Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreement. Is it possible for two people to disagree and have both people still be rational? Those involved in this debate make use of the idea of epistemic peers. Two people are epistemic peers if they share the same knowledge of a given topic and have similar epistemic virtues. My paper argues that we have different kinds of epistemic peers; close peers who think similarly to ourselves, and (...) remote peers who think very differently. I argue that remote peers are genuine peers, but that we should respond to disagreement from remote peers differently than disagreement from close peers. (shrink)

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be (...) related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem. (shrink)

Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by mental states like imagination. One way of capturing this connection is by the claim that belief aims at truth. Normativists argue that we should understand this claim as a normative claim about belief – beliefs ought to be true. A second important connection between belief and truth is revealed by the transparency of belief, i.e. the fact that, when I deliberate about what to believe, I can settle this (...) deliberation only by appeal to considerations I take to show p to be true. It is natural to think that there is a connection between these two features of belief, that the fact that believing for non-evidential considerations would be irrational can help to explain why it is impossible, and Shah and Velleman make exactly this argument. However, as I shall argue, we cannot explain transparency on the basis of a normative requirement on belief. For this explanation to work non-evidential considerations would have to fail to be reasons for belief, and we would have to be able to explain why we are unable to form beliefs on the basis of non-evidential considerations by appealing to the fact that they fail to be reasons for belief. However, while it is plausible that non-evidential considerations are not in fact reasons for belief, the explanatory picture is the other way around. Such considerations only fail to be reasons for belief because we are unable to form beliefs on their basis. (shrink)

In this paper, we critically interrogate the benefits of an interdisciplinary and theoretically diverse dialogue between ‘local food’ and ‘alternative food networks’ and outline how this dialogue might be enriched by a closer engagement with discourses of food sovereignty and the politics of scale. In arguing for a shift towards a greater emphasis on food sovereignty, we contend that contemporary discourses of food security are inadequate for the ongoing task of ensuring a just and sustainable economy of food. Further, rather (...) than treating the local and the global as ontologically given categories around which to contest the politics of food, it is our contention that recognising the socio-spatial aspects of the politics of scale has the potential to reinvigorate discourses of food security, food sovereignty and AFNs. Understanding scale as both fixed to a degree as well as contingent and dynamic has implications for an understanding of the role of food systems, for how the rescaled state privileges certain food systems and the possibilities for resistance through ‘jumping scale’ and food utopias. All of these aspects are significant if we are to fully comprehend and contest the challenges of envisioning and enacting real utopias of food sovereignty. (shrink)

Recent commentaries on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault often operate with an implicit idea of compatibility or consistency that postulates systematic harmony as the decisive criterion for the affinity between them. Accordingly, the predominant question is whether Deleuze and Foucault are “true” friends philosophically and politically. Although the assessments differ, they share a likewise implicit notion of the friend as familiar that excludes any form of ambivalence in amicable relations and consequently cannot fully account for the dynamics and variability (...) of the relation between Deleuze and Foucault. This article tries to address this problem by suspending the notion of the friend-as-familiar, effectively posing the question of what concept of friendship we would have if the ambivalent relation between Deleuze and Foucault would be the model. For this, the reconstruction begins with the early encounters and follows their relationship until the supposed split in the context of the desire-pleasure-debate. What becomes apparent is the dialogical structure of the philosophical friendship between Deleuze and Foucault that entails convergences as well as divergences, which will eventually be related to their own and fundamentally different concepts of friendship. Deleuze and Foucault, as will be argued, are neither “vrais amis” nor “faux amis” but simply amis that practised a form of philosophical friendship, lasting for more than 15 years. (shrink)

The article begins by recalling the most important understandings associated with the term prudence in the history of philosophy.Then it introduces the Aristotelian concept of prudence linked to practical truth—prudence seen in contrast to wisdom and knowledge of manufacturing. The article discusses various forms of rational knowledge associated with the right will, and proves the need of linking prudence to all the other ethical virtues based on moral principles. It emphasizes the problem of how to relate general principles to specific (...) actions which involve particular goods. For resolving this problem, the article refers to Aristotle who sees the solution in political ethics which has a significant impact on individual behavior; consequently, good law and proper education are considered to be necessary conditions which allow to form the moral judgment skills for providing a morally good life. The article concludes with the claim that the proper field to capture the specificity of prudence includes the theory of human action and that of human morality. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

Philosophe et penseur du politique, intellectuel marxiste et militant communiste, enseignant, directeur de collection... : à travers le rayonnement de son oeuvre et de sa personne, Louis Althusser a renouvelé la théorie politique et la philosophie de l'histoire, de Machiavel à Marx. Parmi ses contemporains, Michel Foucault exhorte : " Ouvrez les livres d'Althusser! ", Jacques Derrida évoque " la force rayonnante et provocante de sa pensée ", Gilles Deleuze salue l'" Althusser's Band ", et pour Roland Barthes, " le (...) seul modèle acceptable de la science est celui mis au jour par les études d'Althusser sur Marx ". Aliocha Wald Lasowski converse avec vingt écrivains et philosophes qui ont lu, rencontré, parfois travaillé avec Althusser, quand ils n'ont pas fait partie de ses proches. Où l'on mesure à quel point la pensée d'Althusser demeure d'une actualité brûlante. (shrink)

As Deleuze says in his essay "Nomadic Thought", it is Nietzsche's movement of uncoding which announces a "new politics". Nietzsche marks the beginning of a counter-culture in the effort "to get something through which is not encodable". In this way, Nietzsche establishes a different kind of philosophical discourse, a "counter-philosophy", inasmuch as its utterances are directed against philosophy conceived as the bureaucracy of pure reason. This chapter attempts to establish an untimely echo of Deleuze's essay, which aims at an actualised (...) understanding of this rather enigmatically announced "new politics". It first illustrates how a recent strain of political thought, postfoundationalism, repeats the recoding of society. It then shows that these efforts of recoding are obsessive expressions of a figure which resembles the Nietzschean priest. Finally, it concludes with an outline of Nietzsche's "new politics". (shrink)

Positive and negative feelings were central to the development of economics, especially in utility theory in classical economics. While neoclassical utility theory ignored feelings, behavioral economics more recently reintroduced feelings in utility theory. Beyond feelings, economic theorists use full-fledged specific emotions to explain behavior that otherwise could not be understood or they study emotions out of interest for the emotion itself. While some analyses display a strong overlap between psychological thinking and economic modelling, in most cases there is still a (...) large gap between economic and psychological approaches to emotion research. Ways how to reduce this gap are discussed. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has had profound effects on global health, healthcare, and public health policy. It has also impacted education. Within undergraduate healthcare education of doctors, nurses, and allied professions, rapid shifts to distance learning and pedagogic content creation within new realities, demands of healthcare practice settings, shortened curricula, and/or earlier graduation have also challenged ethics teaching in terms of curriculum allotments or content specification. We propose expanding the notion of resilience to the field of ethics education under the (...) conditions of remote learning. Educational resilience starts in the virtual classroom of ethics teaching, initially constituted as an “unpurposed space” of exchange about the pandemic’s challenging impact on students and educators. This continuously transforms into “purposed space” of reflection, discovering ethics as a repertory of orientative knowledge for addressing the pandemic’s challenges on personal, professional, societal, and global levels and for discovering (and then addressing) that the health of individuals and populations also has moral determinants. As such, an educational resilience framework with inherent adaptability rises to the challenge of supporting the moral agency of students acting both as professionals and as global citizens. Educational resilience is key in supporting and sustaining professional identify formation and facilitating the development of students’ moral resilience and leadership amid moral complexity and potential moral transgression—not only but especially in times of pandemic. (shrink)

Academic philosophy has undergone a homogenization since the Second World War that can be understood as a discursive colonization through analytic philosophy. This colonization directly results in the othering of non-analytic discourses as continental philosophy as well as the normalization of the discipline according to the analytic model. While analytic philosophy serves as the model for this continuing normalization, it is also itself the product of a normalization that occurred in the US during McCarthyism, resulting in the adaptation of mainstream (...) analytic philosophy to the ideological needs of the Cold War. As the historical result of this process, mainstream analytic philosophy can be genealogically defined as our current majoritarian philosophy. The principal normalization techniques of contemporary academic philosophy, such as prepublication peer review and quantified research evaluation, can be analyzed as a strategically coherent intensification of disciplinary techniques of power. These techniques primarily aim at reducing intellectual labour costs, controlling intellectual work, increasing quantifiable research performance, and breaking the relative autonomy of academic staff. (shrink)

Order and change in nature have been for a long time understood in philosophy and theology as founded in divine reason. In the neo-Darwinist theory of evolution, their explanation is reduced to material change without reason. Molecular biologists like M. Behe and W. Demski argue that any reductionist explanation of living beings must be wrong. The evolution of irreducible complex structures is impossible on the basis of random variation and natural selection alone, and must be the result of intelligent design. (...) The article argues that ID-theory, unlike Biblical Creationism, is a challenge for neo-Darwinism and for modern theology as well—for, unlike the Roman magisterium, many Catholic theologians try to harmonize reductive explanation with the notion of creation. (shrink)

Lipid vesicles are often used as compartment structures for preparing cell‐like systems and models of protocells, the hypothetical precursor structures of the first cells at the origin of life. Although the various artificially made vesicle systems are already remarkably complex, they are still very different from and much simpler than any known living cell. Nevertheless, the preparation and study of the structure and the dynamics of functionalized vesicle systems may contribute to a better understanding of biological cells, in particular of (...) the essential features of a living cell that are not found in the non‐living form of matter. The study of protocell models may possibly lead to a better understanding of the origin of the first cells. To avoid misunderstanding in this field of research, it would be useful if generally accepted definitions of terms like “artificial cells,” “synthetic cells,” “minimal cells,” “protocells,” and “primitive cells” exist. Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssaysSynthetic cells and organelles: compartmentalization strategies Abstract. (shrink)

Der Beitrag spürt der Entdeckung dessen, was man heute »Eifersucht« nennt, im antiken Rom in der Zeit des Kaisers Augustus nach. Die Autorin erläutert zunächst einige linguistische, sozioökonomische und gesellschaftliche Voraussetzungen, um dann in einem close reading von Gedichten der Elegiker Properz und Ovid Bedingungen und Umstände der Eifersucht in der Metropole Rom zu diskutieren. Diese philologische Auseinandersetzung bereitet psychologischen Überlegungen den Boden.

According to the Motive of Duty Thesis, a necessary condition for an action to have moral worth is that it be motivated at least in part by a normative assessment of the action. However, this thesis has been subject to two powerful objections. It has been accused of over-intellectualizing moral agency, and of giving the wrong verdict when it comes to people who hold false moral theories that convince them that their actions are in fact morally wrong. I argue that (...) both of these objections can be convincingly answered using resources from the Guise of the Good view, which holds that for an agent to intend to requires that they take Φing to be good. Furthermore, I argue that combining the motive of duty thesis with the Guise of the Good view allows us to recognize an important further condition on moral worth—namely, that the agent recognize that their reason for action requires, rather than merely permits, their action. Thus, while no action lacks moral worth in virtue of being motivated by no normative evaluation at all, an action can still lack moral worth in virtue of failing to be motived by the correct normative evaluation, namely that the action is required. (shrink)

This paper concerns automorphisms of the computably enumerable sets. We prove two results relating semilow sets and prompt degrees via automorphisms, one of which is complementary to a recent result of Downey and Harrington. We also show that the property of effective simplicity is not invariant under automorphism, and that in fact every promptly simple set is automorphic to an effectively simple set. A major technique used in these proofs is a modification of the Harrington-Soare version of the method of (...) Harrington-Soare and Cholak for constructing Δ 0 3 automorphisms; this modification takes advantage of a recent result of Soare on the extension of "restricted" automorphisms to full automorphisms. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy there has been a widespread reaction against the cartesian subjective-individualist conception of a person being normative to any understanding of human personality. Looking back to early greek tragedy we find another model such as the objective-participant conception which also dominates the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

In contemporary philosophy there has been a widespread reaction against the cartesian subjective-individualist conception of a person being normative to any understanding of human personality. Looking back to early greek tragedy we find another model such as the objective-participant conception which also dominates the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

In Willensfreiheit Geert Keil seeks a better explanation of freedom of the will by investigating the connections between free will and determinism vs. indeterminism. Keil thinks that there is no freedom of the will without declaring determinism untrue. So, on the one hand freedom of the will seems to require indeterminism, but on the other hand, freely willed choices and decisions must be different from pure chance. The key, Keil thinks, is global indeterminism without local indeterminism — I doubt this.