Some physicians, in their care of patients at risk of misusing opioids, use machine learning (ML)-based prediction drug monitoring programmes (PDMPs) to guide their decision making in the prescription of opioids. This can cause a conflict: a PDMP Score can indicate a patient is at a high risk of opioid abuse while a patient expressly reports oppositely. The prescriber is then left to balance the credibility and trust of the patient with the PDMP Score. Pozzi1 argues that a prescriber (...) who downgrades the credibility of a patient’s testimony based on a low PDMP Score is epistemically and morally unjustified and contributes to a form of testimonial injustice. This results in patients being silenced, excluded from decision-making processes and subjected to structural injustices. Additionally, the use of ML systems in medical practices raises concerns about perpetuating existing inequalities, overestimating their capabilities and displacing human authority. However, almost the very same critiques apply to human-based systems. Formalisation, ML systems included, should instead be viewed positively,2 and precisely as a powerful means to begin eroding these and other problems in ethically sensitive domains. In this case, the epistemic virtues of formalisation include promoting transparency, consistency and replicability in decision making. Rigorous ML systems can also help ensure that models …. (shrink)

Machine learning models are becoming increasingly prevalent in algorithmic trading and investment management. The spread of machine learning in finance challenges existing practices of modelling and model use and creates a demand for practical solutions for how to manage the complexity pertaining to these techniques. Drawing on interviews with quants applying machine learning techniques to financial problems, the article examines how these people manage model complexity in the process of devising machine learning-powered trading algorithms. The analysis (...) shows that machine learning quants use Ockham’s razor – things should not be multiplied without necessity – as a heuristic tool to prevent excess model complexity and secure a certain level of human control and interpretability in the modelling process. I argue that understanding the way quants handle the complexity of learning models is a key to grasping the transformation of the human’s role in contemporary data and model-driven finance. The study contributes to social studies of finance research on the human–model interplay by exploring it in the context of machine learning model use. (shrink)

Volume 23, Issue 3-4, November - December 2024, Page 245-250.

This essay explores ethical foundations for meeting the digital challenge via a case study of the work, life, and virtues of the greatest mathematician and natural scientist of the eighteenth century, Leonhard Euler. By biography and history one can learn of the gifts of human strength, practices, good will, dependence on others, and friendships which made possible Euler’s own astonishing corpus of work and that of many other scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and technologists. Digital technology results from a combination of (...) science (demonstrable knowledge and method), technology, engineering, and art (forms and artifacts of making and expressing), and mathematics (abstract numerical, algebraic, geometrical, formal, and digital concepts, rules, representations, and logics). Joint reflection on the biographical, historical, and natural sources of mathematics and the digital is essential for any humanization or ascesis in response to the perils and promises of digital technology for human thriving. As ethics enable and embody an ethos, so technologies are means and manifestations of a telos. Thus, thought and action for thriving through the digital needs to contemplate and conciliate the ends of humans and of the digital. (shrink)

The ethical codes of the professional engineering bodies identify the responsibilities of the engineer. Of equal importance to the codes are the virtues which enable the engineer to fulfil these responsibilities. After briefly reviewing such virtues this paper argues that the systematic learning of virtues is possible in a formal way through learner centred learning. Central to this learning experience is the development of integrity which focuses the other major virtues and enables reflection (...) upon them. A review of undergraduate courses suggests how this can be achieved. (shrink)

Medical education, while a process of deep moral formation, lacks any account of how students and trainees are to morally approach the process of learning. The classical understanding of the vice _curiositas_ and the virtue _studiositas_, as described by the theologian Paul Griffiths, provides a framework to help understand the better and worse ways that students and trainees can engage in the learning experience. While medical school may powerfully inculcate the vice of _curiositas_, such a posture to (...) class='Hi'>learning fails when one is faced with the novel challenges of clinical care. Given the challenges inherent to moral formation in medicine, students and trainees might find communities that catechize the virtue of _studiositas_ outside of the boundaries of the medical school and hospital. (shrink)

In this chapter, I attempt to provide a richer account of reflective agency than standard theorists do, by focusing on the deep connection between the role of empathic receptivity and that of reflection. In From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Michael Slote innovatively introduces the idea of receptivity as a virtue into the domains of epistemology and ethics, and argues that the virtue of receptivity plays a crucial role in the realization of a good life (2013). In contrast, I incorporate receptivity as (...) a virtue into the domain of philosophy of action, particularly the philosophical analysis of reflective agency, an aspect on which Slote does not place much emphasis. To date, standard theories of reflective agency have concentrated on analyzing its self-governing aspect (e.g., Bratman 2007; Frankfurt 1999; Korsgaard 1996). Such an analysis is undoubtedly important because autonomous agency is a central value in the modern world. However, standard theorists’ strong commitment to individualistic, self-determining agency appears to have hindered them from appreciating the fundamental significance of empathic receptivity toward others’ perspectives in our rational, reflective lives. To remedy this tendency, I demonstrate how empathic receptivity significantly contributes to the development of our reflective activity. In our temporally extended lives, empathic receptivity is not only associated with an event at a single moment but also with a dynamic process unfolding over time. In my view, such diachronic receptivity helps us to deepen our understanding of others’ perspectives, and in so doing, to reflectively examine our own ways of thinking and acting from different angles that we have not previously recognized. Given that our agency unfolds temporally, practical rationality appears to be partly a matter of how we can develop our reflective capacity conducive to continuous learning from others. My receptivity-based account aims to capture such interpersonal and learning aspects of reflection and thus overcome the individualistic, introspective model of reflection that has long dominated the mainstream philosophy of action. The discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I begin by arguing for receptivity’s centrality in empathy and then briefly sketch how the virtue of empathic receptivity functions in our temporally unfolding lives. In Section 2, I attempt to offer a realistic, dynamic account of the relationship between empathic receptivity and reflection. Particularly, I discuss how a receptively virtuous person can appropriately confront anxiety caused by encountering another’s serious challenge. In the last section, I clarify the strength of my receptivity-based model of reflection by comparing it with Michael Bratman’s policy-based model of reflection. (shrink)

Difficult relationships and challenging situations all come down to one thing: drama. In this groundbreaking book, Doreen Virtue guides you through the process of determining what your Drama Quotient is. You will learn how much you are unnecessarily tolerating and absorbing from other people and situations. Doreen highlights the difference between detaching from drama and being compassionate and helpful, and she shows you how to: Deal with relatives, friends, and co-workers who are addicted to drama Assess your own level of (...) drama addiction Stop attracting and creating negativity in your life Go on an overall Drama Detox to clear away negativity, and let your light shine through! (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are 'black boxes'. The initial response in the literature was a demand for 'explainable AI'. However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or 'interpretable' is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritising interpretability in medical AI may constitute a 'lethal prejudice'. In this paper, we defend the value of interpretability (...) in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realised. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems , may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to - and perhaps even harm - patients. (shrink)

The ethical codes of the professional engineering bodies identify the responsibilities of the engineer. Of equal importance to the codes are the virtues which enable the engineer to fulfil these responsibilities. After briefly reviewing such virtues this paper argues that the systematic learning of virtues is possible in a formal way through learner centred learning. Central to this learning experience is the development of integrity which focuses the other major virtues and enables reflection (...) upon them. A review of undergraduate courses suggests how this can be achieved. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have demonstrated impressive performance across a variety of clinical tasks. However, notoriously, sometimes these systems are “black boxes.” The initial response in the literature was a demand for “explainable AI.” However, recently, several authors have suggested that making AI more explainable or “interpretable” is likely to be at the cost of the accuracy of these systems and that prioritizing interpretability in medical AI may constitute a “lethal prejudice.” In this paper, we defend the value of interpretability (...) in the context of the use of AI in medicine. Clinicians may prefer interpretable systems over more accurate black boxes, which in turn is sufficient to give designers of AI reason to prefer more interpretable systems in order to ensure that AI is adopted and its benefits realized. Moreover, clinicians may be justified in this preference. Achieving the downstream benefits from AI is critically dependent on how the outputs of these systems are interpreted by physicians and patients. A preference for the use of highly accurate black box AI systems, over less accurate but more interpretable systems, may itself constitute a form of lethal prejudice that may diminish the benefits of AI to—and perhaps even harm—patients. (shrink)

This book argues that in order for people to live well, they must develop a virtue of playfulness. Inspired by Aristotle, the book draws on work from philosophy, classics, history, biology, psychology, and media studies to understand the place of play and playfulness in a good life. Many philosophers have written about play, from Presocratics such as Heraclitus to contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Suits. Some champion play as the most crucial value in life. Others deride it and warn strongly (...) against it. This book evaluates the research for how play and playfulness bear on living a good life and becoming a good person. Its main argument is that in order to understand play as an action we must understand playfulness as a virtue in the lives of good people. The author develops a theory of playfulness from an Aristotelian perspective. Like Aristotle sees the virtues as necessary for a happy life, the author argues that playfulness is necessary for living well. And just as Aristotle offers multifaceted characterizations of core virtues, the author argues that playfulness includes aspects of seriousness, creativity, humility, optimism, and sociality. Playful people take play seriously, learn new skills, overcome failure, strive for success, and keep others in mind. As a result, playful people have a better shot at living well. The Virtue of Playfulness is an accessible, empirically-informed, and detailed treatment of the philosophy of playfulness. It will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy and related disciplines who are interested in virtue ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of games, philosophy of sport, and ancient philosophy. (shrink)

There has been a recent revival of interest in the medieval just war theory. But what is the virtue of justice needed to make war just? War is a complex and protracted activity. It is argued that a variety of virtues of justice, as well as a variety of virtues are required to guide the application of the use of force. Although it is mistaken to regard war as punishment, punitive justice—bringing to account those guilty of initiating an (...) unjust war or of war crimes in its conduct— has an important role to play after conflict to restore the wrongs of war and help establish a just peace. Justice as fairness is needed to guide the distribution of resources and so reduce the grounds for war. Protective justice—protecting a community or innocents from harmful attack—helps define what constitutes a just cause for war and so constrains the occasions for war. The just principles set out the criteria to be met if war is to be morally permissible. In practice, this challenging demand requires that political leaders and military at all levels learn and exercise the virtues, particularly the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, self-control and practical wisdom. If we are to make war just and to make only just war, we need justice understood in its broadest sense. Such justice, as Aristotle noted, “is not a part but the whole of virtue.”. (shrink)

The error statistical account of testing uses statistical considerations, not to provide a measure of probability of hypotheses, but to model patterns of irregularity that are useful for controlling, distinguishing, and learning from errors. The aim of this paper is (1) to explain the main points of contrast between the error statistical and the subjective Bayesian approach and (2) to elucidate the key errors that underlie the central objection raised by Colin Howson at our PSA 96 Symposium.

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung. It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to state (...) that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies. (shrink)

This paper examines what constitute the virtues of argumentation or critical thinking and how these virtues might be developed. We argue first that the notion of virtue is more appropriate for characterizing this aspect than the notion of dispositions commonly employed by critical thinking theorists and, further, that it is more illuminating to speak of the virtues of inquiry rather than of argumentation. Our central argument is that learning to think critically is a matter of (...) class='Hi'>learning to participate knowledgeably and competently in the practice of inquiry in its various forms and contexts. Acquiring the virtues of inquiry arises through getting on the inside of the practice and coming to appreciate the goods inherent in the practice. (shrink)

초등 도덕과 수업이 뭔가 의미 있고 재미있도록 하기 위해서는 초등학생들의 도덕성 함양을 위한 효과적인 발문과 교수ㆍ학습 활동의 구안 및 이에 적절한 교수ㆍ학습 자료를 어떻게 제시할 것인가의 문제를 해결하지 않으면 안 될 것이다. 본 논문은 바로 이러한 문제의식에서 출발하여 먼저 초등 도덕과 수업에서 효과적인 질문과 교수ㆍ학습 자료의 개발을 위해 고려해야 할 점들을 생각해 보고, 영역이론에 근거를 두고 “영역에 적합한 교수ㆍ학습 자료 개발과 이와 관련된 효과적인 질문의 예시”를 원리적으로 살펴보았고, 이를 적용하여 “책임 덕목을 활용하여 초등 도덕과 교수ㆍ학습 방법”을 어떻게 구안하여 활용할 것인가에 (...) 대해 논의를 하였다. (shrink)

On the premise that the good knowing is the originary reality, this article provides a synopsis of Wang Yangming’s exposition of the fundamental essence of liangzhi. The self-existent resemblances of the originary reality are outlined and summarized as the eight virtues of liangzhi: voidness, intelligence, luminousness, awareness, constancy, happiness, true I, and purity. These eight virtues are, however, ultimately subsumed by the middle, which governs them in common. The middle is the original state and true form of the (...) fundamental essence of liangzhi, which Wang Yangming describes as a transparent mirror and level balance. (shrink)

In a diverse and complex world, the notion of ‘cultural competence’ is offered by some as an ethical solution to health care work which is culturally naïve or inappropriate. Notions of cultural competence, however, may obscure the fact that many clinicians, regardless of background, may feel ill equipped to deal with difference in their daily work. Drawing largely on South African examples, I suggest that issues of cultural incompetence, linked both to personal anxieties and to the ways in which health (...) care systems are structured, may be important to explore — personally, professionally, and politically. Through examining the difficulties of our own work and recognizing these, we may learn more only by learning a set of skills about the ‘other’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 755 preaching. The question posed by Richard Kieckhefer whether the mystical birth of the Word in the soul can be considered to be a conscious event (discussed briefly on p. 191) may not be capable of satisfactory resolution in terms of modern psychology, especially pop psychology. But there is ample evidence in Eckhart's own words (cf. Sermons DW 10 and DW 68) that awareness must accompany such (...) a breakthrough to be fully human, even if the awareness itself is not the source of bliss. The preceding misgivings notwithstanding, I consider Frank Tobin's book to be a major contribution by a serious scholar in the field, a necessary adjunct in the rapidly growing number of vcolumes in the field of Eckhart studies. As a primer of scholastic thought and language, it.fa an excellent introductory text, especially for readers unfamiliar with the area. And, despite Tobin's modest reservations, even medieval Germanists and Eckhart specialists will find much in it of value. It is a book that can be consulted thoughtfully 1and 1 even freqently with pl'ofit. Loyola University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois RICHARD WooDs, O.P. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. By ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. 270. This impressive volume includes most of the material on the philosophy of religion that the author has published in the last fifteen years, together with some additional items. Philosophy of religion has close links with other areas of philosophy, for instance metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of mind; and several papers argue that theistic belief consorts well with otherwise acceptable positions in these areas. The author roundly contests the view that has recently been in vogue, that there is no matter of fact about the existence and nature of God, and that as a consequence human religious phenomena are the only religious subject matter available for such studies as are to claim academic respectability. He is vehemently 'realist' in this matter. Whatever our beliefs about the issue, he insists, God exists or does not exist, is omnipotent or is not omnipotent, and so forth. The author's realism is combined with what he sees as a moderate scepticism. It is liable to be objected that scepticism naturally and inevitably leads to subjectivism and anti-realism, but this, according to 756 BOOK REVIEWS the author, is a mistake. After all, the assumption, made by persons of common sense and by most philosophers, that physical objects exist and have the properties that they do have independently of our perceiving and thinking about them, implies that there is a gap between objects and our apprehensions of them, which is such that we can never he totally certain of their reality by way of any possible experience. 'This gap inevitably introduces a greater or smaller degree of unprovability into our beliefs about the objectively real. Realism thus goes naturally with some kind of scepticism, and with a need for faith.' This consorts well with the author's view that in matters of religion, as in most matters of concern to philosophers, conclusive proof is impossible, for all that beliefs on these topics may he more or less reasonable, and firm convictions may be appropriate. Thus, while there are no knock-down proofs for the existense of God, the traditional arguments have, and deserve to have, some persausive force, especially when considered cumulatively. Most of the papers here are meant to contribute at least indirectly to such a cumulative case for the existence of God, clearing away some objection, or putting some aspect of theistic belief in a more favorable light than that in which it often appears. The hook is divided into four sections, on faith, the problem of evil, God and ethics, and the metaphysics of theism. While all of the papers display admirable learning and philosophical skill, I was particularly intrigued by the last one, 'Flavors, Colors and God'. Here it is argued, following Descartes and Locke, that the best explanation of the manner in which phenomenal qualia are apparently related to physical properties is a theological one. Elsewhere, Anselm's arguments are formalized with dazzling... (shrink)

Work with the Angels to Detox Your Body and Energy Detoxing with the help of your angels is a gentle way to release impurities from your body, fatigue, and addictions. Doreen Virtue and naturopath Robert Reeves teach yousimple steps to increase your energy and mental focus, banish bloating, feel and look more youthful, and regain your sense of personal power. Rid your life of physical toxins, as well as negative emotions and energies. Angel Detox guides you step-by-step on how to (...) detox your diet, lifestyle, and relationships. You'll learn how to reduce or eliminate cravings for unhealthful food and substances, feel motivated, and enjoy wellness in all areas of your life. This book also includes 7-Day Detox Plans for those wanting to quit smoking or drinking, or to flush out environmental pollution. (shrink)

. The use of narrative to communicate and convey particular points of view in society has increasingly become the focus of academic attention in recent years. In particular, MacIntyre. (1985, 1988, 1990, 1999) has paid attention to the role of narrative in the conflict between different traditions when developing his virtue approach to ethics. Whilst there has been continued debate about the application of virtue approaches, some arguing that it is incompatible with business, I disagree and have already argued for (...) a form of virtue that will focus business on society’s needs rather than better business itself. Here I continue to develop the argument in two ways. First, I will explore the predominant business narrative and offer some comment on the ‘virtues’ that it promotes. However, rather than accepting this narrative, I want to challenge it with a narrative from the environmental tradition. I consider how adopting the virtues promoted by an environmental narrative it would shape business practices and challenge current business conventions. As a second step, I will focus on how we can change managers’ perceptions of business to reflect these environmentally based virtues. (shrink)

On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome (...) your current limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone’s life, and we will all have to learn from these experiences. However, despite the importance of being able to learn from our mistakes, this is very difficult in practice, given that failure of any kind can be distressing, and especially so for moral failure. The distress created by a recognition of moral failure often prompts responses of anger, avoidance, or defensiveness; rather than attempts to make amends and when necessary to work on self-improvement. The most potentially distressing response to moral failure is shame, as it is often associated with defensiveness. It is here where emotion regulation will be important to manage that distress, and I focus on the skill of emotion differentiation. I argue that emotion differentiation is a promising strategy for distinguishing the emotions we may experience in the wake of failure, including shame, and to encourage those emotions that motivate self-improvement. Thus, emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition. (shrink)

In the Journal of Moral Education, 39(2), Brenda Almond and Lawrence Blum debate the importance of tolerance versus acceptance in sex education. Blum defines acceptance as ‘positive regard’, in contradistinction to mere tolerance, ‘a live and let live attitude toward others, an acceptance of coexistence, but with a disapproval of that “other”’. Employing consequentialist and definitional arguments, he defends an acceptant educational policy. I shore up this defence by addressing the issue of autonomy: specifically, I refute the claim that acceptance (...) undermines parental autonomy in a morally unacceptable fashion. Drawing on Philip Pettit and Michael Smith’s defence of the idea of ‘orthonomy’ or right-rule, I argue that orthonomy, rather than autonomy, should guide educational policy-making. I then show that the principle of orthonomy, together with teachers’ professional responsibilities to ensure a safe and prejudice-free learning environment, entails that teachers have an inalienable responsibility to promote homophilic (gay-positive) values, regardless of whether they or their students’ parents agree. (shrink)

The incessancy of the educational reforms of recent decades in Western countries, and their prominent association with conceptions of quality drawn from industry and commerce, tend to becloud the lack of educational substance at the heart of many of the more influential of the reform patterns. This lack betokens something of a sophisticated renaissance of the late nineteenth-century mentality of payment-by-results. Exploration of the reforms also reveals a preoccupation with performance which bypasses the central concerns of education itself. Quality, in (...) short, becomes redefined by a privative rationality, which then furnishes the conceptual arena and the predominant language for decision-making in matters educational. Writings of two influential contemporary thinkers -- MacIntyre and Lyotard -- are reviewed to illustrate the nature and significance of what the reforms have neglected. These thinkers' contrasting analyses reveal how intricate the contexts of educational policy and practice have become in the pluralist circumstances of late modernity. Where MacIntyre adopts a largely traditionalist stance and Lyotard a largely dismissive one in the face of the competing inheritances which battle for the minds and hearts of learners, this paper suggests not a middle way, but a different way. This pursues a kind of thinking which is itself educational more than political, self-critical more than adversarial. Declining the path of self-assured advocacy it concentrates instead on opening up an educational issue which is more often overlooked, or busily bypassed, than understood: What actually befalls the experience of teachers and learners in the practical conduct of education? How can that experience benefit best as teaching and learning are defensibly practised? A range of communicative rather than combative virtues is identified in this connection and their promising import is briefly explored. (shrink)

Argues that Plato's dialogues contain a surprisingly neglected account of Socrates' education about the love of noble virtue and that recovering this education could help broaden and deepen liberalism's moral and political horizon.

This paper explores two pedagogical virtues (intellectual virtues of a teacher) that arise from the insight that non-epistemic situational factors can affect students’ epistemic judgments and behavior. First, a virtuous teacher must be sensitive enough to these factors in order to take advantage of how they boost student learning. However, while cultivating a situationally and epistemically favorable environment for learning sounds good, teachers should also not spoil their students by making them too dependent on these beneficial (...) external factors. The virtuous teacher must also realize that these are only scaffolds; while these do help students initially, they must be eventually removed to promote the students’ intellectual autonomy. This characterizes a second pedagogical virtue: the competence to facilitate the students’ growth so that they become more capable in future opportunities of knowledge acquisition. (shrink)

The figure of the mistress is undoubtedly controversial provoking intense reactions, ranging from fear, to disgust and revulsion, to excitement and titillation, to sadness and perhaps to some, love. The mistress is conventionally depicted as a threat to moral living and someone whose sexuality is 'defective' and 'toxic'. Of course, she is a woman that you would not have as your friend, and certainly not your wife, since her 'ethical sense', if she even has one, is dubious at best. This (...) book subverts these traditional judgements offering an unflinching look at the lived experience of the mistress and recasts her as a potentially loving, free, intimate 'other' woman. Drawing upon feminist philosophy, contemporary sexual ethics and the current cultural moment of #MeToo, Mistress Morality moves beyond a narrative of 'infidelity', conventional judgment, the safeguarding of monogamy and conventional heterosex that permeates our society. It asks what happens when we let go of our insecurities, judgments and moralistic relationship philosophies and opt, instead, for an ethics of kindness. A kindness underpinned by engaging with those deemed 'other' and learning from mistresses, both straight and queer, new ways of thinking about ethics and sex, meaning we have better sex, and can be better to each other. (shrink)

Abstract -- Background, context, overview, and guiding philosophy -- Emotional intelligence meets virtue ethics : implications for educators -- Emotional intelligence as a component of business ethics pedagogy -- Nourishing life, the daoist concept of virtue -- Cultivation of virtue (dé) 1 according to the neiye -- Cultivation of virtuous leaders according to the huainanzi -- Is there a place for contemplation and inner work in business ethics education? -- Incorporating the inner work of ei and contemplation in ethics education (...) -- Glossary -- About the author. (shrink)

In this essay Mordechai Gordon begins to address the neglect of humor among philosophers of education by focusing on some interesting connections between humor, self‐transcendence, and the development of moral virtues. More specifically, he explores the kind of humor that makes fun of oneself and how it can affect educational encounters. Gordon begins his analysis by discussing the nature and purpose of humor in general, while distinguishing it from laughter and amusement. In the next part of the essay, he (...) takes a close look at the characteristics and benefits of the type of humor that we use when we make fun of ourselves. He then turns his attention to exploring the relation between laughing at ourselves, self‐transcendence, and a number of moral virtues. The final part of this essay briefly examines what might happen to the quality of educational encounters when teachers become more comfortable with laughing at themselves. (shrink)

In discussions of early-modern notions of passion and virtue, the humanist movement has played only a minor role. However, it has its own characteristics and approaches to the problem of passion and virtue. The moral philosophy of the Neapolitan humanist Giovanni Pontano is a case in point. Pontano pronounces himself against the Stoic doctrine of the eradication of the passions. Although his moral psychology follows traditional conceptions of the passions as subjected to the rule of reason, it rather illustrates the (...) complex structures into which reason and virtue have to be implemented. The notion of arduousness is helpful to illuminate these structures. Falling back on Aquinas' distinction between a 'concupiscible' and an 'irascible' appetite, Pontano puts a special emphasis on the latter, necessary to deal with the difficulties and hardships that are typical of any process of learning. As he argues, the way to human perfection is full of hardship, and the higher the perfection aims, the greater the hardship will be. This concept implies the need for passionate responses to overcome hardship.Moreover, it suggests the picture of a ruler unimpressed by difficulties and obstacles, vehement and forceful. (shrink)

This article regards the field of neuroscience and indicates on the proper or erroneous functioning of the human brain. Intellectual virtues, especially practical wisdom play a significant role in capturing the truth and implementing it in life. The agile formation of the cognitive function of man encompasses both his reason as well as the sensual judgment of utility with all the bodily backup. The brain possesses great plasticity in the production of neuronal connections. Habit as a permanent wont utilizes (...) the reactions being developed to the construction of often inappropriate mechanisms, that in turn are not easy or completely impossible to eliminate. When practical reason is introduced into a false ethos, the brain responds by forming “ruts” of neuronal connections which seem difficult to consider as something appropriate. The reparation of the existing situation and the removal of the wrong habit require relevant virtues so as to unblock the psychological resistance that is deeply rooted within the physiological neuronal substrate. The learning about the virtues of St. Thomas Aquinas is the best warranty not only for theoretical explanations, but also for the practical application of virtues in dealing with the arised situation. Only well-formed virtues give the opportunity to correct the false instinctive cognition and liberate from erroneous actions. (shrink)

Charles E. Osgood's theory of affective meaning defines affect as interplay of three meaning dimensions – evaluation, potency, and activity – that represent the central constituents of our affective ecology. Based on a rigorous Brunswikian sampling procedure, we selected a representative set of stimuli that mirror this ecology. A germane informative analysis explicates and corroborates the sampling approach. We then report two experiments testing whether these dimensions of affective meaning can be learnt by means of stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure. (...) Our findings yield evidence for (1) stimulus pairing effects on evaluation and activity, and (2) stimulus exposure effects on potency and activity. Overall, the findings reveal that stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure differentially influence the learning of dimensions of affective meaning. We discuss implications of this research for current emotion theories as well as its contribution to research in the cognition–emotion interface. Finally, we argue that the implementation of representative design by virtue of Brunswikian sampling promotes theory development and opens new research avenues for an original and creative science of cognition and emotion. (shrink)

An influential view of education is that it prepares young people for adult life, usually in the areas of civic engagement, leisure and contemplation. Employment may be a locus for learning some worthwhile skills and knowledge, but it is not itself the possible locus or one of the possible loci of a worthwhile life. This article disputes that view by drawing attention to those aspects of employment that make it potentially an aspect of a worthwhile life. The exercise and (...) development of one's abilities, co-operation with others, self-discovery and the pursuit of excellence are all identified as potential components of a worthwhile life. If such an aspect of life is worth striving for then education should prepare one for it. Objections to this argument are reviewed and ultimately rejected. (shrink)

What is a good human life? A life of duty? Virtue? Happiness? This book weaves a path through traditional answers. We live well, suggests the author, not primarily by pursuing goods for ourselves, but by cherishing other people and guiding them towards lives of cherishing. We cherish objects too - the planet, my grandfather's watch - and practices like music-making to which we are personally drawn. In this work of 'populated philosophy' (copiously illustrated by literary and 'real life' examples), a (...) cherishing life is presented as hard and irreducibly individual. The idea of cherishing, says the author, points towards intimate, unreasonable layers of the ethical life, as well as the deepening of wisdom and connection. It also points towards incomparable satisfactions, reminding us who we are and who we want to be. (shrink)

In his feature article,1 McCullough LB et al highlights the importance of civility among medical educators and academic leaders in shaping the professional habits of junior doctors. He emphasises the role of medical educators in correcting unprofessional behaviour and emphasises the need for academic leaders to motivate junior doctors to develop virtuous professional habits. The relationship between junior doctors and medical educators can be likened to that between students and teachers. Through active or passive learning from medical educators, junior (...) doctors gain the necessary knowledge, experience and professional virtues. Academic leaders, as prominent experts in their field, play a guiding role in this process. Therefore, their relationship with junior doctors is akin to that between idols and fans. In this regard, academic leaders can serve as exceptional role models for guiding junior doctors to develop the inclination to …. (shrink)

Darwin's inner voice -- Living the virtuous life -- Of altruism and free riders -- Knowing our immediate predecessors -- Resurrecting some venerable ancestors -- A natural Garden of Eden -- The positive side of social selection -- Learning morals across the generations -- Work of the moral majority -- Pleistocene ups, downs, and crashes -- Testing the selection-by-reputation hypothesis -- The evolution of morals -- Epilogue: humanity's moral future.

The challenge this book addresses is to demonstrate how, in teaching content knowledge, the development of intellectual and moral dispositions as virtues is not merely a good idea, or peripheral to that content, but deeply embedded in the logic of searching for knowledge and truth. It offers a powerful example of how philosophy of education can be brought to bear on real problems of educational research and practice – pointing the reader to re-envision what it means to educate children (...) by developing the person, instead of simply knowledge and skills. Connected intimately to the practice of teaching and teacher education, the book sets forth an alternative theory of education where the developing person is at the center of education set in a moral space and a political order. To this end, a framework of public and personal knowledge forms the content, to which personal dispositions are integral, not peripheral. The book’s pedagogy is invitational, welcoming its readers as companions in inquiry and thought about the moral aspects of what we teach as knowledge. (shrink)

Broad comparisons of international relations across time—of the prospects for peace and of the possibilities for a new ethics for a connected world—typically focus on two dimensions: economic globalization and integration on the one hand, and the character of major interstate relations on the other. One of the most striking features of the pre-1914 world was precisely the coincidence of intensified globalization with a dramatic deterioration in major power relations, the downfall of concert-style approaches to international order, and the descent (...) into total war and ideological confrontation—what T. S. Eliot termed “the panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.” Today's optimists stress the degree to which globalization appears much more firmly institutionalized than it was a hundred years ago, the rather striking success of global economic governance in responding to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and the longer-term trend within international society to move away from major-power war. Pessimists are less sure. They worry that we have had to re-learn just how unstable global capitalism can be, both in terms of the wrenching societal changes produced by economic success and of the political strains produced by slowdown and recession. And they point to the abiding or resurgent power of nationalism in all of the core countries in the system, the return of balance-of-power thinking, and the renewed salience of major power politics. (shrink)

Leaders are faced with ethical and moral dilemmas daily, like those within the military who must span from large-scale combat operations to security cooperation and deterrence. For businesses, these dilemmas can include social and environmental impact such as those in mining; and for governments, the social and economic impact of their decision-making in their response to COVID-19. The move by Western defence forces to align their foundational principles, policies, and “soldier” dispositions with the changing values of the countries they serve (...) are starkly illustrative of challenges faced by all leaders. While admirable, such changes face the apparent contradiction of enhancing individual moral agency within a hierarchical organization that maintain enforceable codes of conduct. Ethical leadership theory provides aspirational goals, but lacks empirically based guidance on how to implement policies that facilitate values-based behavior. Using a discourse theory analysis of a moral dilemma vignette with Royal Australian Air Force personnel, this research identifies important aspects of agency and subject position that must be addressed if such policies are to succeed. These findings show that the potential contradiction can be addressed by acknowledging the contrasting tendency to bureaucratic process by leaders at upper levels, while lower-level leaders address moral issues by incorporating their subjectivity and making a conscious deontological choice between humanity and comrade loyalty. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is one of the three normative approaches to ethics. It foregrounds the virtues or moral character of the individual and can be contrasted with approaches that focus on duties or rules, as in deontological ethics, or on the consequences of actions, as in consequentialism. Virtue Ethics are different from deontological and consequentialist ethical forms. They are related to dispositions. Dispositions, as inner states, precede, condition and have some influence over actions. A disposition is a character type, an (...) habituation, a state of preparation or readiness and a tendency to act in a specified way. Two further issues are relevant to the conception of virtue ethics: notions of causality and free will. The reason why these two notions are important is that in the first case the identification and conceptualisation of the virtues requires a theory of knowledge and of being and the identification of a relationship between the two, including a notion of causation; and in the second case, any ethical theory requires a theory of intention. (shrink)

We propose a new relational direction in higher education that acknowledges external and internal images as integrated in thinking and learning. We expand educational theory and practice that commonly rely on discrete conceptual developments that exclude images. Our argument epistemologically relies on certain semiotic views that consider the role of iconic signs and iconicity (meaning making by the virtue of similarity) as significant in relation to knowledge and learning. The analogical and imaginative work required to discover similarity between (...) external pictures and any educational concept is a form of iconic mind work that opens a space for transformational thinking and creative solutions. The novelty of our argument lies in the schematic philosophy of mind by C.S. Peirce, and specifically, an adaptation of Peirce’s triadic sign diagram for learning, exemplified via an ‘inquiry graphic’ sign and reflective method. This outlook seeks connections in diversity, arguing for an education that acknowledges and teaches intrinsic human relatedness to other humans, beings and things in the environment, thus challenging any notions of anthropocentrism and superiority. It calls for a reaction in international higher education to acknowledge the iconicity of concepts and thinking and embrace integrated image-concept signs for deep and critical teaching-learning, towards a modest educational contribution to counteracting social and environmental crises. (shrink)

The author examines fundamental problems involved in teaching applied ethics in the educational environment of contemporary university culture. American universities are increasingly turning away from liberal arts education and focusing their efforts on constructing more professionalized degrees and programs. As a result, the education process has become increasingly commodified and ethics courses in universities have been further removed from the liberal arts project of moral development in the classroom. The author argues that ethicists should work to reframe the project of (...) moral education if they hope to retain a central role in the process of teaching ethics. The author suggests a growth model to be installed in the undergraduate curriculum that would reacquaint students with the aims and benefits of learning ethical and moral philosophy. (shrink)

With its focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods, virtue epistemology provides a rich set of tools for educational theory and practice. In particular, characteristics under the rubric of "responsibilist" virtue epistemology, like curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity, can help educators and students define and attain certain worthy but nebulous educational goals like a love of learning, lifelong learning, and critical thinking. This volume (...) is devoted to exploring the intersection between virtue epistemology and education. It assembles leading virtue epistemologists and philosophers of education to address such questions as: Which virtues are most essential to education? How exactly should these virtues be understood? How is the goal of intellectual character growth related to other educational goals, for example, to critical thinking and knowledge-acquisition? What are the "best practices" for achieving this goal? Can growth in intellectual virtues be measured? The chapters are a prime example of "applied epistemology" and promise to be a seminal contribution to an area of research that is rapidly gaining attention within epistemology and beyond. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 447-464 [Access article in PDF] Virtue, Reason, and Cultural Exchange: Leibniz's Praise of Chinese Morality Franklin Perkins I should regard myself very proud, very pleased and highly rewarded to be able to render Your Majesty any service in a work so worthy and pleasing to God; for I am not one of those impassioned patriots of one country alone, but I (...) work for the well-being of the whole of mankind, for I consider heaven as my country and cultivated men as my compatriots. —Leibniz (to Peter the Great), 1716 1 Diversity and Harmony Leibniz worked tirelessly to promote tolerance, peace, and the exchange of ideas, perhaps most in his attempts to bridge religious factions in Europe, but also in his receptiveness to the past and his attitude toward other cultures. This accommodation of differences is rooted in the belief that the most perfect possible world maximizes both diversity and harmony. In a time of rapid globalization, as the imperative to maximize diversity and harmony grows, I believe it is worthwhile to turn our attention to Leibniz's philosophy, particularly as it is expressed in his writings on China. The ground of Leibniz's openness toward other cultures is different from the ground to which we are accustomed. Multiculturalism is usually grounded in skepticism. We should accept and tolerate others because we can never be certain that our own beliefs are correct. The ground of Leibniz's tolerance leads in the opposite direction—we should [End Page 447] accept others not because no one knows the truth but because everyone knows something of the truth. 2The well-known metaphor of monads as perspectives on a city illustrates this approach. Leibniz writes, "Indeed, all individual substances are differentexpressions of the same universe and different expressions of the same universal cause, namely God. But the expressions vary in perfection, just as different representations or drawings of the same town from different points of view do." 3 The metaphor of different monads as different perspectives on a town captures what is needed for cultural exchange. What each of us "sees" is not wrong but partial or perspectival. Because our view is limited, we must learn from others whose views have different limitations, and we must be careful not to force our perspective on others. At the same time, each perspective is grounded in truth, which is what Leibniz intends when he says that each monad expresses the same universe. That is said to express a thing in which there are relations [habitudines] which correspond to the relations of the thing expressed. But there are various kinds of expression.... What is common to all these expressions is that we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing expressed. Hence, it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations. 4Leibniz gives many examples. An idea expresses its object. The perception of a monad expresses the universe, and the understanding of a mind expresses the understanding of God. Every effect expresses its cause. The senses and secondary qualities express their objects, as well as the body and its organs. Definitions express the essence of what they define. Paintings express the cities they represent. What do such dissimilar relationships have in common? The two things need not be similar but their conditions must be analogous. In the New Essays Leibniz writes that the resemblance is a relation of order, as an ellipse resembles the circle whose projection it is, "there is a certain precise and natural relationship between what is projected and the projection which is [End Page 448] made from it, with each point on the one corresponding through a certain relation with a point on the other." 5 In the Theodicy Leibniz says that the representation has a natural relationship to what is represented. If this representation is imperfect, then it... (shrink)