This book provides the first comprehensive discussion regarding the role that Kant ascribes to systematicity in the sciences. It considers not only what Kant has to say on systematicity in general, but also how the systematicity requirement for science is specified in different fields of knowledge. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 is devoted to historical context. The chapters explore precursors of Kant's account of the systematicity of the sciences. Part 2 addresses the application (...) of systematicity to the special sciences-cosmology, physics, chemistry, logic, mathematics, the life sciences and history. Finally, Part 3 explores the systematicity of philosophy. Kant and the Systematicity of the Sciences will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant and the history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This review critically examines the current state of the science on the concept of family caregiver–care receiver mutuality, summarizes accomplishments and gaps and identifies directions for future theory development and research. Mutuality between family caregivers and care receivers is of increasing interest to researchers. However, no analysis of the current state of the science of this important concept has been published. Our literature search revealed 34 research articles that met inclusion criteria. The studies were assessed in terms of conceptualization of (...) mutuality, instrument development, populations studied, research designs and methods and findings. Significant scientific progress during the past 30 years includes the development of clear definitions and new instruments, expansion of research beyond the clinical populations in which mutuality was first studied, the use of a variety of research designs, and increasingly sophisticated methods of data analysis. Growing evidence suggests that mutuality is associated with caregiver emotional health outcomes and may decrease over time in the context of chronic illness. Directions for future research include development of new theoretical frameworks grounded in relational theory, development of theory on the dynamics of mutuality over time, exploration of mutuality in diverse cultures and populations, and intervention studies aimed at enhancing mutuality. (shrink)

Amos departs from Austin, who Amos considered "the true founder of the science of law", in important fundamentals. In this text, Amos sets out to draw a "clear line of demarcation between ethical & legal conceptions".

Donald Davidson contributed more deeply to our understanding of language, thought, and reality than perhaps any other recent philosopher. His discussions of skepticism are sometimes seen as peripheral to those contributions. As I read him, Davidson argued against three skeptical worries. First, beliefs are true or false relative to a conceptual scheme. Second, beliefs generally are false. Third, other minds and an external world do not exist. Call those worries ‘conceptual relativism’, ‘falsidicalism’, and ‘solipsism’, respectively. I investigate how Davidson’s arguments (...) are connected. I then show that those connections are so systematic that Davidson ultimately offers a single, master argument with two premises. Premise one is that I think. Premise two is an application of his account of radical interpretation. Focusing on the systematicity of Davidson’s anti-skeptical arguments demonstrates that discussions of skepticism were more central to his views than often appreciated and shines fresh light on his project overall. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the publication of Niklas Luhmann’s book The Science of Society. The system-communicative approach to the analysis of science is reconstructed with a focus on the relation of science to its highly complex external world. The problem of complexity is posed as a key one and is considered in the context of the communicative “reduction of the complexity” of the external world, which science actualizes through its unique binary opposition (truth/falsehood distinction). The (...) complexity of the world that science is facing disintegrates into two large areas. On the one hand, science processes its own external world, i.e., nature, society, the human psyche, as its object and thus fulfills a unique function, the pursuance of research. Scientific communication in this case can be integrated in the form of transdisciplinary studies. On the other hand, science has to respond to the complexity of the internal (i.e., social) external world of the communicative system of science, namely, to interfaced communicative systems of the embracing system of world society (politics, economy, religion, education, law, etc.). In the latter case, science does not fulfill a function but delivers achievements on request to the above-mentioned communicative systems in exchange for resources for interdisciplinary studies, which are occasional and cannot serve for integrating scientific communication on a systematic basis. We will propose some corrections to this theory and apply it to the situation in Russian science. (shrink)

The Sciences of the Qurʾān contain information about the process of Qurʾān and its structural characteristics, language and stylistic features, as well as statistical data on the content of the Qurʾān. This information, which contributes significantly to the understanding of the Qurʾān, is generally classified within the relevant narratives and the classifications are sometimes associated with verses. In this context, the way in which the Sciences of the Qurʾān explain the verses, which do not act solely on methodical (...) premises, differs from the Qurʾānic exegesis books. In the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the subject of revelation forms are classified within the frame of the narrations, and the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā is frequently referred to. In other words, the related classifications are matched with the 51st verse of the Sūrat al-Shūrā. In the exegesis, this verse is handled more comprehensively considering its context and the literal possibilities. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. However, on the contrary, it is possible to encounter examples where the verse is subject to specific discussions. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). When the exegesis of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī are examined, it is seen that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah (seeing Allah) discussion between Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made in this context. However, it is interesting to note that the classification of al-Zamakhsharī is more suitable for the perspective of the Sciences of the Qurʾān. In this study, the codes of the determinations made by al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī related to the 51st verse of Sūrat al-Shūrā was read on the commentaries. While al-Zamakhsharī explains this verse as a proof for the argument that God cannot be seen, al-Bayḍāwī develops an example of reactionary interpretation upon Zamakhsharī’s view. The Sciences of the Qurʾān (as a discipline), which opens a separate title to the ways of revelation, uses this verse as a template and takes it away from the discussion. In the study, the subjective dimensions of the discussion and classifications made in the context of this verse were evaluated. As a result, it is concluded that a classification similar to classification of al-Zamakhsharī has been made in the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān as it provides more comprehensive framework. Summary: During the period of revelation of the Holy Qurʾān not only the sunnah and actions of the Prophet which explained the Holy Qurʾān, but also various sources of information based on language and consultation, were used in order to understand the Holy Qurʾān. The first people introduced to the revelation used their own language/oratory skills, which were natural them, to understand the Qurʾān and were also able to observe the events and problems that brought about the revelation of the verses. These elements, used by those first people for understanding the Qurʾān, were readily available in their society. Therefore, understanding of the Qurʾān while the Prophet was still alive did not require a codification of those resources or treatment of the matter on a theoretical level. Subsequent generations mostly compensated the lack of those advantages by the use of the Sciences of the Qurʾān books penned individually after 2nd Century (A.H.), and those written systematically under the collective name "the Sciences of the Qurʾān" starting from the 6th century (A.H.). These works covered many subjects such as the beginning of the revelation, the accentuation of the Qurʾān, the physical development process of the Qurʾānic text, information based on observation as well as the tone and content of the Qurʾān and provided information details for Qurʾānic interpretations. Over time, this information was classified in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature, organized under various relevant titles and enhanced with examples, numerical and qualitative information. One of the main topics of the Sciences of the Qurʾān is the subject of “revelation and its forms”. In the literature of the Sciences of the Qurʾān, the classifications made under this topic are generally associated with the verse 51 of Sūrat al-Shūrā. In this verse, the forms of communication between Allah (Jalla Jalaluhu) and the servant/prophet are categorized. The context of the verse 51 of the Sūrat al-Shūrā in the tafsīr literature is different from the context in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature. As a matter of fact, while this verse is examined in detail with respect to the context, concept analysis, and the possibilities of i‘rāb (classical Arabic grammar), it is merely referred to in the Sciences of the Qurʾān. This is due to the fact that the determinations and classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān are shaped mostly in the light of the historical context and narrations of the subject.It is also possible to encounter examples of tafsīr where the 51st verse is made the topic of detailed discussions. There are two remarkable comments about this verse in terms of its reflection in the revelation classifications. One of them belongs to Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d.538/1144) and the other belongs to Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286). The tafsīr s of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Bayḍāwī make it clear that this verse is the subject of ru’yat Allah discussion between the Muʿtazila and Ahl al-Sunnah and the classifications are made accordingly. The fact that i‘rāb examinations of the two authors are similar and both took into account other linguistic possibilities despite their preferences, which also prove that the points of conflict are not literal. Al-Zamakhsharī thinks that this verse determines the way Allah speaks not only with his prophets but also with all people. According to al-Zamakhsharī, the 51st verse refers to the three forms of communication that takes place between God and any of His servants. Allah communicates with His servants; a) through inspiration, inspiration to heart or through dreams, b) by making His words heard through certain channels, c) by sending one of his angels as a messenger. In the verse, the first is expressed as revelation, the second is to speak behind a veil, and the third is to send a messenger. According to al-Zamakhsharī, Allah's inspiration to the mother of Moses, the dream that He showed to Abraham regarding the sacrificing of his son and inspiration of Psalms to David, all relate to the revelation concept mentioned in the first option. Al-Zamakhsharī believes that revelation from behind a veil is an adage. This adage can be compared to a king speaking with one of those at his service behind a veil/curtain, where the person hears the voice of the king but cannot see him. Allah only spoke to Moses and angels in that manner, and sent angels to speak to His other servants/prophets.As a response to al-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍāwī interpreted the verse concisely explaining the 'revelation' (وحيا) as a secret word that is quickly understood. Because, in terms of its nature, revelation is not a word made up of sound waves that come one after another to make words. In the verse, this word refers both to the Night Journey (Mi‘rāj) and the talk mentioned in the hadiths regarding the ru’yat Allah, and Allah speaking to Moses without Moses seeing Allah. However, in the verse min verâi ḥicâb/attributed to the word 'revelation 'من وراء حجاب makes it clear that the expression refers to a form of speech in which Allah is heard but not seen. Therefore, the word 'revelation' refers to a mutual talk and according to al-Bayḍāwī, this is proof that ru’yat Allah is possible. The fact that the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān literature agrees with the classification of al-Zamakhsharī, not al-Bayḍāwī. This result is closely related to the structural features of the Sciences of the Qurʾān in which authors strive to make general explanations that are beyond sectarian preferences and views. Understanding the verse as a conversation between Allah and man, and not between Allah and His prophet, provides a more comprehensive classification in terms of the use of revelations (not only the use of the word revelation) in the Qurʾān. Thus, the address that was made to Abraham in his dream, the revelation of to Moses' mother, and inspiration to our holy Prophet and other people can be interpreted according to this verse. In addition, the ru’yat Allah debate was excluded from the subject in the classifications made in the Sciences of the Qurʾān and implication of the verse was limited to the talks made in a worldly manner. (shrink)

When one sees an opening chapter entitled “From Science to Love” it begs for further reading. After all, for most these are incongruent terms that represent two seemingly opposite sides in a debate, logic, and systematic evaluation vs. emotion. There have been many books written about the convergence of science and spirituality, and one cannot help but notice how some of today’s physicists are sounding more like spiritualists than scientists, but Dr. Portola uses this platform as wake up call for (...) humanity. There is a brief discussion about some well-known enlightened beings in our history, including founders of today’s organized religions, and our progression from animism to polytheism, and eventually monotheism, but Portola astutely points out the role that science played in explaining natural phenomena. Our ancestors could not have imagined these discoveries, and it was science that moved us past idol worship to spiritual independence. The author is well versed in the primary disciplines of research that suggest survival and devotes part of the book to discussions of the nature of consciousness, neuroscience, thought transmission, psychokinesis, near-death experiences, reincarnation, mediumship, and instrumental TransCommunication, but the overall message is clear that science can show us the road but changing the world paradigm starts with individual transformation. In the discussion of the neurosciences and parapsychology it is suggested that perhaps an adjustment to the scientific method is indicated by putting more value on the anecdotal personal experiences that are so prevalent. In his discussion about a paradigm shift Portola suggests that all people, including scientists and mediums, will understand more by first finding themselves through contemplation and reflection. It is only after we open to the subtle layers of consciousness that we can achieve the necessary balance needed to reach our objectives. The suggestion that scientists also need to contemplate and reflect upon the bigger picture seems contrary to the definition of science, but I suspect that Portola is correct. (shrink)

Andrea Falcon's work is guided by the exegetical ideal of recreating the mind of Aristotle and his distinctive conception of the theoretical enterprise. In this concise exploration of the significance of the celestial world for Aristotle's science of nature, Falcon investigates the source of discontinuity between celestial and sublunary natures and argues that the conviction that the natural world exhibits unity without uniformity is the ultimate reason for Aristotle's claim that the heavens are made of a special body, unique to (...) them. This book presents Aristotle as a totally engaged, systematic investigator whose ultimate concern was to integrate his distinct investigations into a coherent interpretation of the world we live in, all the while mindful of human limitations to what can be known. Falcon reads in Aristotle the ambition of an extraordinarily curious mind and the confidence that that ambition has been largely fulfilled. (shrink)

Biomedical research on humans is an important part of medical progress. But, when lives are at risk, safety and ethical practices need to be the top priority. The need for the committees that regulate and oversee such research -- institutional review boards, or IRBs -- is growing. IRB members face difficult decisions every day. Evaluating the Science and Ethics of Research on Humans is a guide for new and veteran members of IRBs that will help them better understand the issues (...) involved and the tasks they will be required to perform. The most important purpose of an IRB is to protect the lives of human participants. For three major research areas -- drugs, medical devices, and genetic information -- Dennis J. Mazur shares the methods he has found useful in protecting human participants through the systematic review of scientific protocols and informed consent forms and through adherence to the federal regulations that apply. New members will gain understanding of how proposed research projects are to be reviewed from both scientific and ethical dimensions, how and when to ask key questions of principal investigators, how to work with principal investigators and research teams to ensure the best protection of human participants, and why to schedule regularly spaced reviews of a project that may have adverse outcomes. Based on Mazur's thirty years of research experience, this accessible and informative guide will give all IRB members the tools they need to protect human lives and facilitate the research process. (shrink)

Hermann's Weyl Das Kontinuum has inspired several studies in logic and foundations of mathematics over the last century. The book provides a remarkable reconstruction of a large portion of classical mathematics on a predicative basis. However, diverging interpretations of the predicative system formulated by Weyl have been proposed in the literature. In the present work, I analyze an early formalization of Weyl's ideas proposed by [Casari, E. 1964. Questioni di Filosofia Della Matematica, Milano: Feltrinelli] and compare it with other, more (...) well-known, accounts, such as those proposed respectively by Feferman and Avron. In this way, I fill a gap in the literature on Weyl's predicative mathematics by shedding light on an interpretation that has never been studied. Moreover, Casari's work is plausibly the first systematic reconstruction of Weyl's system. In particular, I highlight the different insights about predicativity that can be found in Weyl's work. Casari's reconstruction focuses on the logical and mathematical processes described by Weyl in the first part of his book. Through the analysis of this unexplored perspective, I shed light on fundamental aspects of Weyl's work and elucidate the alleged ambiguities it presents. In particular, in line with Avron's most recent reconstruction of Weyl's ideas, this analysis supports a stronger conception of predicativity than what is commonly attributed to Weyl in the literature. As a result, this work not only provides an analysis of a neglected interpretation of Das Kontinuum, but also contributes to elucidating Weyl's classical conception of predicativity. (shrink)

IntroductionResearch on the impact of cancer on close relationships brings up conflicting results. This systematic review collects empirical evidence on the research questions whether a cancer diagnosis in general or the type of cancer affects the divorce rate.Materials and MethodsThis systematic review was conducted according to the guidelines of the Cochrane Collaboration and the PRISMA statement. The following electronic databases were searched: Web of Science, Ovid SP MEDLINE, PsycINFO, PsyINDEX, CINAHL, ERIC. Risk of bias assessment was performed with the preliminary (...) risk of bias for exposures tool template. The grading of methodological quality was assessed with the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale.ResultsOf 13,929 identified records, 15 were included in the qualitative synthesis. In 263,616 cancer patients and 3.4 million healthy individuals, we found that cancer is associated with a slightly decreased divorce rate, except for cervical cancer, which seems to be associated with an increased divorce rate.DiscussionAccording to this systematic review, cancer is associated with a tendency to a slightly decreased divorce rate. However, most of the included studies have methodologic weaknesses and an increased risk of bias. Further studies are needed. (shrink)

Scholars have paid ample attention to Aristotle's works on animals. By contrast, they have paid little or no attention to Theophrastus' writings on plants. That is unfortunate because there was a shared research project in the early Peripatos which amounted to a systematic, and theoretically motivated, study of perishable living beings (animals and plants). This is the first sustained attempt to explore how Aristotle and Theophrastus envisioned this study, with attention focused primarily on its deep structure. That entails giving full (...) consideration to a few transitional passages where Aristotle and Theophrastus offer their own description of what they are trying to do. What emerges is a novel, sophisticated, and largely idiosyncratic approach to the topic of life. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Despite the prominence of the systematicity argument in the debate between Classicists and Connectionists, there is extremely widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the argument. For example, Matthews (1994), has argued that the systematicity argument is a kind of trick, where Niklasson and van Gelder (1994), have claimed that it is obscure. More surprisingly, once one examines the argument carefully, one finds that Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin, themselves have not fully understood it. 1 In part as a result of this, (...) many Connectionists who have tried to meet the challenge of explaining the systematicity of thought have been misled about what this challenge involves (e.g. Pollack 1990; Smolensky 1990; Niklasson and van Gelder 1994). I have five principal objectives in this paper. First, I want to respond to those who believe that the systematicity argument is mere obscurity by providing a clear presentation of it. Second, and at the same time, I want to respond to those who believe the argument is mere trickery by showing it to be an instance of a rather familiar form of legitimate scientific reasoning. Third, having seen what sort of reasoning is involved in the argument, I wish to indicate how certain attempts to meet the challenge of systematicity are inadequate. Fourth, having seen the explanatory standard set by the systematicity argument, I want to indicate how even Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin, fail to see how Classicism fails to meet the standard. Fifth, and finally, I wish to indicate what consequences the foregoing considerations have for the prospects of Classicism and Connectionism. (shrink)

What makes scientific knowledge possible? The philosopher Immanuel Kant in his magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, had a fascinating and puzzling answer to this question. Scientific knowledge, for Kant, is made possible by the faculty of reason and its demand for systematic unity. In other words, cognition about empirical objects can aspire to be scientific only if it is rationally embedded within or transformed into a system. But how can such system form once we take into account the (...) perspectival nature of knowledge, i.e., its being situated in individual human cognitive faculties? My PhD thesis has a two-pronged objective: to reconstruct the complexity of the notion of systematicity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; and to defend its plausibility in contemporary debates on the unity or plurality of scientific knowledge. As far as is concerned, Kant’s position is far from being clearly understood in the literature. Despite a renewed interest in Kant’s notion of systematicity in recent decades, existing contributions fail to offer a satisfactory account of it. The aim of my thesis is to provide a unified reading of reason’s systematicity as an essential feature of Kant’s analysis of the sources of cognition. In particular, I defend a novel account of theoretical reason the aims to support the following claims: systematicity is grounded in a legitimate use of reason’s ideas as prescriptive rules for empirical investigation; it is necessary to make empirical cognition possible and generate scientific hypotheses; and it gives us fundamental insights into Kant’s ‘empirical realism’ and his understanding of the role of metaphysics in science. With regard to, I show that Kant’s account of theoretical reason has much more to offer than generally acknowledged. In particular, I present it as providing a reconciling solution to the conflict between unity and pluralism in contemporary philosophy of science. Drawing inspiration from Kant’s ‘perspectivism,’ I argue that unity and pluralism are to be thought as mutually inclusive principles of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce, the American philosopher and a principal figure in the development of the modern study of semiotics, struggled, mostly during his later years, to work out a systematic method for classifying sciences. By doing this, he hoped to define more clearly the various tasks of these sciences by showing how their individual effects are interrelated and how these effects, considered in their interrelations, establish pragmatic meanings for each individual science. Much of his work was centered on the (...) meaning and function of logic in relation to other areas of human knowledge. By rightly defining the work of logic, Peirce argued, the work of the other sciences could be pursued with more rigorous reasoning. Beverley Kent closely examines the published and unpublished writings of Peirce and carefully attends to the chronological development of his systems of classification; she thereby shows for the first time in the scholarly literature how seeming contradictions in Peirce's evolving classification are really part of an increasingly clear position. Logic, Peirce came to understand, is actually dependent on ethics and aesthetics for its principles. Kent shows how Peirce's working out of the classification of logic in relation to other sciences is a clue to the significant differences between his early and late philosophy and, perhaps even more important, to a reading of his more general claims for a philosophy of "pragmaticism." This work will be of interest to readers of Peirce and American philosophy, to historians of logic and semiotics, and to those more generally interested in the history of systems of knowledge-classification. (shrink)

The modern abundance and prominence of data have led to the development of “data science” as a new field of enquiry, along with a body of epistemological reflections upon its foundations, methods, and consequences. This article provides a systematic analysis and critical review of significant open problems and debates in the epistemology of data science. We propose a partition of the epistemology of data science into the following five domains: (i) the constitution of data science; (ii) the kind of enquiry (...) that it identifies; (iii) the kinds of knowledge that data science generates; (iv) the nature and epistemological significance of “black box” problems; and (v) the relationship between data science and the philosophy of science more generally. (shrink)

This volume offers one of the first systematic analyses of the rise of modern social science. Contrary to the standard accounts of various social science disciplines, the essays in this volume demonstrate that modern social science actually emerged during the critical period between 1750 and 1850. It is shown that the social sciences were a crucial element in the conceptual and epistemic revolution, which parallelled and partly underpinned the political and economic transformations of the modern world. From a consistently (...) comparative perspective, a group of internationally leading scholars takes up fundamental issues such as the role of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in the shaping of the social sciences, the changing relationships between political theory and moral discourse, the profound transformation of philosophy, and the constitution of political economy and statistics. (shrink)

We aimed to conduct a scoping review to assess the profile of retracted health sciences articles authored by individuals affiliated with academic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We systematically searched seven databases (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, Embase, Medline/Ovid, Scielo, and LILACS). We included articles published in peer‐reviewed journals between 2003 and 2022 that had at least one author with an institutional affiliation in LAC. Data were collected on the year of publication, study design, authors' countries (...) of origin, number of authors, subject matter of the manuscript, scientific journals of publication, retraction characteristics, and reasons for retraction. We included 147 articles, the majority being observational studies (41.5%). The LAC countries with the highest number of retractions were Brazil (n = 69), Colombia (n = 16), and Mexico (n = 15). The areas of study with the highest number of retractions were infectology (n = 21) and basic sciences (n = 15). A retraction label was applied to 89.1% of the articles, 70.7% were retracted by journal editors, and 89.1% followed international retraction guidelines. The primary reasons for retraction included errors in procedures or data collection (n = 39), inconsistency in results or conclusions (n = 37), plagiarism (n = 21), and suspected scientific fraud (n = 19). In conclusion, most retractions of scientific publications in health sciences in LAC adhered to international guidelines and were linked to methodological issues in execution and scientific misconduct. Efforts should be directed toward ensuring the integrity of scientific research in the field of health. (shrink)

In the context of increasingly numerous cultural and political contradictory debates, humanities are facing the difficult responsibility of removing the veil of ambiguity and doubt. However, they cannot fulfil this task without first undertaking a rigorous return upon themselves, their own fundaments, methods and targeted objects. This book investigates the influence of G.W.F. Hegel on these sciences during their long and controversial process of transformation and consolidation. For this purpose, the author developed, on Gadamer’s suggestions, a dialectical-hermeneutical method able (...) to overcome the insufficiencies of both historical and systematic approaches and to properly take into account the significant references to authors of the Modern Age and the Contemporary Era. In his attempt to advance a speculative model for the present-day social and political sciences, the author brings a new light on some renowned topics including agency in history (Napoleon – Weltgeist or Weltseele on horseback?), the inner structure of the interpreter (Gadamer between Hegel and Heidegger) and the critical concept of alienation (an overthrow or continuity of absolute idealism?), among others. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel was one of the first philosophers of science who reflected systematically on the methodology of the social sciences. His cooperation with Paul F. Lazarsfeld at Columbia University proved to be instructive in this regard. Moreover, Nagel stood in close contact with representatives of sociological functionalism and published, in 1956, a contribution on the prospects of a formalization of functionalism. In his seminal The Structure of Science from 1961, Nagel devoted two long chapters to methodological and explanatory problems (...) of the social sciences. The aim of the present chapter is to rationally reconstruct this 1961 account. I will proceed in three steps: first, I shall shed some light on Nagel’s discussion of the problem of a clear-cut demarcation between the natural and the social sciences; then Nagel’s interpretation of the presumptive ‘immaturity’ of the social sciences will be taken into account; finally, two case studies will be provided in order to illustrate the implications of Nagel’s particular analysis. (shrink)

At what is arguably the most significant turning point in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Immanuel Kant has just completed his exploration of the safe ground of possible experience and is about to embark on the Transcendental Dialectic’s exploration of the stormy sea of metaphysics, he introduces one of the greatest curiosities in the Kantian corpus: a “table … of the concept of nothing” (A290/B346-A292/B349). The brief passage, which is tacked on to the end of a “Remark” that supplements (...) an Appendix to a weighty chapter exploring “the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects [Gegenstände] in General into Phenomena and Noumena” (A235/B294), appears as an afterthought to an afterthought to an afterthought and is thus easily overlooked by interpreters. Indeed, the passage may seem to be little more than an amusing distraction, perhaps intended as light entertainment before Kant undertakes the real work of demolishing traditional metaphysics; or at best, it might be one of those annoying sections whose only reason for existing is to fill a perceived (but artificial) gap in the completeness of Kant’s systematic conception of reason’s architectonic unity. This chapter takes the argument seriously, notwithstanding its widespread neglect, by unpacking the specific purpose served by each perspective on “nothing” that appears in Kant’s table. Closer analysis shows how the table clarifies Kant’s notion of “something in general” by contrasting it with four distinct opposites. The passage thereby orients us to appreciate how the Critique secures the status of metaphysics as queen of the sciences. (shrink)

This paper presents a survey of the literature on the problem of contingency in science. The survey is structured around three challenges faced by current attempts at understanding the conflict between “contingentist” and “inevitabilist” interpretations of scientific knowledge and practice. First, the challenge of definition: it proves hard to define the positions that are at stake in a way that is both conceptually rigorous and does justice to the plethora of views on the issue. Second, the challenge of distinction: some (...) features of the debate suggest that the contingency issue may not be sufficiently distinct from other philosophical debates to constitute a genuine, independent philosophical problem. And third, the challenge of decidability: it remains unclear whether and how the conflict could be settled on the basis of empirical evidence from the actual history of science. The paper argues that in order to make progress in the present debate, we need to distinguish more systematically between different expressions that claims about contingency and inevitability in science can take. To this end, it introduces a taxonomy of different contingency and inevitability claims. The taxonomy has the structure of an ordered quadruple. Each contingency and each inevitability claim contains an answer to the following four questions: (how) are alternatives to current science possible, what types of alternatives are we talking about, how should the alternatives be assessed, and how different are they from actual science? (shrink)

In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, by being more systematic. "Science" is here understood in the broadest possible sense, encompassing not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, the social sciences, and the humanities. The author develops his thesis in nine dimensions in which it is claimed that science is more systematic than other forms of knowledge: regarding descriptions, (...) explanations, predictions, the defense of knowledge claims, critical discourse, epistemic connectedness, an ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, and the representation of knowledge. He compares his view with positions on the question held by philosophers from Aristotle to Nicholas Rescher. The book concludes with an exploration of some consequences of Hoyningen-Huene's view concerning the genesis and dynamics of science, the relationship of science and common sense, normative implications of the thesis, and the demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science. (shrink)

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities “facsimile (...) class='Hi'>sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense. (shrink)

Engineering ethics is a required aspect of accredited ABET programs, but there is widespread variation in how ethics is taught, to what ends, and how those ends are assessed. This variation makes it challenging to identify practices for teaching ethics to engineers aligned with extant practices in the field. In this study, we revise a recent coding framework by reviewing exemplary engineering ethics programs recognized by the National Academy of Engineering in 2016, or what we refer to as “exemplars.” We (...) pursue two primary objectives: (1) To apply and revise a prior coding framework to codify ethics learning objectives, instructional strategies, and assessment strategies in engineering education; and (2) To use the revised coding framework to identify trends in learning objectives, instructional strategies, and assessment strategies of NAE exemplars. We employ systemic review procedures to update the coding framework using 24 of 25 exemplars as a data source. The updated framework includes four primary categories associated with learning objectives, instructional strategies, assessment data collection strategies, and assessment design characteristics. Results indicate that ethical sensitivity or awareness was present in every exemplar as a learning objective, often alongside ethical reasoning-based learning objectives and the formation of professional skills. Exemplars employed numerous instructional strategies in tandem, as we coded eight out of 18 instructional strategies among at least half of the exemplars. Assignments/homework and summative reflections were the most oft-used sources of assessment data. Due to our challenges in coding assessment approaches, we offer practical suggestions for assessing engineering ethics instruction which are based on many of our coding discussions. We hope that this coding framework, the results classifying exemplary features of the NAE programs, and our practical suggestions can guide future instructors as they design, classify, assess, and report their approaches to engineering ethics education. (shrink)

At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor explains why philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor’s science is either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics, or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic deception. By showing how the Visitor’s account (...) of the science of philosophy is just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry identified at the dialogue’s outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. (shrink)

Drawing on drafts and other material from the Harvey Sacks archive this paper examines the development of one of the defining papers of Conversation Analysis, _A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation_ (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). The discussion examines four drafts of the paper along with correspondence between the authors and with William Bright, the editor of the journal _Language_ where it was to be published. The four drafts trace the development of the paper from a (...) 13-page draft to the final 106-page final draft submitted to the journal. By exploring the drafts as they evolved the discussion highlights the development of the central ideas in the paper, the distinctive style of the paper as it is revised, the changes of authorship, and the role of the editor of _Language,_ William Bright, in helping to shape the paper through his own detailed reviews. (shrink)

In the following paper we will attempt to offer a panoramic reconstruction of the relations between scientificity [Wissenschaftlichkeit] and the existentiell dimension of Dasein’s being in the framework of Being and Time and in the period immediately following its publication. To this end, we will attempt to (a) offer an account of the positive and negative appropriations of the concept of the existenziell in the reception of Heidegger's opus magnum, next (b) we will offer a systematic reconstruction of the existentiell (...) dimension by recognizing what we will call developmental "vectors", and lastly, (c) we will review the fundamental moments of the ontological-critical science, and (d) show how each of this constitutive moments is affected by “existentiell unboundingness” [existenzielle Unverbindlichkeit]. (shrink)

This essay shows that Peirce's (more or less) final classification of the sciences arises from the systematic application of his Categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness to the classification of the sciences themselves and that he does not do so until his 1903's "An Outline Classification of the Sciences." The essay proceeds by: First, making some preliminary comments regarding Peirce's notion of an architectonic, or classification of the sciences; Second, briefly explaining Peirce's Categories of Firstness, Secondness (...) and Thirdness; Third, examining how Peirce classifies the sciences in 1902 and 1903—and specifically how the 1903 classification utilizes the Categories; Fourth and finally, showing that he is only led to classify the sciences in this fashion as result of his philosophical inquiries during those intervening months—especially as a result of his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. (shrink)

This essay provides readers with a critical analysis of the ethnographic sciences and the psychological warfare used by the British and Kenyan colonial regimes during the suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion. In recent years, several survivors of several detention camps set up for Mau Mau suspects during the 1950s have brought cases in British courts, seeking apologies and funds to help those who argue about systematic abuse during the times of “emergency.” The author illustrates that the difficulties confronting (...) Ndiku Mutua and other claimants stem from the historical and contemporary resonance of characterizations of the Mau Mau as devilish figures with deranged minds. The author also argues that while many journalists today have commented on the recovery of “lost” colonial archives and the denials of former colonial administrators, what gets forgotten are the polysemic ways that Carothers, Leakey, and other social agents co-produced all of these pejorative characterizations. Kenyan settlers, administrators, novelists, filmmakers and journalists have helped circulate the commentaries on the “Mau Mau” mind that continue to influence contemporary debates about past injustices. (shrink)

The organic trope is a popular way of accepting the systematicity of Hegelian science. It allows for diversity and difference within the living whole, where each organ contributes to the life of the holistic "one", which, in turn, ensures the vitality of each organ. For example, in the Philosophy of Right, the organic state maintains itself in relation to the various institutions and corporations that constitute its organs. However, one element of the organic trope remains largely ignored: excretion. Briefly, if (...) we take Hegel's system as organic, then what does it excrete? What constitutes its excrement? This book chapter examines Hegel's philosophical, syllogistic interpretation of animal digestion and excretion in the Philosophy of Nature and then attempts to apply it to the organic system of science, as an individual, purposive life form whose subjectivity arises through the excretion of what is deemed superfluous. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what the nature of science is. I will first make a few preliminary historical and systematic remarks. Next, I shall give an answer to the question that has to be qualified, clarified and justified. Finally, I will compare my answer with alternative answers and draw consequences for the demarcation problem.

Hegel's "Elements of the Philosophy of Right" offers an innovative and important account of normativity, yet the theory set forth there rests on philosophical foundations that have remained largely obscure. In "Hegel's Theory of Normativity," Kevin Thompson proposes an interpretation of the foundations that underlie Hegel's theory: its method of justification, its concept of freedom, and its account of right. Thompson shows how the systematic character of Hegel's project together with the metaphysical commitments that follow from its method are essential (...) to secure this theory against the challenges of skepticism and to understand its distinctive contribution to questions regarding normative justification, practical agency, social ontology, and the nature of critique--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Today, open source intelligence (OSINT), i.e., information derived from publicly available sources, makes up between 80 and 90 percent of all intelligence activities carried out by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and intelligence services in the West. Developments in data mining, machine learning, visual forensics and, most importantly, the growing computing power available for commercial use, have enabled OSINT practitioners to speed up, and sometimes even automate, intelligence collection and analysis, obtaining more accurate results more quickly. As the infosphere expands to (...) accommodate ever-increasing online presence, so does the pool of actionable OSINT. These developments raise important concerns in terms of governance, ethical, legal, and social implications (GELSI). New and crucial oversight concerns emerge alongside standard privacy concerns, as some of the more advanced data analysis tools require little to no supervision. This article offers a systematic review of the relevant literature. It analyzes 571 publications to assess the current state of the literature on the use of AI-powered OSINT (and the development of OSINT software) as it relates to the GELSI framework, highlighting potential gaps and suggesting new research directions. (shrink)

Any serious attempt to give an account of the cognitive aspect of science – as contrasted with e.g. its social or cultural aspects – cannot ignore the automation revolution. In the conception presented in this paper the results of computer science are taken seriously and integrated with many of the ideas concerning what constitutes scientific inquiry that have been proposed at least since the early Middle Ages. The central idea is that of reliable inquiry. Science makes explicit and elaborates on (...) the methods of acquiring beliefs in our daily life. The central question a scientific method applied to inquiry needs to face is if it is reliable in getting to the truth. On the reliabilist criteria presented here, if a method is logically warranted to get to the right answer – given data and background knowledge available – and to stick to it afterwards, then it is reliable. This is a normative theory, but the standard of reliability is adjusted to the domain of the inquiry at hand. This paper presents the central tenets of the reliabilist conception of science and briefly outlines the main results underlying it. Roughly, the aim of science is interesting truth about the world around us (scientific realism) and reliabilist epistemology affords us precise answers as to how far science can succeed in this task – given the methods, goals and background assumptions available. The philosophical task to deliver an adequate understanding of science is taken to be continuous with scientific research itself (naturalism), a major part of which is concerned with delivering causal explanations (causality) and can only be carried out with limited resources (computability). Many of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science and precisely articulated therewith have appeared earlier in both philosophy and science (history of ideas). I conclude the exposition of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science with discussions of sample case studies where the reliabilist conception of science has been applied to actual scientific research. For obvious reasons none of the grand conceptions of science from the distant past is adequate. Towards the end of this paper I give some substance to the claim that among the few contemporary conceptions of science reliabilist epistemology is the the most comprehensive account. For only it systematically elaborates the ideas of reliability and computability accompanying science from its inception. None of the past or contemporary alternatives to a thoroughly revised understanding of science offered by the reliabilist approach can embrace the recent outburst of new sciences such as computer science, Bayesian statistics and cognitive science. An outline of open problems and directions for future research concludes the paper. (shrink)

The topic of history-of-science explanation is first briefly introduced as a generally important one for the light it may shed on action theory, on the logic of discovery, and on philosophy''s relations with historiography of science, intellectual history, and the sociology of knowledge. Then some problems and some conclusions are formulated by reference to some recent relevant literature: a critical analysis of Laudan''s views on the role of normative evaluations in rational explanations occasions the result that one must make aconceptual (...) distinction between evaluations and explanations of belief, and that there are at leastthree subclasses of the latter, rational, critical, and theoretical; I then discuss the problem of whether explanations of discoveries are self-evidencing and predictive by focusing on views of Hempel and Nickles, and I attempt a formalization of some aspects of the problem. Finally, a more systematic and concrete analysis is undertaken by using as an example the explanation of Galileo''s rejection of space-proportionality, and it is argued that the historical explanation of scientific beliefs is a type of logical analysis. (shrink)

The concepts of ḥaqīqah (literal meaning) and majāz (figurative mea-ning), which are central to the Arabic science of balagah (rhetoric), play a crucial role in the interpretation and understanding of the Qur'an. These terms have been examined in various disciplines such as language, Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), and theology (kalām), and over time, scholars have developed distinct interpretations of these concepts. One of the key debates in early Islamic thought revolves around whether certain Qur'anic verses—those whose apparent meanings defy rational (...) explanation—should be understood literally or figuratively. An important example of this debate is found in Surah al-Baqarah (2/74), where the verse describes "stones that roll down from fear of God." The notion of stones moving due to fear of God raised significant theological and ontological discussions among scholars from the earliest periods of Islam. This article aims to explore the various approaches taken by early Islamic exegetes and theologians concerning Su-rah al-Baqarah 2/74, examining how this verse has been interpreted both linguistically and theologically. The study will analyze the figurative interp-retation of Muʿtazilah theologians such as Jāhiz and Abu ʿAlī al- Jubbāī, who based their views on theories of nature (tabī‘ah), as well as the literalist app-roaches of classical exegetes such as Tabarī, Māturīdī, and Bāqillānī. Additio-nally, the work of linguists like Ibn Jinnī, who utilized the literary technique of metonymy (majaz mursal), and Bāqillānī focus on implied metaphor (isti'ārah makniyyah), will be critically examined to understand how these interpreta-tive strategies reflect broader linguistic theories. By contextualizing these interpretations, this study seeks to shed light on how the perception of ḥaqīqah and majāz evolved in early Arabic rhetoric and how these concepts influenced Qur'anic exegesis. Moreover, the broader implications of these debates for Islamic thought in fields such as theology, law, and the science of language will be analyzed, demonstrating the intricate role of language in shaping Qur'anic interpretation. (shrink)

This volume is the first systematic study of the style of reasoning specific to the field of philosophy in nineteenth-century France. The chapters analyze the often dispersed responses to the fundamental question of the division of the sciences based on the reciprocal relationships of inclusion or exclusion, of adversity or sorority, between metaphysics and the positive sciences. In line with the arrhythmic progress of the different forms of knowledge, these responses renew the Condillacian criticisms of the Cartesian order (...) of the relationships between metaphysics and physics. Between a pronounced divorce and a successful marriage, this volume traces the philosophical history of the various attempts at divorce or union, which, as the century progressed, resulted in original hybridizations that aspired to define a new and ever-problematic "French philosophy.". (shrink)

Following a distinction of the sciences into exact and inexact, based on the kinds of methods and reasoning processes involved in explanation and prediction, the authors briefly develop the peculiar method of the inexact branch, with special emphasis on the systematic use of experts in the formation of limited scientific generalizations, and on the use of simulated experiments.-- J. A. B.

Background Retraction is a mechanism for alerting readers to unreliable material and other problems in the published scientific and scholarly record. Retracted publications generally remain visible and searchable, but the intention of retraction is to mark them as “removed” from the citable record of scholarship. However, in practice, some retracted articles continue to be treated by researchers and the public as valid content as they are often unaware of the retraction. Research over the past decade has identified a number of (...) factors contributing to the unintentional spread of retracted research. The goal of the Reducing the Inadvertent Spread of Retracted Science: Shaping a Research and Implementation Agenda (RISRS) project was to develop an actionable agenda for reducing the inadvertent spread of retracted science. This included identifying how retraction status could be more thoroughly disseminated, and determining what actions are feasible and relevant for particular stakeholders who play a role in the distribution of knowledge. -/- Methods These recommendations were developed as part of a year-long process that included a scoping review of empirical literature and successive rounds of stakeholder consultation, culminating in a three-part online workshop that brought together a diverse body of 65 stakeholders in October–November 2020 to engage in collaborative problem solving and dialogue. Stakeholders held roles such as publishers, editors, researchers, librarians, standards developers, funding program officers, and technologists and worked for institutions such as universities, governmental agencies, funding organizations, publishing houses, libraries, standards organizations, and technology providers. Workshop discussions were seeded by materials derived from stakeholder interviews (N = 47) and short original discussion pieces contributed by stakeholders. The online workshop resulted in a set of recommendations to address the complexities of retracted research throughout the scholarly communications ecosystem. -/- Results The RISRS recommendations are: (1) Develop a systematic cross-industry approach to ensure the public availability of consistent, standardized, interoperable, and timely information about retractions; (2) Recommend a taxonomy of retraction categories/classifications and corresponding retraction metadata that can be adopted by all stakeholders; (3) Develop best practices for coordinating the retraction process to enable timely, fair, unbiased outcomes; and (4) Educate stakeholders about pre- and post-publication stewardship, including retraction and correction of the scholarly record. -/- Conclusions Our stakeholder engagement study led to 4 recommendations to address inadvertent citation of retracted research, and formation of a working group to develop the Communication of Retractions, Removals, and Expressions of Concern (CORREC) Recommended Practice. Further work will be needed to determine how well retractions are currently documented, how retraction of code and datasets impacts related publications, and to identify if retraction metadata (fails to) propagate. Outcomes of all this work should lead to ensuring retracted papers are never cited without awareness of the retraction, and that, in public fora outside of science, retracted papers are not treated as valid scientific outputs. (shrink)

Proponents of Evidence-based medicine (EBM) do not provide a clear role for basic science in therapeutic decision making. Of what they do say about basic science, most of it is negative. Basic science resides on the lower tiers of EBM's hierarchy of evidence. Therapeutic decisions, according to proponents of EBM, should be informed by evidence from randomised studies (and systematic reviews of randomised studies) rather than basic science. A framework of models explicates the links between the mechanisms of basic science, (...) experimental inquiry, and observed data. Relying on the framework of models I show that basic science often plays a role not only in specifying experiments, but also analysing and interpreting the data that is provided. Further, and contradicting what is implied in EBM's hierarchy of evidence, appeals to basic science are often required to apply clinical research to therapeutic questions. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. (shrink)

ArgumentThe study examines the trajectory of Uruguayan Political Science (PS) from a critical theory perspective. Concretely, the article focuses on PS’ institutional birth and early period (1980s and 1990s) and shows how broader political and ideological transformations had a significant impact on its discourse on Uruguayan democracy. Three components of such discourse are unpacked: The embrace of liberalism, the rejection of Marxism, and the uncritical engagement with the local political system, particularly the ‘traditional parties.’ The argument is supported by a (...) systematic analysis of the 163 articles published byRevista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política(RUCP) from 1987 to 2012 and 22 in-depth interviews with scholars from theInstituto de Ciencia Política(ICP) atUniversidad de la República(UdelaR). (shrink)