism in regard to dogmatic comments on certain particular points. It has been perilously easy to frame legislation on the basis of a predilection bolstered up by one or two instances. Even in the field of syntax we have seen generalizations on too narrow a foundation. An editor of Andocides enunciates ‘a very important principle of the language, which is rigidly observed by the best writers; viz., that, when a participle and a verb of different government are referred to the same object, the case of that object depends on the participle and not at all on the verb… Shilleto's remarks on this point must be excused, as evidently written hastily.’ But a casual cast of the net brings up about a score of violations of this principle from Homer to Menander. Where does the editor propose to draw the line between the respectable and the declassé Greek writers? Aristophanes, though cited in support, is actually flagrantly lawless in the matter; and with him must go not only Homer and Hyperides but Sophocles, Euripides, Menander, Xenophon, Lysias, and Plato, leaving among the élite, as cited by this editor, only Thucydides, Antiphon, and Aeschines; and one is entitled to doubt even their rigid observance of the law until they have actually been brought to court. In problems of rhythm, also, one has to be careful to use evidence as against preconception. When an editor hacks and fits the dactylics of Ennius so as to eradicate all feet beginning with two short syllables, it is as impious as recarving a statue by Daedalus because it does not conform to the canon of Polyclitus; and one may be forgiven if now and then one interprets the editor's corr. in his apparatus criticus not as correxi but as corrupi. (shrink)

Two of the most important topics in the field of medical ethics today are insemination by donor (AID) and in-vitro fertilization. The conclusions of a working party set up by the British Association for the Advancement of Science are embodied in a small book reviewed on pate 108 of this issue, but we feel that more discussion than can be set out in the space allocated to book reviews is justified. Also, this journal in its first number has already devoted (...) a group of papers to the issue of abortion, so the conclusions of the working party and our own comments overlap and we hope illuminate further the problems enunciated. (shrink)

Every Greek scholar knows the celebrated lapsus linguae committed by the tragic actor Hegelochus at the Great Dionysia of 408 B.C., when he faltered in his enunciation of line 279 of Euripides' Orestes and gave the impression to the mirthful audience of having said I am surprised, however, that the commentators on this line have only partially explained the reason for its having seemed exceptonally funny.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.1 (2001) 56-72 [Access article in PDF] Deconstruction and ZionismJacques Derrida's Specters of Marx Christopher Wise No differance without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity without here-now. —Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx Introduction Following Jacques Derrida's first sustained critique of Marx and Marxism in Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (1994), an expanded version of his lectures (...) delivered at the University of California, Riverside, in May 1993, numerous "Marxist" theorists have responded to his provocative (and, for some, "untimely") intervention. Several of these critical responses have been gathered in Michael Sprinker's volume Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's "Specters of Marx" (1999), which includes contributions from such diverse theorists as Pierre Macherey, Antonio Negri, Fredric Jameson, Terry Eagleton, Aijaz Ahmad, and many others. Important omissions from Sprinker's book include Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's "Ghostwriting" (1995), an essay that Derrida nonetheless comments upon in his response "Marx & Sons," or any other feminist analysis of Specters of Marx, a curious absence in a text so riveted by questions of patriarchal affiliation. An even more startling omission from Sprinker's book is any analysis of Derrida's discussion of the Middle East, especially his remarks on the State of Israel and "a certain Jewish [i.e. Zionist] discourse on the Promised Land" [Specters of Marx 60] ("un certain discours juif de la Terre" [Spectres de Marx 104]). The myopic range of Marxist critiques of Specters of Marx is regrettable insofar as both Derrida and his Marxist critics ostensibly offer "radical" or "oppositional" perspectives on George H. W. Bush's New World Order while ignoring imperialist practices in places like Jerusalem, Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. In The End of the Peace Process (2001), Edward W. Said observes, "[w]hen one considers the broad lines of Jewish philosophy from [Martin] Buber to [Emmanuel] Levinas and perceives in it an almost total absence of reflection on the ethical dimensions of the Palestinian issue, one realizes how far one has to go" [208]. Said does not include Derrida in this trajectory of Jewish philosophers, possibly because Derrida has repeatedly disavowed any explicit affiliation with Judaism as religion, but I will argue here that Derrida's disavowal is implausible if not altogether disingenuous. In Ghostly Demarcations, Marxist responses to Derrida reveal how little real progress has been made in Western literary theory since the early 1980s, when now-tired debates about the Yale School echoed in nearly every humanities' corridor in the [End Page 56] United States. There are surely more compelling reasons to read Derrida today than to settle old scores with Ithaca-Irvine varieties of deconstruction. A key goal of this article is to enunciate Derrida's elision of the Palestinian question, not so much to undermine Specters of Marx, but to extend its power by venturing into domains that Derrida himself refuses to explore, a factor that weakens without totally disabling his deconstruction of Marxist theory. 1 The Rhetoric of Alterity In Specters of Marx, Derrida offers a complex, challenging, and virtuostic evaluation of Marx, focusing largely on "The Communist Manifesto" and The German Ideology. In particular, Derrida fixes his attention upon Marx's hostile and allegedly "obsessive" critique of Max Stirner, a rival Hegelian and "egological" anarchist. Derrida's criticisms of Marx turn on questions of spectrality, a suggestive way of describing the process whereby alienated or reified objects project illusory autonomy back upon the human subject. For purposes of the present essay, I draw attention to the rhetorical dimensions of the exchange between Derrida and his Marxist interlocutors, rather than the many subtleties implied by their respective analyses of this "new" concept formation. Such a strategy is useful not only because Derrida himself relies upon it in his essay "Marx & Sons," but also because it reveals key assumptions held by Derrida about deconstruction's political value, especially in the Middle East. Various contributors to Sprinker's volume do an impressive job of analyzing Derrida's critique of spectrality, especially Jameson, Warren Montag... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article proposes an interpretation of the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure and Mikhail Bakhtin that seeks to relate them not through an epistemological point of view, but based on a concept proposed by Henri Meschonnic, according to which one author can be linked to another without an explicit reference to an affiliation between them. The starting point is a comment made by Bakhtin about the translation of François Rabelais’ work into Russian, which Meschonnic cites in his anti-structuralist interpretation (...) of Saussure. Finally, a reflection is made on the relevance of addressing metalinguistic comments that discuss the condition of the speaker, which can be the object of an enunciative-anthropological theorization. (shrink)

It is widely held that the cure for such profound social maladies is within reach. The hopes have foundation. The past few years have seen the fall of brutal tyrannies, the growth of scientific understanding that offers great promise, and many other reasons to look forward to a brighter future. The discourse of the privileged is marked by confidence and triumphalism: the way forward is known, and there is no other. The basic theme, articulated with force and clarity, is that (...) "America's victory in the Cold War was a victory for a set of political and economic principles: democracy and the free market." These principles are "the wave of the future - a future for which America is both the gatekeeper and the model." I am quoting the chief political commentator of the New York Times , but the picture is conventional, widely repeated throughout much of the world, and accepted as generally accurate even by critics. It was also enunciated as the "Clinton Doctrine," which declared that our new mission is to "consolidate the victory of democracy and open markets" that had just been won. There remains a range of disagreement: at one extreme "Wilsonian idealists" urge continued dedication to the traditional mission of benevolence; at the other, "realists" counter that we may lack the means to conduct these crusades of "global meliorism," and should not neglect our own interests in the service of others.[2] Within this range lies the path to a better world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 33.2 (2005) 71-97 [Access article in PDF] The Subject of Religion Lacan and the Ten Commandments Kenneth Reinhard Julia Reinhard Lupton Despite Freud's Nietzschean unmasking of religion as ideology, psychoanalysis has frequently been attacked as itself a religion, a cabal of analyst-priests dedicated to the worship of a dead master. Such critics "do not believe in Freud" in much the same way as atheists "do not believe in (...) God," and their rejections of psychoanalysis in the name of the secular partake in the very structure of religious thought they claim to repudiate. In Seminar XXI: Les non-dupes errent, Lacan comments on the blindness of the atheistic insight concerning religion: "I know that you're not believers, right? But that doesn't mean that you aren't all the more conned... because even if you are not believers, you still believe in that aspiration [for the love of God]. I won't say that you suppose it; rather, it supposes you" [Dec. 18, 1973; our trans.]. In Lacan's analysis, it is not that secular intellectuals suffer from unexamined religious "suppositions" or assumptions, to be swept away through a little ideology-critique or time on the couch. The case is rather, in Lacan's strong formulation, that religious discourse supposes us—supports and underwrites our very structures of being, subjectivity, and social interaction. That is, the secular subject is produced by the religious discourses that precede and continue to speak through it; the challenge for the contemporary critic is not to silence or debunk those discourses, but rather to bring the modern subject to assume responsibility for their enunciation.Throughout the decades of his seminar, Lacan addressed the monotheistic foundations of Western subjectivity as a set of discursive ruptures or cuts which continue to scar and brand the modern subject beyond their secular abrogation. Distinguishing between Freud "the individual with his atheistic profession of faith" and "the Freud who was the first to acknowledge the value and relevance of [the] myth... we call the death of God" [S VII 192–93], Lacan insists that Freud regarded monotheism as an epochal divide that irrevocably altered all that came before and after it: "On the left of this [monotheistic] message, there are some things that are henceforth outdated, obsolete; they no longer hold beyond the manifestation of the message. On the right, things are quite different" [172]. What, in Lacan's analysis, is the difference that monotheism has made, both during its periods of dominance and after? The laws, narratives, and symbols of monotheism continue to undergird key fantasies of personhood, nationhood, and neighborhood in the modernity that purports to have supplanted them. In Lacan's formulation, monotheism "supposes" the subject of these fantasies, precipitating it from out of the expanse of signifiers and in relation to a sublime object of both unbearable enjoyment and social obligation. Moreover, it is the scandal and the gift of monotheism that it not only creates moments of traumatic singularity, but also thinks the singular as trauma, rending the fabric of an animistic nature which would unite every polarity of being in the fullness of a sexual relation. Unlike the gods of Greek philosophy, the monotheistic God is not part of the nature he creates. In its decisive thinking of singularity, monotheism elicits and eludes all rapprochement with philosophical conceptions of the One, whether in the guise of Hellenized Judaism, Pauline theology, or Arab Aristotelianism. Lacan extends the monotheistic project of thinking singularity [End Page 71] by insisting that "there is something of One" [il y a de l'Un]—not the self-identical One of Greek logic, mathematics, and cosmology, but the One of a violent rupture that creates subjects and their worlds around a void, an un that un-does the primacy it speaks.If, from the Lacanian vantage, the singular invention of the God shared by the People of the Book forever separates religion from philosophy, we would also insist that religion is not simply a subset of "culture," understood as the symbolic practices that unify a people... (shrink)

Schubert et Goethe ne sont jamais rencontrés. Leur affinité, pourtant, existe en musique. Cet article en explore les motifs à partir de deux lieder extraits du Faust. Plutôt que de penser cette affinité depuis la musique, je montre que le jeu affinitaire du chant et du poème est déjà présent dans le texte de Goethe. Il s’agit donc de décrire comment Schubert met en musique ce que le poème goethéen fait du lied. C’est en cela que leur affinité est la (...) plus remarquable : poésie et musique se rencontrent à l’endroit même où se pose la question de leur jonction. (shrink)

This manual is designed to provide teaching modules on medical ethics for health care professionals in developing countries. The author acknowledges that, although there are common themes, their medical ethical dilemmas are often quite different from those which occur in developed countries and the approach needs to be somewhat less Western in orientation. Emphasis is properly given to topics such as AIDS/HIV and the status of women and children which create special local problems. Although universal principles of medical ethics are (...) affirmed, care is taken to avoid the trap of imposing “our” views and solutions on “their” situations. As a teaching aid the manual is well constructed, starting with the enunciation of general principles, followed by comment and a series …. (shrink)

This well-written book introduces the reader step by step and in a pedagogical way to an aspect of Lacan's thought: the claim that the unconscious is structured like a language. A number of commentators have already introduced two crucial concepts of Lacan into the American intellectual community: the imaginary and the symbolic. Thus the now standard introduction and companion volume to Lacan's Ecrits: Lacan and Language, by John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, gives in the introduction a good presentation (...) of these two concepts. A brief look at the table of contents of the book by Dor allows us to see that Dor takes a further step in the presentation of Lacan's ideas. The first part, "Linguistics and the formation of the unconscious", is only an expansion of the introduction of the Muller-Richardson book, while the second part, "The paternal metaphor as structuring pivot for subjectivity", goes beyond it. The ideas developed in the second part can be usefully complemented by the chapter on the paternal metaphor in the book by De Waelhens Schizophrenia and by my essay on the paternal metaphor or the one on "Fatherhood and Subjectivity". In these other pieces we do not find a clarification of a Lacanian distinction between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated. We also do not find in these other pieces a clarification of Lacan's famous schema L. Dor clarifies both admirably in this part of the book. (shrink)

À partir de conversations sous forme de tchats qui émanent d’une association qui lutte contre le suicide, nous nous intéresserons plus particulièrement aux conversations dont les appelants reviennent sur la plateforme (que nous nommerons poly appelants). Reprennent-ils leurs dires là où la conversation antérieure s’est arrêtée? Quels sont les éléments nouveaux dans le récit des participants? Comment le récit des appelants progresse-t-il au fil des (re)connections? quel(s) versant(s) de l’histoire personnelle est-il, sont-ils mobilisé(s)?

En What Emotions Really Are y en otros artículos, Griffiths afirma que las clases naturales de los organismos vivos en Biología son cladistas. La afirmación está inmersa en una nueva teoría acerca de las clases naturales. En este trabajo examinaré los argumentos esgrimidos por Griffiths para sostener el estatus privilegiado de las clasificaciones cladistas frente a otras clasificaciones. No se discutirá la teoría de las clases naturales ofrecida, de cuyos méritos no dudo, sino su capacidad para ofrecer una solución en (...) la cuestión particular de qué sistema de clasificación de organismos debería utilizarse en Biología. In What emotions really are and in other papers Griffiths states that in Biology, natural classes ofliving organisms are clades. This assertion is made within the bounds of a new theory of natural classes. In this paper I wiIl consider the arguments employed by Griffiths to support the privileged status of the cladistic classification over other classifications. It is not Griffith's theory of natural classes what will be discussed, but his ability to offer a solution to the particular issue ofwhich classification system of organisms should be used in Biology. (shrink)

The terminal philosopher thinks there must always be beliefs or other posits that are terminal: they can neither be justified nor criticized by inference from anything further. In any context whatever, reason giving must at some point leave off - not for practical reasons, such as lack of time, energy or resources, but in principle. No further argumentative recourse is possible at this level of fundamentality. The terminal matters must therefore be justified or criticized non-inferentially - that is to say, (...) immediately - or not at all. Most terminal philosophers conclude "Not at all," on the ground that there is no such thing as unmediated knowledge, justification or critique. (shrink)