We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

When philosophers discuss the possibility of machines making scientific discoveries, they typically focus on discoveries in physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Observing the rapid increase of computer-use in science, however, it becomes natural to ask whether there are any scientific domains out of reach for machine discovery. For example, could machines also make discoveries in qualitative social science? Is there something about humans that makes us uniquely suited to studying humans? Is there something about machines that would bar them (...) from such activity? A close look at the methodology of interpretive social science reveals several abilities necessary to make a social scientific discovery, and one capacity necessary to possess any of them is imagination. For machines to make discoveries in social science, therefore, they must possess imagination algorithms. (shrink)

Reprint of the original, first published in 1860.

Drawing on diverse historical cases, this paper describes and examines various aspects of a modality of scientific appraisal which has remained largely unexplored, theory pursuit. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: the epistemic and pragmatic commitments involved in theory pursuit, including how these differ from those characteristic of theory acceptance; how the research interests of scientists enter into their pursuit decisions; some of the strategies for the refinement and extension of a theory's empirical abilities which typify theory pursuit; and the (...) need to distinguish between individual and community rationality in contexts of pursuit. (shrink)

What is the role of chance in scientific discovery? And, more to the point, if chance plays a key role in scientific discovery, what room is left for reason? These are grounding questions in the debates, for instance, over whether there is a distinction to be made between discovery and justification in science, and whether innate genius must play a role in discovery or if there exists some method that can be taught to anyone. While the (...) role of chance has been discussed throughout the history of science, it has resurfaced in recent debates over how science should be funded, and particularly in the field of biomedical research. The word serendipity, for example, has become increasingly... (shrink)

The NIH-funded Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies® (BRAIN) Initiative has led to significant advances in what we know about the functions and capacities of the brain. This multifaceted and expansive effort supports a range of experimentation from cells to circuits, and its outputs promise to ease suffering from various neurological injuries, diseases, and neuropsychiatric conditions. At the midway point of the 10-year BRAIN Initiative, we pause to consider how these studies, and neuroscience research more broadly, may bear on human (...) characteristics and moral concepts such as identity, agency, and others. This midway point also offers us an opportunity to evaluate the sociology and impacts of BRAIN Initiative-funded investigations to ensure that ethical standards of fairness and justice pervade the scientific process itself. Neuroethics inquiry provides a mechanism to invite relevant, novel expertise from the wide array of disciplines that intersect with biomedicine in neuroscience research. As the BRAIN Initiative and the broader field of neuroscience proceed, neuroethics serves as a central component of neuroscience inquiry to i) foster necessary and beneficial collaborations for responsible discovery; ii) ensure a rigorous, reproducible, and representative neuroscience research process; and iii) explore the unique nature of study of the human brain through accurate and representative models of its function and dysfunction. (shrink)

This book offers the first full exploration of the religious, ethical, and social dimensions of Michael Polanyi's philosophy, and its implications for the crisis of modern culture.

The years immediately after the final downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte could easily have been years of anti-climax in French science. In 1815, after two decades of undoubted greatness, the time, I feel, was ripe for decline. And decline might well have occurred if the traditions and the style of science as practised in France in the period of Napoleon's rule had been carried on unchanged by the disciples of the two great men who had dominated work in the physical sciences (...) for so many years. These men, of course, were the chemist Claude Louis Berthollet and the mathematician and physicist Pierre Simon Laplace. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe distinction between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ in philosophy of science appears simple at first but contains interesting complexities. Paul Hoyningen-Huene has catalogued some of these complexities and suggested that the core usefulness of the ‘context distinction’ is in distinguishing between descriptive and normative perspectives. Here, I expand on Hoyningen-Huene’s project by tracing the label ‘context of discovery and context of justification’ to its origin. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, Hans Reichenbach’s initial context (...) distinction from 1938 does not easily map onto Hoyningen-Huene’s distinction between descriptive and normative perspectives on science. However, this is not a reason to reject Hoyningen-Huene’s simplified context distinction, nor do I recommend returning to Reichenbach’s initial proposal. It is, however, further reason to believe that the context distinction does not have a single, easily understood meaning. Along the way, I revisit Reichenbach’s version of ‘rational reconstruction’ and highlight its usefulness as a tool for philosophy in general. (shrink)

The problem of Galileo's logical methodology has long interested scholars. In this volume William A. Wallace offers a solution that is completely unexpected, yet backed by convincing documentary evidence. His analysis starts with an early notebook Galileo wrote at Pisa, appropriating a Jesuit professor's exposition of the Posterior Analystics of Aristotle, and ends with one of the last letters Galileo wrote, stating that in logic he has been a Peripatetic all his life. Wallace's detective work unearths the complete logic course (...) from which the notebook was excerpted, then proceeds to show how its terminology and methodology continue to surface in Galileo's later writings in which he founds his new sciences of the heavens and of local motion. The result is a tour de force that commends itself not only to Galileo's scholars and to logicians, philosophers, and historians, but to anyone interested in the epistemic roots of modern science. (shrink)

Whom should we credit for the discovery of isotopes? The first suggestion of an idea, the first experimental proof, or the development of a new method that clearly reveals the isotopes? Strömholm and Svedberg, Fajans and Soddy interpreted patterns of radioactive decay, which became confirmed theory on the solid basis of the very accurate atomic weight determinations by Richards and his coworkers. The mass spectrograph measurements by Aston provided major extension of the concept of isotopes to much of the (...) rest of the periodic table. Thus, Strömholm and Svedberg, Fajans and Soddy provided an idea, which Richards proved, and Aston made generally useful. Richards should be listed along with Fajans, Soddy, and Aston for fundamental contributions to establishing isotopes as part of the modern language of science. As much credit should be given to the experimental proof as to the suggestion or naming of the concept. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

The US FDA currently encourages the addition of vitamin D to milk and cereals, with the aim of reducing rickets in children and osteoporosis in adults. However, vitamin D not only regulates the expression of genes associated with calcium homeostasis, but also genes associated with cancers, autoimmune disease, and infection. It does this by controlling the activation of the vitamin D receptor (VDR), a type 1 nuclear receptor and DNA transcription factor. Molecular biology is rapidly coming to an understanding of (...) the multiplicity of roles played by the VDR, but clinical medicine is having difficulty keeping up with the pace of change. For example, the FDA recently proposed a rule change that will encourage high levels of vitamin D to be added to even more foods, so that the manufacturers can claim those foods “reduce the risk of osteoporosis”. The FDA docket does not review one single paper detailing the transcriptional activity of vitamin D, even though, on average, one new paper a day is being published on that topic. Nor do they review whether widespread supplementation with vitamin D, an immunomodulatory secosteroid, might predispose the population to immune dysfunction. This BioEssay explores how lifelong supplementation of the food chain with vitamin D might well be contributing to the current epidemics of obesity and chronic disease. BioEssays 30:173–182, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The problem of opportunity discovery is at the heart of entrepreneurial activity. Cognitive limitations determine the search for and the analysis of information and, as a consequence, constrain the identification of opportunities. Moreover, typical personal characteristics – locus of control, need for independence and need for achievement – suggest that entrepreneurs will tend to take a central position in their stakeholder environments and thus fail to adapt to the complexity of stakeholder relationships in their entrepreneurial activity. We approach this (...) problem by adopting a network perspective on stakeholder management. We propose a heuristic approach of stakeholder analysis, which requires two mappings of the entrepreneurial constituents. The first mapping focuses on current interactions between the entrepreneur and their stakeholders, while the second focuses on a specific issue and the stakeholders that constitute it. In effect, such a stakeholder analysis requires entrepreneurs to use the complexity of stakeholder relationships in order to go beyond their cognitive limitations and thus facilitate the discovery of new opportunities. As we will argue, this has clear implications for the ethics and activities of entrepreneurs. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss social network analysis as a method for the history of economics. We argue that social network analysis is not primarily a method of data representation but foremost a method of discovery and confirmation. It is as such a promising method that should be added to the toolbox of the historian of economics. We furthermore argue that, to be meaningfully applied in history, social network analysis must be complemented with historical knowledge gained by other means (...) and often by more traditional, mostly qualitative, methods. It should therefore be viewed as a method that complements rather than replaces more established approaches in the history of economics. (shrink)

Attention is drawn to the fact that what is alternatively known as Dummett logic, Gödel logic, or Gödel-Dummett logic, was actually introduced by Skolem already in 1913. A related work of 1919 introduces implicative lattices, or Heyting algebras in today's terminology.

This is a response to Tom McLeish's Boyle Lecture 2021 on the rediscovery of contemplation through science. Several implications are sketched: no single mind can encompass fully what there is to be known; we are likely to be unaware of the full range of what it is that is acting upon us or informing us at any given moment; and the universe that we encounter is a system of interaction and implication in which nothing is simply passive or lifeless.