Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...) discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses. Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature: “The proper study of mankind is man.”1. (shrink)

"This thesis is presented by Andrew Dunstall in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of philosophy, at Macquarie University, Sydney May 2012".

"This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy".

"A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy".

All chapters of this thesis have been removed due to copyright reasons.

An Invitation: The time has come to examine the ethical dimensions of our pharmaceutical and device enterprise more broadly. In this inaugural edition of Therapeutic Innovation & Regulatory Science, Lipworth et al have provided a useful introduction to ethical analysis, a framework to guide ethical discussions, and a possible research agenda around the ethical aspects of drug and device development and policy. It may seem strange to be proposing that TIRS become the vehicle for the discussion of the ethical dimensions (...) of policies on drug, device, and companion diagnostics development. But for too long our "industry" has neglected this dimension of our work, to the detriment of all stakeholders, most notably the patient/consumer. All of us are aware that our standing as an industry has suffered, and most of us would dearly love to be recognized as part of a vital enterprise dedicated to improving human health, not only unsullied by scandals fuelling the perception of overriding self-interest but also free to explore new ways to contribute to society. We are excited that TIRS might become the forum in which new thinking will emerge through systematic ethical analyses of pharmaceutical and device policy and practice. As Acting Executive Editor and Editorial Board members we hope that you, as a regulator, pre-clinical scientist, project manager, patient, clinician, health economist, or other stakeholder, will accept this invitation to become involved, and contribute to a stimulating and productive discussion about aspects of drug and device development that have been relatively overlooked heretofore. (shrink)

Audio recording of roundtable discussion between Robert Sinnerbrink, John Mullarkey, Berys Gaut, David Martin-Jones and William Brown held on October 12, 2009 at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. Over the course of at least the last hundred years the intellectual study of cinema has experienced a number of shifts towards and away from theoretical or philosophical attempts to understand the moving image. The twenty-first century sees film-philosophy resurgent, in part due to the interest in cinema that has flourished recently (...) in disciplines like philosophy, and in part due to the interdisciplinary nature of Film Studies. At a time when it is increasingly in vogue to return to theoretical questions previously pushed off the agenda by the dominance of historical approaches to cinema, such as the perennial "What is Cinema?", we are taking this opportunity to ask, "What is Film-Philosophy?" In a context that is witnessing the rise of digital cinema, the global dominance of multi-national media conglomerates, and the worldwide spread of "world cinemas", what role does theory or philosophy play in helping us understand cinema, and indeed, what role can cinema play in transforming philosophy? (shrink)

It may be argued that the emerging discourses focusing on the social, emotional, educational, and economic disadvantages identified for Australia’s First Peoples are becoming increasingly dissociated with an understanding of the interplay between historical and current trends in racism. Additionally, and if not somewhat related to this critique, it can be suggested that the very construction of research from a Western perspective of Indigenous identity and ways of being are deeply entwined within the undertones of epistemological racism still prevalent today. (...) It is the purpose of this article to move beyond the overreliance of outside-based understanding Western epistemologies, and to explore not only the complex nature of both racism and identity from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives, but to also explore the role of education and research in perpetuating varying levels of racism and resistance to Indigenous identity from a contemporary insider-based standpoint. It is hoped this article will shed some light on the pervasive nature of racism directed at Indigenous Australians, and highlight the need for the continual acceptance, respect, and promotion of Indigenous voices and identities within the educational environment and beyond. (shrink)

In this review, I attempt to engage critically with two issues raised in the book: first, the theoretical limits of a public reason based on disagreement; and second, the potential extent of Indigenous self-determination within Ivison's model of the State. The discussion of these two issues leads me to conclude that the conjunction of postcolonialism and liberalism cannot be sustained theoretically, though the conjunction serves as a useful polemic for teasing out the limits and the potential of liberal political theory.

Once upon a time there were three women: they were known as ‘the woman in black’, ‘the grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of humor’ and ‘the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock’. These women, who had known each other for quite some time, were all physicists. They were also friends. As physicists, the woman in black, the grey-haired woman with the well-developed sense of humour and the rather quiet woman with the capacity to shock had learned, and (...) now shared, ‘a specific vocabulary, grammar and rhetoric’. They knew what could count as a scientific observation, ‘what standards of accuracy in determining observations [were] possible, how the words of common language [were] restricted and refined for use in [their particular] scientific discipline’. They knew how to tell the ‘truth’. Rational knowledge and empirical evidence were no strangers to these women who were well versed in what could count as an argument. Consequently, it was said by some that these women constituted a microcosmic rational community. (shrink)

"Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from ‘Truth and Objectivity’ ". By Crispin Wright, Harvard UP, 2003, 9780674010772. This volume collects together Crispin Wright’s papers on realism and its oppositions, from his 1987 Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, in which the programme of his 1992 book Truth and Objectivity was first adumbrated, to papers on aspects of the programme published as recently as 2002. Readers familiar with Truth and Objectivity, and Wright’s earlier collection Realism, Meaning and Truth, will not be surprised (...) to hear that the body of work collected together in Saving the Differences is of the very highest calibre. Wright has been at the forefront of the realism debate for a good quarter-century, and here again we see analytic philosophy at its very best, with traditional philosophical issues tackled in a way that shows how the virtues of the analytic approach – clarity, logical rigour, precision – can be pursued at no expense to profundity or depth. In this study, I shall briefly survey Wright’s programme and the contents of the volume, before raising a few queries that occurred to me in reading through the articles in the book. (shrink)

Pt. I. Appearances of thought. 1. Appearances. 2. Thinking. 3. Recall -- Pt. II. Thinking with others. 4. By metaphor. 5. Conversing. 6. Absence -- Pt. III. Willing myths. 7. Being willing. 8. Resolving will. 9. Commandment -- Pt. IV. Judgment. 10. Process and judgment. 11. Working magic. 12. Willing thought.

The relationship between critical theory and psychoanalysis has a long and interesting history. The first generation of Frankfurt School philosophers, particularly figures such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, embraced psychoanalysis in order to explain why, given seemingly propitious historical circumstances, 'the masses' opted for fascism rather than communism during the 1930s. Following the rise of Nazism and the horrors of Auschwitz, Freudian psychoanalytic theory once again proved important, as evinced in Adorno's account of the 'authoritarian personality' and Adorno and (...) Horkheimer's earlier analysis of Nazism and anti-Semitism in the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". Marcuse's famous critique of the domination effects of 'repressive desublimation' is another example of the productive appropriation of psychoanalytic theory as a key element of the critical theory of modernity. (shrink)

Indigenous Australians represent 2.2% of the working age population, yet account for only 1.4% of all university enrolments. In relation to higher degree research students, Indigenous Australians account for 1.1% of enrolments, but only 0.8% of all higher degree research completions. This paper reports on findings that emerged from an Australian Research Council-funded study which aimed to establish a model of best practice for the supervision of Indigenous doctoral students. The project identified the dissertation examination as one of the critical (...) factors underpinning the success of doctoral candidates. Whilst research into the examination process for doctoral students is limited, the research that specifically explores the examination of dissertations submitted by Indigenous students is entirely inadequate. Our research identified key epistemological concerns that impact approaches to the examination process, to demonstrate how the dominance of Western methods of research impact the examination process for Indigenous doctoral students. This paper explores the experiences of 50 successful Indigenous Australian doctors with a specific focus on their examiner preference and disciplinary requirements. It highlights the limitations that some Indigenous students and their supervisors experience in finding an appropriate examiner. (shrink)

Theorists in the humanities and social sciences are increasingly aware of the need to account for the dynamic role played by spatial factors in nearly every domain of human experience. Theatre, as an art form that is utterly dependent on its own spatiality, has a major contribution to make to contemporary debates about space and place.

Terrence Malick’s The New World is a poetic evocation of one of America’s founding myths, the story of Pocahontas. While the film allegorises - through the theme of marriage - the possibility of successful cultural exchange and of reconciliation with nature, it also fuses mythic history, subjective reflection, and the self-expression of nature. This unstable point of view has led to a critical ambivalence concerning the film’s romantic naivety: its evocation of ideologically suspect myths or historically anachronistic tropes. My discussion (...) defends the film as knowingly romantic; an aesthetic challenge to our historical scepticism towards the experience of new worlds. (shrink)

Like the fabled black swan of early epistemological inquiry, ‘Australasian Continental philosophy’ seems a kind of chimera apt to raise doubts rather than certainty. Is there such a mythical creature? Is it nothing more than a pale reflection of more paradigmatic instances found ‘overseas’, as we say in Australia, an Antipodean counterpart to the ‘major’ developments occurring in the United Kingdom or the United States? Or are there distinctive features of this phenomenon that, like the black swan, represent an unexpected (...) variation unique to the Australasian environment? For a movement that one can date as first appearing in the early part of the twentieth century—the publication of John McKellar Stewart’s 1913 critical study of Henri Bergson’s philosophy may serve as a convenient starting point—it is surprising that Continental philosophy in Australia has only recently become a topic of historical interest. Part of the problem is the contested nature of the phenomenon in question. ‘Continental philosophy’ is a term that goes back to the nineteenth-century historical contrast between ‘British empiricism’ and ‘Continental rationalism’ ). It emerges more explicitly, however, with J.S. Mill’s essays on the contrast between Benthamite philosophy and the ‘Germano-Coleridgean doctrine’, the latter being identified with the ‘Continental philosophers’, and ‘the Continental philosophy’ as well as ‘French philosophy’. It takes on its more contemporary meaning, however, only after WWII, especially during the 1950s. The term gives way to the political urgency of Marxism and feminism during the 1970s, gains a new sense of institutional valency during the 1980s and 90s, and has more recently become the subject of meta-philosophical reflection. (shrink)

In this chapter, we argue for three theses: (1) we lack the power to form beliefs at will (i.e., directly); at very least, we lack the power to form at will beliefs of the kind that proponents of doxastic voluntarism have in mind; but (2) we possess a propensity to form beliefs for non-epistemic reasons; and (3) these propensities—once we come to know we have them—entail that we have obligations similar to those we would have were doxastic voluntarism true. Specifically, (...) we will argue that we have obligations to avoid triggering these propensities to form beliefs that are unwarranted or even immoral. (shrink)

This paper analyses the model of interaction at the heart of Axel Honneth's social philosophy. It argues that interaction in his mature ethics of recognition has been reduced to intercourse between human persons and that the role of nature is now missing from it. The ethics of recognition takes into account neither the material dimensions of individual and social action, nor the normative meaning of non-human persons and natural environments. The loss of nature in the mature ethics of recognition is (...) made visible through a comparison with Honneth's initial formulation of his project. As an anthropology of intersubjectivity combining the teaching of the German philosophical anthropologists and G.H. Mead, his first model sought to ground social theory in the natural preconditions of human action. The last part of the article argues that a return to Mead's theory of practical intersubjectivity informed by Merleau-Ponty's germane theory of intercorporeity provides essential conceptual tools to enable the integration of the natural and the material within the theory of recognition. (shrink)

Introduction. There is substantial evidence that patients with delusions exhibit a reasoning bias—known as the “jumping to conclusions” bias—which leads them to accept hypotheses as correct on the basis of less evidence than controls. We address three questions concerning the JTC bias that require clarification. Firstly, what is the best measure of the JTC bias? Second, is the JTC bias correlated specifically with delusions, or only with the symptomatology of schizophrenia? And third, is the bias enhanced by emotionally salient material? (...) Methods. To address these questions, we conducted a series of meta-analyses of studies that used the Beads task to compare the probabilistic reasoning styles of individuals with and without delusions. Results. We found that only one of four measures of the JTC bias—“draws to decision”—reached significance. The JTC bias exhibited by delusional subjects—as measured by draws to decision—did not appear to be solely an epiphenomenal effect of schizophrenic symptomatology, and was not amplified by emotionally salient material. Conclusions. A tendency to gather less evidence in the Beads task is reliably associated with the presence of delusional symptomatology. In contrast, certainty on the task, and responses to contradictory evidence, do not discriminate well between those with and without delusions. The implications for the underlying basis of the JTC bias, and its role in the formation and maintenance of delusions, are discussed. (shrink)

This article analyses letters to the editor written on or about Muslims printed in a British broadsheet newspaper. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is applied as a model for explaining and understanding the arguments employed in the sampled letters. Our presentation of pragma-dialectical theory focuses on argumentative reasonableness. More specifically, we introduce the four dialectical stages through which any argument must pass and explain the ten rules of critical discussion that participants must follow throughout if they are to resolve the (...) argument. The article focuses in particular on the letter writers' use of argument schemes-that is, the manner in which these writers use arguments to support their standpoints. We conclude by highlighting the role that unreasonable arguments can play in perpetuating racialized inequalities and hence the importance of analyzing argumentation. (shrink)

A book review of The Moral, Social and Political Philosophy of the British Idealists. Edited by William Sweet, ISBN:9780907845676.

Morally good action requires both sincere moral judgment and moral motivation. Internalists claim in one way or another that these two things are internally connected. Externalists, on the other hand, claim that the connection between moral judgment and action is forged by motives external to the judgment itself. First we will look at the evidence from psychopathy, then we will turn to cases of so-called acquired sociopathy.

A review of Andrew Haas’ "Hegel and the Problem of Multiplicity", Northwestern University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-810-11670-7 ; 0-810-11669-3.

This is a clear and critical account of Foucault's political thought: what he said, how it's been used and its influence today. Michel Foucault, French philosopher, social theorist, historian of ideas and literary critic, is primarily known as a radical thinker who disturbs our understanding of society, yet little attention has been paid to his politics. Now, Mark Kelly details and criticises all of Foucault's major political ideas: the historical relativity of knowledge; exclusion and abnormality; his radical reconception of power; (...) his historical analysis of biopolitics in terms of discipline and biopower; his concept of governmentality; and his late work around ethics and subjectivity. Kelly shows how Foucault's positions changed over time, how his thought has been used in the political sphere and examines the importance of his work for politics today. It engages with Foucault's entire corpus, from his first works right up to his posthumously published College de France lectures and the unabridged version of the History of Madness. It looks at the theoretical reception of Foucault's thought and how it has been applied to real-world problems. (shrink)

This paper examines Rorty's view of the relation between religion and philosophical pluralism. The first section deals with monotheism in the context of Rorty's pluralist approach to truth. The discussion here deals mainly with the reflexive stance towards belief that pluralism requires of the believer. The second section considers the way Rorty sketches the moral hopes embodied in pluralism, the basic kind of social relations that would typify a pluralist culture, and the capacity of monotheism to orient or sustain those (...) relations. The general conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that monotheism - at least in the sense Rorty gives to that term - is structurally at odds with pluralism in the ways Rorty suggests. In the third section, however, it is argued that Rorty's case is vitiated by its reliance on utilitarianism. Rorty invokes utilitarianism to show how religion can be made compatible with pluralism, but - as critics of utilitarianism have long argued - utilitarianism is badly suited to this purpose because it is insensitive to the specific normative content of religion. (shrink)

My concern in this paper is to consider issues of life and death as political issues, to locate a ʻbio-politicsʼ, a politics of life, and a ʻthanato-politicsʼ, a politics of death, within our ways of thinking about and imagining politics. I follow two recent theorists, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, who are convinced that not only must we consider how we exercise powers of life and death in modern politics but how the very notion of politics and political community are (...) intimately related to such issues. At issue is the power we call sovereign power, and its relation to this politics of life and death. I shall in turn consider four possible theses that can be derived from the work of these thinkers and from other twentieth century critical and legal theorists. (shrink)

A focus on the presence of unjustified coercion is one of the central normative concerns of Kant’s entire practical philosophy, from the ethical to the cosmopolitical. This focus is intimately interconnected with Kant’s account of sovereignty, since only the sovereign can justifiably coerce others unconditionally. For Kant, the sovereign is she who has the rightful authority to legislate laws and who is subject only to the laws that she gives herself. In the moral realm (or kingdom) of ends, each citizen (...) is both a member of that realm and an equal co-sovereign of its categorically binding laws (GMS, 4:433-34, Reath 2006, p. 5). As such, each citizen is 'subject to the moral law' only insofar as she is 'at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only for that reason subordinated to it' (GMS, 4:440). But when Kant comes to think about sovereignty in the political sphere, a number of tensions emerge. These tensions emerge because a doctrine of absolutist popular sovereignty, according to which the people are the ultimate holders of sovereignty, seems to be implied by Kant’s underlying normative theory. However, Kant also makes numerous explicit statements which seem to imply a doctrine of absolutist ruler sovereignty, according to which the ruler is the ultimate holder of sovereignty. And this seems inconsistent. However, despite the appearance of inconsistency I shall argue, by exploring the issues of civil disobedience and cosmopolitan peace, that Kant consistently defends an account of absolutist popular sovereignty which is compatible with his core normative commitments. Exploring these issues will also illuminate Kant’s political teleology by showing us the political ends towards which we should work and the means by which we should pursue them. (shrink)

In this essay, I take as a starting point Foucault’s rejection of two different ways of thinking about the future, prophecy and utopianism, and use this rejection as a basis for the elaboration of a more detailed rejection of them, invoking complexity-based epistemic limitations in relation to thinking about the future of political society. I follow Foucault in advocating immanent political struggle, which does not seek to build a determinate vision of the future but rather focuses on negating aspects of (...) the current conjuncture. I extend this argument into an ethical register, arguing that the same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to our personal lives. I conclude by engaging with Jacques Lacan’s account of subjectivity, and the interpretation of its political import furnished by Yannis Stavrakakis, drawing from these additional supports for my position, in particular the rejection of utopianism as an attempt to avoid limitation by the real. (shrink)

One of the many fault-lines within accounts of consciousness concerns the unity of consciousness. Some theorists claim that consciousness is unified—indeed, some theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this (...) chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations that can hold between conscious states, and in the following sections I show how these unity relations can be used to construct various conceptions of the unity of consciousness—what I call unity theses. These unity theses provide us with a set of reference points by means of which we can orient discussions of the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

A book review of Daniel Frampton's 'Filmosophy', 2006. London: Wallflower, ISBN 1904764843.

Kant develops his political philosophy in the context of a teleological conception of both nature and human history. For Kant, political thought must be undertaken in the context of a progressive historical view of humanity’s place in nature. For this reason Kant would strongly agree with John Rawls’s claim that one of the key roles that political philosophy plays in a society’s political culture is that of ‘probing the limits of practicable political possibility. In this role, we view political philosophy (...) as realistically utopian’ (Rawls 2007, pp. 10-11). The fact that political philosophy has this public role helps to explain the close links that exist between politics and teleology in Kant’s work. Teleology is the study of ends and of the purposiveness of both nature and history. One of the key roles of political philosophy is, for Kant, to probe what politics and human societies more generally can, will and should become in the context of the historically developing and purposive natural systems of which humans are part. Politics must be understood in its natural and historical context, but nature (especially human nature) and history must in turn be understood from a progressive political perspective. For Kant, the historical outcome of this purposive natural system, the end of history, is the full development of humanity’s predispositions for the use of reason within a moral and just society. This volume explores these issues. (shrink)