A bounded formula is a pair consisting of a propositional formula φ in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate, interpreted to express the lower-bound probability of φ. Converting conjunctive/disjunctive combinations of bounded formulas to a single bounded formula consisting of the conjunction/disjunction of the propositions occurring in the collection along with a newly calculated lower probability is called absorption. This paper introduces two inference rules for effecting conjunctive and disjunctive absorption and (...) compares the resulting logical system, called System Y, to axiom System P. Finally, we demonstrate how absorption resolves the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preference. (shrink)

The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial language and (ii) provides a logical (...) calculus of rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence. The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second. (shrink)

The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The (...) new solution will be defended against a seemingly obvious objection. 1 The paradoxes of rational acceptability 2 The standard solution 3 A new solution to the paradoxes 4 Basic assumptions 5 The new solution defended 6 Conclusion 7 Appendix. (shrink)

This article provides a straightforward diagnosis and resolution of the lottery paradox and the epistemic version of the paradox of the preface. In doing so, The article takes some steps in relating the notion of probability to the notion of epistemic justification.

This article presents a rule-utilitarian theory which lies much closer to the social contract tradition than most other forms of consequentialism do: calculated-rates rule preference utilitarianism. Being preference-utilitarian allows the theory to be grounded in instrumental rationality and the equality of agents, as opposed to teleological assumptions about impartial goodness. The calculated-rates approach, judging rules’ consequences by what would happen if they were accepted by whatever number of people is realistic rather than by what would happen if they were accepted (...) universally or by exactly 90% of the population, allows it to select rules based not just on their ability to give good advice to their followers but also on their ability to attract followers in the first place. The result is a theory that, although fully utilitarian and not at all pluralistic or intuitionist, nevertheless offers a principled justification for giving some weight to seemingly non-utilitarian considerations: Lockean natural rights, Kantian respect for autonomy, and Scanlonian distributive justice. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, (...) similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science. (shrink)

Audi defends his views in epistemology against the challenges raised by Laurence BonJour, Timothy Williamson, and William Alston in Part II, “Knowledge, Justification, and Acceptance.” Specifically, Audi addresses his concerns about the sorts of beliefs that can be noninferentially justified, the sense in which the grounds of justification may be internal, and the range of attitudes that admit of justification and rationality.

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

Papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December, 1968 and revised in the light of discussion at the symposium for publication. The contributors hold different views about the role played by induction in theories of knowledge and rational belief but many of the papers are conciliatory, reflecting no doubt a good deal of helpful communication at the symposium. For example, Frederic Schick's clearly written and informative lead article considers (...) subjectivist, empiricist, and pragmatist theories of rational belief, arguing that they are compatible theories relevant to different types of issues. Marshall Swain follows with an article which presents a general framework within which rules of rational acceptance can be constructed. An exchange between Isaac Levi and Richard Jeffrey shows that advocates of theories of acceptance and theories of partial belief may be defending complementary and not mutually exclusive theories. In the remaining three essays Henry Kyburg Jr., Gilbert Harman, and Keith Lehrer defend their own distinctive views about the nature of inductive inference and rational belief. Kyburg traces difficulties in some theories to the acceptance of the principle of conjunction which he rejects. Harman and Lehrer both see the relation of inductive inference to explanation as crucial to understanding the former and they develop theories along different lines which make use of this relation. A long and useful bibliography was prepared for the symposium by Ralph L. Slaght and revised for publication in the volume.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Most recently, what I have been working on in connection with it is the larger picture of the role of the editor in professional communication. Since the basic context for this is not philosophical communication in particular but rather scientific communication in general—ultimately professional communication in general—I've been exchanging some ideas with one of the main editors for the American Physical Society, which is the major professional society for physicists, and it has been most helpful in expanding my understanding of (...) the editorial role, which is clearly the single most important factor in the publication system at this point. I don't get into that in what follows below, but the basic frame for the discussion is adjusted to make that a part of what is considered. (shrink)

Following Kuhn's main thesis according to which theory revision and acceptance is always paradigm relative, I propose to outline some possible consequences of such a view. First, asking the question in what sense Bayesian decision theory could serve as the appropriate (normative) theory of rationality examined from the point of view of the epistemology of theory acceptance, I argue that Bayesianism leads to a narrow conception of theory acceptance. Second, regarding the different types of theory revision, i.e. (...) expansion, contraction, replacement and residuals shifts, I extract from Kuhn's view a series of indications showing that theory replacement cannot be rationalized within the framework of Bayesian decision theory, not even within a more sophisticated version of that model. Third, and finally, I will point to the need for a more comprehensive model of rationality than the Bayesian expected utility maximization model, the need for a model which could better deal with the different aspects of theory replacement. I will show that Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science gives us several hints for a more adequate theory of rationality in science. I will also show that Kuhn is not in a position to fully articulate his main ideas and that he well be confronted with a serious problem concerning collective choice of a paradigm. (shrink)

To understand something involves some sort of commitment to a set of propositions comprising an account of the understood phenomenon. Some take this commitment to be a species of belief; others, such as Elgin and I, take it to be a kind of cognitive policy. This paper takes a step back from debates about the nature of understanding and asks when this commitment involved in understanding is epistemically appropriate, or ‘acceptable’ in Elgin’s terminology. In particular, appealing to lessons from the (...) lottery and preface paradoxes, it is argued that this type of commitment is sometimes acceptable even when it would be rational to assign arbitrarily low probabilities to the relevant propositions. This strongly suggests that the relevant type of commitment is sometimes acceptable in the absence of epistemic justification for belief, which in turn implies that understanding does not require justification in the traditional sense. The paper goes on to develop a new probabilistic model of acceptability, based on the idea that the maximally informative accounts of the understood phenomenon should be optimally probable. Interestingly, this probabilistic model ends up being similar in important ways to Elgin’s proposal to analyze the acceptability of such commitments in terms of ‘reflective equilibrium’. (shrink)

The papers collected in this volume were originally presented at a sym posium held at the University of Pennsylvania in December of 1968. Each of the papers has been revised in light of the discussions that took place during this symposium. None of the papers has appeared in print previously. The extensive bibliography that appears at the end of the volume was originally distributed during the symposium and was revised on the basis of many helpful suggestions made by those who (...) participated. The symposium was made possible by a grant from The National Science Foundation and funds contributed by the Philosophy Depart ment of the University of Pennsylvania. On behalf of the contributors to this volume, I would like to express my thanks to these organizations for their generous support. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Graduate Philosophy Students Organization at the University of Penn sylvania for the considerable assistance they gave me during the sym posium. My thanks, also, to Judith Sofranko and Lynn Luckett for their very responsible efforts in the preparation of the manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank Professor James Cornman for his invaluable advice and encouragement. (shrink)

The Oregon Basic Health Services Act of 1989 seeks to establish universal access to basic medical care for all currently uninsured Oregon residents. To control the increasing cost of medical care, the Oregon plan will restrict funding according to a priority list of medical interventions. The basic level of medical care provided to residents with incomes below the federal poverty line will vary according to the funds made available by the Oregon legislature. A rationing plan such as Oregon's which potentially (...) excludes medically necessary procedures from the basic level of health care may be just, for the right to publically-sponsored medical care is restricted by opposing rights of private property. However, the moral acceptability of the Oregon plan cannot be determined in the absence of knowing the level of resources to be provided. Finally, Oregon to date has failed to include the individuals being rationed in discussions as to how the scarce resources are to be distributed. (shrink)

Joseph Ransdell posted the following draft of an introduction to a work in progress to the peirce-l email list on September 22, 2000. The post triggered a long thread of discussion in which he participated quite actively. At least one later and much longer version of the introduction exists. Still, this draft will give a concentrated “taste” of a side of Ransdell more familiar perhaps to long-time peirce-l subscribers than to those who have read only his published works. In the (...) message containing the draft, Ransdell characterized the draft as follows: “What follows below is an introductory section to some work that has actually been in progress for some five years or more now, which began as an explication of.. (shrink)

We often use the same word “belief” to refer to two different cognitive attitudes. Both of them are dispositions to behave in the same way, but one of these dispositions is involuntary and context independent , while the other one is voluntary and context dependent . Belief, like perception, is the result of the automatic workings of our biological cognitive apparatus. Acceptance is the result of a decision, which can be guided by a variety of goals. Acceptance can (...) be accompanied by belief, but need not, and very often is not. Acceptance, not belief, is the fundamental disposition in such varied fields as therapy, the law and science. And acceptance, not belief, is the proper object of a theory of rationality. (shrink)

Normativism, the approach that judges human rationality by comparison against normative standards, has recently come under intensive criticism as unsuitable for psychological enquiry, and it has been suggested that it should be replaced with a descriptivist paradigm. My goal in this paper is to outline and defend a meta-theoretical framework of such a paradigm, grounded rationality, based on the related principles of descriptivism and (moderate) epistemic relativism. Bounded rationality takes into account universal biological and cognitive limitations on human rationality. Grounded (...) rationality accepts universal constraints but adds cognitive variability: Within-individual variability (dual processing), and individual as well as cultural differences. I discuss the implications of grounded rationality to dual processing, proposing that investing limited cognitive resources in analytic processing might be less instrumentally rational for individuals with low cognitive ability. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn 2009, an earthquake struck the city L’Aquila, causing more than 300 deaths and leading to a trial which lasted almost four years and – though cleared in the appeal – in which scientists...

This book brings together papers presented at a symposium at the University of Pennsylvania and later revised. They are concerned with the concept of rational belief and with the rôle that induction plays in theories of rationality. There are three well-known theories: subjectivism provides the norm that ‘we may believe a proposition if and only if it fits in with those we already believe, and that we must believe it if and only if avoiding the belief would make for (...) some imbalance in the set of all our beliefs’; an empiricist logic argues that probability must be our guide and holds that a rational person believes a proposition if and only if it has a sufficiently high degree of confirmation assessed on the basis of observation; the pragmatist conceives belief as a species of action, assessing it as rational when it contributes to the furtherance of ends. (shrink)

Van Fraassen has maintained that acceptance of a scientific theory does not involve the belief that the theory is true. Blackburn, Mitchell and Horwich have claimed that acceptance, as understood by van Fraassen, is the same as belief; in which case, van Fraassen's position is incoherent. Van Fraassen identifies belief with subjective probability, so the question at issue is really whether acceptance of a theory involves a high subjective probability for the theory. Van Fraassen is not committed (...) to this, and hence the charge of incoherence is misplaced. Indeed, van Fraassen is correct on this point. However, he is wrong to think that acceptance requires a high subjective probability that the theory is empirically adequate; and his reason for thinking that science aims at empirical adequacy rather than truth rests on an overly crude theory of rational choice. (shrink)

Judgments of the rationality of beliefs must take the costs of acquiring and possessing beliefs into consideration. In that case, certain false beliefs, especially those that are associated with the benefits of a cohesive community, can be seen to be useful for an agent and perhaps instrumentally rational to hold. A distinction should be made between excusable misbeliefs, which a rational agent should tolerate, and misbeliefs that are defensible in their own right because they confer benefits on the (...) agent. Likely candidates for such misbeliefs are to be found in the realm of nationalism and religion, where the possession costs of true beliefs are high, and where collective beliefs in falsehoods may allow for a cohesive community. We discuss the paradoxes of reflective awareness involved in the idea of deliberately embracing falsehoods. More rigorous, fully reflective concepts of rationality would still disallow false beliefs, but such demanding versions of rationality would commit agents to pay large costs, thereby weakening the motivation for acquiring true beliefs. (shrink)

In this essay, I will examine Broome’s argument in Weighing Goods (1991; sections 5.4 and 5.5) that aims to show that moderate Humeanism, according to which any coherent sets of preferences should be rationally acceptable, is not a sustainable view of decision theory. I will focus more specifically on the argument Broome uses to support his claim, and show that although it may get some traction, it does not undermine moderate Humeanism as we know it. After reconstructing Broome’s argument, I (...) argue that standard decision theory supposes that the representation of a decision problem fully captures what is relevant to the agent, and therefore has nothing to say about the legitimacy of the representation in question. I argue that although Broome’s criticism does not jeopardize moderate Humeanism, it does pave the way for a new area of research in decision theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is accepted that treatment of previously competent, now incompetent patients can be limited if that is what the patient would desire, if she were now competent. Expressed past preferences or an advance directive are often taken to constitute sufficient evidence of what a patient would now desire. I distinguish between desires and rational desires. I argue that for a desire to be an expression of a person's autonomy, it must be or satisfy that person's rational desires. (...) A person rationally desires a course of action if that person desires it while being in possession of all available relevant facts, without committing relevant error of logic, and “vividly imagining” what its consequences would be like for her. I argue that some competent, expressed desires obstruct autonomy. I show that several psychological mechanisms operate to prevent a person rationally evaluating what future life in a disabled state would be like. Rational evaluation is difficult. However, treatment limitation, if it is to respect autonomy, must be in accord with a patient's rational desires, and not merely her expressed desires. I illustrate the implications of these arguments for the use of advance directives and for the treatment of competent patients. (shrink)

Here a group of philosophers, economists and political theorists discuss the work of David Gauthier, which seeks to show that rational individuals would accept certain moral constraints on their choices. The possibilities and limitations of a contractarian approach to issues of justice is analyzed.

Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed (...) to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role. (shrink)

What theory should we accept from the practical point of view, or accept as a basis for guiding our actions, if we don’t know which theory is true, and if there are too many plausible alternative theories for us to take them all into consideration? This question is the theme of the first three parts of this dissertation. I argue that the problem of theory acceptance, so understood, is a problem of practical rationality, and hence that the appropriate grounds (...) for theory acceptance are practical considerations. I argue for a number of principles of theory acceptance, and I explore the implications of these principles for the acceptance both of descriptive theories and evaluative theories. (shrink)

This paper outlines the Epicurean conception of rationality and then tries to assess the merits of the notorious contention of the Epicurean philosophers that it is irrationalto fear death. At the outset, I talk about the nature of harmful emotions or passions, of which the fear of death is an outstanding example: their dependence on one‘s disposition, their cognitive and non-cognitive components, the ways in which these elements may be related to each other, and the healthy counterparts of the passions, (...) namely the ‚bites‘. Next, I distinguish different kinds of fears involving the thought of death and I examine the Epicurean arguments against each one of them: fears about the state of being dead, others about dying prematurely, yet others concerning the dying process and especially the moment when the soul leaves the body and, finally,the fear that we must die sometime. Much of the discussion focuses on the writings of Philodemus . Philodemus offers the most sustained discussion of the fear of premature death and of the fear of dying that survive in the Epicurean literature. In addition, in the peroration of his treatise On Death, he gives a brilliant example of how we can reconcile ourselves with the fact that we shall die sometime and accept our own mortality. My provisional conclusion is that although the Epicurean philosophers often succeed in appeasing our fears about death, for the most part they fail to prove that these fears are irrational. (shrink)

In ‘Rational Persuasion as Paternalism', George Tsai argues that providing another person with reasons or evidence can be a morally objectionable form of paternalism. I believe Tsai’s thesis is importantly correct, denying the widely accepted identification of rational persuasion with respectful treatment. In this comment, I disagree about what is centrally wrong with objectionable rational persuasion. Contrary to Tsai, objectionable rational persuasion is not wrong because it undermines the value of an agent’s life. It is wrong (...) because it is contrary to an agent’s will. (shrink)

Relativism has been discussed concerning the concepts of truth and rationality in Hilary Putnam's thoughts. Putnam suggested that truth is formed by idealizing rational acceptability. Rational acceptability is a criterion that depends on cognitive virtues and can change with human development. The relation of the sciences to the concept of conformity shows that our knowledge of the world presupposes values. Putnam considers relativism an inconsistent view in the sense that justification for truth is up to the individual. He (...) says that at least some value judgments should be objective. He argues that some conceptual truths are not descriptions of reality, but are indisputably true. Here, he thinks that we have objectivity without an object. (shrink)

As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a (...) number of these constraints will be satisfied if and only if acceptable sentences are true under all valuations in a distinguished non-empty set W. Drawing inspiration from distance-based aggregation procedures, various scoring rule based membership conditions for W are discussed and a possible point of contact with ranking theory is considered. The paper closes with various suggestions for further research. (shrink)

Adaptive rationality theorists question the manner in which psychologists have typically assessed rational behavior and cognition. According to them, human rationality is adaptive, and the biases reported in the psychological literature are best seen as the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. As it turns out, their challenge is also quite controversial, and several aspects of it have been called into question. Yet, whilst it is often suggested that the lack of cogency comes about due to (...) the implausibility of the alternative normative framework, in this paper I articulate a different strategy to resist the revolutionary rhetoric of AR. As I argue here, even if we accept the normative framework of AR, the challenge from AR is less damaging than usually accepted. In particular, I challenge the claim that biases reported in the literature should be conceived of as violations of axiomatic rationality. I argue that the category of bias refers instead to a range of heterogeneous phenomena and that, since several important families of biases are not just violations of axiomatic rationality, these are not vulnerable to the AR challenge. In fact, I also show that the families I consider here look like plausible cases of irrational behavior from the perspective of AR, and that the outcome of my analysis does not sit well with AR theorists’ claim that people are generally successful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals. (shrink)

There is a rich tradition within game theory, decision theory, economics, and philosophy correlating practical rationality with impartiality, and spatial and temporal neutrality. I argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over both times and places, and to times over places. I also show how three plausible dominance principles regarding people, places, and times conflict, so that we cannot accept all three. However, I argue that there are some cases where we should give priority to times (...) over people, suggesting that there is impersonal value to the distribution of high quality life over different times. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that such cases pose no threat to a more broadly conceived knowledge-based view (...) of practical reasoning. I will first motivate the view that rational acceptance depends on a knowledge-based condition being met. I will then show how KPR can be amended—yielding what I call KPR+—to include this condition. I will argue that KPR+ not only avoids Gao’s counterexample, but harbours additional explanatory power by providing an account of the normative role of acceptance in practical reasoning. Finally, I will defend KPR+ against objections by employing theoretical tools that are readily available to those sympathetic to knowledge-based views. (shrink)

Only ten to twelve percent of Americans would voluntarily live within a mile of a nuclear plant or hazardous waste facility. But industry spokespersons claim that such risk aversion represents ignorance and paranoia, and they lament that citizen protests have delayed valuable projects and increased their costs. Who is right? In _Risk and Rationality_, Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues that neither charges of irresponsible endangerment nor countercharges of scientific illiteracy frame the issues properly. She examines the debate over methodological norms for risk (...) evaluation and finds analysts arrayed in a spectrum. Points of view extend from cultural relativists who believe that any risk can be justified to naive positivists who believe that risk evaluation can be objective, neutral, and value free. Both camps, she argues, are wrong, because risk evaluation as a social process is rational and objective, even though all risk-evaluation rules are value-laden. Shrader-Frechette defends a middle position called "scientific proceduralism." She shows why extremist views are unreliable, reveals misconceptions underlying current risk-evaluation methods and strategies, and sketches the reforms needed to set hazard assessment and risk evaluation on a publicly defensible foundation. These reforms involve mathematical, economic, ethical, and legal procedures. They constitute a new paradigm for assessment when acceptance of public hazards is rational, recognizing that laypersons are often more rational in their evaluation of societal risks than either experts or governments have acknowledged. Such reforms would provide citizens with more influence in risk decisions and focus on mediating ethical conflicts, rather than seeking to impose the will of experts. Science, she argues, need not preclude democracy. (shrink)

Belief polarization is said to occur when two people respond to the same evidence by updating their beliefs in opposite directions. This response is considered to be “irrational” because it involves contrary updating, a form of belief updating that appears to violate normatively optimal responding, as for example dictated by Bayes' theorem. In light of much evidence that people are capable of normatively optimal behavior, belief polarization presents a puzzling exception. We show that Bayesian networks, or Bayes nets, can simulate (...) rational belief updating. When fit to experimental data, Bayes nets can help identify the factors that contribute to polarization. We present a study into belief updating concerning the reality of climate change in response to information about the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming. The study used representative samples of Australian and U.S. participants. Among Australians, consensus information partially neutralized the influence of worldview, with free-market supporters showing a greater increase in acceptance of human-caused global warming relative to free-market opponents. In contrast, while consensus information overall had a positive effect on perceived consensus among U.S. participants, there was a reduction in perceived consensus and acceptance of human-caused global warming for strong supporters of unregulated free markets. Fitting a Bayes net model to the data indicated that under a Bayesian framework, free-market support is a significant driver of beliefs about climate change and trust in climate scientists. Further, active distrust of climate scientists among a small number of U.S. conservatives drives contrary updating in response to consensus information among this particular group. (shrink)

Rational dialetheism is the view that for some contradictions, it is rational to believe that they are true. The view, associated with the work of among others, Graham Priest, looks as if it must lead to absurd consequences, and the present paper is an unsuccessful attempt to find them. In particular, I suggest that there is no non-question-begging account of acceptance, denial and negation which can be brought to bear against the rational dialetheist. Finally, I consider (...) the prospect of attacking the position without trying to "refute" it, but even these approaches seem unpromising in the present case. If the drift of the paper is correct, the only strategy is to examine the paradoxes one by one, and show in each case that the best account is non-dialetheic. (shrink)

One theory about rationality is the Self-interest Theory, or S. S claims that what each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself. And it is irrational for anyone to do what he knows would be worse for himself. When morality conflicts with self-interest, many people would reject the Self-interest Theory. But most of these people would accept one of the claims that S makes. This is the claim that we should not care less (...) about our further future, simply because it is further in the future. We should not, for example, postpone pains at the foreseen cost of making them much worse. In our concern for our own self-interest, we should give equal weight to all the parts of our future. In this paper I shall discuss how a Self-interest Theorist should defend this claim. (shrink)