This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non-philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics. Among these are its minimality, the plausibility of its individual propositions, the non-empirical character of some of these propositions, and the fact that a discursive context exists within which some of M's non-mathematical non-empirical propositions are challenged by argument. The extrinsic and pragmatic criterion marks the key novelty of the (...) presented definition. Building on the analysed concept of a philosophical problem, the paper explores the question of how the definition relates to philosophy as a discipline, whether it should be interpreted as descriptively adequate and exclusive, and whether there is space for genuine philosophical research that does not deal with philosophical problems in the presented sense. (shrink)

This paper explores how contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering can benefit from Richard Rorty's approach by outlining Rortian conceptual engineering. Three perspectives on Rortian conceptual engineering are discussed. First, Rortian conceptual engineering represents a form of radical conceptual engineering that dismisses the role of folk intuitions and views philosophical progress as the replacement of old problems with new ones. More specifically, Rortian conceptual engineering sees conceptual revolution as a process in which new metaphors replace old literal meanings. Second, Rorty's metaphilosophical (...) distinction between epistemological and conversational philosophy is more profound than the distinctions between conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering, or between functional and nonfunctional approaches, thus enhancing our understanding of two types of contemporary conceptual engineering: epistemological and conversational. Third, Rorty argues that choosing concepts should take into account not only the competing concepts but also the conceptual schemes in which these concepts are situated. (shrink)

This article examines the benefits and challenges of integrating decolonisation into philosophy. Its thesis is that a decolonial approach must address not only what decolonisation entails but also how to implement it methodologically. While the analysis of ethnocentrism in philosophy is crucial, it is insufficient if it remains confined to internal criticism without leading to a methodological introjection of the unfamiliar and the foreign. A solid methodology is essential to prevent superficial approaches to diversity and inclusion that fail to challenge (...) disciplinary practices. This methodology, however, is not an end but a means to encourage ongoing conversations beyond comparative and cross‐cultural philosophy. Thus, this article proposes methodological syncretism as a critical approach that embraces a variety of methodologies. The aim is to mitigate the risk of neutralizing the active force of decolonisation by reducing it to a mere theoretical abstraction, which could ultimately lead to a reproduction of colonial appropriation. (shrink)

This article has three main aims. First, it argues that the question of the inclusion of “non‐Western” thought in philosophy cannot be resolved by appealing to definitions of philosophy, as such definitions are an integral part of the epistemically hegemonic practices responsible for the exclusion of non‐Western thought in the first place. Second, it argues that philosophy is structurally Eurocentric. It makes this argument first by looking at metaphilosophy. It argues that metaphilosophy is primarily performative and that its performativity is (...) a form of boundary work that is engaged in hegemonic practices of the epistemic type. It then argues that philosophy as a whole is inescapably engaged in boundary work and hegemonic practices, some of which partake in structural Eurocentrism. Finally, it promotes sociometaphilosophy, an approach that draws from the new sociology of knowledge to identify illegitimate mechanisms of exclusion inscribed in the rules that codify philosophical practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to address the complex relationships within the geography of virtues. Based on the recent prototypical theories of concepts as idealized cognitive models arising from abstraction, the article argues that the relations between virtues are asymmetrical, with a prototypical virtue characterizing the whole category and specific virtues being character traits or skills derived from the prototypical virtue. It also argues that the most promising candidates for the role of prototypical virtue are phronesis (practical wisdom) and (...) the virtue of care, for their ability to represent and elicit any virtuous behavior when the situation calls for them. It therefore confronts the two options, which embody competing perspectives. In the concluding section, it proposes two possible directions for further research to settle in favor of one of the candidates. The article can be taken as an illustration of the potential of prototype theory for analyzing ethical concepts. (shrink)

Permissivism is the view that for some body of evidence E there may be more than one rational doxastic attitude that inquirers may take towards some proposition. This paper examines the aims and processes involved in doing the history of philosophy. It argues that the complexities involved in the process of doing the history of philosophy motivates hermeneutical permissivism. Section 2 of the paper discusses and motivates complexity. Section 3 focuses on a particular kind of complexity that historians face, namely, (...) the problem of theory choice. Section 4 argues that complexity motivates permissivism. Section 5 argues for the value of thinking about the task of the historian of philosophy as contributing to the landscape of plausible interpretations. The paper demonstrates how this way of thinking about our discipline may be productive and useful for historians of philosophy with differing aims. (shrink)

Some philosophical pluralists argue that both a top-down and a bottom-up approach serve as equally justified methods for engaging in ontological inquiry. In the top-down approach, we start with an analysis of theory and extrapolate from there to the world. In the bottom-up approach, we begin with an empirical investigation of the world and let our theory respond accordingly. The idea is that ontological conclusions arrived at via these two equally justified methods are then also equally justified. In this paper, (...) I argue that top-down/bottom-up methodological pluralism inadvertently grants primacy to the top-down approach. I go on to suggest that this is, in fact, unavoidable because it applies to ontological inquiry in general. Ontological inquiry invariably adopts the top-down approach because (a) ontological conclusions are not revealed during empirical investigations; instead, they are conceptual (i.e. theoretical) posits asserted top-down and (b) even if we consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches during ontological inquiry, such a consideration itself occurs from within theory (i.e. top-down). (shrink)

Individualism dominates Western ontologies: atoms and molecules; substances, minds, and agents. Each is said to embody conditions sufficient to establish its nature and existence. Ontologies spawned by Descartes's cogito and Kantian world‐making are, nevertheless, false to all we know of reality and ourselves. This paper suggests an alternative: entities and events are generated by the material circumstances in which they emerge and evolve; nothing at any scale is exempt from the discovery that its existence and character derive from and are (...) sustained by circumstances additional to those it embodies. All are embedded in the context that has been their source. (shrink)