This paper develops two theses and one suggestion. The first thesis concerns how to reason about the problem of philosophical progress. Chalmers (2015) and Dellsén et al. (2022) proposed frameworks to reason about this problem. I argue that these frameworks have limits and develop an alternative. Having done this, I put my proposed framework to the test. That is, I use it to analyse the views held by Kant in the first critique and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. The second (...) thesis concerns the relations between these works. My proposed framework makes evident that, for all their differences, Kant and Wittgenstein gave similar answers to the problem of philosophical progress. They both claimed that philosophy has been very unproductive for much of its history and proposed methods to fix this. My suggestion is that this might be a recurring pattern in the history of philosophy, which perhaps could help explain why, to this day, there is so much pessimism concerning philosophical progress. (shrink)

This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression (or a symbol). Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of non-primitive symbols, (...) the analyticity thesis and the strong analyticity thesis. The picture theory emerges as what provides the only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis (that an elementary proposition is contingent) and the independence thesis (that elementary propositions are mutually logically independent) which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies. (shrink)

According to a growing number of scholars (Dolby, in: Glock H-J, Hyman J (eds) A companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-Blackwell, London, 433–442, 2016) Wittgenstein’s account of truth in the _Tractatus_ is not a correspondence theory. Foremost among them, Hans-Johann Glock has argued that Wittgenstein neither held the version of correspondence theory standardly ascribed to him nor any other version, simply because there is no such thing as a genuine correspondence relation in Wittgenstein’s treatise. Instead, according to Glock, Wittgenstein held an obtainment (...) theory according to which “a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains” (Glock in Synthese 148(2):345–368, 2006, p. 347). Though sympathetic to Glock’s critique of the standard interpretation, I argue that Wittgenstein nonetheless always thought of truth in terms of correspondence and never thought of it in terms of an obtainment theory or in terms of any other nonrelational account. Instead, truth in the _Tractatus_ consists of an indirect internal relation of correspondence, which Wittgenstein understands in terms of “correctly depicting reality.” This, I further argue, was suggested to him by the rejection of a mistaken conception of correspondence held by Russell and by one of Frege’s critique of the correspondence theory. The resulting version of correspondence theory not only differs from the one that is usually ascribed to him but is much more sophisticated than Moore’s and Russell’s versions of it, is largely independent of the picture theory, and offers some answers to classical critiques of the correspondence theory that have gone unnoticed. (shrink)

Augustine scholarship on grief has mostly focused on Confessiones 4 and 9 and De ciuitate dei 14.9, with a focus on how Augustine legitimates Christian expressions of grief. In this essay, I explore the ways in which his account of grief is inflected Christologically, with a primary focus on In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 49, 52, and 60, where Augustine reflects on a set of Johannine texts that speak of Jesus being “troubled”: John 11:33, 12:27, and 13:21. The homiletic context (...) adds to the traditional picture of grief in Augustine scholarship by drawing more attention to issues of Christology. In particular, the Johannine passages afford Augustine the opportunity to highlight the ways in which conceptions of divine power (potestas) shape an interpretation of the difference between Christ’s unique experience of grief in comparison with ours. Christ’s grief, Augustine emphasizes, is only ever voluntary, whereas we experience it involuntarily, and yet it is precisely this difference that prompts Augustine to focus his hearer’s attention on how Christ’s grief serves as the healing of our griefs. (shrink)

The original version of the article missed to include an acknowledgments. The missing information is provided below.

Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus first appeared in 1921 and was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme compression and brilliance, it immediately convinced many of its readers and captivated the imagination of all. Its chief influence, at first, was on the Logical Positivists of the 1920s and 30s, but many other philosophers were stimulated by its (...) philosophy of language, finding attractive, if ultimately unsatisfactory, its view that propositions were pictures of reality. Perhaps most of all, Wittgenstein himself, after his return to philosophy in the late 1920s, was fascinated by its vision of an inexpressible, crystalline world of logical relationships. The posthumous publication of other writings has, therefore, only served to reawaken interest in the Tractatus and to illuminate its more neglected aspects. David Pears and Brian McGuinness revised their translation in the light of Wittgenstein's own suggestions and comments in his correspondence with C.K. Ogden about the first translation. In addition, this edition contains the introduction by Bertrand Russell which appeared in the original English translation. (shrink)

... TRACTATUS DE IMMORTALITATE ANIM Ж. PR 0 OE^MIU M. * Continens intentionem, feu libri materiatn & can* fam intentionis. F rater Hieronymus Natalis, ...

Reading the Tractatus. And appreciating it The reception history of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus displays an impressive and persistent diversity. This paper explores possible sources of that diversity and locates them in different takes on the text and its context of origin, and in different perspectives of the readers. This hermeneutics is illustrated by a comparison of two views on the importance of ethics for an understanding of the Tractatus: that of Cora Diamond and the one developed by (...) the authors in previous work. (shrink)

Je pose une question concernant la place du Tractatus de Wittgenstein dans la tradition éthique. Le Tractatus et la tradition éthique Les remarques que je ferai sont à considérer dans le contexte d'une interprétation du Tractatus qui a été qualifiée de lecture résolue de cette œuvre, ainsi que de la philosophie de Wittgenstein en général Comme l'a écrit Cora Diamond, le Tractatus travaille sur la libération des besoins et des désirs philosophiques, une libération de la philosophie (...) effectuée avec des outils philosophiques : la situation du Tractatus est similaire à celle évoquée dans les Recherches et dans l'œuvre ultérieure, qui se consacre également au projet de se libérer de la philosophie pour le bien de la philosophie. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, me centraré únicamente en la ontología del Tractatus porque, a pesar de ser uno de los temas que abandona después de 1930, tiene dos aspectos que quisiera resaltar de manera especial: su carácter relacional, y su afirmación de la contingencia del mundo. Considero que ambos son de interés en sí mismos por su carácter inédito, pero creo, además, que es posible establecer sugerentes relaciones entre ellos y algunas posiciones contemporáneas, tanto de las ciencias naturales como (...) de las ciencias sociales. En el primer caso, haré referencia al libro recientemente publicado de Friedrich Hülster, Introduction to Wittgenstein´s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Para el segundo, tomaré como punto de partida Radical Uncertainty, publicado el año pasado por John Kay y Marvyn King. (shrink)