The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles has been challenged with various thought experiments involving symmetric universes. In this paper, I describe a fractal universe and argue that, while it is not a symmetric universe in the classical sense, under the assumption of a relational theory of space it nonetheless contains a set of objects indiscernible by pure properties alone. I then argue that the argument against the principle from this new thought experiment resists better than those from classical symmetric universes (...) three main objections put forth against this kind of arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a view of real definitions such that a difference of a species need not presuppose all of the differences that occur in the definition of the genus it qualifies. In such a case, two differences can be swapped in the definition of the species. Under this view, the correct diagrammatic representation of the subdivision of genera into species is a graph possibly containing cycles, rather than a tree as commonly assumed. Applying this theory, I respond (...) to Joseph Gredt’s claim that “rational animal” cannot be further specified except accidentally, as rationality does not admit further specification. I also tackle a different argument by David Oderberg to the effect that all possible rational animals, even merely possible ones, are of the same metaphysical species. (shrink)