Although many active scientists deplore the publicity about Drexler's futuristic scenario, I will argue that the controversies it has generated are very useful, at least in one respect. They help clarify the metaphysical assumptions underlying nanotechnologies, which may prove very helpful for understanding their public and cultural impact. Both Drexler and his opponents take inspiration from living systems, which they both describe as machines. However there is a striking contrast in their respective views of molecular machineries. This paper based on (...) semipopular publications is an attempt to characterize the rival models of nanomachines and to disentangle the worldviews underpinning the uses of biological reference on both sides. Finally, in an effort to point out the historical roots of the contrast in the concepts of nanomachines, I raise the question of a divide between two cultures of nanotechnology. (shrink)

During the late twentieth century, drawing on C. P. Snow’s well-known concept of a “two cultures” divide between scientists and humanists, many psychologists identified polarizing divergences in their discipline. This essay traces how purported professional divides affected the understanding and management of mental retardation in clinical psychology. Previous work in the history of science has compared the differing cultures of disciplines, demonstrating that there is no one, unified science. Through an examination of multiple “two cultures” divides within (...) the discipline of psychology, the essay demonstrates that perceived divergences in the field were animated by considerations of professional identity, ambitions, and goals. It argues that differing views among clinical psychologists about mental retardation, and crucially the localization of its causes—in individual bodies, minds, and genomes or within social institutions—reflected their position among the multiple “cultures” of psychology. References to Snow’s two cultures spanned the late twentieth-century scientific and clinical literature and were often used to encourage a conversation about the nature and goals of research in a field. In considering these purported “two cultures” divides, the essay proposes that historians of science must take care to look beyond constructed polarities, to instead analyze the resulting discussions about professional training and purpose. (shrink)

There are two contrasting cultures in every religious tradition, the holy war and peaceable garden cultures. Examples are given for Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Conflict is basic to human existence, stemming from the uniqueness of human individuals and their groups. Churches, instead of helping their societies develop the middle‐ground skills of negotiation and mediation, have insisted on a choice between two extreme behaviors: unitive love or destruction of the enemy. In international affairs this has led to the identification (...) of the church with the state in wartime and kept it from claiming the important middle ground of peacemaking. Institutionalized religion can pick up its missed opportunities. (shrink)

This paper approaches the ‘Drexler-Smalley’ debate on nanotechnology from a neglected angle – the common denominator of ‘the frontier’ as a metaphor for scientific exploration. For Bensaude-Vincent, the debate exemplifies the clash of ‘two cultures’ – the ‘artificialist’ and biomimetic’ schools. For us, the portrayal of nanosphere as ‘new frontier’ stymies the prospect of genuine inter-cultural debate on the direction of molecular engineering. Drawing on Brandon, the‘dominium’ impulse of European imperialism is contrasted to the ‘communitas’ tradition of Native America. (...) Proposing a single label – hybridist – for both schools, we juxtapose to this approach the holistic disposition of indigenous North American science. (shrink)

The notion that our society, its education system and its intellectual life, is characterised by a split between two cultures – the arts or humanities on one hand and the sciences on the other – has a long history. But it was C. P. Snow's Rede lecture of 1959 that brought it to prominence and began a public debate that is still raging in the media today. This fiftieth anniversary printing of The Two Cultures and its successor piece, (...) A Second Look features an introduction by Stefan Collini, charting the history and context of the debate, its implications and its afterlife. The importance of science and technology in policy run largely by non-scientists, the future for education and research, and the problem of fragmentation threatening hopes for a common culture are just some of the subjects discussed. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's, book The Copernican Revolution deserves to be regarded as the best of that small group of longue duree histories that mark postwar historiography of science. In many respects, it is probably the single most influential one. Tightly written and brilliantly argued, it is responsible, together with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for the continued popularity of the metaphor of revolution in science among scholars and students alike. Yet, surprisingly, while aspects of the story conceived in Kuhn's original account (...) have been debated, researched, and considerably revised, his overall understanding of a scientific revolution initiated by Copernicus has received no detailed scrutiny. The same may be said of the deployment of Copernican episode in Structure. Finally, a critical appreciation is in order not least because Kuhn's story is so compact and his language at times metaphorical. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit the debate concerning the distinction, which is sometimes made between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy. I look at the historical context in which the distinction came to prominence in the twentieth century, the reasons why it subsequently declined in popularity, and eventually had begun to be undermined. I argue that the distinction possesses intuitive content, which the recent attempts at exposing it as conceptually flawed fail to account for. I suggest that the intuitive content of the (...) distinction provides us with resources to usefully define two different ways philosophical reflection has been approached during the course of the twentieth century. I conclude by suggesting that we can bring these two ways of approaching philosophy into focus by appealing to the idea of philosophical temperament. (shrink)

The schism between analytic and continental philosophy resists repair because it is not confined to philosophers. It is a local manifestation of a far more profound and pervasive division. In 1959 C.P. Snow lamented the partition of intellectual life in to `two cultures': that of the scientist and that of the literary intellectual. If we follow the practice of most universities and bundle historical and literary studies together in the faculty of humanities on the one hand, and count pure (...) mathematics among the sciences on the other, then it is fair to say that the mutual ignorance and occasional hostility between scientists and humanists decried by Snow is still with us. And it runs through the middle of philosophy. Philosophy aspires to say something about everything, so it is unsurprising that philosophers have reproduced in miniature the division between the arts and the sciences. What is worrying is that we have failed to overcome it. (shrink)

Aristotle continues to be a highly cited author in cultural sciences (human and social sciences) and humanities. In the last two decades, his work attracted up to a hundred times more attention than the work of Konrad Lorenz or Edward O. Wilson, who have attempted to synthesize new knowledge on behavior and society and proposed alternatives to traditional, intuitively appealing, explanations. Aristotle's interpretations of the world, which appear to be intuitive to the human mind, were abandoned in natural sciences upon (...) introduction of the experimental method. Human intuition may have been appropriate in conditions under which it was originally selected: for life of small non-anonymous groups of hunters and gatherers in the savannah. Intuition confines human understanding to a simple reality circumscribed by a boundary that can be called Aristotle's barrier. The barrier may only be crossed by experimentation, which is largely missing in cultural sciences. Snow's concept of two cultures may be revisited to characterize a splitting of natural sciences versus cultural sciences. It may also be applied to a widening gulf between science and technoscience. Diverging of the two cultures may have far-reaching consequences for prospects of humankind's survival. (shrink)

Cultural routines, such as reading and writing direction (script direction), channel attention orientation. Depending on one's native language habit, attention is biased from left‐to‐right (LR) or from right‐to‐left (RL). Here, we further document this bias, as it interacts with the spatial directionality that grounds time concepts. We used a spatial cueing task to test whether script direction and the grounding of time in Portuguese (LR, Exp. 1) and Arabic (RL, Exp. 2) shape visuomotor performance in target discrimination. Temporal words (e.g., (...) tomorrow, yesterday) were presented as cues in two modalities: visual (Exp. 1–2) and auditory (Exp. 1). Gaze movement (Exp. 1) and speed of discrimination decisions (Exp. 1–2) of targets presented to the left or right sides of the screen were assessed. As predicted, the interaction between target location and time concepts was significant across both modalities and linguistic communities. Additionally, LR participants detected the target on the right side of the screen faster after a future word than the target on the left side of the screen after a past word cue. In contrast, RL participants detected the target on the left side of the screen faster when the cue word was a future word than the target on the right side of the screen cued by a past word. In both modalities, the initial eye‐gaze movement (Exp. 1) was responsive to the cue's time referent, further confirming that time orients attention. An additional bias was observed for the first fixation onset, which landed earlier on the target set that matched habitualized spatial routines. We conclude that scanning regularities are shaped by writing habits and bodily grounded categorical features. (shrink)

Many post World War II thinkers have been perplexed by the problem of how or even whether people from different cultures can understand each other. The problem arose when we started to think of culture as formative of language and thought. The common assumptions of most theorists of language are that language is fundamental to thinking and culture; and language, thought, culture or humanity is a natural product of biological evolution. Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi-seen as diametrically opposed-both independently (...) criticize these assumptions and provide alternative theories of humanity whereby cross-cultural understanding is a real problem that can be broached through engaging in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. So, though language and culture creates hurdles for achieving cross-cultural understanding, the pursuit of science transcends the limitations of culture. (shrink)

This essay examines different approaches to writing the history of science in light of the increased importance of microhistorical studies in the past two decades. It specifically examines the role of microhistory within the history of science and the importance of Thomas Kuhn’s concept of the “normal exception” in early methodological statements about the function of microhistory. It also considers the possibilities for writing archivally based history of science for a general readership as a means of bridging the divide between (...) specialized research within the subfields of the history of science and more general accounts of the nature and growth of science.Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be regarded with much suspicion.—C. P. Snow. (shrink)

Anhand von zwei Unterbereichen der künstlichen Intelligenz - den Expertensystemen und der wissenschaftlichen Entdeckung - wird aufzuzeigen versucht, daß die Beziehung zwischen der "formalen" und der "intuitiven" Kultur aus dem Gleichgewicht geraten ist. Dem Bereich der Intuition sollte größere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet werden.

This paper brings to light the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking for contemporary physics. The point of departure is his 1956–57 Collège de France lectures on Nature, coupled with his reflections on the crisis in modern physics appearing in THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE. Developments in theoretical physics after his death are then explored and a deepening of the crisis is disclosed. The upshot is that physics’ intractable problems of uncertainty and subject-object interaction can only be addressed by shifting its philosophical (...) base from objectivism to phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty suggested. Merleau-Ponty’s allusion to “topological space” in THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE provides a clue for bridging the gap between “hard science” and “soft philosophy.” This lead is pursued in the present paper by employing the paradoxical topology of the Klein bottle. The hope is that, by “softening” physics and “hardening” phenomenology, the “two cultures” (cf. C. P. Snow) can be wed and a new kind of science be born. (shrink)

Vanity of Science Knowledge of physical science will not console me for ignorance of morality in time of affliction, but knowledge of morality will always console me for ignorance of physical science.

This paper begins by considering the specific position of philosophy on culture: philosophy is part of culture as well as being a reflection of the whole complex. Thus, culture finds in philosophy its own meta-cultural account. One of the results achieved by this philosophical approach might be the diagnosis of the cultural split and the symptoms of anthropological regress. On the other hand, the example of Michel de Certeau’s work shows us that from this point of view it is possible (...) to develop philosophical anthropology as a performative discipline, studying the activities of transformation, and appropriation at the level of everyday life. This anthropological approach leads us to an awareness of the principal openness of the cultural field and even to a new understanding of balkanization. (shrink)

Returning to the text of his phrase-making Rede lecture Sir Charles Snow, surely an experienced explorer of the corridors of power, confesses to the awe of the sorcerer’s apprentice at the flood of comment, hostile and appreciative, near and far in origin, which his unpretentiously original thoughts upon the current rift in cultural communication conjured from the practitioners of literature and science, who broadly divide higher education in England today and whom he addressed at Cambridge in May 1959. The widespread (...) spontaneity of reaction has led him to conclude that his analysis touched a nerve, ‘something which people, all over the world, suspect is relevant to present actions’. His original lecture refused to relate itself to the political waging of ‘the cold war’ as ‘the prime absolute of our age’ and it castigated modernist literature for its neglect of the currently scientific stage of the industrial revolution, which is producing a new egalitarian society in our own time. Now he restates his major theme: the pressing need for a new education to promote common understanding between these two dominant cultures, so that the expanding social force of applied science be directed with the minimum danger and the maximum good for humanity. He does not minimise the danger of leaving a mystic status to the initiates of science. (shrink)

In two experiments we demonstrate a substantial cross‐cultural difference in a mnemonic context effect, whereby a magnitude estimate of a simple stimulus such as a line or circle is biased toward the center of the distribution of previously seen instances of the same class. In support of the hypothesis that Asians are more likely than Americans to disperse their attention to both the target stimulus and its mnemonic context, this effect was consistently larger for Japanese than for Americans. Moreover, the (...) cultural difference was attenuated by an experimentally induced belief in class homogeneity that augmented the context effect itself in both cultures. More important, these belief effects happened in the absence of any objective change in stimulus distribution. Implications for sociocultural shaping of cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Two cultures are at play in the field of social entrepreneurship: an age-old culture of charity, and a more contemporary culture of entrepreneurial problem solving. These cultures permeate activities from resource providers to front line operations. Both have roots in our psychological responses to the needs of others and are reinforced by social norms. They can work hand-in-hand or they can be at odds. Some of the icons of the social entrepreneurship movement have spoken harshly about charity, yet (...) most of them rely to some degree, at least early in their development process, on resources that are given out of a charitable impulse. The success of social entrepreneurship requires an integration of values from each of these cultures, in which the satisfactions of giving are correlated with social benefits of rigorous problem solving. (shrink)

This article argues that early modern philosophy should be seen as an integrated enterprise of moral and natural philosophy. Consequently, early modern moral and natural philosophy should be taught as intellectual enterprises that developed hand in hand. Further, the article argues that the unity of these two fields can be best introduced through methodological ideas. It illustrates these theses through a case study on Scottish Newtonianism, starting with visions concerning the unity of philosophy and then turning to a discussion of (...) how methodological ideas figure in those visions. Finally, the article argues that methodological considerations can serve as good starting points to introduce and discuss central topics and canonical figures of the early modern period. (shrink)

That C. P. Snow had first-hand experience both in science and writing was taken for granted in the years of controversy over ‘the two cultures’, but neither the quality of his experience nor the circumstances of his eventual adoption of a literary career was given close enough consideration. Snow's own statements on these two points are often misleading. Yet the autobiographical nature of his fiction throws significant light on the subject. An examination of the autobiographical elements in Snow's novels (...) in the light of his conception of the novel raises the question of whether his shift from science to literature was exactly the result of a genuine choice and also reveals that the two cultures dichotomy is embedded in his personal experience. (shrink)

Research on bounded rationality has two cultures, which I call ‘idealistic’ and ‘pragmatic’. Technically, the cultures differ on whether they build models based on normative axioms or empirical facts, assume that people's goal is to optimize or to satisfice, do not or do model psychological processes, let parameters vary freely or fix them, aim at explanation or prediction and test models from one or both cultures. Each culture tells a story about people's rationality. The story of the (...) idealistic culture is frustrating, with people in principle being able to know what they should do, but in practice systematically failing to do it. This story makes one hide in books for intellectual solace or surrender to the designs of someone smarter. The story of the pragmatic culture is empowering: If people are educated to use the right tool in the right situation, they do well. (shrink)

ExcerptIn 1959, C. P. Snow delivered the Rede Lecture on “The Two Cultures.”1 Snow’s fundamental point was that humanists and scientists speak past each other, assuming that they communicate at all. “[I]ntellectual life,” Snow writes, “is increasingly being split into two polar groups.” At one end, “literary intellectuals,” at the other, “scientists,” and between the two “a gulf of mutual incomprehension—sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding.” Scientists don’t read any imaginative (...) literature because it has no practical application; and humanists ignore science because they think it is “of no interest either in its own value or its consequences.” The result is a split that does nobody any good. (shrink)

Many people would like to know where scientific ideas come from and how they arise. In the case of mathematics, new ideas often come in the form of new “mathematical objects”: groups, vector spaces, sets, etc. Some people think these new objects are invented, others that they are discovered. By exploring the birth of descriptive set theory in France and Russia in the period 1890–1930 we show that the leading French mathematicians worked within a rational, secular worldview that made them (...) doubt the legitimacy of infinite sets, particularly nondenumerable ones; on the other hand, the creators of the famous Moscow school of mathematics, particularly those who subscribed to a religious doctrine known as “name‐worshipping,” believed that humans had absolute freedom to invent mathematical objects. Partly as a result of their different cultural environments, the French and the Russians took different approaches to the same problem. In the end the Russians created a new field, descriptive set theory, at a time when the French remained hesitant. (shrink)

Cross-cultural comparisons can a) illuminate the manner in which cultures differentially highlight, ignore, and group various facets of emotional experience, and b) shed light on our evolved species-typical emotional architecture. In many societies, concern with shame is one of the principal factors regulating social behavior. Three studies conducted in Bengkulu and California explored the nature and experience of shame in two disparate cultures. Study 1, perceived term use frequency, indicated that shame is more prominent in Bengkulu, a collectivistic (...) culture, than in California, an individualistic culture. Study 2, comparing naturally occurring shame events with reports thereof, revealed that shame is associated with guilt-like accounts in California but not in Bengkulu, and subordinance events in Bengkulu but not in California; published reports suggest that the latter pattern is prominent worldwide. Study 3 mapped the semantic domain of shame using a synonym task; again, guilt was prominent in California, subordinance in Bengkulu. Because shame is overshadowed by guilt in individualistic cultures, and because these cultures downplay aversive emotions associated with subordinance, a fuller understanding of shame is best arrived at through the study of collectivistic cultures such as Bengkulu. After reviewing evolutionary theories on the origins and functions of shame, I evaluate these perspectives in light of facets of this emotion evident in Bengkulu and elsewhere. The available data are consistent with the proposition that shame evolved from a rank-related emotion and, while motivating prestige competition, cooperation, and conformity, nevertheless continues to play this role in contemporary humans. (shrink)

This book is a study of the transformation of Chinese political consciousness during the post-Mao era.

Human communication is by defaultpolysemiotic: it involves the spontaneous combination of two or moresemiotic systems, the most important ones beinglanguage,gesture, anddepiction. We formulate an original cognitive-semiotic framework for the analysis of polysemiosis, contrasting this with more familiar systems based on the ambiguous term “multimodality.” To be fully explicit, we developed a coding system for the analysis of polysemiotic utterances containing speech, gesture, and drawing, and implemented this in the ELAN video annotation software. We used this to analyze 23 video-recordings of (...) sand drawing performances on Paama, Vanuatu and 20 sand stories of the Pitjantjatjara culture in Central Australia. Methodologically we used theconceptual-empirical loopof cognitive semiotics: our theoretical framework guided general considerations, such as distinguishing between the “tiers” of gesture and depiction, and the three kinds of semiotic grounds (iconic, indexical, symbolic), but the precise decisions on how to operationalize these were made only after extensive work with the material. We describe the coding system in detail and provide illustrative examples from the Paamese and Pitjantjatjara data, remarking on both similarities and differences in the polysemiosis of the two cultural practices. We conclude by summarizing the contributions of the study and point to some directions for future research. (shrink)

Despite the continuous emphasis on globalization, we witness increasing divisions and divisiveness in all domains of human activities. One of the reasons, if not the main one, is the intellectual fragmentation of humanity, compared in the title to the failed attempt at building the Biblical Tower of Babel. The attempts to reintegrate worldview, fragmented by the specialization of education (C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures) and expected to be achieved through reforms in curricula at all levels of education, were based (...) on the assumption that the design of a curriculum should focus on the wide distribution of subjects of study, as if the distribution was the goal. The key point is not the distribution of themes, but the development of skills in the integration of knowledge. The quantitative assessment of the width of knowledge by the number of disciplines is of secondary importance. We cannot expect the miracle that students without any intellectual tools developed for this purpose would perform the job of integration, which their teachers do not promote or demonstrate, and which they cannot achieve for themselves. There are many other reasons for the increasing interest in making inquiries interdisciplinary, but there is little progress in the methodology of the integration of knowledge. This paper is a study of the transition from multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity, and further, to transdisciplinarity, with some suggestions regarding the use of methodological tools of structuralism and the choice of a conceptual framework. (shrink)

The most distinctive activities of humankind and the source of its greatest achievements are the scientific investigation of the world and the creation of art. Newton's Sleep examines their complementary roles in contemporary life and defends both against those who assert that science is spiritually empty and inherently dangerous and that art is trivialised by a lack of social mission.

While the scientific contributions of François Jacob were outstanding, I also consider that his conception of science, and of its place among other forms of knowledge, is also highly original, and important for the future of science in our societies. His contributions to the history and philosophy of science were neither a hobby nor a secondary activity, but they were for him a natural complement to his scientific work. He fully opposed the concept of the two cultures, the literary (...) and the scientific, proposed by C.P. Snow. For Jacob, concepts, metaphors and models circulated between the various spheres of human activity. This is obvious in his own work. This “open” conception of scientific activity did not prevent him from defending the specificity, and the superiority, of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

C. P. Snow's conception of “two cultures” has been readily applied to modern European and especially Anglo-American contexts and used to bemoan the negative impact of disciplinary distinctions. But in the pre-modern period, disciplinary distinctions prevailed along different fault lines. I consider two examples of the dynamics between the disciplines in medieval and early modern Europe to argue that distinctions between the disciplines can foster crucial benefits along with the tensions and obstacles to interdisciplinarity of which we are more (...) often aware. In the medieval university the institutional and intellectual separation between philosophy and theology gave the former an important measure of protection and independence from the cultural dominance of the latter. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the long-traditional distinction between mathematical disciplines and Aristotelian physics was gradually abandoned, and distinctions akin to those Snow identified were first commented on during the quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns. (shrink)

Ralph Burhoe developed his proposals for a social reformation at a time when the “two cultures” debate was still active. It is suggested here that Burhoe, sharing with his contemporaries an understanding of culture that was Western and normative in character, overlooked the distinction between the culture of the elites and popular culture, and consequently between religion as presented by theologians and church officials and popular religion. Therefore, his proposals for the revitalization of traditional religions, even if implemented, would (...) not work. Some contradictions within his own program are pointed out, and the social role of the sciences after World War II, as well as the ambiguities of their presence in the so-called underdeveloped nations, is analyzed. As a positive conclusion, it is suggested that Burhoe's main contribution should be sought, not in his outline for a social reformation, but in his role as an organizer of the dialogue between religion and science. (shrink)