We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap (...) arises from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social implications of this gap. (shrink)

오늘날 인공지능과 로봇의 세상이 다가오면서 규범학적 관심에서 새로이 부각되고 있는 두 분야가 바로 로봇윤리와 로봇법학이다. 본고는 다음 질문들을 다룬다. 이 두 분야는 어떤 관계에 있는가? 가령, 로봇윤리는 로봇법학을 수행하는 데에 필수불가결하게 요청되는 전제인가? 즉 로봇윤리를 논하고 거기에서 일정한 결론을 내려야만 로봇법학을 수행할 수 있는가? 아니면 로봇법학을 논하는 데에 로봇윤리는 불필요하고, 심지어 로봇법학으로 로봇윤리를 대체할 수 있는가? 그리고 그 역(逆)은 어떠한가? 이 질문들에 대해 필자가 제시하는 답은 “따로 또 같이”다. 로봇윤리와 로봇법학의 관계는 “따로 또 같이”라는, 이중적이고도 복합적인 양상으로 나타난다. 우선 법과 (...) 도덕이 ‘같이’ 갈 수 있다는 전망, 즉 둘 간의 협업(協業)의 전망은 로봇윤리와 로봇법학 간 협업의 전망으로 재현된다. 지능형 로봇의 활용과 관련하여 윤리적 난제에 당면했을 때 법적 장치를 활용하여 그 문제를 우회적으로 해결할 수 있으며, 이와 반대로 법적 난제에 당면했을 때에 윤리적 고찰을 통해 그 긴장과 교착의 상태를 완화할 수 있다. 결과적으로, 지능형 로봇을 둘러싸고 로봇윤리와 로봇법학은 흥미로운 복합적 상관(相關) 하에 놓여 있음이 확인된다. 반면 법과 도덕이 반드시 ‘같이’ 가야만 하는 것은 아니듯이, 로봇윤리와 로봇법학도 그러하다. 지능형 로봇의 사용과 관련해서, 위와 같은 식의 협업, 즉 법이 도덕을 차용하거나 도덕이 법을 차용하는 일이 모든 경우에, 혹은 필수적으로, 요청되지는 않는다는 말이다. 즉 둘은 서로의 관점을 반영하거나 서로의 결론을 활용할 수 있기는 하지만, 또한 그러지 않는 것도 가능하다. 이에, 필자는 지능형 로봇 중 자율주행자동차에 관한 윤리와 법, 특히 그 사고시의 윤리적 책임과 법적 책임을 비교 고찰함으로써 이상과 같은 논지를 예증하고자 한다. (shrink)

In 1969, John McCarthy and Pat Hayes uncovered a problem that has haunted the field of artificial intelligence ever since--the frame problem. The problem arises when logic is used to describe the effects of actions and events. Put simply, it is the problem of representing what remains unchanged as a result of an action or event. Many researchers in artificial intelligence believe that its solution is vital to the realization of the field's goals. Solving the Frame Problem presents the various (...) approaches to the frame problem that have been proposed over the years. The author presents the material chronologically--as an unfolding story rather than as a body of theory to be learned by rote. There are lessons to be learned even from the dead ends researchers have pursued, for they deepen our understanding of the issues surrounding the frame problem. In the book's concluding chapters, the author offers his own work on event calculus, which he claims comes very close to a complete solution to the frame problem. Artificial Intelligence series. (shrink)

ObjectiveStress can play a role in the onset and exacerbation of psoriasis. Psychological interventions to reduce stress have been shown to improve psychological and psoriasis-related outcomes. This pilot randomised study investigated the feasibility of a brief interaction with a Paro robot to reduce stress and improve skin parameters, after a stressor, in patients with psoriasis.MethodsAround 25 patients with psoriasis participated in a laboratory stress task, before being randomised to either interact with a Paro robot or sit quietly for (...) 30 min. Raman spectroscopy and trans-epidermal water loss were measured at baseline, after the stressor and after the intervention as indexes of acute skin changes. Psychological variables, including self-reported stress and affect, were also measured at the three time-points.ResultsNo statistically significant differences between the two conditions were found for any of the outcomes measured. However, effect sizes suggest significance could be possible with a larger sample size. Changes in the psychological and Raman spectroscopy outcomes across the experimental session were found, indicating the feasibility of the procedures.ConclusionThis pilot study showed that a brief interaction with a Paro robot was a feasible intervention for patients with psoriasis, but future trials should broaden the inclusion criteria to try to increase recruitment rates. Studying people who are highly stressed, depressed or who are stress-responders may increase the power of the intervention to show effects using a longer-term intervention. (shrink)

The year is 2100. Geena is the proud new owner of Emit, a state-of-the-art robot. She has just unwrapped him, the packaging strewn across the dining room floor. Emit is designed to replicate the outward behaviour of a human being down to the last detail . Emit responds to questions in much the same way humans do. Ask him how he feels and he will say he has had a tough day, has a slight headache, is sorry he broke (...) that vase, and so on. Geena flips the switch at the back of Emit's neck to ‘on’. Emit springs to life. (shrink)

Is there a God, should I eat meat, where does the universe come from, could I live for ever as a robot? These are the big questions readers will be wrestling with in this thoroughly enjoyable book. Dip into any chapter and you will find lively scenarios and dialogues to take you through philosophical puzzles ancient and modern, involving virtual reality, science fiction and a host of characters from this and other planets. The text is interspersed on every page (...) with lively cartoons, and there is a list of philosophical jargon at the end.. Stephen Law has a gift for communicating complex ideas. He offers few answers, but his unstuffy, highly personal approach will have the reader thinking and arguing with as much pleasure as he does himself. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence and related technologies are changing both the law and the legal profession. In particular, technological advances in fields ranging from machine learning to more advanced robots, including sensors, virtual realities, algorithms, bots, drones, self-driving cars, and more sophisticated "human-like" robots are creating new and previously unimagined challenges for regulators. These advances also give rise to new opportunities for legal professionals to make efficiency gains in the delivery of legal services. With the exponential growth of such technologies, radical disruption (...) seems likely to accelerate in the near future. This collection brings together a series of contributions by leading scholars in the newly emerging field of artificial intelligence, robotics, and the law. The aim of the book is to enrich legal debates on the social meaning and impact of this type of technology. The distinctive feature of the contributions presented in this edition is that they address the impact of these technological developments in a number of different fields of law and from the perspective of diverse jurisdictions. Moreover, the authors utilize insights from multiple related disciplines, in particular social theory and philosophy, in order to better understand and address the legal challenges created by AI. Therefore, the book will contribute to interdisciplinary debates on disruptive new AI technologies and the law. (shrink)

Life, the universe, and everything -- Thinking robots and mysterious minds -- The good, the bad, and the ugly -- Is seeing believing?

The enduring progression of artificial intelligence and cybernetics offers an ever-closer possibility of rational and sentient robots. The ethics and morals deriving from this technological prospect have been considered in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, the design of automatons with roboethics and the contemplation of machine ethics through the concept of artificial moral agents. Across these categories, the robotics laws first proposed by Isaac Asimov in the twentieth century remain well-recognised and esteemed due to their specification of preventing human harm, (...) stipulating obedience to humans and incorporating robotic self-protection. However the overwhelming predominance in the study of this field has focussed on human–robot interactions without fully considering the ethical inevitability of future artificial intelligences communicating together and has not addressed the moral nature of robot–robot interactions. A new robotic law is proposed and termed AIonAI or artificial intelligence-on-artificial intelligence. This law tackles the overlooked area where future artificial intelligences will likely interact amongst themselves, potentially leading to exploitation. As such, they would benefit from adopting a universal law of rights to recognise inherent dignity and the inalienable rights of artificial intelligences. Such a consideration can help prevent exploitation and abuse of rational and sentient beings, but would also importantly reflect on our moral code of ethics and the humanity of our civilisation. (shrink)

This book explores how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may affect today's legal systems and, more particularly, matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law, contractual obligations, and torts. By distinguishing between the behaviour of robots as tools of human interaction, and robots as proper agents in the legal arena, jurists will have to address a new generation of "hard cases." General disagreement may concern immunity in criminal law (e.g., the employment of robot soldiers in battle), (...) personal accountability for certain robots in contracts (e.g., robo-traders), much as clauses of strict liability and negligence-based responsibility in extra-contractual obligations (e.g., service robots in tort law). Since robots are here to stay, the aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual relationships. (shrink)

This article argues that legal discourses about robots are framed within a limiting ‘human paradigm.’ While this is not a specific failure of lawyers, it has significant consequences for law in a digital future. This visualising of robots has its origins in mainstream twentieth-century science fictional tropes of artificial beings. This article begins by identifying the predominant science fiction tropes regarding artificial beings as a source of anxiety for human futures, as located in discrete bodies and as separate from humans. (...) The article then traces this ‘human paradigm’ in robot law scholarship. It is shown how a focus on embodiment and separation disrupts appreciation of the emerging partial disembodiment and hybridity of digital autonomy. There is a continual sense of needing to keep robots and humans distinct and separate, which is not how digital futures are manifesting. (shrink)

The recent progression in AI, nanomedicine and robotics have increased concerns about ethics, policy and law. The increasing complexity and hybrid nature of AI and nanotechnologies impact the functionality of “law in action” which can lead to legal uncertainty and ultimately to a public distrust. There is an immediate need of collaboration between Central Asian biomedical scientists, AI engineers and academic lawyers for the harmonization of AI, nanomedicines and robotics in Central Asian legal system.

Using Asimov’s “Bicentennial Man” as a springboard, a number of metaethical issues concerning the emerging field of machine ethics are discussed. Although the ultimate goal of machine ethics is to create autonomous ethical machines, this presents a number of challenges. A good way to begin the task of making ethics computable is to create a program that enables a machine to act an ethical advisor to human beings. This project, unlike creating an autonomous ethical machine, will not require that we (...) make a judgment about the ethical status of the machine itself, a judgment that will be particularly difficult to make. Finally, it is argued that Asimov’s “three laws of robotics” are an unsatisfactory basis for machine ethics, regardless of the status of the machine. (shrink)

Humans are becoming increasingly dependent on the ‘say-so' of machines, such as computers, smartphones, and robots. In epistemology, knowledge based on what you have been told is called ‘testimony' and being able to give and receive testimony is a prerequisite for engaging in many social roles. Should robots and other autonomous intelligent machines be considered epistemic testifiers akin to those of humans? This chapter attempts to answer this question as well as explore the implications of robot testimony for the (...) criminal justice system. Few are in agreement as to the ‘types' of agents that can provide testimony. The chapter surveys three well-known approaches and shows that on two of these approaches being able to provide testimony is bound up with the possession of intentional mental states. Through a discussion of computational and folk-psychological approaches to intentionality, it is argued that a good case can be made for robots fulfilling all three definitions. (shrink)

Robots are slowly, but certainly, entering people's professional and private lives. They require the attention of regulators due to the challenges they present to existing legal frameworks and the new legal and ethical questions they raise. This paper discusses four major regulatory dilemmas in the field of robotics: how to keep up with technological advances; how to strike a balance between stimulating innovation and the protection of fundamental rights and values; whether to affirm prevalent social norms or nudge social norms (...) in a different direction; and, how to balance effectiveness versus legitimacy in techno-regulation. The four dilemmas are each treated in the context of a particular modality of regulation: law, market, social norms, and technology as a regulatory tool; and for each, we focus on particular topics? such as liability, privacy, and autonomy? that often feature as the major issues requiring regulatory attention. The paper then highlights the role and potential of the European framework of rights and values, responsible research and innovation, smart regulation and soft law as means of dealing with the dilemmas. (shrink)

How to make robots safe for humans is intensely debated, within academia as well as in industry, media and on the political arena. Hardly any discussion of the subject fails to mention Isaac Asimov’s three laws of Robotics. We find it curious that a set of fictional laws can have such a strong impact on discussions about a real-world problem and we think this needs to be looked into. The probably most common phrase in connection with robotic and AI ethics, (...) second to “The Three Laws of Robotics”, is “The Trolley Problem”. Asimov’s laws and the Trolley Problem are usually discussed separately but there is a connection in that the Trolley Problem poses a seemingly unsolvable problem for Asimov’s First Law, that states: A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. That is, it contains an active and a passive clause and obliges the robot to obey both, while the Trolley Problem forces us to choose between these two options. The object of this paper is therefore to investigate if and how Asimov’s First Law of Robotics can handle a situation where we are forced to choose between the active and the passive clauses of the law. We discuss four possible solutions to the challenge explicitly or implicitly used by Asimov. We conclude that all four suggestions would solve the problem but in different ways and with different implications for other dilemmas in robot ethics. We also conclude that considering the urgency of finding ways to secure a safe coexistence between humans and robots, we should not let the Trolley Problem stand in the way of using the First Law of robotics for this purpose. If we want to use Asimov’s laws for this purpose, we also recommend discarding the active clause of the First Law. (shrink)

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against (...) her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law. (shrink)

Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...) consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others. The second claims that the use of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. (shrink)

AI and people do not compete on a level-playing field. Self-driving vehicles may be safer than human drivers, but laws often penalize such technology. People may provide superior customer service, but businesses are automating to reduce their taxes. AI may innovate more effectively, but an antiquated legal framework constrains inventive AI. In The Reasonable Robot, Ryan Abbott argues that the law should not discriminate between AI and human behavior and proposes a new legal principle that will ultimately improve human (...) well-being. This work should be read by anyone interested in the rapidly evolving relationship between AI and the law. (shrink)

After 50 years, the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics capture the imagination of the general public while, at the same time, engendering a great deal of fear and skepticism. Isaac Asimov recognized this deep-seated misconception of technology and created the Three Laws of Robotics. The first part of this paper examines the underlying fear of intelligent robots, revisits Asimov’s response, and reports on some current opinions on the use of the Three Laws by practitioners. Finally, an argument against robotic (...) rebellion is made along with a call for personal responsibility and suggestions for implementing safety constraints in intelligent robots. (shrink)

Jon Bing was not only a pioneer in the field of artificial intelligence and law and the legal regulation of technology. He was also an accomplished author of fiction, with an oeuvre spanning from short stories and novels to theatre plays and even an opera. As reality catches up with the imagination of science fiction writers who have anticipated a world shared by humans and non-human intelligences of their creation, some of the copyright issues he has discussed in his academic (...) capacity take on new resonance. How will we regulate copyright when robots are producers and consumers of art? This paper tries to give a sketch of the problem and hints at possible answers that are to a degree inspired by Bing’s academic and creative writing. (shrink)

이 글은 프롬의 바이오필리아와 네크로필리아 개념을 중심으로 4차 산업혁명의 시대에 법이 가져야 할 방향성을 고찰한다. 바이오필리아는 생명에 대한 사랑을 의미하고 네크로필리아는 죽음에 대한 사랑을 의미하는데, 프롬의 이론에서 네크로필리아는 기계적인 것에 대한 사랑으로 새롭게 해석된다. 흥미로운 것은 프롬에게서 바이오필리아와 네크로필리아가 심리적이면서 도덕적인 문제로 설정된다는 점이다. 이 점에 착안하여 이 글은 인간의 로봇화, 로봇의 인간화가 말해지고 인공지능 로봇의 발전으로 인해 ‘쓸모없는 인간 계급’이 등장할 가능성마저 말해지는 지금의 상황에서, 바이오필리아와 네크로필리아가 법의 방향성을 모색할 유용한 개념일 수 있음을 주장한다. 법이 과학의 발전을 도모하면서도 기계적인 (...) 것에 대한 사랑이 생명에 대한 사랑을 대체하지 않도록 하는 파수꾼으로서 기능할 때, 바이오필리아를 확대시키는 생명의 법으로 거듭날 수 있을 것이다. 이 글은 특히 법적 상징계에 인공지능 로봇 등의 기계를 위치시킴에 있어서 지능적 기계와 동물이 비교되는 상황의 위험성을 지적하고, ‘인간-비인간(non-human)’의 패러다임에서 벗어나서 ‘생명-비생명(non-life)’의 패러다임으로 나아갈 것을 촉구한다. 또한 인간과 로봇의 관계를 법적으로 규율하는 미래적 과제에 임할 때에, 그 관계가 자기애적이고 네크로필리아적인 것일 가능성을 인식할 필요성도 제안해보았다. (shrink)

The question of whether new rules or regulations are required to govern, restrict, or even prohibit the use of autonomous weapon systems has been the subject of debate for the better part of a decade. Despite the claims of advocacy groups, the way ahead remains unclear since the international community has yet to agree on a specific definition of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and the great powers have largely refused to support an effective ban. In this vacuum, the public has (...) been presented with a heavily one-sided view of Killer Robots. This interdisciplinary volume presents a more nuanced approach to autonomous weapon systems that recognizes the need to progress beyond a discourse framed by the Terminator and HAL 9000. Re-shaping the discussion around this emerging military innovation requires a new line of thought and a willingness to challenge the orthodoxy. Lethal Autonomous Weapons focuses on exploring the moral and legal issues associated with the design, development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons. The volume brings together some of the most prominent academics and academic-practitioners in the lethal autonomous weapons space and seeks to return some balance to the debate. As part of this effort, it recognizes that society needs to invest in hard conversations that tackle the ethics, morality, and law of these new digital technologies and understand the human role in their creation and operation. (shrink)

Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do not take responsibility away (...) from humans; in fact they increase the abil-ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are probably good news. (shrink)

Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems are here. Technological development will see them become widespread in the near future. This is in a matter of years rather than decades. When the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meets on 10-14th November 2014, well-considered guidance for a decision on the general policy direction for LAWS is clearly needed. While there is widespread opposition to LAWS—or ‘killer robots’, as they are popularly called—and a growing campaign advocates banning them outright, we argue the opposite. LAWS (...) may very well reduce suffering and death in war. Rather than banning them, they should be regulated, to ensure both compliance with international humanitarian law, and that this positive outcome occurs. This policy memo sets out the basic structure and content of the regulation required. (shrink)

The development of highly humanoid sex robots is on the technological horizon. If sex robots are integrated into the legal community as “electronic persons”, the issue of sexual consent arises, which is essential for legally and morally permissible sexual relations between human persons. This paper explores whether it is conceivable, possible, and desirable that humanoid robots should be designed such that they are capable of consenting to sex. We consider reasons for giving both “no” and “yes” answers to these three (...) questions by examining the concept of consent in general, as well as critiques of its adequacy in the domain of sexual ethics; the relationship between consent and free will; and the relationship between consent and consciousness. Additionally we canvass the most influential existing literature on the ethics of sex with robots. (shrink)

No single moral theory can instruct us as to whether and to what extent we are confronted with legal loopholes, e.g. whether or not new legal rules should be added to the system in the criminal law field. This question on the primary rules of the law appears crucial for today’s debate on roboethics and still, goes beyond the expertise of robo-ethicists. On the other hand, attention should be drawn to the secondary rules of the law: The unpredictability of robotic (...) behaviour and the lack of data on the probability of events, their consequences and costs, make hard to determine the levels of risk and hence, the amount of insurance premiums and other mechanisms on which new forms of accountability for the behaviour of robots may hinge. By following Japanese thinking, the aim is to show why legally de-regulated, or special, zones for robotics, i.e. the secondary rules of the system, pave the way to understand what kind of primary rules we may want for our robots. (shrink)

Sexbots are coming. Given the pace of technological advances, it is inevitable that realistic robots specifically designed for people's sexual gratification will be developed in the not-too-distant future. Despite popular culture's fascination with the topic, and the emergence of the much-publicized Campaign Against Sex Robots, there has been little academic research on the social, philosophical, moral, and legal implications of robot sex. This book fills the gap, offering perspectives from philosophy, psychology, religious studies, economics, and law on the possible (...) future of robot-human sexual relationships. (shrink)

The enduring innovations in artificial intelligence and robotics offer the promised capacity of computer consciousness, sentience and rationality. The development of these advanced technologies have been considered to merit rights, however these can only be ascribed in the context of commensurate responsibilities and duties. This represents the discernable next-step for evolution in this field. Addressing these needs requires attention to the philosophical perspectives of moral responsibility for artificial intelligence and robotics. A contrast to the moral status of animals may be (...) considered. At a practical level, the attainment of responsibilities by artificial intelligence and robots can benefit from the established responsibilities and duties of human society, as their subsistence exists within this domain. These responsibilities can be further interpreted and crystalized through legal principles, many of which have been conserved from ancient Roman law. The ultimate and unified goal of stipulating these responsibilities resides through the advancement of mankind and the enduring preservation of the core tenets of humanity. (shrink)

This article explores the role of constitutional thought in Latour’s work on cosmopolitics. It will study his non-modern proposal in the Politics of Nature (2004) and argue for a constitutional rather than political understanding. To address criticisms of being too metaphysical or unpractical, we will work out the notion of a “constitutional ecology of practices” to highlight how different practices such as politics, science, organization, but also law, all contribute to the design of the stage and processes for composing a (...) common world. Special focus will here be placed on the role of “epigrams”: practical models for ordering contributions of different practices or modes in hierarchical relationships. This renders them identifiable, mobilizable, and contestable as cross-cutting models for shaping mutual relations in concrete collaborative settings. The case of the legal regulation of robots will be presented as an example of a cosmopolitical attempt to introduce non-human entities in the common collective. We will here observe the role that epigrams play in framing, ordering and contesting the epistemic contributions of the various practices involved in this innovation ecology. This case will be used to discuss Latour’s proposals and to study non-modern constitutionalism in action. (shrink)

May lethal autonomous weapons systems—‘killer robots ’—be used in war? The majority of writers argue against their use, and those who have argued in favour have done so on a consequentialist basis. We defend the moral permissibility of killer robots, but on the basis of the non-aggregative structure of right assumed by Just War theory. This is necessary because the most important argument against killer robots, the responsibility trilemma proposed by Rob Sparrow, makes the same assumptions. We show that the (...) crucial moral question is not one of responsibility. Rather, it is whether the technology can satisfy the requirements of fairness in the re-distribution of risk. Not only is this possible in principle, but some killer robots will actually satisfy these requirements. An implication of our argument is that there is a public responsibility to regulate killer robots ’ design and manufacture. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explore the safety value of implementing Asimov’s Laws of Robotics as a future general framework that humans should obey. Asimov formulated laws to make explicit the safeguards of the robots in his stories: (1) A robot may not injure or harm a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; (2) A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except where such orders (...) would conflict with the First Law; (3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law. In Asimov’s stories, it is always assumed that the laws are built into the robots to govern the behaviour of the robots. As his stories clearly demonstrate, the Laws can be ambiguous. Moreover, the laws are not very specific. General rules as a guide for robot behaviour may not be a very good method to achieve robot safety – if we expect the robots to follow them. But would it work for humans? In this chapter, we ask whether it would make as much, or more, sense to implement the laws in human legislation with the purpose of governing the behaviour of people or companies that develop, build, market or use AI, embodied in robots or in the form of software, now and in the future. (shrink)

The rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics will have a profound impact on society as they will interfere with the people and their interactions. Intelligent autonomous robots, independent if they are humanoid/anthropomorphic or not, will have a physical presence, make autonomous decisions, and interact with all stakeholders in the society, in yet unforeseen manners. The symbiosis with such sophisticated robots may lead to a fundamental civilizational shift, with far-reaching effects as philosophical, legal, and societal questions on consciousness, citizenship, rights, (...) and legal entity of robots are raised. The aim of this work is to understand the broad scope of potential issues pertaining to law and society through the investigation of the interplay of law, robots, and society via different angles such as law, social, economic, gender, and ethical perspectives. The results make it evident that in an era of symbiosis with intelligent autonomous robots, the law systems, as well as society, are not prepared for their prevalence. Therefore, it is now the time to start a multi-disciplinary stakeholder discussion and derive the necessary policies, frameworks, and roadmaps for the most eminent issues. (shrink)

In order to present a hopefully comprehensive framework of what is the stake of the growing use of robot soldiers, the paper focuses on: the different impact of robots on legal systems, e.g., contractual obligations and tort liability; how robots affect crucial notions as causality, predictability and human culpability in criminal law and, finally, specific hypotheses of robots employed in “just wars.” By using the traditional distinction between causes that make wars just and conduct admissible on the battlefield, the (...) aim is to clarify how advancement of military robotics technology is transforming a 2,000-year-old legal debate on the concept of “just war.” For the first time, legal systems will hold political authorities and military commissioners responsible for what an artificial soldier autonomously decides to do. The paper examines how the new scenario affects both principles of military conduct and notions of justice in resorting to war. (shrink)

This is an attempt to axiomatise the natural laws. Note especially axiom 4, which is expressed in third order predicate logic, and which permits a solution to the problem of causation in nature without stating that “everything has a cause”. The undefined term “difference” constitutes the basic element and each difference is postulated to have an exact position and to have a discrete cause. The set of causes belonging to a natural set of dimensions is defined as a law. This (...) means that a natural law is determined by the discrete causes tied to a natural set of dimensions. A law is defined as “defined” in a point if a difference there has a cause. Given that there is a point for which the law is not defined it is shown that a difference is caused that connects two points in two separate sets of dimensions. (shrink)

In the seventy years since AI became a field of study, the theoretical work of philosophers has played increasingly important roles in understanding many aspects of the AI project, from the metaphysics of mind and what kinds of systems can or cannot implement them, the epistemology of objectivity and algorithmic bias, the ethics of automation, drones, and specific implementations of AI, as well as analyses of AI embedded in social contexts (for example). Serious scholarship in AI ethics sometimes quotes Asimov’s (...) speculative laws of robotics as if they were genuine proposals, and yet Lem remains historically undervalued as a theorist who uses fiction as his vehicle. Here, I argue that Lem’s fiction (in particular his fiction about robots) is overlooked but highly nuanced philosophy of AI, and that we should recognize the lessons he tried to offer us, which focused on the human and social failures rather than technological breakdowns. Stories like “How the World Was Saved” and “Upside Down Evolution” ask serious philosophical questions about AI metaphysics and ethics, and offer insightful answers that deserve more attention. Highlighting some of this work from The Cyberiad and the stories in Mortal Engines in particular, I argue that the time has never been more appropriate to attend to his philosophy in light of the widespread technological and social failures brought about by the quest for artificial intelligence. In service of this argument, I discuss some of the history and philosophical debates around AI in the last decades, as well as contemporary events that illustrate Lem’s strongest claims in critique of the human side of AI. (shrink)

At a product demonstration conference in Chicago a few years ago, Taser introduced its latest technological achievement: a remote-controlled robot, developed by the iRobot company of Japan, armed with a Taser. Such a device could save lives on both sides of the law. But it is not the only use of robots replacing humans in dangerous jobs of security and defense. Recently we have seen the first robot soldiers, armed with lethal weapons, entering the battlefield as the US (...) military begins to deploy remote-controlled machinegun- armed robots to patrol dangerous neighborhoods in occupied Iraq. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a variety of agents that appear in Kantian ethics in order to determine which would be necessary to make a robot a genuine moral agent. However, building such an agent would require that we structure into a robot’s behavioral repertoire the possibility for immoral behavior, for only then can the moral law, according to Kant, manifest itself as an ought, a prerequisite for being able to hold an agent morally accountable for its actions. (...) Since building a moral robot requires the possibility of immoral behavior, I go on to argue that we cannot morally want robots to be genuine moral agents, but only beings that simulate moral behavior. But then, if that is what we want for robots, why should we want something different for human beings? Robot ethics, it seems, presents something of a reductio of Kant’s ethics that points to hidden assumptions that hide in the very fabric of the Kantian moral enterprise, not the least of which is that Kant presumes humans to be fallen creatures. Religious doctrine, in other words, infects Kant’s attempt to derive morality from reason. This paper will demonstrate that this is so. (shrink)

The Laws of Armed Conflict require that war crimes be attributed to individuals who can be held responsible and be punished. Yet assigning responsibility for the actions of Lethal Autonomous Weapon...

This is the short version, in French translation by Anne Querrien, of the originally jointly authored paper: Müller, Vincent C., ‘Autonomous killer robots are probably good news’, in Ezio Di Nucci and Filippo Santoni de Sio, Drones and responsibility: Legal, philosophical and socio-technical perspectives on the use of remotely controlled weapons. - - - L’article qui suit présente un nouveau système d’armes fondé sur des robots qui risque d’être prochainement utilisé. À la différence des drones qui sont manoeuvrés à distance (...) mais comportent une part importante de discernement humain, il s’agit de machines programmées pour défendre, attaquer, ou tuer de manière autonome. Les auteurs, philosophes, préfèrent prévenir de leur prochaine diffusion et obtenir des Nations Unies leur régulation. Une campagne internationale propose plutôt leur interdiction. (shrink)

Currently, the central questions in the philosophical debate surrounding the ethics of automated warfare are (1) Is the development and use of autonomous lethal robotic systems for military purposes consistent with (existing) international laws of war and received just war theory?; and (2) does the creation and use of such machines improve the moral caliber of modern warfare? However, both of these approaches have significant problems, and thus we need to start exploring alternative approaches. In this paper, I ask whether (...) autonomous robots ought to be programmed to be pacifists. The answer arrived at is “Yes”, if we decide to create autonomous robots, they ought to be pacifists. This is to say that robots ought not to be programmed to willingly and intentionally kill human beings, or, by extension, participate in or promote warfare, as something that predictably involves the killing of humans. Insofar as we are the ones that will be determining the content of the robot’s value system, then we ought to program robots to be pacifists, rather than ‘warists’. This is (in part) because we ought to be pacifists, and creating and programming machines to be “autonomous lethal robotic systems” directly violates this normative demand on us. There are no mitigating reasons to program lethal autonomous machines to contribute to or participate in warfare. Even if the use of autonomous lethal robotic systems could be consistent with received just war theory and the international laws of war, and even if their involvement could make warfare less inhumane in certain ways, these reasons do not compensate for the ubiquitous harms characteristic of modern warfare. In this paper, I provide four main reasons why autonomous robots ought to be pacifists, most of which do not depend on the truth of pacifism. The strong claim being argued for here is that automated warfare ought not to be pursued. The weaker claim being argued for here is that automated warfare ought not to be pursued, unless it is the most pacifist option available at the time, and other alternatives have been reasonably explored, and we are simultaneously promoting a (long term) pacifist agenda in (many) other ways. Thus, the more ambitious goal of this paper is to convince readers that automated warfare is something that we ought not to promote or pursue, while the more modest—and I suspect, more palatable—goal is to spark sustained critical discussion about the assumptions underlying the drive towards automated warfare, and to generate legitimate consideration of its pacifist alternatives,in theory, policy, and practice. (shrink)

Robots are now associated with various aspects of our lives. These sophisticated machines have been increasingly used in different manufacturing industries and services sectors for decades. During this time, they have been a factor in causing significant harm to humans, prompting questions of liability. Industrial robots are presently regarded as products for liability purposes. In contrast, some commentators have proposed that robots be granted legal personality, with an overarching aim of exonerating the respective creators and users of these artefacts from (...) liability. This article is concerned mainly with industrial robots that exercise some degree of self-control as programmed, though the creation of fully autonomous robots is still a long way off. The proponents of the robot’s personality compare these machines generally with corporations, and sporadically with, inter alia, animals, and idols, in substantiating their arguments. This article discusses the attributes of legal personhood and the justifications for the separate personality of corporations and idols. It then demonstrates the reasons for refusal of an animal’s personality. It concludes that robots are ineligible to be persons, based on the requirements of personhood. (shrink)

In July 2014, the roboticist Ronald Arkin suggested that child sex robots could be used to treat those with paedophilic predilections in the same way that methadone is used to treat heroin addicts. Taking this onboard, it would seem that there is reason to experiment with the regulation of this technology. But most people seem to disagree with this idea, with legal authorities in both the UK and US taking steps to outlaw such devices. In this paper, I subject these (...) different regulatory attitudes to critical scrutiny. In doing so, I make three main contributions to the debate. First, I present a framework for thinking about the regulatory options that we confront when dealing with child sex robots. Second, I argue that there is a prima facie case for restrictive regulation, but that this is contingent on whether Arkin’s hypothesis has a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Third, I argue that Arkin’s hypothesis probably does not have a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Consequently, we should proceed with utmost caution when it comes to this technology. (shrink)

This paper intends to sum up the main findings of the European project RoboLaw. In this paper, the authors claim that the European Union should play a pro-active policy role in the regulation of technologies so as to inform the development of technologies with its values and principles. The paper provides an explication of the rationale for analysing of a limited and heterogeneous number of robotics applications. For these applications, the following issues are addressed: whether robotics deserve a special case (...) of regulation; the direct and indirect role ethics can play in regulating technology; the transformations of both vulnerabilities and capabilities, and the effects of liability law in favouring the socially relevant applications. In conclusion, a reflection on the possibility to generalize some of the RoboLaw findings to other technologies is proposed, with respect to liability and ethics. (shrink)

While the 2010 EPSRC principles for robotics state a set of 5 rules of what ‘should’ be done, I argue they should differentiate between legal obligations and ethical demands. Only if we make this difference can we state clearly what the legal obligations already are, and what additional ethical demands we want to make. I provide suggestions how to revise the rules in this light and how to make them more structured.