Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

In this paper I discuss Siger of Brabant’s anti-deterministic argument as developed in De necessitate et contingentia causarum. First, I offer an in-depth reconstruction of how Siger justifi es the contingency of effects in nature: the contingent status of an effect depends only on (the contingent status of) its proximate cause, and not on the First Cause. According to Siger, the First Cause, which is understood as a necessary cause, only determines the necessity of its immediate effect. I, then show (...) that such an account runs into an impasse: it is, in fact, impossible to justify how there can be contingent (i.e., impedible) secondary causes in the chain of causes, once it has been assumed that the First Cause is a necessary (i.e., nonimpedible) cause which immediately produces a necessary effect. (shrink)

The article analyzes the occurrences and meaning of the expression ratio practica in the works of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. A lexicographical survey shows that ratio practica appears in the philosophical vocabulary of Latin medieval philosophy starting from the second quarter of the thirteenth century. In particular, it occurs with some frequency in the early works of Albertus Magnus (before 1250), who uses ratio practica in connection with Augustine of Hippo’s theory of the double reason (ratio superior and ratio (...) inferior). Albertus seems to abandon the use of ratio practica when he begins to engage with the exegesis of Aristotle. Notably, he uses it negligibly in the two commentaries on the complete version of the Nicomachean Ethics, of which, before 1250, he only knew the fi rst three books (Ethica nova and vetus). In contrast, Thomas Aquinas frequently uses the expression ratio practica, but only in contexts related to the psychological process preceding action, which Aristotle had primarily described in the Nicomachean Ethics. In short, thanks to Thomas, ratio practica is characterized as an Aristotelian notion, while Albertus’s merit lies in introducing it into the philosophical vocabulary. (shrink)

Walter Chatton’s Reportatio has been dated to 1322-23, possibly at London, and his Lectura either as a revision of bachelor lectures given earlier at Oxford, or given after 1323. Stephen Brown has shown that material in Chatton’s Lectura dates to 1323-1324 when Chatton and Ockham were disputing in the same place, presumably London, before Ockham left England forever. The present article shows how arguments dating to one place and time can be used in a later work, and should not be (...) used to date that work. (shrink)

The present contribution focuses on Harclay’s Parisian Commentary on the Sentences and is divided into two sections. The fi rst section (§1) is devoted to the attribution to Harclay of a Commentary on the second book of the Sentences, a controversial issue among scholars for decades. In this fi rst section, after having reconstructed in more detail the status quaestionis about the attribution of the Commentary contained in the ms. BAV, Borgh. 346, I will present new evidence in support of (...) its attribution to Henry of Harclay. The second section (§2) is devoted to an analysis of the manuscript tradition of Harclay’s Commentary, shedding light in particular on its indirect tradition, which is indispensable – as we shall see – for any editorial project. This section also contains an editorial Appendix with the text of Harclay’s Sent. II d. 12 q. 1, in which the Author provides his point of view on the topic of prime matter. This appendix is preceded by a brief analysis of the philosophical contents of the question. (shrink)

This article deals with the lectio ultima, the last lecture on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, written by theologians from the University of Cracow in the fi fteenth century. Previous studies concerning the last question from Cracow did not recognize it as a specifi c literary genre or acknowledge its characteristics. This article will attempt to disclose these. There is a strong relationship between the lectiones ultimae and the principia on the Sentences, which, thus far, has not been described in the literature. (...) This article characterizes the hallmarks of the lectiones ultimae which are understood as a separate literary genre and gives a catalogue of examples of this genre from the University of Cracow. (shrink)

From Hippocrates and Galen, meteorological medicine studied the impact of environmental factors and weather phenomena on mental and bodily health. This theory has been largely diffused by medical works and encyclopaedias, such as those of Vincentius de Beauvais and Bartholomeus Anglicus. However, its reception within mediaeval meteorology still remains to be fully inquired, partly because it was not a traditional topic to be discussed in the question commentaries on the Meteorologica of Aristotle. This article aims to focus on three Parisian (...) quaestiones on the Meteorologica in which Radulphus Brito and Themo Iudaei de Monasterio utilised concepts of meteorological medicine as a tool to explain meteorological principles. The medical theory is used to clarify how antiperistasis works within animals’ bellies and its impacts on their general health; and in the second one, to describe the harmful impacts water has on human and animal bodies; and then thirdly, to explain the process of generating rain. (shrink)

In 1972, Kurt Flasch broke new ground with his contentious thesis that Dietrich von Freiberg, as early as 1300, had formulated a theory of productive subjectivity. Flasch argues that Dietrich recognized the object-constituting function of the mind conceived in transcendental terms, much in the same vein as Immanuel Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding this thesis, Kant has been noticeably neglected in the relevant scholarly discussion. The following paper will address this oversight through a comparative analysis of (...) Dietrich’s and Kant’s theories on mental constitution and intellect. While there are general similarities between the two philosophers, closer inspection reveals critical discrepancies in their core theoretical constructs. Additionally, their respective methodologies are fundamentally incompatible. Dietrich’s approach does offer a reorientation in medieval thinking, yet its underpinnings of metaphysics and theocentricism clash with the experimental nature of Kant’s transcendental refl ections. (shrink)

This reexamination of documents purporting to show that Henry of Ghent served on a commission of 16 theologians that compiled the 219 articles condemned in 1277 produces a different picture. It shows that Henry did not serve on a special commission appointed by bishop Tempier but was present at a meeting of all masters, who condemned the articles. It also shows that Tempier did not bypass masters in the faculty of theology, but had them vote on the articles.

Recent scholarship has focused on the notion of ‘rationality’ and the consequences of different conceptions to the characterization of the human-animal divide. In this article, I attempt to further muddle the waters by considering examples of stricter requirements being imposed on what counts to be rational. I argue that whereas many medieval authors were willing to identify similarities in the way humans and non-human animals behave and process information, they also tended to emphasize the differences in those processes: human processes (...) are inherently rational (or rational-oriented), while those of other animals may resemble rational processes but are not rational. I further claim that this evidence should lead scholars to be less generous in their attribution of rationality to non-human animals to avoid trivializing that notion. (shrink)

In 2024, five centuries will have passed since the first course taught by Vitoria in Spain after his arrival in his native country. This monographic issue of Scio gathers the signatures of several experts on Vitoria's thought and the School of Salamanca.

In this paper, I propose a view of real definitions such that a difference of a species need not presuppose all of the differences that occur in the definition of the genus it qualifies. In such a case, two differences can be swapped in the definition of the species. Under this view, the correct diagrammatic representation of the subdivision of genera into species is a graph possibly containing cycles, rather than a tree as commonly assumed. Applying this theory, I respond (...) to Joseph Gredt’s claim that “rational animal” cannot be further specified except accidentally, as rationality does not admit further specification. I also tackle a different argument by David Oderberg to the effect that all possible rational animals, even merely possible ones, are of the same metaphysical species. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant attempts to derive the principle of causality from our observation of events’ temporal succession. His argument, however, faces difficult objections. These objections show that his argument is unable to draw the strong necessity of causation out of the weaker necessity of temporal succession. Thomists generally offer a different sort of argument from Kant. They seek to derive the principle of causality from the concept of actual contingent being. I compare the Kantian and Thomistic arguments, and I show that (...) the Thomistic argument is successful where the Kantian argument fails. I also defend the Thomistic argument from possible Kantian objections. (shrink)

The seventeenth-century Spanish Dominican Cosme de Lerma authored numerous philosophical works, some ofwhich were posthumously reorganised into a Cursus philosophicus, intended as an arts course for the Dominican studia in Italy. Lerma’s philosophical project consisted in developing the doctrines proposed a century earlier by his fellow Dominican friar Domingo de Soto. Through analysing Lerma’s Compendium and Disputationes based on Soto’s Summulae and Lerma’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Logic, this paper explores three issues: first, Lerma’s axiomatic theory of inference, including the development (...) of Soto’s project of relevance logic (relating to the analysis of the paradoxes of implication); second, the question whether there are different degrees of validity (answered negatively by Lerma); third, Lerma’s psychology of inference, which offers an interpretation of human inferential behaviour and its limitations in terms of the scholastic theories of causation and natural agency. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose and defend what I take to be the correct reading of the phrase non tantum… sed… as it is used by Duns Scotus. I identify two possible interpretations of the phrase — the Additive Interpretation and the Intensive Interpretation — and argue that the latter is correct. Then I analyse three occurrences of this construction in Scotus’s writing and show how misinterpreting it will lead and, in two of these cases, actually has (...) lead to an erroneous understanding of a crucial passage in Scotus. (shrink)

Given recent developments in Church-State relations, it is important to discuss the relationship between liberty and morality in law. We must reconcile the classical understanding of politics as a way to make citizens virtuous with a more modern understanding of law as institutional safeguards to liberty. Legal pronouncements can lead citizens to virtue or condemn their wrongdoing without engaging in forceful punishment. The law in this way can be used as an instrument of moral education. Congressional resolutions and moral curricula (...) serve as current examples of this. Political theorists and lawyers should reaffirm not only the just structures that constitute political offices but also the virtue required to uphold them. Without this proper moral education, citizens abandon their commitment to liberty. This solution allows us to recognize that liberty and virtue must coexist because the moral order is inextricably tied with the free order of society. (shrink)

In this essay I examine some instances of the relations between body and soul and between health and salvation in the development of the ‘medicine of the soul’, that is ‘spiritual medicine’ (12th–15th centuries). In particular, I examine texts by theologians and men of Church – Hugo de Fouilloy, Alanus de Insulis, Humbert de Romans, Nicola of Occam, Giovanni da S. Gimignano, Bartolomeo da Ferrara and Jean Gerson – in which aspects of secular medicine are used for ethical and spiritual (...) aims. I also touch upon some physicians – Gilles de Corbeil, Arnaldo da Villanova, Galvano da Levanto, Michele Savonarola – who are, in their medical writings, very attentive to the health of the soul and its salvation. (shrink)

The contribution aims to analyze the pathology of leprosy (al-ǧuḏām) and smallpox (al-ǧudarī) in the Arabic medical encyclopedia Kitāb al-Malakī, composed by the physician ʿAlī ibn al-ʿAbbas al-Maǧūsī, and in its two Latin translations, the Pantegni by Constantine the African and the Liber Regalis by Stephen of Antioch. The study of the Arabic text shows that the etiology of these diseases involves an interplay of different factors, including contagion, and explains to what extent the Kitāb al-Malakī presents original doctrines. Secondly, (...) by taking into account similarities and shifts in comparison with the Arabic original, the contribution shows how the two Latin translators faced the challenge of creating a new lexicon as a vehicle for the innovative translated ideas. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the exchange of letters (winter 1634) between the French scholar Jean Bourdelot and the Aristotelian philosopher Fortunio Liceti. The letters published in the appendix provide new information on the dissemination of Campanella’s works in France and on the attention paid to his thought in Aristotelian circles.

Few philosophers present themselves with as much complexity as Marcus Tullius Cicero. At once a philosopher, statesman, orator, and lawyer, Cicero consciously fashioned his own image for posterity and wrote philosophical texts as invitations for his readers to think for themselves. His philosophy has continued to unfold over the centuries, repeatedly inspiring new and independent philosophical positions. Since J.G.F. Powell’s pivotal contribution in 1995, we have witnessed countless translations and scholarly treatments of Cicero’s philosophy that emphasize his creativity and influence. (...) In this tradition, the present volume offers fresh and incisive contributions that advance the ongoing renaissance in Cicero scholarship. -/- Part One of the volume focuses on Cicero’s approaches to writing philosophy and on specific interpretive questions facing readers of his philosophical corpus. Part Two traces key moments in Cicero’s philosophical afterlife, from Augustine through the Scholastic period to the Renaissance, culminating in the rich and varied tradition of Ciceronian reception in the European Enlightenment. Throughout the volume, special attention is given to Cicero’s practical philosophy. (shrink)

This article distinguishes between two historical ways of presenting the catchphrase “Once true, always true” (semel verum, semper verum), associated with the twelfth-century logical school of the nominales. Within the Time-Jumping Model, a hypothetical tenseless propositional content (enuntiabile) is treated as the common significate of differently tensed statements, such as “Socrates will die” and “Socrates died,” uttered before and after Socrates’s death. This hypothetical enuntiabile is “always true” thanks to its tenseless nature. By contrast, the Fixed-Present Model preserves the tensed (...) character of enuntiabilia. By revealing an implicit temporal index, the nominales could apply “Once true, always true” to enuntiabilia such as Christum venisse (that Christ has come), which not only is true and will always be true but also – paradoxically – has always been true. It has always been true because it amounts to the propositional content that Christ came before this instant, where “this instant” rigidly denotes the present moment. The Fixed-Present Model alleviates the worry that the nominales confused truth-bearers with truthmakers. (shrink)

The idea of reconciling Ptolemaic planetary theory with Aristotelian natural philosophy by imagining epicycles and eccentric deferents as three-dimensional orbs or orb-segments within larger spheres is frequently associated with Georg Peurbach and his widely read astronomy textbook, the Theoricae novae planetarum (1454). This article cautions against existing tendencies to overstate the originality or revolutionary force of this work by taking a closer look at the early history of the same Ptolemaic-Aristotelian compromise in a Latin European context. Using previously unpublished or (...) unused source material from the twelfth to early fourteenth centuries, it documents the gradual spread and acceptance of an orbicular interpretation of Ptolemy’s planetary models among astronomers and university teachers. (shrink)

Continuing the tradition of Oxford Calculatorial physics, the late fourteenth-century British Carmelite Richard Lavenham authored an amplification of the popular short textbook commonly referred to as Termini naturales. A copy of this amplification, preserved in a late fourteenth-century manuscript (Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, ms Lat. Z. 300 [= 1872]), is followed by a short series of notes and comments on some of the principles introduced in Lavenham’s treatise (drawn from the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics). The present article offers (...) an edition of the text, and analyses its content and relationship with fourteenth-century physics, especially with the physical doctrines of Richard Lavenham. (shrink)

Peter John Olivi is oft characterized as having a particularly radical view, concerning the activity of the soul in cognition/appetite, where the soul’s cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes from which even their most basic acts are produced; in contrast, external corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any direct effect on these “higher” powers. Olivi’s view can appear to be untenable, either leaving external objects completely outside of psychological explanation or requiring some novel type of cause outside (...) of the typical medieval-Aristotelian causal framework. However, in this paper, I seek to alleviate this concern by considering Olivi’s response that the object can still be considered a “broadly efficient cause”; in particular, I look at how Olivi’s same view is endorsed by Gonsalvus of Spain, one of Olivi’s students. I argue that Gonsalvus takes a more diplomatic approach, despite endorsing essentially the same view, which shows that their shared active view of cognition/appetite can safely fit into a wider medieval-Aristotelian causal framework with some further explanation. As I explain, this interpretation of Olivi, alongside Gonsalvus, helps put later active views of cognition/appetite (e.g., from John Duns Scotus), and their own qualifications, into a more complete context. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to explain Peter John Olivi’s technical notion of “aspectus.” More specifically, I distinguish different uses of this notion by Olivi, not all of which have been made clear in the secondary literature, in order to help resolve a prima facie tension in the way Olivi puts together his active theory of cognition and his direct account of cognition (or “direct realism”). In brief, the issue is that Olivi builds his active theory of cognition out of (...) the commitment that the body cannot, strictly speaking, act as an efficient cause to produce an act of cognition in the spiritual soul; so, in order to account for soul-body interaction, Olivi will often speak of the soul having a seemingly one-way aspectus or orientation towards the body so that the soul can respond appropriately to changes in the body. However, given Olivi’s commitment to direct realism, the aspectus of cognition should go directly to the external object when, e.g., perceiving a present object. So, I take it Olivi must have some sort of distinction in mind between types of aspectūs in order to avoid contrariety. In short, my view is that by distinguishing between conscious/cognitive and non conscious/non-cognitive sorts of aspectūs in Olivi, one can understand how an aspectus towards inner corporeal changes can still contribute to direct cognition of external objects. Moreover, I take it that Olivi’s discussion of another technical notion, the mode of connection or “colligantia” between soul and body, provides further evidence for my interpretation. (shrink)