Ce volume inaugure l'édition française de l'ensemble de l'activité exégétique d'Averroès sur la somme logique qu'est l' " Organon " aristotélicien. On trouvera, accompagnées de l'annotation essentielle, les oeuvres d'Averroès sur le traité " De l'interprétation ", où Aristote établit la doctrine de la proposition simple et de ses éléments constitutifs.

Il y a trente ans, un lecteur curieux de consulter un ouvrage de synthèse sur la biographie antique se trouvait confronté à une situation étrange. D’un côté, il pouvait bénéficier des travaux consacrés à l’hagiographie tardo-antique et médiévale, un domaine où la recherche scientifique était (et est encore) extrêmement vivante et féconde depuis le début du xxe siècle, notamment sous l’impulsion des travaux des Bollandistes et du P. Hippolyte Delehaye. D’un autre côté, et s’il cherchait un ape...

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

On February 22, 1987, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published the Donum Vitae Instruction. Twenty years later, on February 22, 2007, Pope Benedict XVI asked for an update of this Instruction. According to the Donum Vitae Instruction of 1987, the principle of the holiness of life imposes respect for human persons from the very beginning of human life. In these past 20 years, new medical techniques have raised fresh ethical issues that are to be addressed by the (...) Roman Catholic Church Magisterium. The Roman Catholic Church, in its update of the Instruction planned for 2007, will have to explain how civil law is to be regulated according to the fundamental norms of the moral law. The moral message of the new Donum Vitae will be to affirm the substance of human justice: respect for human life, as expressed in the resolve not to infringe on, or to protect such life. Even in a post-Christian Europe, this theological message can be understood if it is true that Europe is marked by the principle of the absolute protection of human life. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus présente le scepticisme néo-pyrrhonien comme une philosophie qui cherche la vérité (PH I, 1-3). Il est difficile de le croire, pourtant, lorsque l ’ on étudie les longues séries d ’ arguments qu ’ il met en opposition afin de produire l ’ isosthénie, la force égale des arguments, qui amène à la suspension du jugement. Comment faut-il interpréter ce qui pourrait apparaître comme un décalage entre la théorie et la pratique du scepticisme? Plutôt que de conclure à (...) l ’ inconséquence du scepticisme, (i) l ’ article se propose de reprendre à nouveaux frais les passages où Sextus présente le scepticisme comme une recherche de la vérité. Pour ce faire, il faut d ’ une part (ii) lier cette présentation à l ’ opération de différenciation entre le scepticisme de la Nouvelle Académie et celui des néo-pyrrhoniens ; d ’ autre part (iii) revenir sur la pratique du scepticisme par les néo-pyrrhoniens. Loin d ’ être une recherche de la vérité, le pyrrhonisme présenté par Sextus Empiricus recherche l ’ incertitude à l ’ origine du bonheur sceptique. (shrink)

Why is there a specific problem with biological individuality? Because the living realm contains a wide range of exotic particular concrete entities that do not easily match our ordinary concept of an individual. Slime moulds, dandelions, siphonophores are among the Odd Entities that excite the ontological zeal of the philosophers of biology. Most of these philosophers, however, seem to believe that these Odd Cases oblige us to refine or revise our common concept of an individual. They think, explicitly or tacitly, (...) that to be a living, evolutionary entity is to be a living individual. In this paper, we explore an alternative proposal: the variety and oddity of the forms of the living realm might be ontologically regimented through an increase in the categorial complexity of the living realm, by admitting, beside living individuals, living non-individuals or by acknowledging, more generally, that the evolutionary development of the living forms is not necessarily a process of building individuals, that life is not necessarily individuals-oriented. We claim that, from an ontological point of view, the spectacle of the living realm obliges us to take aggregativity seriously. (shrink)

Lacepède was a key figure in the French intellectual world from the Old Regime to the Restoration, sinc e he was not only a scientist, but also a musician, a writer, and a politician. His brilliant career is a good example of the progress of the social status of scientists in France around 1800. In the life sciences, he was considered the heir to Buffon and continued the latter’s Histoire naturelle, but he also borrowed ideas from anti-Buffonian scientists. He broached (...) many important subjects such as the nature of man, the classification of animals, the concept of species, and the history of the Earth. All these topics led to tensions in the French sciences, but Lacepède dealt with them in a consensual, indeed even ambiguous way. For example, he held transformist views, but his concept of evolution was far less precise and daring than Lamarck’s contemporaneous attempts. His somewhat confused eclecticism allowed him to be accepted by opposing camps of the French scientific community at that time and makes his case interesting for historians, since the opinions of such an opportunistic figure can illuminate the figure of the French intellectual better than more original works could do. In turn, Lacepède’s important social and scientific position gave his views a significant visibility. In this sense, his contributions probably exerted an influence, in particular with regard to the emergence of transformist theories. (shrink)

The article aims at assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the objections to Habermas’s epistemic conception of democracy raised by Thomas McCarthy in some of his essays. The author defends two ideas. First, he contends that McCarthy is mistaken in believing that democratic debates would not be a matter of consensus. In this regard, two arguments are raised, showing that the search for agreement and consensus by citizens in public forums can hardly be dismissed and that consensus can be invested (...) with many meanings in democratic life. Secondly, however, the author approves McCarthy when challenging Habermas’s epistemic claims regarding his theory of democracy. Not all democratic deliberations can be analysed in epistemic terms, in particular, debates on values. The pitfalls of any epistemic account of this form of deliberation are pointed out in the end of the essay. (shrink)

Dans la philosophic d'Emmanuel Lévinas (Totalité et Infini, 1961; Autrement qu'être, 1974) l'idée de la priorité absolue de l'éthique sur le savoir se traduit par la place centrale accordée à la notion de justice. Dans les rapports de personne à personne, l'exigence de justice est fondée sur l'idée de la non-réciprocité de la relation éthique. La priorité de l'autre sur le Moi se traduit par une conception de la justice comme don. D'un autre côté, la réalité économique, sociale et politique (...) du monde postule l'institution d'une justice objective, commandée par la figure du tiers comme l'autre de l'autre. Cependant, une société qui reposerait sur le seul principe de l'équilibre entre les intérêts égoïstes de chacun de ses membres n'instituerait qu'une égalité purement formelle, qui mènerait nécessairement à la lutte permanente de tous contre tous. D'où une critique fondamentale (quoiqu'implicite) de la théorie contractualiste de la justice. Ces différents principes sont illustrés concrètement par les commentaires de certains passages du Talmud que Levinas développe dans les Quatre lectures talmudiques (1968), Du sacné au saint (1977) et L'au-delà du verset (1982). /// Na filosofia de Emmanuel Levinas, particularmente na sua expressdo mais significativa em Totalité et Infini (1961) e Autrement qu'être (1974), a ideia da prioridade absoluta da itica sobre o saber traduz-se na centralidade da noção de justiça. Nas relações de pessoa a pessoa, a exigência de justiça está fundada sobre a ideia da não-reciprocidade da relação ética. A prioridade do outro sobre o Eu traduz-se por uma concepção da justiça como dom. Por outro lado, a realidade económica, social e política do mundo postula a instituição duma justiça objectiva, determinada pela ftgura do terceiro como outro do outro. No entanto, uma sociedade que repousasse apenas sobre o princípio do equilíbrio entre os interesses egoístas de cada um dos seus membros não instituiria senão uma igualdade puramente formal, a qual conduziria necessariamente à luta permanente de todos contra todos. Daí a crítica fundamental de Levinas (ainda que implícita) da teoria contratualista da justiça. O artigo ilustra estes diferentes princípios de forma concreta mediante o recurso que faz aos comentários de Levinas sobre determinadas passagens do Talmude, tal como é o caso em Quatre lectures talmudiques (1968), Du sacré au saint (1977) et L'au-delà du verset (1982). (shrink)

La experiencia común presenta los sueños como una sucesión de imágenes. Incluso quienes lo teorizaron vinculan lo onírico con lo visual: soñar es ver algo. No obstante, dado que los sueños están habitados por negatidades que se presentan bajo la forma de la ausencia, de la falta, de la frustración o, de manera más general, del deseo, el autor muestra que la ontología paradójica de éstas obliga a alejarnos del paradigma visual de la representación para pensarlo mediante el modelo discursivo (...) de la significación. Así, lejos de ser una imagen, los sueños son siempre ya un texto. (shrink)

This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals and the existence (...) of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reductive account of intentions which I call a gate-based reductive account. In contrast with other reductive accounts, however, the reductive basis of this account is not limited to desires, beliefs and judgments. I suggest that an intention is a complex state in which a predominant desire toward a plan is not inhibited by a gate mechanism whose function is to assess the comparison of our desires given the stakes at hand. To vindicate this account, (...) I rely on several considerations: the similarity between epistemic feelings and the feeling of being decided that tells us that we have an intention, the necessity of postulating a gate mechanism to explain our hesitating behavior, and the tight link that exists between the realization of our actions and our desires. In agreement with non-reductivists, I nevertheless acknowledge that intentions encompass plans, although I emphasize that the planning capacity must also be dependent on our motivational life and the general evaluative mechanisms that explains our emotions. (shrink)

We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. The translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. It is practically relevant because it makes it possible to use a decision procedure for the guarded fragment in order to decide regular grammar logics with (...) converse. The class of regular grammar logics includes numerous logics from various application domains. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for every regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Other logics that can be translated into GF2 include nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed-point operators. (shrink)

This paper proposes an essentially theoretical reflection on initial training, a reflection based on four fundamental concepts: professional development, professional identity, well-being and strengths of character. More specifically, recognizing the complexity of the teaching profession, the authors argue that the teacher training in Quebec gives too little room for self-reflection. According to them, this reflection should be based on a search for meaning in terms of a vision of well-being. Positive psychology research on strengths of character may provide useful avenues (...) for rethinking teacher education. (shrink)

Michel Villey a consacré toute sa carrière universitaire à démontrer la fécondité de la définition philosophie du droit que nous ont léguée les jurisconsultes romains. Pour Villey, comprendre " le droit comme un partage " c'est saisir toute la richesse de l'esprit du droit romain. Le droit est bien plus que l'ensemble des règles juridiques posées par l'Etat ou l'ensemble des précédents judiciaires décidés par le Juge. Le droit est partage ; il est cette attribution de biens et de charges (...) que le Législateur ou le Juge découvrent. Le droit n'est pas un pouvoir qui dit, sans nuance, ce qui doit être des rapports juridiques entre citoyens. Le droit n'est pas extérieur aux relations humaines, il est dans la relation entre les hommes. Le droit unit pour " bien vivre ensemble " mettant ainsi fin à ce qui désunit. Plus que la décision d'une autorité formellement compétente, le droit ancré dans la réalité des choses, est une recherche intellectuelle. Prendre au sérieux l'intelligence des juristes signifie leur permettre de comprendre ce qu'il y a de juste dans les rapports sociaux. A l'heure où les pays de l'Union européenne peinent à se mettre d'accord sur le contenu juridique de la Constitution européenne, il paraît essentiel de revenir à la pensée de Michel Villey et à travers elle, redécouvrir la dimension historique commune à tous les systèmes juridiques européens. (shrink)

La physique métaphysique de Descartes permet de synthétiser plusieurs aspects de la philosophie naturelle de Descartes et de comprendre pourquoi elle repose sur une approche métaphysique. Cet ouvrage, qui n'a jusqu'à aujourd'hui aucun équivalent même en France, se présente comme une sorte de manuel de physique cartésienne, une introduction à sa philosophie mécaniste, telle que lui-même, ou un homme de son époque, bienveillant, mais non dénué de réserves critiques, l'aurait présentée. C'est, en effet, en tant que métaphysicien, c'est-à-dire en ayant (...) fait de la métaphysique le fondement de sa physique, que Descartes tranche les questions qui se posent au sujet des atomes, des espaces vides, des lois de la matière. Par là, Descartes rompt avec la tradition et se démarque de son époque, souligne Daniel Garber. Mais il ne se borne pas à ce constat : il expose aussi soigneusement les termes du débat et les nombreuses controverses auxquelles les options métaphysiques de Descartes ont donné lieu. Au fur et à mesure se dégage le portrait d'un homme de plus en plus préoccupé par la construction de son système et de moins en moins attaché à résoudre des problèmes particuliers, fussent-ils scientifiques ou métaphysiques. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

Longtemps, les philosophes français du XIXe siècle, ont été injustement rejetés. Dans les années 30, l'extrême droite, avec Léon Daudet, les disait " stupides ". Dans les années 60, l'extrême gauche, avec Louis Althusser, les jugeait pitoyables et affligeants. De telles opinions sont désormais revues et corrigées. La lecture des textes est d'ailleurs éclairante. A l'évidence, ces œuvres du siècle dernier esquissent, le plus souvent, le cadre des grands débats intellectuels d'aujourd'hui. Qu'il s'agisse des rapports entre l'esprit scientifique et la (...) spiritualité religieuse, des relations entre la civilisation occidentale et les autres cultures, ou de la conception du rôle de l'Etat. Philosophie, France, XIXe siècle constitue le premier panorama du genre : il rassemble un large ensemble de textes essentiels - toujours donnés dans leur version intégrale-, introuvables en librairie. Organisé en chapitres thématiques, qui reprennent les principaux fils directeurs de la réflexion du temps, détaillent les enjeux et les inscrivent dans leur contexte historico-philosophique, le volume constitue un instrument irremplaçable pour découvrir l'une des périodes les plus méconnues de la philosophie française. (shrink)

Il ne subsiste aucun vestige de la charpente du temple d’Apollon construit à Delphes durant le ive s. av. J.‑C., ni de bloc comportant des réservations pour l’appui des poutres. En revanche, de nombreux passages des comptes de construction mentionnent des pièces en bois et font état de travaux sur les parties hautes du monument. Nous présentons ici un commentaire de ces inscriptions qui s’articule autour de trois objectifs principaux : déterminer la destination et la fonction des pièces de bois (...) ; analyser le vocabulaire technique ; établir la chronologie des travaux dans les parties hautes du temple. Au‑delà d’une étude centrée sur l’architecture delphique, le corpus mobilisé contribue à la caractérisation des techniques de charpente et à la connaissance du déroulement des chantiers d’architecture monumentale en Grèce ancienne. (shrink)

It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...) concept of belief. In contrast, it appears that no similar constraint applies when we deliberate about emotions. Indeed, I argue that extrinsic norms are suf ficient to understand thoroughly the normativity of emotions. Therefore, the postulation of intrinsic norms or correctness conditions seems unmotivated. Worse, if emotions had intrinsic norms or correctness conditions, they would manifest themselves when we wonder whether an emotion is appropriate in this or that context. But they don’t. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First, we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian (...) Hypotyposes 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy. (shrink)

In this theoretical contribution, we interpret the notion of professional development in the light of concepts coming from cognitive development. This brings us to consider teacher training as not only having to allow the elaboration of skills, but also as having to encourage the development of new cognitive structures. We explore the theoretical concepts in relation with certain processes revealed by the reflexive texts of the students. Finally, we propose ways that could foster certain dimensions of global professional development in (...) learners, among which self-regulated learning, the focus on certain concerns and taking into account certain types of information. (shrink)

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. (...) I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats. (shrink)

Est-il sensé de croire que l’art et la littérature puissent jouer un rôle dans la formation morale de l’être humain? Aident-ils à rendre l’être humain meilleur? Apportent-ils des lumières au plan moral qui pourraient contribuer à éduquer les élus et les citoyens? Cet article se penche sur les débats récents entourant ces questions dans la philosophie anglo-américaine. J’entends évaluer les principaux arguments qui ont été avancés pour soutenir l’idée que l’art et la littérature peuvent contribuer à l’éducation morale, mais aussi (...) pour réfuter les critiques, nombreuses, qui ont été formulées à l’endroit d’une telle perspective. Trois objections, en particulier, retiennent mon attention : les objections conséquentialiste, épistémique et normative. (shrink)

Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on smaller (...) sets of issues can lead to paradoxical outcomes. Any pragmatic method for running a multi-issue election will have to balance these two concerns. We identify and analyse the problem of generating an agenda for a given election, specifying which issues to vote on together in local elections and in which order to schedule those local elections. (shrink)

Que l’idéologie raciste nazie ait pu engendrer la Shoah relève de l’évidence, la plus effrayante sans aucun doute de toute l’histoire du XXe siècle. Que des juristes catholiques et patriotes aient pu se montrer les complices actifs de la persécution des Juifs ne s’explique que dans le contexte d’une IIIe République déchirée et agonisante, accouchant du régime de Vichy. Mais..

In this short piece I defend my position on self-consciousness against the objections raised by Dow and Musholt to a paper in the same issue. These are that (1) Bermudez’s (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness broadly supports the CP Hypothesis; (2) the self-concept requires no further complexity than knowledge of one’s own existence and capacity to take deliberate action; (3) understanding the idea of a perceiver requires understanding the concept of an agent that performs the action of perception; (4) Dow (...) dismisses the possibility of scrub jay self-consciousness too readil. (shrink)

Homeosis is a developmental abnormality corresponding to the transformation of a part of the body into another one. This term was introduced in 1894 by William Bateson, who aimed to make an inventory of all kinds of biological variation in order to understand how evolution proceeds. But, immediately afterwards experimental embryology, or Entwicklungsmechanik in Germany, adopted and redefined this term to refer to abnormal regenerations in which the newly developed organ was not identical to the initial one but rather resembled (...) another part of the body. At that time, many experimental embryologists, such as Wilhelm Roux, were calling for the elimination of any phylogenetic explanation of development and were attempting to promote more mechanistic, proximate explanations. Despite these recommendations, several biologists continued to account for developmental processes by turning to phylogeny instead of mechanical forces. The case of homeosis is representative. Indeed, abnormal regenerations were often seen as examples of atavisms, or recurrence of ancestral characteristics, and many embryologists appealed to Ernst Haeckel's 'fundamental biogenetic law' to explain these strange phenomena. The break between Haeckelian tradition and Entwicklungsmechanik is thus less radical than often assumed, and the homeosis concept represents one of the factors of this continuity. (shrink)

Le processus d'hominisation n'est ni plus ni moins que la solution à la violence engendrée par l'imitation des désirs.

Selon le subjectivisme à propos du bien-être, un événement contribue au bien-être d’un individu dans la mesure où cet individu a ou aurait une certaine pro-attitude à l’égard de cet événement dans des circonstances à préciser. Une telle approche doit donc spécifier un certain nombre d’éléments de cette définition, par exemple les circonstances pertinentes. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur la pro-attitude pertinente. Afin d’organiser la discussion, je soutiens que cette pro-attitude doit satisfaire trois desiderata. Elle doit permettre de (...) formuler une conception du bien-être qui serait extensionnellement adéquate moyennant une détermination satisfaisante des circonstances pertinentes. Elle doit offrir une conception du bien-être qui ne varie pas, peu importe que l’on considère des êtres humains à la naissance, jeunes ou adultes. Elle doit enfin exister effectivement. Ces desiderata posés, je montre qu’un subjectivisme faisant appel au désir, à une pro-attitude cognitive ou plus complexe, éventuellement comprise en termes de désirs, ne peut satisfaire à la fois le critère d’adéquation extensionnelle et le critère d’invariabilité. En réponse à cette difficulté, je suggère que le subjectivisme devrait adopter une pro-attitude de valorisation. Une telle pro-attitude a été introduite par différents auteurs, mais j’en propose une interprétation plus simple et je soutiens qu’elle est la seule à satisfaire les trois desiderata initialement présentés. (shrink)

Si nul ne sait ce que peut un environnement, nul ne sait sans doute davantage ce que peut être de nos jours une philosophie de l’environnement. Aussi est-il souhaitable de faire dialoguer des philosophes d’ici et d’ailleurs, d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, que nous avons tendance à tenir pour étrangers aux problèmes environnementaux parce que nous négligeons le plus souvent de les interroger sur ce chapitre où les questions et les réponses semblent connues d’avance. En tirant le portrait sur fond de crise (...) écologique de plus d’une quinzaine de penseurs différents (d’Edmund Husserl à Peter Sloterdijk, en passant par Martin Heidegger, Arne Næss et Gilles Deleuze), dont les voix et les visages parfois se mêlent, cet ouvrage voudrait modifier l’éclairage sous lequel ces penseurs sont perçus et, par là, contribuer à jeter une autre lumière sur ce que peuvent être les enjeux et les défis d’une pensée de l’environnement dont l’identité reste à construire. (shrink)