"This book provides an introduction to a scientifically informed approach to epistemological questions. Theories of knowledge are often motivated by the need to respond to skepticism. The skeptic presents an argument which seems to show that knowledge is impossible, and a theory of knowledge is called upon to show, contrary to the skeptic, how knowledge is indeed possible. Traditional epistemologies, however, do not draw on the sciences in providing their response to skepticism. The approach taken here, however, shows how an (...) epistemology which is informed by the sciences offers an especially illuminating understanding of the nature of knowledge and what makes it possible. Along the way, a distinctive methodology for philosophy is defended, as is an approach to understanding how inference is conducive to knowledge which highlights various structural similarities between the workings of our perceptual systems and native inferential mechanisms. A perspective on the human capacity to reflect on our beliefs is defended which highlights its importance in cooperative problem solving"--. (shrink)

This article will explore the ways in which early twentieth century physics informs and sustains Gaston Bachelard’s writing on epistemology and time. By investigating the scientific underpinnings of Bachelard’s philosophy of time, this article will also establish a connection between his epistemological and temporal works that are underdeveloped in the secondary literature. This discussion will seek to prove an epistemological commitment, scattered throughout Bachelard’s work on science, in which all epistemological claims are beholden to the claims of modern (...) science. It will be demonstrated how this epistemological claim is implemented in Bachelard’s work on time—specifically, the ways in which relativity theory and microphysics influences his philosophy of time. Such an approach will bridge the gap between Bachelard’s epistemological writings and his work on time while simultaneously illustrating the ways in which physics influences his thinking. (shrink)

In a 1993 paper, I argued that empirical treatments of the epistemologyused by scientists in experimental work are too abstract in practice tocounter relativist efforts to explain the outcome of scientificcontroversies by reference to sociological forces. This was because, atthe rarefied level at which the methodology of scientists is treated byphilosophers, multiple mutually inconsistent instantiations of theprinciples described by philosophers are employed by contestingscientists. These multiple construals change within a scientificcommunity over short time frames, and these different versions ofscientific methodology (...) can determine the outcome of a controversy. Iillustrated with a comparatively detailed analysis of the methodologyused by biologists debating the existence of an entity called thebacterial mesosome between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. This 1993piece has drawn several critiques in the philosophical literature. Inthis present piece I respond to these critiques and argue that they failto address the core argument of the original paper, and I reflectfurther on the methodologies of philosophers of science pursuingempirical or `naturalistic' epistemology. (shrink)

This article offers a novel reconstruction of Foucault’s methodology that emphasises his respect for the natural sciences. Foucault’s work has long been suspected of reducing knowledge to power, and thus collapsing into unconstrained relativism and methodological incoherence. These concerns are predicated on a misunderstanding of Foucault’s overall approach, which takes the form of a historico-critical project rather than a normative epistemology. However, Foucault does sometimes make normative epistemological judgements, especially about the human sciences. Furthermore, there are outstanding questions about (...) what secures the descriptive rigour of the genealogical method. To address these issues, I develop two claims that will significantly enrich our understanding of Foucault’s methodology. The first is that Foucault’s respect for the natural sciences is crucial in making sense of his normative epistemological judgements. The second is that the descriptive rigour of his genealogical method derives from the fact it is modelled on empirical inquiry. (shrink)

What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence of various brands of "naturalistic" epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and (...) defended. (shrink)

This article examines the underlying problems of one particular perspective in educational theory that has recently gained momentum: the Wilfred Carr approach, which puts forward the premise that there is no theory in educational research and, consequently, it is a form of practice. The article highlights the scientific, epistemological and methodological assumptions inherent in such a view. The argument is developed as follows: first, it expounds what Carr understands by the methodology of action research and educational theory, setting out (...) his distinctive view. Secondly, it explains that both Carr's underlying methodology, as well as his theoretical alternative, are based on a particular perspective on Social Science. Thirdly, it reveals Carr's epistemological assumptions and the resultant educational consequences. (shrink)

The article is based on a synthetic comparative analysis of two different epistemic traditions and explores indigenous and scientific epistemic cultures throughclose reading and exploration of two books. The first book, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, written by Austrian sociologist Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999), serves as an excellent foundational material to represent scientific epistemic tradition. The second book by cultural and linguistic anthropologist Keith Basso (1996), Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache, opens (...) a wide perspective for exploration indigenous epistemic culture. Both of the books deal with questions of knowledge production and social-cultural mechanisms that surround these processes. The article seeks to explain how the differences between methodological approaches, in their distinct questions, and the variance in research subjects eventuallyleads the authors to completely dissimilar understandings of such shared notions as ‘place’ and ‘knowledge.’ Through the comparative exploration of both texts, the present analysis uncovers the meanings of these notions as articulated and presented in each of the books. (shrink)

O objetivo deste breve artigo é o estudo da confiabilidade alcançada pela ciência (natural) com o exame da contribuição para este fenômeno encontrada no trabalho de Filósofo da Ciência Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996). Busca-se compreender a contribuição, a partir da construção conceitual proposta por Kuhn em “A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas”, à noção de que a ciência se movimenta a partir de paradigmas e que o sentido de (in) evolução, nas ciências naturais, sempre possui relevância histórica por se tratar de uma (...) experiência agregada, o que colocou a ciência em um patamar diferenciado dos demais conhecimentos humanos, gerando maior confiabilidade e certeza, onde se supõe que, mesmo quando diagnósticos ou assertivas ditas científicas se provem equivocados fatidicamente, são sempre proveitosos da perspectiva histórica. Há aqui uma isenção (absolvição) de qualquer possibilidade de falácia ou erro e uma enorme contribuição para a inequívoca confiabilidade popular à ciência. Tudo parece ser compreendido a partir da noção de “experiência”. (shrink)

My title is intended to echo Hans Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951), and the phrase "scientific epistemology" is intended in two Reichenbachian senses. One involves the epistemology of science; the other involves epistemology undertaken with a scientific orientation. Talk of "progress and procedures" is intended in a similar dual sense. I start by looking back over the last century, at how a family of problems was tackled by scientifically oriented philosophers. These are (...) problems with the nature of evidence and testing – with how, given our limited access to the world and the ambitious reach of our theories, we can have good reason to believe one such theory over another. These discussions were informed especially by skeptical treatments of the problem in Hume. We see in this period a number of different theoretical strands. These are characterized by different raw materials, and by different organizing or paradigm cases – different bets regarding the parts of scientific practice that should function as exemplars. (shrink)

_Abstract_: The sciences achieved consensus amongst their practitioners through emancipation from philosophy. In the first half of the 20 th century, philosophers began to align themselves with science, and most contemporary philosophers call themselves naturalists. Epistemology was still largely considered a philosophical prerogative until Quine’s paper “_Epistemology naturalized_” (1969). Opinion is now divided. Ironically, the prodigious work that secured Jean Piaget’s reputation as a cognitive developmental psychologist was actually carried out largely in service of epistemology. Disillusioned with philosophical (...) speculation and with a background in empirical science (Piaget trained as a biologist), Piaget conceived a method based on psychological and historical evidence to investigate epistemological questions scientifically. In this paper, I outline his genetic-epistemological method and locate it in the discourse on naturalism. I conclude by classifying genetic epistemology according to Goldman’s classification of naturalistic epistemologies and by assessing it in the light of criticism typically levelled at naturalistic epistemologies, before highlighting some salient points for a future scientific epistemology. _Keywords_: Epistemology; Naturalism; Psychologism; Genetic Epistemology; Jean Piaget _Ritorno al futuro dell’epistemologia scientifica? Jean Piaget su scienza ed epistemologia_ _Riassunto_: Le scienze hanno acquisito credito tra gli addetti ai lavori emancipandosi dalla filosofia. Nella prima metà del XX secolo i filosofi hanno iniziato ad allinearsi alla scienza e molti filosofi si definiscono oggi naturalisti. L’epistemologia è stata considerata materia filosofica fino alla “_Epistemologia naturalizzata_” di Quine (1969). Qui le opinioni si dividono. Per ironia della sorte il poderoso lavoro che ha consegnato a Jean Piaget reputazione di psicologo cognitivo dello sviluppo è stato di fatto svolto largamente al servizio dell’epistemologia. Deluso dalla speculazione filosofica e formatosi nell’ambito delle scienze empiriche Piaget (che era un biologo di formazione) ha elaborato un metodo basato sull’evidenza storica e psicologica per dare risposte scientifiche a problemi epistemologici. In questo lavoro intendo illustrare il suo metodo epistemologico-genetico, collocandolo all’interno del discorso sul naturalismo. Concluderò discutendo l’epistemologia genetica in base alla classificazione delle epistemologie naturaliste proposta da Goldman e valutandola alla luce delle critiche tipicamente rivolte alle epistemologie naturaliste, prima di illustrare alcuni punti salienti per una futura epistemologia scientifica. _Parole chiave_: Epistemologia; Naturalismo; Psicologismo; Epistemologia genetica; Jean Piaget. (shrink)

Science education is generally perceived as a key facilitator in cultivating a scientifically literate society. In the last decade, however, this conventional wisdom has been challenged by evidence that greater scientific literacy and critical thinking skills may in fact inadvertently aggravate polarization on scientific matters in the public sphere. Supporting an alternative “scientific update hypothesis,” in a series of studies (total N = 2087), we show that increased science’s epistemology literacy might have consequential population-level effects on (...) the public’s alignment with scientific results. In one exploratory study and a pre-registered national online survey, we first show that understanding scientific epistemology predicts refusal of pseudoscientific beliefs and higher scores in a methodology of science test. We also find and replicate a propensity for epistemologically literate citizens to endorse the norm of belief updating and the communicated scientific consensus following both ideologically congruent and incongruent scientific results. Notably, after 2 months of first being presented with scientific results on politically controversial issues, a one standard deviation higher score in epistemological literacy is associated with a 14% increase in the odds of individuals switching their beliefs to align with the scientifically communicated consensus. We close by discussing how, on the face of ideological incongruity, a general understanding of scientific epistemology might foster the acceptance of scientific results, and we underscore the need for a more nuanced appreciation of how education, public comprehension of scientific knowledge, and the dynamics of polarization intersect in the public sphere. (shrink)

The compatibility of scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology is a controversial issue in contemporary philosophy of science. Scientific realism is the view that scientific theories aim to describe the true nature of reality, while evolutionary epistemology is the view that scientific knowledge is the product of natural selection and adaptation. Some philosophers argue that evolutionary epistemology undermines the epistemic status of scientific theories and thus poses a serious challenge to scientific realism. (...) This paper examines this problem and explores whether scientific realism can be reconciled with evolutionary epistemology. The paper argues that critical rationalism (CR), a philosophical approach that rejects justificationism and emphasizes the role of criticism, rationality, and objectivity in science, can provide a viable framework for integrating scientific realism and evolutionary epistemology. The paper shows that by adopting a non-justificationist fallibilist stance toward scientific theories, CR can reconcile the realist and the evolutionary views on scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This paper argues that the proponents of epistemological scientism must take some stand on scientific methodology. The supporters of scientism cannot simply defer to the social organisation of science because the social processes themselves must meet some methodological criteria. Among such criteria is epistemic evaluability, which demands intersubjective access to reasons. We derive twelve theses outlining some implications of epistemic evaluability. Evaluability can support weak and broad variants of epistemological scientism, which state that sciences, broadly construed, are the best (...) sources of knowledge or some other epistemic goods. Since humanities and social sciences produce epistemically evaluable results, narrow types of scientism that take only natural sciences as sources of knowledge require additional argumentation in their support. Strong scientism, which takes sciences as the only source of knowledge, also needs to appeal to some further principles since evaluability is not an all-or-nothing affair. (shrink)

In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence-based epistemology according to which scientific knowledge is based on critical analysis of evidence using argumentation. This new epistemology of scientific evidence (ESE) models scientific knowledge as achieved through a process of marshaling evidence in a scientific inquiry that results in a convergence of scientific theories and research results. We show how (...) a dialogue interface of argument from expert opinion, along with its set of critical questions, provides the argumentation component of the ESE. It enables internal scientific knowledge to be translated over into a wider arena in which individual nonexpert citizens and groups can make use of it. The external component shows how evidence is presented and used in a legal procedural setting that includes fact-finding, weighing the credibility of expert witnesses, and critical questioning of arguments. The paper critically reviews the standards of admissibility of scientific evidence using the ESE. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its (...) rivals. (shrink)

This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas (...) Kuhn's (1922–1996). Issues of scientific continuity, scientific realism and scientific rationality are discussed. It is argued that Piaget's view highlights weaknesses in Kuhn's ‘discontinuous’ picture of scientific change. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of some research methods evident in contemporary nursing literature. The arguments derive from critical‐feminist, humanist and ethical perspectives. As a consequence of investigating specific aspects of scientific method, an approach to research that is congruent with values intrinsic to an holistic approach to nursing practice is articulated. Such methodologies also render problematic withstatus quopower relations between nurses and other health professionals, as well as between nurses and patients. The central themes in this paper are: (...) the absence of overt conceptual frameworks; an avoidance of complex social contexts within which research subjects live; an apparent lack of empathy; and an apolitical articulation of research problems and data analyses. All four of these difficulties may be traced to scientific methodology by many researchers. Most nurse researchers may not actually adhere to this technique, but I propose that they have been informed by belief systems associated with scientific methodology and diat these have dire consequences for the discipline of nursing. A key argument is diat the apparent lack of conceptual frameworks in the majority of nursing research is due to the epistemology, which therefore provides a pre‐existing, non‐declared conceptual framework, that is incorporated into the research by drawing upon scientific mediodology. A further argument is diat scientific, or scientistic, ways of approaching situations are antithetical to nursing values and to constructive social change for the benefit of patients, nursing and nurses. (shrink)

The complex societal challenges of the twenty-first Century require scientific researchers and academically educated professionals capable of conducting scientific research in complex problem contexts. Our central claim is that educational approaches inspired by a traditional empiricist epistemology insufficiently foster the required deep conceptual understanding and higher-order thinking skills necessary for epistemic tasks in scientific research. Conversely, we argue that constructivist epistemologies provide better guidance to educational approaches to promote research skills. We also argue that teachers adopting (...) a constructivist learning theory do not necessarily embrace a constructivist epistemology. On the contrary, in educational practice, novel educational approaches that adopt constructivist learning theories often maintain traditional empiricist epistemologies. Philosophers of science can help develop educational designs focused on learning to conduct scientific research, combining constructivist learning theory with constructivist epistemology. We illustrate this by an example from a bachelor’s program in Biomedical Engineering, where we introduce conceptual models and modeling as an alternative to the traditional focus on hypothesis testing in conducting scientific research. This educational approach includes the so-called B&K method for constructing scientific models to scaffold teaching and learning conceptual modeling. (shrink)

Though science and philosophy take different approaches to ontology, metaphysical inferences are relevant to interpreting scientific work, and empirical investigations are relevant to philosophy. This book argues that there is no uniquely rational way to determine which domains of ontology are appropriate for belief, making room for choice in a transformative account of scientific ontology.

Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible (...) conceptions of merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined. (shrink)

본고는 사이버네틱스의 이론적 체계 및 이 이론이 지향하는 인식론을 비판적으로 검토한다. 이때 필자는 특히 이 인식론의 메타-과학적 지위를 정당화하는 것에 몰두할 것이다. 달리 말하면, 필자는 사이버네틱스의 역사, 학문적 체계 그리고 인식론 등을 단순히 소개하는 데 만족하는 것이 아니라, 필자가 강조해 온 구조구성주의의 인식론에서 사이버네틱스의 인식론을 비판적으로 검토할 것이다. 계보학적 관점에서 볼 때, 사이버네틱스는 일반체계론의 한 분파이다. 물론 그 반대를 주장하는 학자도 있다. 그런데 필자의 관점에서 볼 때, 양자는 궁극적으로 구조구성주의의 인식론으로 통합된다. 다른 한편으로, 통사구조, 의미구조, 의미소, 판단체계, 추론체계 등과 같은 (...) 용어들에서 보듯이, 인문학적 사고도 체계론적 사유를 벗어나면, 더 이상 학문적인 지위를 유지하기 어려울 것이다. 철학적 해석학자들이 염려하듯이, 사이버네틱스는 컴퓨터 공학에 고유한 단순환 기계론적 환원주의가 아니다. 이는 오히려 철학적 반성이 구축해 온 모든 고려 사항들을 폭넓게 수용하면서, 특히 관찰 대상과 관찰자의 상호작용을 고려한 체계의 구성과 진화를 해명한다. 또한 이는 모든 과학적 체계들, 즉 공학적 체계, 유기체적 체계, 심리학적 체계, 사회학적 체계 그리고 심지어 체계에 가장 저항적인 인문학적 체계까지 포섭하면서 체계들 상호간의 진정한 상호작용의 본질을 질적으로 기술할 뿐만 아니라, 가능한 한 수학적인 엄밀한 공식을 구성하려고 한다. 바로 이런 점에서 사이버네틱스는 이 시대의 메타과학이며, 가능한 한 전체를 사고하려는 사유운동, 즉 진정한 의미의 철학적 사유이다. (shrink)

The paper highlights the contemporary discussions on the concept of objectivity in feminist epistemology, in which it is taken in its historical development. Following the works of S. Harding, L. Code, D. Haraway, L. Daston. J. Tannoch-Bland and others the author focuses mainly on one of the topics in feminist epistemology, namely the problematic of the so called "situated knowledge" as related to the objectivity of knowledge. The paper also gives a brief outline of the transformation of "aperspective (...) objectivity" and its becoming a "perspective objectivity", which is closely related to the conception of a situated knowledge as the basis of the feminist standpoint theory. Attention is paid also to the concept of "strong objectivity", in which the ontological importance of the objectivity is stressed and the empirical-realistic core of the standpoint epistemology preserved. (shrink)

This book provides a collection of chapters on the development of scientific philosophy and symbolic logic in the early twentieth century. The turn of the last century was a key transitional period for the development of symbolic logic and scientific philosophy. The Peano school, the editorial board of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, and the members of the Vienna Circle are generally mentioned as champions of this transformation of the role of logic in mathematics and in (...) the sciences. The scholarship contained provides a rich historical and philosophical understanding of these groups and research areas. Specifically, the contributions focus on a detailed investigation of the relation between structuralism and modern mathematics. In addition, this book provides a closer understanding of the relation between symbolic logic and previous traditions such as syllogistics. This volume also informs the reader on the relation between logic, the history and didactics in the Peano School. This edition appeals to students and researchers working in the history of philosophy and of logic, philosophy of science, as well as to researchers on the Vienna Circle and the Peano School. (shrink)

Various errors can affect scientific code and detecting them is a central concern within computational science. Could formal verification methods, which are now available tools, be widely adopted to guarantee the general reliability of scientific code? After discussing their benefits and drawbacks, we claim that, absent significant changes as regards features like their user-friendliness and versatility, these methods are unlikely to be adopted throughout computational science, beyond certain specific contexts for which they are well-suited. This issue exemplifies the (...) epistemological heterogeneity of computational science: profoundly different practices can be appropriate to meet the reliability challenge that rises for scientific code. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the influence of time constraints on different research practices. The first two parts present case studies, which serve as a basis for discussing the epistemological and ethical implications of temporal limitations in scientific research. Part I is a case study on gravitational wave research, conducted by the LIGO Scientific Collaboration. This exemplifies fundamental research – without immediate societal applications, open-ended in terms of timeline and in terms of research goals. It is based, in part, on (...) qualitative interviews conducted with gravitational wave physicists. I show that considerations about time and speed play a role in every stage of research: goal setting, method design, and the evaluation and communication of results. Part II provides a case study on translational medicine, an approach explicitly dedicated to accelerating research in order to develop and implement new therapies. This epitomizes applied research with high social stakes, motivated by non-epistemic goals. Here, epistemic trade-offs between speed and reliability intersect with ethical trade-offs between different types of harms. In Part III, the insights from both of these case studies are used as the basis for a more general discussion concerning the pragmatic aspects of epistemic practices, especially in relation to current debates centered on the role of values in science. A particular focus is on the value of speed and the ability to generate reliable results, either via choice of methods, or via decisions about which goals to set, as well as decisions about when to stop further testing. The primary thesis of the dissertation is that pragmatic considerations stemming from limitations of resources are a necessary feature of the pursuit of epistemic aims, and that the epistemic is thus inherently pragmatic. (shrink)

It is exhibited that maxwellian electrodynamics grew out of the old pre-maxwellian programmes reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampere-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday’s scientific research programme. The programmes’ meeting led to construction of the whole hierarchy of theoretical objects starting from the genuine crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual mongrels. After the displacement current invention the interpenetration of the pre-maxwellian programmes began that marked the beginning of theoretical schemes of optics and electromagnetism real unification. Maxwell’s (...) programme did supersede its rivals because it had assimilated some ideas of the Ampere-Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young-Fresnel and Faraday. Maxwellian programme’s victory over its rivals became possible because the core of Maxwell’s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology looked through the prism of William Whewell and such representatives of Scottish Enlightenment as Thomas Reid and William Hamilton. It was Kantian epistemology that enabled Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz to arrive at such a version of Maxwell’s theory that could serve a heuristical basis for the radio waves discovery. (shrink)

v. 1. An overview. -- v. 2-6. [without special title]. -- v. [7]. Tables of contents and glossary of Arabic terms.

In this paper, I propose a new way to integrate historical accounts of social interaction in scientific practice with philosophical examination of scientific knowledge. The relation between descriptive accounts of scientific practice, on the one hand, and normative accounts of scientific knowledge, on the other, is a vexed one. This vexatiousness is one instance of the gap between normative and descriptive domains. The general problem of the normative/descriptive divide takes striking and problematic form in the case (...) of social aspects of scientific knowledge. With respect to this issue, history and philosophy of science appear starkly incompatible. I show how this dualism can be overcome, drawing on social action theory and the recent history of cellular immunology. (shrink)

A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Implications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored.

Continuously from the 1940s, Michael Polanyi comments on topics that have resonated later since the 1960s in the works of his fellow theorists of science, philosophers of natural sciences, and epistemologists. First part of this article provides a brief reconstruction of Polanyi’s concept of „personal knowledge“ which focuses mainly on the interconnection of the individual level of scientific research with its social dimension. My aim is to evaluate the potential of this concept for the interpretation of research fields where (...) sciences are in close contact with other disciplines. I am convinced that Polanyi’s original approach to the problem of reality should be read as an advocacy of diversity of thought. In my interpretation, Polanyi carries out some form of philosophical therapy of science and its self-concept, which, like the whole of Western society, has undergone dramatic changes over the last century. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the relationship between scientific practice and the metaphysics of laws of nature and natural properties. I begin by examining an argument by Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer that an important feature of scientific practice—namely, that scientists sometimes invoke non-fundamental properties in fundamental laws—is incompatible with metaphysical theories according to which laws govern. I respond to their argument by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. This (...) epistemology is of general interest for non-Humean theories of laws, for it helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities such as governing laws or fundamental powers. (shrink)

The paper examines the integration of virtue epistemology into the philosophy of science, emphasizing its potential to deepen our understanding of scientific inquiry. The article begins by considering the limitations of traditional epistemological frameworks that focus on beliefs. The discussion is set in the context of the “value turn” in contemporary epistemology. Arguments are made to move towards recognizing the significance of intellectual virtues and the nature of epistemic agents. The current gaps in definitions of intellectual virtues (...) about reliabilist and responsibilist approaches are examined and conceptual steps are proposed to bridge these gaps. It is suggested that the local and general epistemic goals of science should be clearly distinguished and then different ways of knowing should be attributed to these goals. These ways of knowing are proposed to be seen as exemplifying the realization of reliable skills and intellectual character traits. In sum, the article argues that adopting a virtue epistemology not only enriches the discourse on scientific knowledge but also promotes a culture of responsibility and integrity in the scientific community. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 397-414, September 2022.