While many commentators have remarked on Nietzsche’s admiration for the Greek historian Thucydides, most reduce the affinity between the two thinkers to their common commitments to “political realism” or “scientific naturalism.” At the same time, some of these same commentators have sought to minimize or dismiss Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the Greek sophists. We do not deny the importance of realism or naturalism, but we suggest that, for Nietzsche, realism and naturalism are rooted in a rejection of moral absolutism and its (...) leading advocates, Socrates and Plato. Through careful exegesis of crucial sections from Daybreak, we show that, as early as 1880 (if not earlier), Nietzsche regarded the agonistic, anti-absolutist stance of the sophist Protagoras as an indispensable model both for Thucydides’s history and for his own philosophy. (shrink)

The science underlying global warming, climate change, and the connections between these phenomena are reviewed. Projected future climate changes under various plausible scenarios of future human behavior are explored, as are the potential impacts of projected climate changes on society, ecosystems, and our environment. The economic, security, and ethical considerations relevant to determining the threat posed by climate change are subsequently assessed. The article then discusses the various means available for climate change mitigation, focusing on the relative strengths and weaknesses (...) of various societal alternatives including ‘geoengineering’ and transitioning to less carbon intensive energy sources. The article concludes with the author's views as to what steps might most profitably be taken to avert dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth's climate, and the ramifications if such steps are not taken. (shrink)

Are we responsible for our misdeeds in dreams? The obvious answer would seem to be ‘No’. Dreams catch us with our defences down: just those critical and discriminative abilities which are distinctive of our waking lives as responsible moral agents seem out of play when we dream; el sueño de la razón produce monstruos . Moreover, if we are responsible for our dreamt misdeeds, then parity of reasoning demands that we be praised for dreaming noble dreams. But that is absurd. (...) Moral credit should not come that easily, and so neither should moral blame. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As a classical philologist, Nietzsche was extremely familiar with the work of many ancient Greek writers. It is well known that Nietzsche made a practice of identifying with and praising ancient thinkers with whom he felt a kinship. It is worth investigating, then, whether Nietzsche's mention of Hippocrates in D signals a sustained interest in the so-called father of medicine. I argue that there is no evidence that Nietzsche paid special attention to Hippocrates or the Hippocratic corpus. Instead, Nietzsche's (...) curious allusion to Hippocrates is likely influenced in part by his reading of the Comtean positivist Émile Littré. Finally, I argue that if Nietzsche is consciously “Hippocratic” at all, he is so in virtue of the “medical posture” he adopts in D, where Nietzsche's remarks suggest his mission is to relieve humankind of the psychological suffering caused by morality. (shrink)

Many philosophers take the point of Plato's Euthyphro to be an indictment of attempts to ground morality in religion, specifically in the attitudes of a deity or deities. It has been argued cogently in recent essays that Plato's case is far from conclusive. This essay suggests instead that the Euthyphro can be read more narrowly as raising critical questions about a specific religious virtue, Piety. Then it presents the ingredients of a reply to those questions. The reply proceeds by suggesting (...) that one need not accept the standards of definition used by Plato, and that one can provide an explanation of what Piety is by embedding Piety in a more comprehensive picture of the human, the divine, and the relations between the two. The picture makes use of a doctrine of divine sovereignty and a doctrine concerning love between God and humans. (shrink)

For some years, Matthew Meyer has labored at a comprehensive interpretation of Nietzsche’s oeuvre that understands his philosophical and literary output as a revival of a particularly Greek mode of thought. This volume represents the culmination of much, but not all, of this previous work, and it serves also as a promise of future work in the same vein. The title, Reading Nietzsche Through the Ancients, is therefore a trifle misleading: Meyer is not reading all of Nietzsche through all the (...) ancients, but only some of Nietzsche through some of them. That is all for the good, so far as I am concerned, since I am usually suspicious of ambitions to resolve Nietzsche’s debt to antiquity in a single... (shrink)

It is not uncommon to hear that poor school performance, welfare dependancy, youth unemployment, and criminal activity result more from shortcomings in the personal makeup of individuals than from societal forces beyond their control. Are American values declining as so many suggest? And are those values at the root of many social problems today?Shaped by experience and public policies, people's values and social norms do change. What role can or should a democratic government play in shaping values? And how do (...) these values conditon the efficacy of public policy?In this book, six distinguished social scientists identify trends in America's values and their consequences, and consider public policy tools with which some of those values might be changed.Daniel Yankelovich begins with a discussion of how American values have shifted in the last half-century, and argues that affluence is the driving force behind these changes in values. James Q. Wilson argues that destructive habits which can lead to social pathologies, like crime and drug use, are set early in life; he examines how public policy might intervene when children are young to promote better values. David Popenoe maintains that America has veered too far towards industrialist values, and explores the resulting decline of families and many attendant social ills. Nathan Glazer describes the history and present status of the dispute over multicultural education. Jane Mansbridge examines the process of building cooperation, consensus, and public spirit. And George Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen discuss the problem of gang criminality.Inthe past, social scientists have often sidestepped questions about values as undefinable, unquantifiable, and somehow unscientific. The essays in this volume address these questions at last.Henry J. Aaron, director of the Economic Studies program at Brookings, is the authorof numerous books, including most recently Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America's Health Care (1991), and coeditor of Setting Domestic Priorities (1992). Thomas E. Mann is director of the Brookings Governmental Studies program, coeditor of Media Polls in American Politics (1992), and coauthor of the Renewing Congress series (1993). Timothy Taylor is managing editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives at Stanford University. (shrink)

Suppose that God exists: what difference would that make to the world? The answer depends on the nature of God and the nature of the world. In this book, William E. Mann argues in one new and sixteen previously published essays for a modern interpretation of a traditional conception of God as a simple, necessarily existing, personal being. Divine simplicity entails that God has no physical composition or temporal stages; that there is in God no distinction between essence and existence; (...) that there is no partitioning of God's mental life into beliefs, desires, and intentions. God is thus a spiritual, eternal being, dependent on nothing else, whose essence is to exist and whose mode of existence is identical with omniscience, omnipotence, and perfectly goodness. In metaphysical contrast, the world is a spatial matrix populated most conspicuously by finite physical objects whose careers proceed sequentially from past to present to future. Mann defends a view according to which the world was created out of nothing and is sustained in existence from moment to moment by God. The differences in metaphysical status between creator and creatures raise questions for which Mann suggests answers. How can God know contingent facts and necessary truths without depending on them? Why is it so easy to overlook God's presence? Why would self-sufficient God create anything? Wouldn't a perfect God create the best world possible? Can God be free? Can we be free if God's power is continuously necessary to sustain us in existence? If God does sustain us, is God an accomplice whenever we sin? Mann responds to the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing for a kind of divine command metaethical theory, whose normative content lays emphasis on love. Given the metaphysical differences between us, how can there be loving relationships between God and creatures? Mann responds by examining the notions of piety and hope. (shrink)

The doctrine of divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no physical or metaphysical complexity whatsoever, is not a doctrine designed to induce immediate philosophical acquiescence. There are severe questions about its coherence. And even if those questions can be answered satisfactorily in favour of the doctrine, there remains the question why anyone should accept it. Thomas V. Morris raises both sorts of questions about a version of the doctrine which I have put forward. In the following pages I shall (...) respond to what I take to be the most serious of Morris's objections. I shall argue that the doctrine survives Morris's onslaught, but that one observation of his points it in a direction I had hitherto not taken seriously. The bulk of Morris's paper raises questions of the first sort; perforce the bulk of my paper will also. I shall offer, at the end, a reason for thinking that neither of us is yet in a position to pronounce categorically on the second question. My remarks in this paper constitute an interim report on how I think things presently stand with divine simplicity. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on Gareth B. Matthews's “The Socratic Augustine” and Peter King's “Augustine on the Impossibility of Teaching.” Matthews's paper adduces several instances of Augustine's apparent willingness to accept Socratic perplexity in some philosophical matters. Matthews suggests that these cases are compatible with Augustine's dogmatism because Augustine presupposes that the phenomena in question, although perplexing, are actual. I suggest instead that Augustine can be viewed as taking a neutral stance toward many of his examples, because they arise (...) in areas of philosophical inquiry where it is not important to the tenets of his faith that he hold the right opinion. King defends the Augustinian thesis that teaching, construed as the causal transmission of knowledge from teacher to learner, is, if not impossible, at least mysterious. I suggest that much of the alleged mystery may rest on a confusion between epistemological dependency and metaphysical dependency. (shrink)

In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, John Duns Scotus considered five arguments for the claim that humans, equipped only with their native intellectual capacities, would be incapable of discovering the truths most important for their salvation. Scotus endorsed three of the arguments,regarding them as ‘more probable’ than the other two. I shall not attempt detailed analyses of the arguments. Rather, my purpose is to embed the arguments in a more general picture of the epistemology (...) of religious belief. In the course of doing that, I shall suggest that Scotus should have taken one of the two less probable arguments more seriously. I shall argue, finally, that Scotus’s position on belief formation is rationally defensible. (shrink)

This volume presents fourteen of William E. Mann's essays on three prominent figures in late Patristic and early medieval philosophy: Augustine, Anselm, and Peter Abelard. The essays explore some of the quandaries, arguments, and theories presented in their writings. The essays in this volume complement those to be found in Mann's God, Modality, and Morality. While the essays in God, Modality, and Morality are primarily essays in philosophical theology, those found in the present volume are more varied. Some still deal (...) with issues in philosophical theology. Other essays are aporetic in nature, discussing cases of philosophical perplexity, sometimes but not always leaving the cases unresolved.All the essays display, directly or indirectly, the philosophical influence that Augustine has had. His Confessions is a rich source for philosophical puzzlement. Individual essays examine his reflections on the alleged innocence of infants, which raises questions about cognitive, emotional, and linguistic development; his juvenile theft of pears and its relation to moral motivation; and his struggle with and resolution of the problem of evil. One essay presents the rudiments of an Augustinian moral theory, rooted in his understanding of the Sermon on the Mount. Another essay illustrates the theory by discussing his writings on lying. Mann argues that Abelard amplified Augustine's moral theory by emphasizing the crucial role that intention plays in wrongdoing.Augustine bequeathed to Anselm the notion of. (shrink)

This chapter examines Augustine’s speculation in Book 1 of the Confessions that infants may not be as innocent as we think. The central question here is whether infant behavior can be motivated by selfish, jealous desires. Recently arguments have been offered to the effect that infants cannot have any desires or beliefs; the development of those capacities is alleged to occur only in tandem with the development of language. This chapter examines one such argument put forward by Donald Davidson. The (...) chapter suggests that Davidson’s argument is less than dispositive. Thus Augustine may have been justified in his speculation. The chapter concludes by listing a series of related quandaries, for example, whether animals without a language can have beliefs and desires. (shrink)

Here is the crucial passage from Proslogion II.

Eight new essays examine key philosophical issues raised by Augustine in his Confessions--a masterpiece of world literature. They explore a range of topics including what constitutes the happy or blessed life, the role of philosophical perplexity in the search for truth, and the problems that arise in the attempt to understand minds.

Artykuł omawia zjawisko dylematów moralnych z perspektywy teistycznej. Teiści przyjmują często, że (1) opatrznościowy Bóg nigdy nie postawiłby stworzonej przez siebie istoty przed taką sytuacją wyboru, w której owa istota nie jest w stanie uniknąć czynu niesłusznego, bądź że (2)jeśli istota staje przed taką sytuacją wyboru, to jest to wynikiem pewnego niesłusznego działania, którego dokonałajuż wcześniej. Wielu komentatorów przypisuje tę drugą opcję Tomaszowi z Akwinu. Autor argumentuje, że taka interpretacjajest błędna, przytaczając między innymi przeprowadzoną przez Akwinatę analizę ślubowania Jeftego opisanego (...) w Księdze Sędziów. Natomiast w odniesieniu do pierwszej opcji artykuł zamykają uwagi dotyczące sposobu opracowania normatywnej teorii etycznej o charakterze teistycznym, która uznaje istnienie dylematów moralnych. Teiści zainteresowani taką teorią powinni poważnie rozważyć odrzucenie założenia, że powinność implikuje możliwość. (shrink)

This excellent book is a revision of Kretzmann’s Wilde Lectures in Comparative and Natural Religion delivered at Oxford in 1994. As the subtitle suggests, the book is a study of book 1 of Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles. Kretzmann envisions the book as the first in a trilogy on SCG, with one volume devoted to each of SCG’s first three books.

Antiphon is often criticized for confusing two distinct species of responsibility, causal and moral. Insofar as this distinction is fundamental to any mature legal or ethical theory, Antiphon appears at best naïve, at worst dishonest. I argue that a careful analysis of his second tetralogy reveals that Antiphon was well aware of the distinction and the rationale for recognizing it. However, Antiphon questions whether the distinction can be so easily made in every case, and he suggests that the inadequacy of (...) the distinction might have radical implications for traditional ideas at the core of the Greek legal system. In short, Antiphon's second tetralogy gives us yet another reason to question whether the sophists were as philosophically unsophisticated as we are often led to believe. (shrink)

Anselm examines and defends the doctrine of the Trinity in three works, the ’Monologion’, ’On the Incarnation of the Word’, and ’On the Procession of the Holy Spirit’. Using the ’Monologion’ as a base, this essay connects Anselm’s doctrine of God’s metaphysical simplicity to his Trinitarian views. Anselm is concerned to avoid the heresies of Arianism, tritheism, and modalism. Because he regards the doctrine as transcending the powers of human reason and thus incapable of being proved, his argumentation proceeds by (...) adopting the analogies of memory, understanding, and will used earlier by Augustine, and by modifying Augustine’s analogy of water as headwaters, river, and drinking water. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Abelard understood, incorporated, and in some cases developed more fully an ethical outlook to be found in Augustine’s writings. In characterizing sin as contempt of God, Abelard rejects views that maintain that sin is a vice, or a bad deed, or even the will to perform a bad deed. Sin is precisely the intention to do evil. Abelard thus distinguishes sharply between acting willingly and acting intentionally. The justification for the distinction can be found in the (...) difference between Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio and his De Sermone Domini in Monte. This chapter explores several ramifications of Abelard’s intentionalism, including the analysis of intention as a kind of consent, differences between intentions and desires, the role of natural law, ignorance, and mistaken belief. (shrink)

“Inner-Life Ethics” presents the elements of Augustine’s moral theory, elements that can be found scattered in works written by the year 401. The theory is shaped by Augustine’s understanding of Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount and Augustine’s soul-body dualism. Augustine’s dualism is distinctive in claiming that because the soul is superior to the body, the body cannot affect the soul, and that the moral appraisal of an agent’s bodily behavior must take account of the state of the agent’s soul. Augustine (...) interprets the Sermon on the Mount as emphasizing the moral importance of an agent’s intentions: if one intends to do something morally impermissible, one is already morally culpable, even if the intention is never acted upon. The theory is then applied to Augustine’s concern over his theft of the pears, his worry about his erotic dreams, and his remarks about lying. (shrink)

This chapter examines Augustine’s two treatises on lying, De Mendacio and Contra Mendacium ad Consentium. Augustine’s differentiation between statements that are lies from those that are not illustrates the importance of a presence of an intention to deceive. His views on lying are compared with views expressed by Bernard Williams. One of the surprising consequences of Augustine’s views is that a person can lie when telling the truth. In spite of some examples that Augustine regards as poignant, he defends the (...) position that all lying is sinful, even when the consequences of lying would be better than the consequences of telling the truth. (shrink)