"""This book neither wants to make an accusation, nor impose things that are impossible to carry out. It merely wants to make the Balinese and tourists aware of what is happening in this paradise on earth and about the positive infl uence they can have in preserving the culture of the beautiful island of Bali. Tri Hita Karana, the spirit of Bali originated from the rich Balinese-Hindu philosophy. Tri Hita Karana means three causes of happiness: (...) balanced and harmonious relationships of humans with God; of humans with fellow human beings; and of humans with the surrounding nature. Respect and togetherness are essential values in this philosophy. The Hindu doctrine of tat tvam asi, “I am you and you are me”, teaches us that all things are connected. Humans who do not respect God, fellow humans and nature are not respecting themselves, and this will eventually lead to self-destruction. Respect and togetherness will lead to harmony and happiness. Since the Balinese are already living according to the age-old philosophy of Tri Hita Karana, they can contribute to a sustainable environment for their children. The past and the present cannot be separated from each other; the present is born out of the past. Our actions to create a sustainable environment today matter, or in Gandhi’s words: the future depends on what we do today. The authors, Jan Hendrik Peters, a former professor of service studies and Wisnu Wardana, chief-editor of Bali Travel Newspaper, are deeply concerned about the negative infl uences of mass tourism and want to plead for a sustainable future for Bali, by writing this book. “We really do need this book on Bali to make the Balinese people and the international tourists familiar with the essence of Hinduism. If the Balinese follow the philosophy of Tri Hita Karana as a guide in their personal life and business, it means that Bali will be the Island of the Gods forever.” - Ida Pedanda Subali Tianyar, Hindu high priest, Chairman of the Council of Hindu Priests in Indonesia.""". (shrink)

Tri Hita Karana is a traditional Balinese philosophy that emphasizes the importance of balance in the relationships between humans and God, humans and others, and humans and the natural environment. Although this principle underpins many aspects of life, its application in architectural and urban planning often faces various challenges. This research identifies the gap between traditional principles and the demands of modern development. A qualitative case study approach was used in Kedonganan Traditional Village, Kuta, Bali, employing in-depth (...) interviews and direct observation methods. The results of the study show that the people of Kedonganan Traditional Village still uphold customs and cultural traditions, which are implemented in various aspects of daily life, including religious activities, mutual cooperation, and environmental management. Collaboration between the government and traditional communities has proven effective in maintaining ecological, social, and spiritual balance. Additionally, the findings indicate that cultural, architectural and landscape elements remain relevant and functional in community life. The implications of this research highlight the importance of integrating Tri Hita Karana values into development policies to achieve sustainable balance. (shrink)

On business ethics practiced by the Balinese in accordance with their traditional knowledge.

The present volume, comprising ninteen articles by renowned scholars, is divided into three sections, namely, Buddhist Jaina and Hindu Philsosphical Researches.

Publicado por primera vez en 1982 y merecedor del Premio Nacional de Ensayo en 1983, Lo bello y lo siniestro es un texto imprescindible para comprender la historia de las ideas estéticas y de la teoría del arte. Mediante el análisis de obras diversas -desde las pinturas renacentistas de Sandro Botticelli hasta la célebre película Vertigo de Alfred Hitchcock- el genial filósofo valora la evolución histórica de dos categorías estéticas opuestas, lo bello y lo siniestro, para descubrir lo que ambas (...) tienen de sublime. Eugenio Trías persigue y consigue incansablemente para ofrecer al lector uno de los ensayos más descollantes de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

In this paper, we draw on Alfred Schutz’s theoretical framework to better understand how oppression is enacted through discriminatory acts. By closely examining the role of typifications and relevances in our experience of others, and by supplementing this analysis with contemporary social scientific resources, we argue that a Schutzian perspective on oppression yields important phenomenological insights. We do this in three key steps. Firstly, we contextualise _Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World_ within Schutz’s broader body of work, (...) elucidating his central conditions of discrimination. Secondly, we highlight the limitations of Schutz’s account, in how it fails to capture more peripheral, subtle, and implicit oppressive practices. Finally, we introduce two underexplored insights derived from Schutz’s framework: the role of relevances in understanding the motivational underpinnings of implicit biases, and the connection between self-typification and stereotype threat. With this multidimensional approach, we hope to enhance our understanding of oppression whilst bridging gaps in Schutz’s original conceptualization. (shrink)

Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural “we.” In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the “we” are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part (...) of a “we” compared to an experience of being part of an “us.” To have a “we-experience” there must be a plurality of (unified) subjects sharing in an experience together such that the experience has the phenomenal character of being ours. An “us-experience,” on the other hand, requires the experiential salience of an external “Third” in a way that is constitutively significant. Drawing on Sartrean social ontology, I argue that the “us” is distinct from the “we” on three levels, all of which pertain to the constitutive and unifying role of the Third. I then outline two forms of us-experiences: (1) the experience of being grouped and (2) the experience of apprehending one's seriality. (shrink)

Contributed seminar papers on concept of knowledge in Indian philosophy organised by Poornprajna Samshodhana Mandirm, Bangalore in March 2010.

In recent years, misogyny has become a central concept in philosophy as well as an established concept in public discourse and political policy. But where is misogyny’s supposed counterpart, namely, misandry? In this paper I argue for an ameliorative analysis of "misandry", arguing that it can be reformulated in an effort to reclaim it from its misogynistic weaponisation. The term "misandry" is used almost exclusively as a misogynistic rhetorical device for attributing unjust anger, hatred, or other similar emotions to (...) a speaker, thereby undermining their epistemic authority. Rather than dismissing the term as conceptually flawed and politically problematic, I argue that we ought to ameliorate misandry to instead refer to a felt anger, hostility, or fear toward the patriarchal social order and its valorisation and/or expression in misogynistic and machismo behaviour. To support these claims, I begin with a discussion of Kate Manne's analysis of misogyny before reflecting on how this can inform our understanding of misandry. I then demonstrate the various ways in which misandry is rhetorically deployed as a means of silencing speakers that express dissent against the patriarchy. Following this, I argue that we should ameliorate the term, not only to undermine these misogynistic practices, but also to articulate a legitimate affective and reactive attitude against the patriarchal imposition of a hierarchical gender binary. (shrink)

Analyzing the reasons why we fail to grasp genuinely first principles, this book gives a new perspective on how to understand the meaning of the radical aporetism in the treatise on the first principles written by Neoplatonic philosopher Damaskios. - Analysant les raisons de nos échecs à dire, connaître et concevoir authentiquement les principes premiers, ce livre offre une compréhension nouvelle du sens et du rôle de l’aporétique radicale du traité des Principes Premiers du néoplatonicien Damaskios.

In this paper, my aim is to develop a phenomenological understanding of discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator. Since early existential phenomenology, the phenomenon of discrimination has received a great deal of attention. While much of this work has focused on the experience of the discriminatee, recent scholarship has begun to reflect on the intentional structures on the side of the discriminator. In a contribution to this trend, I argue that our sense of what is (ab)normal plays a constitutively (...) significant role in the reiteration and reinforcement of harmful discriminatory practices. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's distinction between two forms of normality, namely, concordance-normality [Einstimmigkeit] and optimal-normality [Optimalität], is an important tool for illuminating otherwise overlooked aspects of the discriminator's experience. I achieve this by demonstrating how these two notions of normality play distinct constitutive roles when comparing deliberate acts of discrimination committed with malintent, compared with more primordial, habitual, and prereflective expectations which are already discriminatory in nucleo. I argue that at the heart of discriminatory practices there is a naïve, normalizing attempt to stabilize concordance at the expense of critical self-reflection, normative revisions, and enriched horizons of expectation. In doing so, this paper provides a novel and important contribution to philosophical discussions surrounding discrimination. (shrink)

Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural 'we'. In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the 'we' are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part (...) of a 'we' compared to an experience of being part of an 'us'. To have a 'we-experience' there must be a plurality of (unified) subjects sharing in an experience together such that the experience has the phenomenal character of being ours. An 'us-experience', on the other hand, requires the experiential salience of an external 'Third' in a way which is constitutively significant. Drawing on Sartrean social ontology, I argue that the 'us' is distinct from the 'we' on three levels, all of which pertain to the constitutive and unifying role of the Third. I then outline two forms of us-experiences: (1) the experience of being grouped and (2) the experience of apprehending one's seriality. (shrink)

Background Achieving meaningful consent can be challenging, particularly in contexts of diminished literacy, yet is a vital part of participant protection in global health research. Method We explored the challenges and potential solutions of achieving meaningful consent through a qualitative study in a predominantly hill tribe ethnic minority population in northern Thailand, a culturally distinctive population with low literacy. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 37 respondents who had participated in scrub typhus clinical research, their family members, researchers and other key (...) informants. A thematic analysis was conducted. Results Our analysis identified four interrelated themes surrounding participants’ ability to give consent: varying degrees of research understanding, limitations of using informal translators, issues impacting decisions to join research, and voluntariness of consent. Suggestions for achieving more meaningful consent included the use of formal translators and community engagement with research populations. Conclusions Participant’s agency in decision making to join research should be supported, but research information needs to be communicated to potential participants in a way that they can understand. We found that improved understanding about the study and its potential benefits and harms goes beyond literacy or translation and requires attention to social and cultural factors. (shrink)

Lives and work of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedantadesika), 1268-1369, and Maṇavāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, Vaishnavite leaders and exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy from Tamil Nadu.

Within the context of a critique of volitionism, Trying Without Willing articulates a new philosophy of the mind and its role in intentional action, based on the notion of de re intentionality. This book will be of interest to anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mind, the nature of intentional action and mental causation, or the influence of Cartesianism in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Working in academia is challenging, even more so for those with limited resources and opportunities. Researchers around the world do not have equal working conditions. The paper presents the structure, operation method, and conceptual framework of the SM3D Portal's community coaching method, which is built to help Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and researchers in low-resource settings overcome the obstacle of inequality and start their career progress. The community coaching method is envisioned by three science philosophies (cost-effectiveness, transparency spirit, and proactive (...) attitude) and established and operated based on the Serendipity-Mindsponge-3D knowledge (SM3D) management framework (i.e., mindsponge thinking and Bayesian Mindsponge Framework analytics serve as the coaching program's foundational theory and analytical tools). The coaching method also embraces Open Science's values for lowering the cost of doing science and encouraging the trainees to be transparent, which is expected to facilitate the self-correcting mechanism of science through open data, open review, and open dialogue. Throughout the training process, members are central beneficiaries by gaining research knowledge and skills, acquiring publication as the training's product, and shifting their mindsets from “I can't do it” to “I can do it,” and at the same time transforming a mentee to be ready for a future mentor's role. The coaching method is thus one of the members, for the member, by the members. -/- • The paper provides the structure, operation method, and conceptual framework of the SM3D Portal's community coaching method, which is built to help Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and researchers in low-resource settings overcome the obstacle of inequality and start their career progress. • The paper presents three major science philosophies envisioning the establishment and operation of scholarly community coaching. • The paper employs the mindsponge theory and BMF analytics to construct a conceptual framework explaining how an environment is created to help shift members’ mindsets from “I can't do it” to “I can do it.”. (shrink)

This research aims to describe and analyze Ibn Taymiyyah’s philosophical-constructive critique of Ibn ‘Arabī’s waḥdat al-wujūd thought. The method used in this research is descriptive-analytical. The primary data used in this research are the works of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn ‘Arabī. Meanwhile, secondary data in this research are books, journal articles, and other websites that discuss the thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn ‘Arabī. The research results show that Ibn Taymiyyah rejected thinking of waḥdat al-wujūd, because of his understanding of (...) the doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd This is different from the understanding of Ibn ‘Arabī and his followers. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, waḥdat al-wujūd is the equating of God with nature. In modern terms synonymous with pantheism. Ibn Taymiyyah said those who adhere to waḥdat al-wujūd say that existence is one, and wajib al-wujūd what God has is the same as possible waḥdat al-wujūd that a creature has. Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticism emerged because he only saw aspects of tashabbuh (equation of God with his creatures) from understanding waḥdat al-wujūd, and did not see aspects of tanzīh (purification of God from the likeness of his creatures) from the same understanding. These two aspects are combined into one in the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabī. Even according to Ibn Taymiyyah, the understanding that considers God’s existence to be united with the existence of His creatures is a form of disbelief for God, a form of disbelief and shirk in Him. (shrink)

Maybe God doesn’t have to do anything in order to bring it about that there be light. Most of us, however, have to perform some sort of act like flicking a switch to do so. But some of the things we bring about do not require such mediating acts. For example, it appears that I don’t have to do anything in order to bring about or cause the arm movements I perform in flicking the switch. I just move my arm. (...) Of course, a number of things will happen when I move my arm: neurons fire, muscles flex. But these are not acts in and of themselves. The only act we have here is the moving of the arm. So my arm movement in this instance is basic in a sense in which my illumination of the room is not. (shrink)

How is it that false statements, such as “horses have eight legs”, can be just as meaningful as true statements, such as “horses have four legs”? Where does logical structure come from? We can describe what the world would be like if the laws of physics were different – could we do the same for the laws of logic? Are there facts about ethics? If we ever managed to answer the philosophical questions that humans have pondered for thousands of years, (...) what would life look like on the other side? -/- All of these questions and more are addressed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus…which was first published 100 years ago. (shrink)

The implications of this example for the philosophy of action are, of course, important: at the very least, it casts serious doubt on the often heard view that the notion of volition is a mere invention of philosophers, having no use outside philosophical contexts. It is, then, worthy of study. But many recent philosophers have paid practically no attention to actual cases of paralysis. Instead, they have preferred to deal a priori with the possibility of a paralytic trying to (...) perform a bodily movement, and to deal with it in such a way that the occurrence of acts of volition, to which they have theoretical objections, need not be admitted in the theory of action. I have undertaken a theoretical defense of volition elsewhere, so we shall deal little with such objections here. Instead, we shall focus on the subject of trying, and especially on attempts like that described above, which seem to me to have been badly misunderstood. It will be my contention that trying is generally present in intentional, overt action, that in cases of paralysis trying has substantially the same features it has in relatively uncontroversial cases, and that the attempts of paralytics constitute sound evidence that acts of volition occur typically when bodily movements are performed. (shrink)

This introduction to a collection of papers on normativity provides a framework modelled on the division in ethics to approach normative issues. It suggests that is is useful to divide questions about normativity into five groups: normative ontology, normative semantics, normative epistemology, normative psychology, and substantial normative theory.

What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something (...) A, one’s desire to do that thing A is one’s motivation. Second, when Dave throws out a pack of cigarettes, this may or may not be part of an attempt to quit smoking. It may be a political protest against R.J.R. Nabisco. Dave’s throwing out the cigarettes only counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, if it is done for the right reason, out of the right motivation. Again, the right motivation seems to be the desire to quit smoking. Thus, the desire to do A appears to play important roles in the attempt to do A. At the very least, it helps to motivate, guide, and constitute the attempt as the attempt to do A. It is because Dave wants to quit smoking that his throwing out his cigarettes counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, not as a political protest. (shrink)

Sue knows that, unaided, she cannot lift the 1,000 pound weight, but surely she can try. Can she not? For even if she believes it is impossible to succeed in lifting the weight, trying to lift the weight need not involve success. So surely, it would seem that nothing could be easier than for Sue to give lifting the weight a try. In this paper, I agrue that, appearances aside, it is not possible for someone to try to do what (...) that person believes to be impossible. So, on this view, perhaps surprisingly, not only would it be impossible for Sue to lift the weight, but it would be impossible for her to try (as long as she believed her lifting it to be impossible). I defend this view in the context of a package of related claims and a functional accoung of trying and intentional action. (shrink)

My research focuses on the moral evaluation of people’s motivations. A popular recent view in Philosophy is that good people are motivated by the considerations that make actions morally right (the “right-making features”). For example, this view entails that a Black Lives Matter protester can be a good person if she is motivated to engage in protest by the thought that it will bring about equality, or justice, since this is what makes engaging in protest morally right. But this (...) view entails that the protester cannot be a good person if she engages in protest because it is morally right. I think that this is a serious mistake. My view is that it is good to be explicitly committed to acting rightly and motivated by the moral rightness of one’s actions. More specifically, I explore the nature and defend the value of a complex state that I call "trying to act rightly". This comprises (a) wanting to act rightly, (b) thinking about which actions are right, and (c) doing the things that you think are right, because they are right. The three papers of my Dissertation each make part of the case for trying to act rightly. My first paper, “Praiseworthy Motivations”, addresses the view that it is good to be motivated by the right-making features but not good to be motivated to act rightly. I argue that this view rests on poorly-drawn comparison cases that are not genuine minimal pairs, and that well-constructed cases show these two types of motivation to be equally good. I address the worry that trying to act rightly leads people with false moral beliefs to act wrongly, by noting that this also applies to motivation by right-making features, since people can be motivated by a right-making feature while being mistaken about which acts have this feature. I then argue that we should distinguish carefully between motivations, actions, and beliefs when evaluating these well-meaning but morally mistaken agents. The second paper, “We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too”, addresses the view that the fact that an act is morally right is not a genuine reason to perform it, and that our reasons for action are instead provided by the right-making features. I argue that this view rests on a confused picture of moral metaphysics, which would rule out any case in which one reason to perform an act is partially metaphysically constituted by another fact that is also a reason to perform the same act – as, for example, when a salad both is healthy and contains vegetables. I then sketch an alternative picture of moral metaphysics, on which genuine reasons for action can be metaphysically related to one another. My third paper, “Accidentally Doing the Right Thing”, uses general reflections on the nature of deliberate action and its relationship to praiseworthiness to argue that someone is only praiseworthy for acting rightly if she was trying to act rightly. I apply this idea to the philosophical debate on moral worth, defending the Kantian view that actions have moral worth just in case they are instances of someone’s trying to act rightly and succeeding. This is a radical departure from the most popular contemporary view on moral worth, and requires a re-evaluation of the main case discussed in this literature: that of Huckleberry Finn. (shrink)

Can philosophy still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such? In particular, what kind of philosophy can be legitimized in the face of sciences? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions, listing the characteristics philosophy should have to be fruitful and legitimized in the face of sciences. Since the characteristics in question demand that philosophy search for new knowledge and new rules of discovery, a philosophy with such characteristics (...) may be called the ‘heuristic view’. According to the heuristic view, philosophy is an inquiry into the world which is continuous with the sciences. It differs from them only because it deals with questions which are beyond the present sciences, and in order to deal with them must try unexplored routes. By so doing, when successful, it may even give birth to new sciences. In listing the characteristics that philosophy should have, the paper systematically compares them with classical analytic philosophy, because the latter has been the dominant philosophical tradition in the last century. (shrink)

Does 'Person P tried to A' entail that there is some particular, whether a mental act or a brain state or whatever, that is a trying? Most discussions of trying assume that this entailment holds. There is no good reason for holding that this is a valid inference. In particular, I examine one 'Davidsonian' argument that might be used to justify the validity of such an inference and argue that the argument is not sound. See: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/IxsuPqt7rvdzqMxpFiTv/full.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 104-105 [Access article in PDF] William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe. Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 344. Cloth, $40.00. Newman and Principe have produced a masterful study of intellectual context, primarily by correcting the commonly held belief that there was a radical (...) break in the seventeenth century between late medieval alchemy and early modern chemistry. Although their main focus is on George Starkey (the 'alchemist') and Robert Boyle (the 'chemist'), they also provide copious details on the chemical practices and theories of Van Helmont, Benjamin Worsley, Frederick Clodius, and Kenelm Digby, among others. It is hard to do justice to their complex study in a short review. Following a brief summary, therefore, I will limit my discussion to how the authors' conclusions are significant for a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of philosophy in the seventeenth century.After a helpful introduction, Chapter 1 outlines the differences in the early lives of the English, aristocratic Boyle and the American, Harvard-educated Starkey. Chapter 2's background on late medieval chemistry includes an examination of corpuscular theories within that tradition as well as Van Helmont's arguments concerning the way in which mathematics is useful for explaining "superficial" changes but not the real, internal changes in bodies. Chapters 3 and 4 provide a close study of Starkey's laboratory notebooks. Among the entries, recorded in a style adapted from Scholasticism, there are passages that adopt the secrecy of alchemy, while others show Starkey's effective use of theoretical principles and such experimental quantitative methods as mass balance. Chapter 5 examines Boyle's intellectual context. Newman and Principe argue convincingly for Starkey's role in Boyle's addition of Helmontian elements to the general Baconian program. Chapter 6 looks at the [End Page 104] results of Boyle's eclectic mix of chemistry and mechanism. Although Helmontian chemistry played a significant role in Boyle's natural philosophy, the authors attribute his meager interest in quantitative measures and analyses to his attempts to use chemistry as a support for mechanism and as evidence against Aristotelianism. The concluding chapter draws together elements from previous chapters to provide the full argument against the idea of a radical break between medieval alchemy and modern chemistry.Newman and Principe's reconsideration of traditional categories surrounding the idea of a radical break should provide an impetus for similar reconsideration in the history of philosophy. As they point out, 'the' mechanical philosophy drew from a diverse range of disciplines. Boyle's eclectic and complex attempt to develop a unique version of the mechanical philosophy can be seen in other English philosophers, especially Locke and Newton. This study provides a promising basis for yet more extensive and refined studies of the seventeenth-century milieu. The continuing over-emphasis on the physical principles of Descartes and Gassendi's versions of the mechanical philosophy and the tendency to reduce all mechanism to their view needs revision. Also in need of reconsideration is the currently popular belief that the study of context simply means adding social elements to an uncontroversial intellectual context. As the authors clearly show, much more work on the intellectual context remains to be done.One line of research in the history of philosophy that could be pursued concerns the role of Francis Bacon in this context. Although Newman and Principe mention the general Baconian ethos, a detailed discussion of Bacon was clearly beyond their scope. Yet Bacon's own debts to chemistry, although frequently unrecognized, seem more significant given this study. Also, it would be interesting to see the extent to which Bacon's works influenced Van Helmont or Starkey. Newman and Principe's claims regarding the novelty of Starkey's notebooks, for example, may be a little overstated. Many of the elements from Starkey's notebooks can be found in Bacon's advice in his Natural and Experimental Histories (1622). In that work, Bacon advised writers... (shrink)

Seminar papers; on the contribution of Rāhula Sāṅkr̥tyāyana, 1893-1963 to Buddhist philosophy and literature.

This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.

Explores "why we find spontaneity so elusive and shows how early Chinese philosophy points the way to happier, more authentic lives"--Dust jacket flap.

Lectures on Sankhya philosophy and contribution of Kaṇāda and Pāṇini; lecture series organized by Centre for Vedanta Studies, University of Kerala with the financial assistance from the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India during the Sanskrit year 2000.

Článek postupně analyzuje tři nesnáze, s nimiž se potýká filosofie při oslovování veřejnosti: hermetismus, bagatelizaci a vizionářství. Na základě kritiky těchto forem jsou postupně vymezovány podmínky, za nichž je dnes možné považovat filosofii za smysluplnou činnost.