Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018, Page 343-354.

The paper offers an interpretation of thesis 6.01. The treatment touches upon variables, identity, elementary propositions, internal relations. Klammerausdrücke, and operations. Wittenstein's notations are found not to cover the particular form of definition by induction that is used at 6 and 6.01. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's ability to design of a formal system of logic does not match his outstanding logico-philosophical insight.

... TRACTATUS DE IMMORTALITATE ANIM Ж. PR 0 OE^MIU M. * Continens intentionem, feu libri materiatn & can* fam intentionis. F rater Hieronymus Natalis, ...

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captivated the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 30s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its (...) philosophy of language, finding attractive, if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, Wittgenstein himself, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. The posthumous publication of other writings has, therefore, only served to reawaken interest in the Tractatus and to illuminate its more neglected aspects. David Pears and Brian McGuinness revised their translation in the light of Wittgenstein's own suggestions and comments in his correspondence with C.K. Ogden about the first translation. In addition, this edition contains the introduction by Bertrand Russell which appeared in the original English translation. (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

"Ludwig Wittgenstein's brief Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is one of the most important philosophical works of the Twentieth Century, yet it offers little orientation for the reader. The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and the scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. In Tractatus in Context, James C. Klagge presents the vital background necessary for appreciating Wittgenstein's gnomic masterpiece. Tractatus in Context contains the early reactions to the Tractatus, including the initial reviews (...) written in 1922-1924. And while we can't talk with Wittgenstein, we can do the next best thing-hear what he had to say about the Tractatus. Klagge thus presents what Wittgenstein thought about germane issues leading up to his writing the book, in discussions and correspondence with others about his ideas, and what he had to say about the Tractatus after it was written-in letters, lectures and conversations. It offers, you might say, Wittgenstein's own commentary on the book. Key Features: Illuminates what is at stake in the Tractatus, by providing the views of others that engaged Wittgenstein as he was writing it. Includes Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts on ideas in the book as recorded in his notebooks, letters, and conversations as well as his later, retrospective comments on those ideas. Draws on new or little-known sources, such as Wittgenstein's coded notebooks, Hermine's notes, Frege's letters, Hänsel's diary, Ramsey's notes, and Skinner's dictations. Draws connections between the background context and specific passages in the Tractatus, using a proposition-by-proposition commentary"--. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein claims that a sentence expresses the same proposition in every possible world and, hence, which proposition is expressed cannot depend on how each world is. In this paper, I shall explore the interpretation of this thesis under the perspective of Stalnaker’s theory of assertions as the reduction of the context set, i.e., the set of possible worlds compatible with the information gathered at a conversation. In Stalnaker’s version, this principle follows from the explication of assertions (...) as having the illocutionary point of excluding some possible worlds from the context set. If there is no unique instruction to exclude some worlds, then it is not clear which reduction is meant by the speaker. This might lead to a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s own version. (shrink)

Reading the Tractatus. And appreciating it The reception history of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus displays an impressive and persistent diversity. This paper explores possible sources of that diversity and locates them in different takes on the text and its context of origin, and in different perspectives of the readers. This hermeneutics is illustrated by a comparison of two views on the importance of ethics for an understanding of the Tractatus: that of Cora Diamond and the one developed by (...) the authors in previous work. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, me centraré únicamente en la ontología del Tractatus porque, a pesar de ser uno de los temas que abandona después de 1930, tiene dos aspectos que quisiera resaltar de manera especial: su carácter relacional, y su afirmación de la contingencia del mundo. Considero que ambos son de interés en sí mismos por su carácter inédito, pero creo, además, que es posible establecer sugerentes relaciones entre ellos y algunas posiciones contemporáneas, tanto de las ciencias naturales como (...) de las ciencias sociales. En el primer caso, haré referencia al libro recientemente publicado de Friedrich Hülster, Introduction to Wittgenstein´s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Para el segundo, tomaré como punto de partida Radical Uncertainty, publicado el año pasado por John Kay y Marvyn King. (shrink)

Je pose une question concernant la place du Tractatus de Wittgenstein dans la tradition éthique. Le Tractatus et la tradition éthique Les remarques que je ferai sont à considérer dans le contexte d'une interprétation du Tractatus qui a été qualifiée de lecture résolue de cette œuvre, ainsi que de la philosophie de Wittgenstein en général Comme l'a écrit Cora Diamond, le Tractatus travaille sur la libération des besoins et des désirs philosophiques, une libération de la philosophie (...) effectuée avec des outils philosophiques : la situation du Tractatus est similaire à celle évoquée dans les Recherches et dans l'œuvre ultérieure, qui se consacre également au projet de se libérer de la philosophie pour le bien de la philosophie. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...

In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language"– a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation – containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign – commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is (...) developed in the service of ontological frugality. I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter. (shrink)

The article argues for a contextualised reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. It analyses in detail the role that use and application play in the text and how that supports a conception of transcendentality of logic that allows for contextualisation. The article identifies a tension in the text, between the requirement that sense be determinate and the contextual nature of application, and suggests that it is this tension that is a major driver of Wittgenstein’s later ideas.

Le premier Wittgenstein expose dans le Tractatus une philosophie des sciences marquée par le conventionnalisme complété d’un certain vérificationnisme assuré par la logique de l’ Abbildung. Pour autant il ne développe aucune idéologiste scientiste. A partir de 1929, sa philosophie prend un tournant grammatical : la « grammaire » de la science comporte non seulement les lois logiques, mais aussi la partie théorique des sciences de la nature. L’assimilation des grandes théories (Copernic, Darwin, Freud) à des « vues synoptiques (...) » rassemblant une quantité de phénomènes, comme les paradigmes de Kuhn, n’empêche pas Wittgenstein de donner à sa philosophie le tour d’un incontestable réalisme (au sens de Cora Diamond). La dernière partie de ce texte essaie d’apprécier, à partir de Wittgenstein, les différences et les relations entre science et philosophie dans le naturalisme contemporain. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's conception of the general form of a truth function given in thesis 6 can be presented as a sort of a trade-off: the author of the Tractatus is unable to reconcile the simplicity of his original idea of a series of forms with the simplicity of his generalisation of Sheffer's stroke; therefore, he is forced to sacrifice one of them. As we argue in this paper, the choice he makes – to weaken the logical constraints put on the (...) concept of a series of forms, thus effectively metaphorising that concept for the sake of upholding the N-operation's role of generating the series – is unfortunate. An actual expansion of a series of truth functions as defined in 6 would require either making decisions at each step (Anscombe) or outwardly rejecting the concept of a series (Sundholm). However, neither is faithful to Wittgenstein's own fundamental intuitions regarding the nature of logic. For this reason, a different trade-off that prioritises upholding the basic features of a series of forms over the simplicity of the operation that generates that series seems to be much more reasonable. We offer such a trade-off by developing the schema already present in the Tractatus (5.101). The key element of our alternative solution is the construction of an operation that can perform the task of producing all consecutive truth functions of a given collection of atomic propositions as an invariant difference between any base and its successor throughout the series. We define it as a composition of three functions (in an algebraic sense): the first turns a symbol of a given truth function into a binary number, the second increments that number, the third turns the result back into a symbol of another truth function. We also show how the operation can be defined by means of a different notation without invoking binary arithmetic. (shrink)

Los conceptos de filosofía y método son centrales en el Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein. Sin embargo, su comprensión es de alta complejidad puesto que exige un próvido examen de otros conceptos que entran en relación con ellos. Dado que hoy contamos con la teoría de modelos, una teoría matemática con aplicaciones en lógica, debería ser bastante útil utilizar su marco teórico para comprender el Tractatus. El objetivo principal es, entonces, dilucidar los conceptos de filosofía y método mediante un (...) análisis de las proposiciones 1 a 5 con la teoría de modelos. (shrink)

Si sente spesso parlare di due diversi Wittgenstein, corrispondenti ai due capolavori del filosofo austriaco: il Tractatus e le Ricerche. Il presente saggio mette in questione tale netta distinzione – e qualsiasi altra – mostrando come il pensiero di Wittgenstein sia in una costante e graduale transizione. La tesi principale è che soffermarsi retrospettivamente sulla fluidità di questa transizione, esaminandone i passaggi fondamentali, può essere più illuminante che isolare assunti teorici utili a “contare i Wittgenstein”. In particolare, dopo una (...) discussione di alcune idee del Tractatus, l’articolo si soffermerà sulla transizione dai concetti di proposizione elementare e sintassi logica a quelli di sistema proposizionale e grammatica, mostrando come, attraverso un costante ripensamento del concetto di forma, Wittgenstein giunga a identificare il significato delle parole col loro uso effettivo nei nostri giochi linguistici. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BRAD S. GREGORY Until now those interested in Spinoza have lacked an adequate English translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. ...

I examine the ideas leading up to Wittgenstein's pronouncement at Tractatus 5.4611 that signs for logical operations are punctuation marks.

Discussion of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the 'resolute' reading of Diamond and Conant. Marie McGinn's principal aim in this book is to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea, central to the metaphysical reading, that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into (...) how language functions. McGinn takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein's early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. However, the early Wittgenstein undertakes this descriptive project in the grip of a set of preconceptions concerning the essence of language that determine both how he conceives the problem and the approach he takes to the task of clarification. Nevertheless, the Tractatus contains philosophical insights, achieved despite his early preconceptions, that form the foundation of his later philosophy. -/- The anti-metaphysical interpretation that is presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein's remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein's early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein's approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role of the nonsensical ‘statements’ of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the aims of the book, a topic which has in recent years been the subject of, at times heated, controversy among Wittgenstein’s readers.1 In this debate the so-called ineffability interpretation argues that the role of nonsense in the Tractatus is to make us grasp ineffable truths which ‘strictly speaking’ cannot be said or thought2. By contrast, the interpretation known as the resolute reading emphasises (...) the incomprehensibility of the notion of ineffable truths. According to the latter, nonsense in the Tractatus serves a therapeutic purpose: that of curing us from attempts to put forward nonsensical philosophical doctrines3. By employing a method of juxtaposition I.. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to appeal to the idea that thoughts manage to explain how sentences, primarily elementary sentences, can be such that their subsentential elements refer to objects. In this respect, he seems indeed to appeal to the claim that thoughts, qua endowed with not only original, but also intrinsic, intentionality, lend this intentionality to names, by transforming them into ‘names-of’, i.e., symbols endowed with intrinsic intentionality as well. Such a claim, however, entails that there must be (...) necessary superfacts. Since according to the Tractatus’ ontology there cannot be necessary facts in the world, but at most only in its logical scaffolding, the most likely chance is that such facts are facts for the limit of the world, i.e., the transcendental subject. Curiously enough, in his later critique, in the Investigations, of mentalist semantics, Wittgenstein fails to appeal to this claim, which can block the infinite regress that he there changes the mentalist position with. Since in the Investigations necessary facts seem to be allowed, this failure is even more striking. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' is one of the most important books of the twentieth century. It influenced philosophers and artists alike and it continues to fascinate readers today. It offers rigorous arguments but clothes them in enigmatic pronouncements. Wittgenstein himself said that his book is 'strictly philosophical and simultaneously literary, and yet there is no blathering in it'. This introduction, first published in 2005, considers both the philosophical and the literary aspects of the 'Tractatus' and shows how they (...) are related. It also shows how the work fits into Wittgenstein's philosophical development and the tradition of analytic philosophy, arguing strongly for the vigour and significance of that tradition. (shrink)

Richard Janko's acclaimed translation of Aristotle's _Poetics_ is accompanied by the most comprehensive commentary available in English that does not presume knowledge of the original Greek. Two other unique features are Janko's translations with notes of both the _Tractatus Coislinianus_, which is argued to be a summary of the lost second book of the Poetics, and fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets, including recently discovered texts about catharsis, which appear in English for the first time.

The notion of the riddle plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus . By examining the comparisons he draws between philosophical problems and riddles, this paper offers a reassessment of the aims and methods of the book. Solving an ordinary riddle does not consist in learning a new fact; what it requires is that we transform the way we use words. Similarly, Wittgenstein proposes to transform the way philosophers understand the nature of their problems. But since he holds that (...) these problems are ultimately unsolvable, rather than attempting to solve the riddles of philosophy, he aims to dissolve them. (shrink)

The Argument of the "Tractatus" presents a single unified interpretation of the Tractatus based on Wittgenstein's own view that the philosophy of logic is the real foundation of his philosophical system.

Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’un sonunda, kendisini anlayan okuyucunun, söylediklerinin saçma olduğunu göreceğini söyler. Eserin bu paradoksu eserle tanışan hemen her okuyucu için bir kafa karışıklığı vesilesidir. Eğer eserde dile getirilenler saçmaysa bunların saçma olduğu da dahil olmak üzere eserin dile getirdiklerini ciddiye almamak gerekir, eğer eser ciddiye alınacaksa söylenenlerin saçma olduğunu kabul etmek gerekir. Eserin bu paradoksunun nasıl ele alınması gerektiğine dair hatırı sayılır bir literatür vardır. Bu çalışmada, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’taki bu paradoksun, saçmanın sağaltıcı işleviyle değerlendirildiğinde eseri anlamayı engellemeyeceği (...) fikri savunulacaktır. Bunun için öncelikle genel olarak Resim Kuramı’nın ana hatlarından söz ederek Wittgenstein için saçmanın ne olduğunu anlatacağım. Daha sonra, Wittgenstein için saçmanın işlevinin ne olduğuna dair iyi gerekçelendirildiğini düşündüğüm fikirlerden söz edeceğim. Son olarak, saçmaya işaret edebilmenin ancak saçma ile mümkün olduğunu, Wittgenstein’ın bu yolla yaygın bir yanılgıyı sağalttığını ve dolayısıyla saçmanın sağaltıcı bir işlevi olduğunu iddia edeceğim. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz demonstrates the necessity of, and provides a guide for, the redirection of humanity. He argues that this paradigm shift must involve changing the character of social life and politics from competitive to cooperative, encouraging moral and intellectual virtues, providing foundations for happy societies, promoting peace among countries and (...) building a strong international community. (shrink)

In this remarkably clear and original study of the Tractatus Peter Carruthers has two principal aims. He seeks to make sense of Wittgenstein's metaphysical doctrines, showing how powerful arguments may be deployed in their support. He also aims to locate the crux of the conflict between Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies. This is shown to arise from his earlier commitment to the objectivity of logic and logical relations, which is the true target of attack of his later discussion of (...) rule-following. Within this general framework Dr Carruthers explores a number of themes, including the early Wittgenstein's doctrine of the priority of logic over metaphysics, the nature and purpose of his programme of analysis for ordinary language and the various possible arguments supporting the existence of Simples. He offers many original interpretations and defends them with considerable attention to textual detail, yet the book's clarity and directness will make it accessible to anyone acquainted with the Tractatus. It will be required reading for all serious students of Wittgenstein's philosophy. (shrink)