Los retos planteados por el avance y desarrollo de las tecnologías disruptivas han dinamizado la actividad del legislador, exigiendo nuevas respuestas y garantías a bienes jurídicos ya conocidos. Este es ahora el caso de la privacidad del pensamiento y de la igualdad entre personas, que han derivado en el nacimiento de nuevos derechos como la privacidad mental o el derecho al acceso equitativo a la aumentación cognitiva. En el presente artículo se estudiarán ambos derechos, así como su (...) encaje tanto en el ordenamiento jurídico español como en el chileno. Este último de especial relevancia por ser el primer sistema jurídico en regular los neuroderechos. (shrink)

A raíz de los avances realizados en neurociencia y sus implicancias en el derecho en general, y el derecho penal en particular, nos proponemos a evaluar si la normativa de los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos es suficiente para cubrir los principios que surgen de sus postulados, o si es necesaria una ampliación (ya sea interpretativa o normativa) en Latinoamérica. Realizaremos un breve repaso de los avances en el campo del neuroderecho y consideraremos algunas de las propuestas más destacadas. Trataremos (...) el derecho a la libertad cognitiva, la privacidad y la integridad mentales y la continuidad psicológica. Finalmente, proponemos una ampliación del bloque convencional interamericano de derechos humanos para dar respuesta a los nuevos posibles conflictos de derechos y garantías. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive (...) architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look. (shrink)

Conscious mental qualities, aka phenomenal qualities, are seemingly a leading factor in much of our behaviour. Pains make us recoil from painful stimuli, itches make us scratch, feelings of anger sometimes make us shout, visually perceiving red leads us to halt at stop lights, and so on. To relinquish this claim about the efficacy of conscious mental qualities would mean surrendering a major component of our everyday, intuitive self-conception; hence, the claim enjoys considerable prima facie plausibility. Unconscious (...) class='Hi'>mental qualities, however, have been posited by a mere handful of philosophers historically, and are nowadays almost universally rejected. Via a case study of ‘restless legs syndrome’, I argue that there is a hitherto unnoticed cost to this prevailing rejection of unconscious mental qualities: the causal efficacy of conscious mental qualities is threatened. In fact, I argue, we face a dilemma: To endorse epiphenomenalism about conscious mental qualities, or to posit unconscious mental qualities. Since it is so plausible that conscious mental qualities are causally efficacious, this reasoning constitutes an argument for unconscious mental qualities. Moving beyond the sensory case, I explain how analogous reasoning might apply to other mental faculties where phenomenal qualities seem causally involved: notably, emotions and mental imagery. (shrink)

As earthquakes expose geological faults, so mental conflict reveals tendencies to rupture within the mind. Dissension is rife not only between people but also within them, for each of us is subject to a contrariety of desires, beliefs, motivations, aspirations. What image are we to form of ourselves that might best enable us to accept the reality of discord, or achieve the ideal of harmony? Greek philosophers offer us a variety of pictures and structures intended to capture the actual (...) and the possible either within a reason that fails to be resolute, or within a split soul that houses a play of forces. Reflection upon them alerts us to the elusiveness at once of mental reality, and of the understanding by which we hope to capture and transform it. Studying in turn the treatments of _Mental Conflict_ in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, A.W. Price demonstrates how the arguments of the Greeks are still relevant to philosophical discussion today. (shrink)

The side-effect effect, in which an agent who does not speci␣cally intend an outcome is seen as having brought it about intentionally, is thought to show that moral factors inappropriately bias judgments of intentionality, and to challenge standard mental state models of intentionality judgments. This study used matched vignettes to dissociate a number of moral factors and mental states. Results support the view that mental states, and not moral factors, explain the side-effect effect. However, the critical (...) class='Hi'>mental states appear not to be desires as proposed in standard models, but rather ‘deeper’ evaluative states including values and core evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

Are humans alone in their ability to reminisce about the past and imagine the future? Recent evidence suggests that food-storing birds (scrub jays) have access to information about what they have stored where and when. This has raised the possibility of mental time travel (MTT) in animals and sparked similar research with other species. Here we caution that such data do not provide convincing evidence for MTT. Examination of characteristics of human MTT (e.g. non-verbal declaration, generativity, developmental prerequisites) points (...) to other avenues as to how a case for animal MTT could be made. In light of the current lack of evidence, however, we maintain that MTT is a uniquely human characteristic. (shrink)

The paper discusses radical constructivism about episodic memory as developed by Kourken Michaelian under the name of “simulationism”, a view that equates episodic memory with mental time travel. An alternative, direct realist view is defended, which implies disjunctivism about the appearance of remembering. While admitting the importance of mental time travel as an underlying cognitive mechanism in episodic memory, as well as the prima facie reasonableness of the simulationist’s critique of disjunctivism, I formulate three arguments in defense of (...) disjunctivism, which thus appears to be a feasible alternative to radical constructivism. (shrink)

In this article I present a characterization of the right to mental integrity (RMI), expanding and refining the definition proposed by Ienca and Andorno’s (Life Science Society Policy 13 5, 2017) and clarifying how the scope of this right should be shaped in cases of cognitive extension (EXT). In doing so, I will first critically survey the different formulations of the RMI presented in the literature. I will then argue that the RMI protects from i) nonconsensual interferences that ii) (...) bypass reasoning and iii) produce mental harm. Contrary to other definitions proposed in the literature, my formulation disentangles the RMI from the right to cognitive liberty (RCL) (Lavazza in Frontiers Neuroscience 12 82, 2018), the right to mental privacy (RMP) (Lavazza and Giorgi in Neuroethics 16 (1): 1-13, 2023), and the right to psychological continuity (RPC) (Zohny et al. in Neuroethics 16: 20, 2023), thus enabling a fine-grained assessment of their simultaneous or individual violation. Finally, I analyse how the extended mind thesis (EXT) reshapes the scope of the RMI, proposing a layered protection of extended mental integrity, which grants stronger protection to the organism-bound cognitive system and self in case of manipulative influences of the mind-extending device. To conclude, I present a variety of neurorights violations and mental harms inflicted to organism-bound and cognitively extended agents. (shrink)

The Heisenberg-Gabor uncertainty principle defines the limits of information resolution in both time and frequency domains. The limit of resolution discloses unique properties of a time series by frequency decomposition. However, classical methods such as Fourier analysis are limited by spectral leakage, particularly in longitudinal data with shifting periodicity or unequal intervals. Wavelet transformation provides a workable compromise by decomposing the signal in both time and frequency through translation and scaling of a basis function followed by correlation or convolution with (...) the original signal. This study aimed to compare the accuracy of predictive models in mental arithmetic in time and frequency domains. Analysis of the author's response time at mental arithmetic using a soroban was modeled for two periods, an initial period, and a return period both separated by an interval of 370 days. The median response times in seconds was longer for all tasks during the TI compared to the TR period, for addition [CTAdd 62 vs 50 s] and summation [CTSum 68 vs 57 s]. Response times were longer for errors regardless of the study period or task. There was an increasing phase difference for the addition and summation tasks during the TI period toward the end of the series 49.65o compared to the TR period where the phase difference between the two tasks was only 2.05o, indicating that both tasks are likely demonstrating similar learning rates during the latter study period. A comparison between time and time/frequency domain forecasts for an additional 100 tasks demonstrated higher accuracy of the maximum overlap discrete wavelet transform model, where the mean absolute percentage error ranged between 5.48 and 8.19% and that for the time domain models [autoregressive integrated moving average, generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity ] was 6.16–10.80%. (shrink)

We ordinarily think of the mind as private, “inside,” and accessible only to the person whose mind it is, and that the integrity of the mind is threatened by “outside” intervention. The prospect that neurotechnologies could be developed that are able to “read” our brains and directly manipulate our thoughts and feelings is, therefore, alarming to many. Implicit behind this sense of alarm is the view that, unlike other types of manipulation and persuasion that depend for their success on rational (...) autonomy, direct interventions into the brain uniquely undermine this autonomy. According to the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), there is no necessary reason why mental states and processes must be realized by internal neural states. External artifacts can constitute part of a coupled cognitive system if these artifacts play the same functional role as internal states and processes. Interventions into these artifacts could, therefore, be considered direct interventions into the mind. If we alarmed by the threat to mental integrity posed by neurotechnology, then it is likely that we will be aghast at the idea that the mind can extend beyond the brain. For intuitively, extending the mind beyond the brain makes the mind more vulnerable to invasion. This paper argues that this fear may be misplaced. Specifically, the paper argues: (i) the most relevant processes to mental integrity are conscious, personal-level processes, (ii) the types of processes that can be extended according to the most influential account of EMT are unconscious, non-occurrent, and subpersonal processes, therefore (iii) the threat posed to mental integrity by neurotechnology if EMT is adopted may be quite modest. (shrink)

In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health phenomena denoted by multiple concepts (...) of mental health. Analysis and illumination of mental health may still be possible, but there isn’t a single phenomenon or concept to be analysed in addressing the question of what mental health is. The question of pluralism has been overlooked in the philosophy of mental health. The discussion to follow is an attempt to get us to take mental health pluralism seriously. To that end, in this essay I have three primary goals: (1) to give a precise account of what mental health pluralism is, (2) to show that the question of pluralism should not be neglected in debate about what mental health is, and (3) to argue for mental health pluralism. I also draw out some implications of this discussion for philosophy, science, and psychotherapy. (shrink)

As was previously known, pediatric medical staff in China faced several hurdles including high occupational risk, multiple contradictions, heavy workload, and long working hours. After the outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus, facing the overload of work and the potential risk of infection, pediatric medical workers may be under great psychological pressure. The purpose of this article was to call attention to the impact of the epidemic on the mental health of Chinese pediatric workers, and developing psychological intervention program that (...) are tailored to them. The experiences from this public health emergency should inform the efficiency and quality of future crisis intervention of the Chinese government and authorities around the world. (shrink)

Whether psychopathy is a mental disease or illness can affect whether psychiatrists should treat it and whether it could serve as the basis for an insanity defense in criminal trials. Our understanding of psychopathy has been greatly improved in recent years by new research in psychology and neuroscience. This illuminating research enables us to argue that psychopathy counts as a mental disease on any plausible account of mental disease. In particular, Szasz's and Pickard's eliminativist views and Sedgwick's (...) social constructivist account of mental illness that might exclude psychopathy are not plausible, and there is no reason to exclude psychopathy under Boorse's and Scadding's biomedical accounts, Wakefield's harmful dysfunction account, and the DSM-IV-TR objective harm account of mental disease. The basic reason is that psychopathy involve neural dysfunction that increases risk of serious harm and loss to people with psychopathy. (shrink)

According to L.A. Paul, undergoing an experience is transformative if we learn something we cannot learn without having the experience and if it substantially changes our point of view. While the implications of transformative experiences have primarily been discussed in the context of rational choice, their underlying concept has also proven fruitful in the context of unchosen occurrences. The present paper examines mental disorder and its treatment from a transformative experiential perspective, using major depressive disorder as an exemplary case. (...) It shows that developing a mental disorder typically requires a transformative experience since the two popular mental disorder classification systems primarily classify such disorders on an experiential basis. This provides an explanation for the lack of understanding mentally disordered people often face: their experiential state is epistemically inaccessible for those who have not experienced a similar state before. Furthermore, successful treatment of mental disorder again requires a (personally) transformative experience that results in the disorder’s overcoming. The paper examines pharmacological, psychological, and psychedelic-assisted treatment and reveals that each of them uses a different transformative route to recovery: a finding relevant, for example, to ongoing debates in medical ethics about informed consent. (shrink)

Patients who are subject to compulsory care constitute a substantial proportion of the work-load of mental health professionals, particularly psychiatric nurses. This article examines the traditional ‘beneficence-autonomy’ approach to ethics in compulsory psychiatric care and evaluates it against the reality of daily practice. Risk to the public has always been an important but often unacknowledged consideration. Inequalities exist among ethnic and socio-economic groups and there is a lack of agreement on what constitutes mental disorder. Two major changes in (...) compulsory psychiatric care - community orders and care for patients with untreatable severe personality disorders - further challenge the traditional ethical approach. There are also important human rights implications. The simple patient-health professional relationship no longer provides an adequate framework for mental health professionals on which to base their ethical decisions. The public and organizations may have different perspectives and their interests are becoming increasingly important. Mental health professionals, particularly psychiatric nurses, may face ethical dilemmas because of these different perspectives. (shrink)

There has been a lot of discussion about how the cognitive penetrability of perception may or may not have important implications for understanding perceptual justification. The aim of this paper is to argue that a different set of findings in perceptual psychology poses an even more serious challenge to the very idea of perceptual justification. These findings are about the importance of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality (such as amodal completion (...) and multimodal completion). I argue that these findings show that everyday perception is in fact a mixture of sensory stimulation-driven perceptual processing and perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality and we have strong reasons to doubt the epistemic pedigree of the latter process. The implication of this is not that we should become skeptics or deny the possibility of perceptual justification. It is, rather, that the only way in which we can understand when and whether a perceptual state justifies beliefs is by paying close attention to empirical facts about the reliability of perceptual processing that is not driven by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. In this sense (a very narrow sense) epistemology needs to be naturalized. (shrink)

The relationship between social justice and criminal justice gives rise to a range of important ethical questions. The purpose of this paper is to consider an influential argument within this field: namely, the responsibility-based argument for social adversity mitigation. According to this argument, offenders with a ‘rotten social background’ should be given a sentence mitigation because they have less-developed mental capacities than offenders who have not experienced deep social deprivation. However, it is argued, first, that even if the empirical (...) assumptions of this argument are correct, the conclusion is nevertheless premature. Second, it is shown that both the relations between diminished capacities and reduced responsibility, and between reduced responsibility and sentence mitigation give rise to several theoretical challenges. Finally, it is considered whether these challenges can be held to arise from an overambitious view of what should be expected from a penal ethical theory or from a failure to draw on proper standardizations in this sort of theorizing. It is concluded that it constitutes a highly complicated task to underpin the inference from diminished capacities to reduced sentences of socially deprived offenders. (shrink)

Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion, contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has independent justification, because (...) it is also needed to solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts of mental causation and is defended against objections. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. (...) class='Hi'>Mental strength has been largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

The most serious ethical challenge facing multinational corporations in the next century is their exportation of the mental model of Western-style capitalism. This model promises that industrialized free enterprise in a free trade global economy, where businesses and entrepreneurs can pursue their interests competitively without undue regulations or labor restrictions, will produce growth and well-being, i.e., economic good, in every country or community where this phenomenon is allowed to operate. This paper points to some limitations to this model and (...) illustrates how multinational corporations might meet this challenge. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, (...) mental and bodily actions appear to have a significantly different structure. A careful analysis of the role of normative requirements, distinguishing them from instrumental reasons, allows the distinction between mental and bodily forms of action to be clarified. Two kinds of motives must be present for a mental act to develop. The first kind is instrumental: a mental act is performed because of some basic informational need, such as the need to "remember the name of that play". The second kind is normative: given the specific type of mental action performed, there is a specific epistemic norm relevant to that act. These two motives actually correspond to different phases of a single mental act. The first motivates the mental act, i.e. makes salient the corresponding goal. The second offers an evaluation of the feasibility of the act, on the basis of its constitutive normative requirement. Conceived in this way, a characterization of mental acts avoids the three difficulties mentioned above. The possibility of pre-specifying the outcome of epistemic mental acts is blocked by the fact that such acts are constituted by strict normative requirements. That mental acts include receptive features is shown to be a necessary architectural constraint for mental agents to be sensitive to epistemic requirements. Finally, the phenomenology of intending is shown to be absent in most mental acts; the motivational structure of mental acts is, rather, associated with error- signals and self-directed doubtings. Mental acts need to be recognized as a natural kind of action meant to normatively control and enhance cognitive efficiency according to current processing needs. (shrink)

Although employed throughout health-related rhetoric and research today, prevention it is an ambiguous and complicated category when applied to mental and behavioral health. It is analyzed here, along with four ethical issues arising when public health preventative methods and goals involve mental health: age of intervention; resource priorities between prevention and treatment; substantive issues in preventive pedagogies and trade-offs framed by differences of approach. Illustrations include some of the most widespread and ambitious recent preventive models: those aiming to (...) avert subsequent mood disorders of depression and anxiety; those that would curb self-harming behavior, and efforts to anticipate and avoid or delay psychosis. To suppose that public mental health can be entirely modeled on other public health programs is mistaken. Instead, it must proceed with awareness of the particular features typifying many mental disorders. These include features of the disorders themselves; the preliminary nature of scientific knowledge about them; the contested applicability of traditional disease models to them; the dearth of established research data available about preventive interventions currently in place or proposed; and the effects of stigma and discrimination on any such interventions. (shrink)

Background Coercion can cause harm to both the patient and the patient’s family. Few studies have examined how the coercive treatment of a close relative might affect young next-of-kin. Research questions We aimed to investigate the views and experiences of health professionals being responsible for supporting young next-of-kin to patients in mental health care (children-responsible staff) in relation to the needs of these young next-of-kin in coercive situations and to identify ethical challenges. Research design We conducted a qualitative study (...) based on semistructured, focus group interviews and an individual interview. Participants and research context We held three focus group interviews with six to seven children-responsible staff in each group (a total of 20 participants) and one individual interview with a family therapist. The participants were recruited from three hospital trusts in the eastern part of Norway. Ethical considerations The study was approved by the National Data Protection Official for Research and based on informed consent and confidentiality. Findings Coercion was not a theme among the participants in relation to their work with young next-of-kin, and there was much uncertainty related to whether these young people need special support to deal with the coercive treatment of their close relative. Despite the uncertainty, the study indicated a need for more information and emotional support among the youth. Discussion Few studies have addressed the potential impact of coercive treatment of a close family member on young next-of-kin. The findings were consistent with existing research but highlighted disagreement and uncertainty among the children-responsible staff about to what extent the young next-of-kin should visit and whether they should enter the ward unit or not. We identified ethical challenges for the children-responsible staff related to the principle of not inflicting harm ( nonmaleficence). Conclusion From the perspective of children-responsible staff, it appears that the coercive treatment of a close family member entails a need for extra support of young relatives both in relation to information and the facilitation of visits, but more systematic knowledge about these issues is needed. (shrink)

In physics, we use the same laws to explain why airplanes fly, and why they crash. In psychiatry, we use one set of laws to explain sane behaviour, which we attribute to reasons (choices), and another set of laws to explain insane behaviour, which we attribute to causes (diseases). God, man's idea of moral perfection, judges human deeds without distinguishing between sane persons responsible for their behaviour and insane persons deserving to be excused for their evil deeds. It is hubris (...) to pretend that the insanity defence is compassionate, just, or scientific. Mental illness is to psychiatry as phlogiston was to chemistry. Establishing chemistry as a science of the nature of matter required the recognition of the non-existence of phlogiston. Establishing psychiatry as a science of the nature of human behaviour requires the recognition of the non-existence of mental illness. (shrink)

E.J. Lowe has recently proposed a model of mental causation on which mental events are emergent, thus exerting a novel, downward causal influence on physical events. Yet on Lowe's model, mental causation is at the same time empirically undetectable, and in this sense is "invisible". Lowe's model is ingenious, but I don't think emergentists should welcome it, for it seems to me that a primary virtue of emergentism is its bold empirical prediction about the long-term results of (...) human physiology. Here I'll try to restore emergentism's empirical status, but my broader aim is to use Lowe's model to explore some central topics in the mental causation debate, including the "causal closure" of the physical world and the nature of causal powers. (shrink)