In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective al-lows us to understand argumentation pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than as a method for obtaining the truth—that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.

In the history of thought the relation between the mind and the body has been discussed in terms of various analogies. Plato, for example, examined the analogy of a man and his clothes and of the music of an instrument and the instrument itself; Aristotle advocated the analogy of an instrument's capacity and the instrument itself; Descartes alluded to that of a pilot and his ship; and Ryle derided that of a ghost and a machine.What I wish to discuss, (...) however, are the analogies used by contemporary philosophers to explain their theory that the mind is the brain, that the mind's states, capacities and qualities are the brain's states, capacities and qualities, that our thoughts and our thinking are brain elements and brain movements and that our mental experiences, such as having images or sensations, are brain processes. Various analogies have been advanced to explain the sense in which one of the former is one of the latter. (shrink)

This article highlights a use of analogies in science that so far has received relatively little systematic discussion: providing reasons for pursuing a model or theory. Using the development of the liquid drop model as a test case, I critically assess two extant pursuit worthiness accounts: that analogies justify pursuit by supporting plausibility arguments and that analogies can serve as a guide to potential theoretical unification. Neither of these fit the liquid drop model case. Instead, I develop (...) an alternative account, based on the idea that analogies facilitate the transfer of a well-understood modelling strategy to a new domain. 1Introduction2Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model3Plausibility Accounts 3.1Bartha on plausibility and analogical inference3.2Plausibility and the drop analogy4Analogies as a Guide to Unification5Generative Accounts 5.1Analogy-based modelling strategies5.2Did analogies play a merely generative role?6A New Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies 6.1Transferring understanding-with through analogies6.2Understanding-with and the liquid drop model7Conclusion. (shrink)

Sounds are heard, sometimes even felt, but in most cases they remain unseen. This ephemeral and invisible nature of sound was already considered a problem when the science of acoustics took form in the seventeenth century. The fact that sound could not be seen was described as a significant hindrance to its understanding. But it was precisely during this time that a wide variety of sounds attracted broad scientific attention across Europe. Scholars, natural philosophers, and mathematicians investigated and experimented with (...) sound and musical instruments and developed theories of hearing. This article looks at the role of images, diagrams, and visualization techniques in late seventeenth-century acoustics, bringing together the history of sound and the history of scientific images. Focusing on water and light as the dominant analogies for sound, the article demonstrates that visualization was an important tool for thinking about sound and allowed for the circulation of theories and experiments. At the same time, the epistemic status of these images remained contested, as there was no single model that could explain the different ways sound behaves as it moves through space and that could be visualized. (shrink)

In this philosophical paper, we explore computational and biological analogies to address the fine-tuning problem in cosmology. We first clarify what it means for physical constants or initial conditions to be fine-tuned. We review important distinctions such as the dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we explore how two great analogies, computational and biological, can give new insights into our problem. This paper includes a preliminary study to examine the two (...) analogies. Importantly, analogies are both useful and fundamental cognitive tools, but can also be misused or misinterpreted. The idea that our universe might be modelled as a computational entity is analysed, and we discuss the distinction between physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic information theory. Smolin introduced the theory of "cosmological natural selection" with a biological analogy in mind. We examine an extension of. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to look at the extent and nature of the uses of analogy during the ªrst century following the so-called scientiªc revolution. Using the research tool provided by JSTOR we systematically analyze the uses of “analog” and its cognates (analogies, analogous, etc.) in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London for the period 1665–1780. In addition to giving the possibility of evaluating quantitatively the proportion of papers explicitly using analogies, this approach (...) makes it possible to go beyond the maybe idiosyncratic cases of Descartes, Kepler, Galileo, and other much studied giants of the so-called Scientiªc Revolution. As a result a classiªcation of types of uses is proposed. Relations between types of analogies and research ªelds are also established. In this paper we are less interested in discussing the “real nature” or “essence” or even the cognitive limitations of analogical thinking than in describing its various uses and different meanings as they changed over the course of a century. (shrink)

If you were Monica Lewinski's mother, how would you describe Linda Tripp? Remember that Linda Tripp is the woman who tapped her own phone conversations with Monica and then used them to incriminate President Clinton. Marcia Lewis, Monica's actual mother, chose the following expression: "She is like a meddlesome witch, a praying mantis." This expression conveys a multiple analogy, a comparison in which several sources are likened to a target. In this case, the first source tells us that Marcia thinks (...) of Linda as a disagreeable woman who entices youngsters into her confidence in order to ensnare them for her own purposes, much like the witch who trapped Hansel and Gretel. The second source tells us that Marcia thinks of Linda as a creature that ambushes others out of an inhuman lust for prey. ;This example shows the usefulness of multiple analogies in satisfying certain cognitive goals, such as constructing an adequate explanation of Linda Tripp and her behavior. Multiple analogies have also proven to be very useful in satisfying other kinds of cognitive goals, such as those of philosophers and scientists. However, no cognitive model of multiple analogies has yet been proposed or explored. This dissertation presents an exploration of multiple analogies as found in the literature of evolutionary biology, archaeology, and philosophy with the aim of proposing a cognitive model of this interesting mode of reasoning. This model is based upon the Multiconstraint theory of analogies, which is extended for the purpose, and also contrasted with previous theories of analogy. (shrink)

Cristofano Bertelli’s companion broadsheets, printed in Modena in the 1560s, represent a failed attempt to introduce a new iconographic theme to the Italian print market. Contrary to the vibrant success of transalpine prints representing the Steps of Life with animal analogies, Bertelli’s initiative did not stimulate Italian visual culture to produce the multiple copies, imitations and derivations long enjoyed by this motif in areas north of the Alps. The only other, comparable images to appear in the peninsula in the (...) course of the sixteenth century would seem to be Titian’s allegorical triple portrait, and a pair of large, anonymous woodcuts from the later Cinquecento, possibly made in Venice. The recalcitrance of Counter-Reformation Italy towards this imported topos is difficult to account for, especially when a retail vogue for a similar genre—the multi-vignette moralising broadsheet— was trending in local print markets. There is no direct explanation for the apparent indifference met by Bertelli’s attempt at iconographic innovation. Nonetheless, a cluster of factors relative to print culture and animal lore North and South of the Alps provides indirect but ample evidence to account for the ‘flop’ of Bertelli’s broadsheets. Among these, the Christian visual tradition features prominently, contributing to viewer diffidence towards serial analogies between humans and animals. The market for illustrated books on animals is also considered, as it testifies to a transalpine divide with regard to moralised natural history and, in Italy, an inhospitable cultural climate for the Steps of Life motif. (shrink)

In his famous article “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” Eugen Wigner argues for a unique tie between mathematics and physics, invoking even religious language: “The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve”. The possible existence of such a unique match between mathematics and physics has been extensively discussed by philosophers and historians of mathematics. Whatever the merits (...) of this claim are, a further question can be posed with regard to mathematization in science more generally: What happens when we leave the area of theories and laws of physics and move over to the realm of mathematical modeling in interdisciplinary contexts? Namely, in modeling the phenomena specific to biology or economics, for instance, scientists often use methods that have their origin in physics. How is this kind of mathematical modeling justified? (shrink)

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents (...) a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same. (shrink)

Based on the distinction between global and local levels of visual perception, here we studied different levels of reasoning in visual analogies. Specifically, we created problems that could be solved by inferring relations either between the global shapes (global path) or the underlying objects (object path). The problems varied in the saliency of the global shape, in the colour and familiarity of the objects, and in the presentation of the visual problem (simultaneous or sequential). The results of three studies (...) showed that the global path was used more frequently than the object path, particularly for images with salient global shapes such as objects placed in a circle. However, neither colour nor object familiarity affected the tendency to use the object path. Importantly, the tendency to use the global path correlated with analogical problem-solving in other visual and verbal tasks. Overall, these findings suggest that the global precedence observed in image perception also applies to visual analogical reasoning. Furthermore, the tendency to use the global path can be regarded as an informative measure of individual differences. (shrink)

Presents the latest research on how reasoning with analogies, metaphors, metonymies, and images can facilitate mathematical understanding. For math education, educational psychology, and cognitive science scholars.

Kant deploys analogies from private law in describing relations between states. I explore the relation between these analogies and the broader Kantian idea of the distinctively public nature of a rightful condition, in order to explain why states, understood as public things, stand in horizontal, private legal relations without themselves being private. I use this analysis to explore the international law analogues of the three titles of private right, explaining how territory differs from property, treaty from contract and (...) the specific form of status relations between nations. I conclude with a brief discussion of the ongoing relevance of these horizontal relations. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the kind of inference used in the reconstruction of proto-languages. Hypothesis is at the core of this reconstruction process and this, together with the structure of reasoning involved, indicates abductive reasoning. We analyse abductive reasoning, and specify its nuances and particularities. The novelty we introduce is the importance of context as we focus on a form of abduction that goes beyond the context in which the scientific work is being developed by incorporating (...) contexts from other sciences. Therefore, an intercontextual chain of inference can be part of abductive reasoning processes and the resulting hypothesis remains provisional. Several disciplines, such as archaeology, history and linguistics, play a cognitive role in the reconstruction of proto-languages, thus requiring more than one context. We use the case of the reconstruction of proto-Semitic and the unexpected fact of the Ugarit and Ebla discoveries (plus Amorite names). This sample may shed light on the use of abduction to explain certain scientific practices. (shrink)

Following the experimental discovery of the Higgs boson, physicists explained the discovery to the public by appealing to analogies with condensed matter physics. The historical root of these analogies is the analogies to models of superconductivity that inspired the introduction of spontaneous symmetry breaking into particle physics in the early 1960s. We offer a historical and philosophical analysis of the analogies between the Higgs model of the electroweak interaction and the Ginsburg-Landau and Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer models of superconductivity, (...) respectively. The conclusion of our analysis is that both sets of analogies are purely formal in virtue of the fact that they are accompanied by substantial physical disanalogies. In particular, the formal analogies do not map the temporal, causal, or modal structures of SSB in superconductivity to temporal, causal, or modal structures in the Higgs model. These substantial physical disanalogies mean that analogies to models of superconductivity cannot supply the basis for the physical interpretation of EW SSB; however, an appreciation of the contrast between the physical interpretations of SSB in superconductivity and the Higgs model does help to clarify some foundational issues. Unlike SSB in superconductivity, SSB in the Higgs sector of the Standard Model is neither a temporal nor a causal process. We discuss the implications for the `eating' metaphor for mass gain in the Higgs model. Furthermore, the distinction between the phenomenological GL model and the dynamical BCS model does not carry over to EW models, which clarifies the desiderata for so-called `dynamical' models of EW SSB. Finally, the development of the Higgs model is an illuminating case study for philosophers of science because it illustrates how purely formal analogies can play a fruitful heuristic role in physics. (shrink)

By what right do sovereign states prohibit migrants from entering their territories? It cannot be assumed that they do, certainly not as a matter of the way we define “sovereignty.” Can the sovereign right to exclude immigrants be derived from the sovereign’s status as owner of the territory it controls? This Article shows that the idea of the sovereign as owner is too problematic to be the basis of any argument for the right to exclude. It also argues against the (...) proposition that communities, considered as informal sovereigns, have a right to exclude based on their communal property in the land they inhabit. In both cases, an “ownership conception” is distinguished from a more attractive “responsibility conception” of sovereignty. The former remains unclear, while the latter leaves open the question of who the sovereign is responsible for. (shrink)

Thoreau believed that we can learn how to live by observing nature, a view that appeals to modem environmentalists. This doctrine is exemplified in Thoreau’s use of insect analogies to illustrate how humans, like butterflies, can be transformed from the “larval” stage, which relates to the physical world through consumption, to a “perfect” state in which consumption is less important, and in which freedom and contemplation are the ends of life. This transformational idea rests upon a theory of dynamic (...) dualism in which the animal and the spiritual self remain in tension, but in which the “maturity” of the individual-transcendence of economic demands as imposed by society-emerges through personal growth based on observation of nature. Thoreau’s dynamic theory of value, and its attractiveness to environmentalists, explains why environmentalists reject the mainstream, neoclassical economic paradigm. This paradigm accepts consumer preferences as “givens” and treats these preferences as thesource of all value in their model. Because Thoreau insists that there is value in transformations from one preference set to another, the neoclassical paradigm cannot capture this central value, and cannot account for the environmentalists’ emphasis on public “education” to reduce consunlptive demands of humans on their environment. (shrink)

An application and confirmation of the thesis of my book, "Kant's Model of the Mind", that, for Kant, space and time exist only in and for imagination, and the given of sense is atemporal and aspatial (=transcendental idealism). On previous interpretations of transcendental idealism, appearances already have temporal and spatial existence; on mine, they lack such existence, and the purpose of the Analogies is to show how they originally acquire it. Existence in space and time is constituted by a (...) priori principles of necessary connection (the Analogies), whose validity with respect to appearances is grounded on the demand for original apperception (i.e., a synthetic unitary sensibility). The implications vis-à-vis Kant's metaphysics of nature and his Euclideanism are then explored. (shrink)

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question (...) of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions. (shrink)

Research in general, and research on friendship in particular, uses metaphors and analogies, and research itself can be seen in analogy with map making. This chapter takes us on a meandering walk along mono- and multidisciplinary inquiries into friendship as seen from many perspectives, like that of history and philosophy of science (that has analogical modelling as a canonical style of reasoning) and semiotics, to reflect on the uses of metaphor and analogy. Semiotics as founded by C. S. Peirce (...) is the science of representations, how representational devises relate to their objects and how the meaning generated depends upon context and interpretation. Metaphor and analogy are such representational tools, at once cognitive and common as we all use them to think with, but also specialized within the sciences and humanities where they can be used in effective and misleading ways. It is shown how the general map analogy can be semiotically analysed as a diagram and how its general form can be applied to the aspects of friendship that concern the friends’ knowledge of Self and Other. We not only think, but also do things with metaphors, such as transforming a friend into some kin, or vice versa. (shrink)

In this response paper, we respond to the criticisms that Michal Pruski raised against our article “Beyond Money: Conscientious Objection in Medicine as a Conflict of Interests.” We defend our original position against conscientious objection in healthcare by suggesting that the analogies Pruski uses to criticize our paper miss the relevant point and that some of the analogies he uses and the implications he draws are misplaced.

In order to show how formal analogies between different physical systems play an important conceptual work in physics, this paper analyzes the evolution of Einstein’s thoughts on the structure of radiation from the point of view of the formal analogies he used as “lenses” to “see” through the “black box” of Planck’s blackbody radiation law. A comparison is also made with his 1925 paper on the quantum gas where he used the same formal methods. Changes of formal points (...) of view are most of the time taken for granted or passed over in silence in studies on the mathematization of physics as if they had no special significance. Revisiting Einstein’s classic papers on the nature of light and matter from the angle of the various theoretical tools he used, namely entropy and energy fluctuation calculations, helps explain why he was in a unique position to make visible the particle structure of radiation and the dual nature of light and matter. Finally, this case study calls attention to the more general question of the surprising creative power of formal analogies and their frequent use in theoretical physics. This aspect of intellectual creation can be useful in the teaching of physics. (shrink)

The Higgs model was developed using purely formal analogies to models of superconductivity. This is in contrast to historical case studies such as the development of electromagnetism, which employed physical analogies. As a result, quantum case studies such as the development of the Higgs model carry new lessons for the scientific realism--anti-realism debate. I argue that, by breaking the connection between success and approximate truth, the use of purely formal analogies is a counterexample to two prominent versions (...) of the 'No Miracles' Argument for scientific realism, Psillos' refined explanationist defence of realism and the Argument from History of Science for structural realism. The NMA is undermined, but the success of the Higgs model is not miraculous because there is a naturalistically acceptable explanation for its success that does not invoke approximate truth. I also suggest some possible strategies for adapting to the counterexample for scientific realists who wish to hold on to the NMA in some form. (shrink)

This article is a theoretical study of the relations between logic and Anglo-American cognitive science. It uses temporal, historical, and intentional evidence, and it is based on two consequential assumptions: (a) between the late 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, some logical systems attempted to explain the foundations of mathematics and (b) since the 1940s and 1950s, these same systems became implicit sources of contents and methods of the rising Cognitivism. This study produces an important conclusion: (...) Anglo-American cognitive science partly derives from logic and partly shares many similarities with this science. (shrink)

Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to (...) new domains. While the first is plausible for some cases, only the second can account for the liquid drop case study. (shrink)

L'auteur étudie le cas des analogies de l'expérience à la lumière de la thèse selon laquelle la Critique de la Raison Pure fonctionne selon une double modalité (du moins en ce qui concerne l'Esthétique et l'Analytique) : d'tune part comme élaboration des conditions générales d'une ontologie de l'étant (problème de la compétence du discours rationnel); d' autre part comme discours fondateur des mathématiques (Esthétique) et de la physique (Analytique). L'auteur présente l'exposé transcendantal des analogies, en donne une interprétation (...) épistémologique et en formule la transcription scientifique. The author studies the case of the analogies of experience, basing himself upon the thesis according to which, the Critique of Pure Reason works refetring itself to a double modality (at least as far as transcendantal Aesthetic and Analytic are concerned) : on one hand, it works as an élaboration of the general conditions of an ontology of the being (under the form of a problem of the competence of the rational discourse), on the other hand as the fundamental and founding discourse of mathematics (Aesthetic) and physics (Analytic). The author presents the transcendantal argument of analogies, provides it with an epistemologica! interpretation and formulates its scientific transcription. (shrink)

This paper analyzes community ecologist Charles Elton’s ideas on animal communities, and situates them with respect to the classical opposition between organicist–holistic and individualistic–reductionist ecological views drawn by many historians of ecology. It is argued that Elton espoused a moderate ecological holism, which drew a middle way between the stricter ecological holism advocated by organicist ecologists and the merely aggregationist views advocated by some of their opponents. It is also argued that Elton’s moderate ecological holism resonated with his preference for (...) analogies between ecological communities and human societies over more common ones between communities and individual organisms. I discuss, on the one hand, how the functionalist-interactionist approach to community ecology introduced by Elton entailed a view of ecological communities as more or less self-maintaining functionally organized wholes, and how his ideas on this matter were incorporated into their views by organicist ecologists Frederic Clements, Victor Shelford, and Warder C. Allee et al. On the other hand, I identify some important divergences between Elton’s ecological ideas and those of organicist ecologists. Specifically, I show how Elton’s ideas on species distribution, animal migrations, and ecological succession entailed a view of animal communities as exhibiting a weaker degree of part-whole integration than that attributed to them by Clements and Shelford; and how Elton’s mixed stance on the balance of nature idea and his associated views on community stability attributed to communities a weaker form of self-regulation than that attributed to them by Allee et al. (shrink)