Donald Trump’s victory depended on the defection of hundreds of longstanding Democratic communities. Trump appealed to these communities partly because he behaves like some of their most beloved politicians. Like the president, these politicians are brazen, thin skinned, nepotistic, and offer an older, boss-centered vision of politics. Trump—the anti-establishment outsider—appealed to voters in these communities because he resembles the local insiders. This appeal widens an old fault line inside the Democratic Party.

The continuing ramifications of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 have forced social scientists to raise fundamental questions about the relationship between capitalism, democracy and inequality. In particular, Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Wolfgang Streeck’s Buying Time focus on, respectively, the economic and the political contradictions of capitalistic societies. Piketty argues that capitalism naturally tends towards the exacerbation of rent-based wealth inequality, whereas Streeck suggests that capitalism and democracy are ultimately incompatible. A striking feature of these two contributions is that their authors (...) are social democrats, not Marxists or radical anti-capitalist thinkers. In this review article, I illustrate how the combination of social democratic convictions and the acknowledgment that capitalism cannot be tamed generates interesting tensions between the diagnosis offered by the two monographs and the solutions that are proposed. I end the piece by raising two remarks on the implications that this tension might have for normative political theory. On the one hand, it is time for theory to do more work on political action and agency. On the other, liberal egalitarian theorists might have to acknowledge that they are in the same predicament as Piketty and Streeck: social democracy is their ideal, yet it is perhaps unattainable. If this is the case, liberal egalitarians might be committed to adopt a more confrontational attitude towards capitalism: they might have to become reluctant radicals. (shrink)

Over the last few years, events in countries like Algeria, whose free democratic elections were cancelled by army officers to prevent a probable Islamic fundamentalist victory, have drawn attention to a number of issues that are in urgent need of consideration. Apart from the fact that the political reverberations of the Algerian incident are still being felt throughout the region, the fact that it happened helped to focus attention on a thorny problem for democrats everywhere. Many people have found (...) themselves plunged into a dreadful dilemma -- torn between their liberal democratic principles on the one hand, and the immediate and practical threats of oppression and the withholding of human rights on the other. To add to their anguish, the Algerian incident has been taken by certain Islamic fundamentalists to provide justification for their claim that democracy is little more than a tool of cynical Western capitalists. (shrink)

A decade has passed since the breaking out of the ‘Arabic Spring’ revolutionary phenomena all over the Arab World’s societies. Many challenging and radically intriguing developments and ramifications have eventuated out of that era and led the Arab World’s context into unchartered territories of existence and self-understanding. This essay pauses at one of the particular challenges that faces this Sitz im Leben, namely the question of identity-formation and self-perception processes. It argues that the Arab states do manifest in their political (...) and statehood situations a political situation of democracy that is run by ‘non-democrats’. The essay then suggests that this democracy of non-democrats is the outcome of the prevalence of an identity-formation and self-perception rationales that are rooted in crudely religious Weltanschauung that, far from maintaining distinction and particularity individually and communally, turns alterity into a self-otherizing dogma expressive of contrariety and stark divisive and discriminative relatedness to the other. The essay, finally, suggests that liberating the identity-formation process from the dogmatic attempt at turning religion into ‘identity’ per se is the first required step towards a more cross-pollinating and symbiotic relationality between the different persons and groups who live in that context. (shrink)

An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral problem of authority. For some, (...) authority has legitimacy in a deliberative democracy because deference to its rules better meets the demands of freedom and rationality. As I hope to show here, this line of thought does not give an adequate account of authority. If a directive is legitimate only if it has a certain content, as deliberative democrats are saying, one does not defer to but rather merely complies with such a directive. (shrink)

La teoría democrática rara vez se ajusta a las prácticas democráticas y las fluctuaciones de la opinión pública rara vez coincide con la cobertura de ese mismo actor político en los medios de comunicación. En septiembre de 2010, el partido anti-inmigración sueco, los Sweden Democrats (SD), superaron el límite electoral necesario para participar en el parlamento de Suecia y su popularidad no ha cesado de crecer. En este artículo, analizamos el efecto que tiene la exposición mediática en las fluctuaciones (...) de las encuestas de opinión sobre los partidos políticos, o el llamado efecto mediático. Nuestros resultados muestran que el efecto mediático es más intenso en el caso del SD que en el de otros partidos parlamentarios. La exposición mediática repercute en ocasiones, pero no en el mismo grado ni necesariamente en el mismo momento. (shrink)

If people vote rationally for their economic interests, one would expect Democrats to be perennial favorites among working poor and middle class, and especially so in this year of economic downturn. Why then does polling show the election a tossup? A culture's moral compass is not an innate or logical determination, but an underdetermined product of historical contingency and willful choice. Belief in moral "rightness" or "truth" is always a matter of faith rather than reason. Only some professional philosophers, (...) jurists, scientists and academics believe that the principal point of political argument is, or ought to be, truth rather than persuasion, and that an argument's principal appeal should be reason rather than passion. The fundamental social constituent of economic and political culture in the United States was neither the individual nor the state, but the sectarian community. The religious community in the USA was a civic as well as moral community, a combination which infused American economic and political culture with particular dynamism. As Darwin noted, in competition between groups with similar levels of technology and population size, those groups will tend to win out that favor and transmit willingness to sacrifice some self interest for group interests. Religions with morally concerned deities arguably made the rise of civilization and large-scale cooperation between genetic strangers possible. (shrink)

By analysing the policies and ideas of German social democracy, the British Labour Party and the Italian Communist Party, this article explores their attitude towards science and their imagination of the future in the 1950s. Deeply different, social democrats and communists shared a positivist attitude in favour of scientific progress and high modernity. This painted their attitude towards the space race, peaceful nuclear power and automation. Science was conceived as a neutral power to be supported, but it required political (...) guidance to harness it and turned it into social progress. Thus, their disagreement was over the political implications for capitalist societies experiencing growing prosperity. Science was also a powerful rhetorical argument to castigate the conservatives for failing the nation and allowing it to decline and fall behind its competitors. The article combines comparison and transnational history, innovating the latter by introducing the concepts of horizontal, vertical and antagonistic transnationalism. (shrink)

Goal – The great depression forced changes in the economic program of the Christian Democracy. Indicating the exceptional role of the Upper Silesian heavy industry in the economic potential of the Second Polish Republic, the program emerged from the criticism of the Sanation program of surviving the crisis. Research method – The study analyzes archival sources and literature on the subject, as well as statistical data. Results – In the years of the great depression, official state authorities, as well as (...) individual political groups formulated their own programs for overcoming the economic difficulties that were faced. Christian Democracy was one of these groups, but its program to combat the crisis was limited only to ad hoc measures aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the crisis. The activists of the Silesian Christian Democrats did not properly interpret the sources of economic difficulties, as they did not understand the core of the problem. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Militant democracy calls for pre-emptive measures against political actors who use democratic institutions to undermine or outright abolish a democratic political system. Born in the context of interwar fascism, militant democracy has recently been revived by political and legal theorists concerned about the rise of authoritarian right-wing populists. A long-standing charge against militant democracy—also articulated with renewed force in our era—is that, as a top-down way to deal with the intolerant, militant democracy is inherently elitist and bears uncomfortable similarities (...) with technocracy. But while it is true that militant democracy relies on state institutions to preserve democracy, it by no means excludes citizen engagement: “courts or the people” is a false choice. On the other hand, citizens engaged in militant democracy must take on the difficult task of distinguishing very clearly between democratic essentials under threat and political questions about which citizens might reasonably disagree. While citizen assemblies are not the answer to all of contemporary democracies’ travails, they might be very helpful in clarifying such distinctions for wide audiences. (shrink)

The reasoning of Duarte et al. hinges on the basic premise that a positive ratio of Democrats versus Republicans implies a political bias. However, when placed in a global and historical context, it is evident that U.S. Democrats currently represent a moderate position on the political left–right spectrum. Thus, Duarte et al. provide no evidence of a leftward bias in the scientific community.

This paper answers the title question, “Yes,” on both counts. The first part of the paper argues that modern liberals are socialists, and the second part argues that they are also social democrats. The main idea behind the first argument is that the state has effectively taken control of the incidents of ownership through its taxation, spending, and regulatory policies. The main idea behind the second argument is that the institutions of social democracy are replicated by the institutions favored (...) by modern American liberalism. Specifically, the takeover of the American healthcare system, Social Security, employers' mandatory contributions to unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation insurance replicate the institutions of social democracy. (shrink)

Property-owning democracies combine the regulative and redistributive functions of the welfare state with the governmental aim of ensuring that wealth and capital are widely dispersed. John Rawls, political philosophy’s most famous property-owning democrat, argued that property-owning democracy was one of two regime types that best realized his two principles of justice, though he was notoriously vague about how a property-owning democracy’s institutions are meant to realize his principles. To compensate for this deficiency, a number of Rawlsian political philosophers have tried (...) to add institutional and policy content to the idea. While their efforts have advanced the discussion, few have criticized the soundness of these attempts. This article attempts to fill the void. I claim that, in comparison to welfare-state capitalism, property-owning democracy is both prohibitively impractical and unjust on Rawlsian grounds. I first argue that property-owning democracy is economically ineffective. Even granting the assumptions of Rawlsian ideal theory, property-owning democracies generate bad incentives and face severe information problems in comparison to more market-friendly welfare states. Further, in nonideal theory the motivations of political officials and citizens will likely be corrupted by the temptation to abuse the awesome state power at their disposal. Second, I argue that property-owning democracy is unjust relative to welfare-state capitalism. The three principles used to defend property-owning democracy—the difference principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the “political liberty” proviso—do not vindicate property-owning democracy and may even prohibit it. Welfare-state capitalism does much better. (shrink)

The prevailing historiographic reconstruction of the political struggle in Athens during the last years of the fifth century originates from the discovery of the text of the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia [Ath.]. According to this reconstruction, three political options and three political programmes were in effect. These were, on the one hand, traditional democracy and opposing oligarchy; on the other, a new third way, that of ‘the moderates’, who under the leading of Theramenes represents a solution to the stasis. The political (...) program of themoderates is supposed to include the following fundamental items: a return to an ancient constitution, the reduction of the number of citizens and their political rights, the sovereignty of law, and the recuperation of accord between citizens. This paper tries to highlight the weakness of this interpretation by analysing the difficulties in grasping from the sources this whole program and their adscription to a leader and to a distinctive political group. The misinterpretation was already implicit in the author of the Athenian Constitution, perhaps a disciple of Aristotle. He wrote influenced by the Aristotelian political theory and thereby he interpreted all that he had read about Theramenes, the Five Thousand and the patrios politeia as if the Aristotelian ideals of the mesotes and of mese politeia were actually proposed and temporally achieved in Athens by the efforts of Theramenes and his supporters. (shrink)

After a decades-long debate on the compatibility between Confucianism and human rights, Confucian political theorists now seem to generally agree that the fallback theory of rights provides an account of human rights acceptable to both sides of the debate. Interestingly, some Confucian political meritocrats make a distinction between non-political human rights and political rights, and argue that while the former are subject to the fallback theory of rights, the latter are subject to the so-called “service conception” of rights, which authorizes (...) political hierarchy among citizens. After identifying the irresolvable tension between the fallback theory of rights and the service conception of political rights as a critical threat to Confucian political meritocracy’s internal stability, this article suggests that Confucian political meritocracy can overcome the instability problem only by taking seriously the political implications of the fallback theory of rights, which entails the endorsement of the right to political participation. (shrink)

The Ukrainian Democratic-Radical Party was formed as a result of the unification of the Ukrainian Democratic and Ukrainian radical party in 1905. Regarding religious affairs, the UDRP program required the separation of the Church from the state and the election of the clergy that was traditional for Ukraine. The party's foundations were local communities that existed autonomously and often raised and resolved on their own. In January, 1905, the Odessa community asked the Russian government to ensure the freedom to use (...) the Ukrainian language in the church. (shrink)

This article examines the puzzling phenomenon that many Chinese liberal intellectuals fervently idolize Donald Trump and embrace the alt-right ideologies he epitomizes. Rejecting ‘pure tactic’ and ‘neoliberal affinity’ explanations, it argues that the Trumpian metamorphosis of Chinese liberal intellectuals is precipitated by their ‘beacon complex’, which has ‘political’ and ‘civilizational’ components. Political beaconism grows from the traumatizing lived experience of Maoist totalitarianism, sanitizes the West and particularly the United States as politically near-perfect, and gives rise to both a neoliberal (...) affinity and a latent hostility toward baizuo. Civilizational beaconism, sharing with its nationalistic counterpart -- civilizational vindicativism -- the heritages of scientific racism and social Darwinism imported in late-Qing, renders the Chinese liberal intelligentsia receptive to anti-immigrant and Islamophobic paranoia, exacerbates its anti-baizuo sentiments, and catalyzes its Trumpian convergence with Chinese non-liberals. (shrink)

The 2010s were not an easy decade for liberalism. Kicked off the by 2008 credit crash, the decennium liquidated classical parties across Europe and emancipated technocrats across the world, culmina...