The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 9, Page 31-33, September 2011.

The commercial introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has revealed a broad range of views among scientists and other stakeholders on perspectives of genetic engineering (GE) and if and how GMOs should be regulated. Within this controversy, the precautionary principle has become a contentious issue with high support from skeptical groups but resisted by GMO advocates. How to handle lack of scientific understanding and scientific disagreement are core issues within these debates. This article examines some of the key issues (...) affecting precaution as a legal standard and as an approach to the use of science in decision-making processes. It is pointed out that there is a need for reflection over the level of scientific evidence required for applying the precautionary principle as well as who should have the burden of proof when there are uncertainties. Further, an awareness of the broader scientific uncertainties found in GMO risk assessment implies that a precautionary approach must be elaborated: both for acknowledging uncertainties and for identification of scientific responses. Since precaution is an important issue within the sustainable development framework, it is suggested that sustainability can provide a normative standard that can help to reveal the influence and negotiate the importance of the various forms of uncertainty. Wise management of uncertainties and inclusion of normative aspects in risk assessment and management may help to ensure sustainable and socially robust GMO innovations at present and in the future. (shrink)

The literature on the impact of urban form design on travel behavior reveals mixed results. Instead of interpreting this finding as an insufficient basis for warranting action, this article suggests that a precautionary approach be introduced. This approach should be based on two interdependent modes of knowing and doing to establish and evolve design exemplars in conjunction with discipline-based analytical exemplars. Even if trends, including the digitization of human life and society, peak oil and climate change turn (...) out to have smaller negative effects than is currently anticipated, we will be ahead with more livable and sustainable urban forms. (shrink)

The introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops and foods into Europe has generated considerable controversy. Despite a risk assessment system that is intended to beprecautionary in nature, the decisions thathave been taken have not gathered publicconfidence. Key attributes of a precautionaryappraisal system include humility,completeness, assessing benefits andjustifications, making comparisons, allowingfor public participation, transparency,diversity, and the ``mapping'' of alternativeviews rather than the prescription of singlesolutions. A comparison of the European GMregulatory system with a different (moreprecautionary) approach using a ``multi-criteriamapping'' technique (...) reveals a number ofproblems. These include the narrow framing ofthe established risk assessment system (therebyexcluding many issues of public concern), alack of public involvement in the process, anda failure to include appropriate comparisons ora diversity of options. Recent changes to theEuropean regulatory system only go part of theway to addressing these issues. Furthercontroversy may therefore be expected. However,practical ways of undertaking a morebroad-based precautionary approach are nowavailable (including the multi-criteria mappingmethod). These new approaches to technologyassessment offer a means for decision making toearn greater public confidence in this complexand difficult area. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic presents unprecedented challenges to public health decision-making. Specifically, the lack of evidence and the urgency with which a response is called for, raise the ethical challenge of assessing how much (and what kind of) evidence is required for the justification of interventions in response to the various threats we face. Here we discuss the intervention of introducing technology that aims to trace and alert contacts of infected persons—contact tracing (CT) technology. Determining whether such an intervention is proportional (...) is complicated by complex trade-offs and feedback loops. We suggest that the resulting uncertainties necessitate a precautionary approach. On the one hand, precautionary reasons support CT technology as a means to contribute to the prevention of harms caused by alternative interventions, or COVID-19 itself. On the other hand, however, both the extent to which such technology itself present risks of serious harm, as well as its effectiveness, remain unclear. We therefore argue that a precautionary approach should put reversibility of CT technology at the forefront. We outline several practical implications. (shrink)

My paper builds on the conceptual tools from three interrelated philosophical debates that—as I believe—may help structure important if chaotic discussions about surrogates for living human brains and resolve some practical issues related to regulatory matters. In particular, I refer to the discussions about the “moral precautionary principle” in research ethics (Koplin and Wilkinson 2019); about normative uncertainty in ethics (MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020), and about the inductive risk problem for animal welfare scientists (Birch 2018). I elucidate upon (...) the possible meanings of the phrase “a too good human brain surrogate” used by Henry T. Greely (2021), and I demonstrate that the evaluation of the practical and regulatory implications of the “goodness” of such surrogates created for research purposes should be sensitive to the possible consequences of two types of errors: the under-attribution and over-attribution of moral status to such beings. Many authors writing about this topic (including Greely 2021, but see also, e.g., Koplin and Savulescu 2019) concentrate only on the first type of error, neglecting the negative consequences of the second type, i.e., over-attribution. (shrink)

As COVID-19 emerged as a phenomenon of the total environment, and despite the intertwined and complex relationships that make humanity an organic part of the Bio- and Geospheres, the majority of our responses to it have been corrective in character, with few or no consideration for unintended consequences which bring about further vulnerability to unanticipated global events. Tackling COVID-19 entails a systemic and precautionary approach to human-nature relations, which we frame as regaining diversity in the Geo-, Bio-, and (...) Anthropospheres. Its implementation requires nothing short of an overhaul in the way we interact with and build knowledge from natural and social environments. Hence, we discuss the urgency of shifting from current to precautionary approaches to COVID-19 and look, through the lens of diversity, at the anticipated benefits in four systems crucially affecting and affected by the pandemic: health, land, knowledge and innovation. Our reflections offer a glimpse of the sort of changes needed, from pursuing planetary health and creating more harmonious forms of land use to providing a multi-level platform for other ways of knowing/understanding and turning innovation into a source of global public goods. These exemplary initiatives introduce and solidify systemic thinking in policymaking and move priorities from reaction-based strategies to precautionary frameworks. (shrink)

Nanoparticles have multifaceted advantages in drug administration as vaccine delivery and hence hold promises for improving protection of farmed fish against diseases caused by pathogens. However, there are concerns that the benefits associated with distribution of nanoparticles may also be accompanied with risks to the environment and health. The complexity of the natural and social systems involved implies that the information acquired in quantified risk assessments may be inadequate for evidence-based decisions. One controversial strategy for dealing with this kind of (...) uncertainty is the precautionary principle. A few years ago, an UNESCO expert group suggested a new approach for implementation of the principle. Here we compare the UNESCO principle with earlier versions and explore the advantages and disadvantages by employing the UNESCO version to the use of PLGA nanoparticles for delivery of vaccines in aquaculture. Finally, we discuss whether a combined scientific and ethical analysis that involves the concept of responsibility will enable approaches that can provide a supplement to the precautionary principle as basis for decision-making in areas of scientific uncertainty, such as the application of nanoparticles in the vaccination of farmed fish. (shrink)

Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have been widely criticized for being too delayed and indecisive. As a result, the precautionary principle has been endorsed, applauded, and proposed to guide future responses to global public health emergencies. Drawing from controversial issues in response to COVID-19, especially in Vietnam, this paper critically discusses some key ethical and legal issues of employing the precautionary principle in public health emergencies. Engaging with discussions concerning this principle, especially in environmental law where the (...) class='Hi'>precautionary principle first appeared as a guiding principle with objective content(s), this paper formulates the precautionary principle as ‘in dubio pro salus’, which is about advising, justifying and demanding states to proactively prepare for scenarios arising out of any public health emergency. It distinguishes the precautionary principle into moderate and hard versions. A moderate version largely takes a holistic approach and fulfils a series of criteria specified in this paper, while a hard version either permits restrictive measures to be deployed primarily on a hypothetic basis or expresses an instrumental mentality. The hard version should be rejected because of the ethical and legal problems it raises, including risk-risk tradeoffs, internal paradoxes, unjustified causing of fear and unreasonable presupposition. Ultimately, this paper defends the moderate version. (shrink)

Consideration of society’s response to climate change is complex; with emergent deliberations over how we should balance present-day costs of achieving emissions reduction in the short-run against...

The precautionary principle (PP) aims to anticipate and minimize potentially serious or irreversible risks under conditions of scientific uncertainty. Thus it preserves the potential for future developments. It has been incorporated into many international treaties and pieces of national legislation for environmental protection and sustainable development. In this article, we outline an interpretation of the PP as a framework of orientation for a sustainable information society. Since the risks induced by future information and communication technologies (ICT) are social risks (...) for the most part, we propose to extend the PP from mainly environmental to social subjects of protection. From an ethical point of view, the PP and sustainability share the principle of intergenerational justice, which can be used as an argument to preserve free space for the decisions of future generations. Applied to technical innovation and to ICT issues in particular, the extended PP can serve as a framework of orientation to avoid socio-economically irreversible developments. We conclude that the PP is a useful approach for: (i) policy makers to reconcile information society and sustainability policies and (ii) ICT companies to formulate sustainability strategies. (shrink)

Innovation in basic science is often a cause for won­der and excitement. Those associated with a new development are quick to point out the anticipated benefits: a cure for cancer or dementia, an end to unsafe water or hunger. These advocates are slower to draw at­tention to the possible costs, which may become known only much later. It is always hard to have an accurate overview, as it is almost impossible to predict the total effects of the widespread adoption of (...) any new technology and, especially, its longer‐term or cumulative effects, as as­bestos and CFCs demonstrate. For this reason, some policy‐makers or members of the public hope that we can apply “the precautionary principle” to innovation. Unfortunately, if one is looking for a principle that can guide action, then, strictly speaking, there is no pre­cautionary principle. One might better speak of a “pre­cautionary approach,” although even this needs to be unpacked. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has been widely discussed in the academic, legal, and policy arenas. This paper argues, however, that there is no single precautionary principle and we should stop referring to ?the? precautionary principle. Instead, we should talk about ?precaution? and ?precautionary approaches? more generally and identify and defend distinct precautionary principles of limited scope. Drawing on the vast literature on ?the? precautionary principle, this paper further argues that the challenges of decision making under (...) conditions of uncertainty necessitate taking a precautionary approach to decision making that will enable us to understand what particular precautionary principles require of us on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The precautionary principle is a useful strategy for decision-making when physicians and patients lack evidence relating to the potential outcomes associated with various choices. According to a version of the principle defended here, one should take reasonable measures to avoid threats that are serious and plausible. The reasonableness of a response to a threat depends on several factors, including benefit vs. harm, realism, proportionality, and consistency. Since a concept of reasonableness plays an essential role in applying the precautionary (...) principle, this principle gives physicians and patients a decision-making strategy that encourages the careful weighing and balancing of different values that one finds in humanistic approaches to clinical reasoning. Properly understood, the principle presents a worthwhile alternative to approaches to clinical reasoning that apply expected utility theory to decision problems. (shrink)

The precautionary principle is an emerging principle of international law but has only recently been proposed in North America as a new basis for environmental policy. On the surface it is a simple, common-sense proposition: in the face of possible harm, exercise precaution. But the enthusiasm the principle has stirred among public advocates suggests it has a deeper appeal. It is, in fact, based on values related to “forecaring for life” and the natural world. The principle cannot effectively be (...) invoked without stating these values up front. The principle makes it clear that decisions and developments in science and technology are based first of all on values and only secondarily on scientific and technological fact and process. Moreover, a precautionary approach is best carried out in the context of goals that embody the values of communities and societies. (shrink)

Two interpretations of the precautionary principle are considered. According to the normative interpretation, the precautionary principle should be characterised in terms of what it urges doctors and other decision makers to do. According to the epistemic interpretation, the precautionary principle should be characterised in terms of what it urges us to believe. This paper recommends against the use of the precautionary principle as a decision rule in medical decision making, based on an impossibility theorem presented in (...) Peterson . However, the main point of the paper is an argument to the effect that decision theoretical problems associated with the precautionary principle can be overcome by paying greater attention to its epistemic dimension. Three epistemic principles inherent in a precautionary approach to medical risk analysis are characterised and defended. (shrink)

Surgical innovation involves practices, such as new devices, technologies, procedures, or applications, which are novel and untested. Although innovative practices are believed to offer an improvement on the standard surgical approach, they may prove to be inefficacious or even dangerous. This article considers how surgeons considering innovation should reason in the conditions of uncertainty that characterize innovative surgery. What attitude to the unknown risks of innovative surgery should they take? The answer to this question involves value judgments about the (...) acceptability of risk taking when satisfactory scientific information is not available. This question has been confronted in legal contexts, where risk aversion in the form of the precautionary principle has become increasingly influential as a regulatory response to innovative technologies that pose uncertain future hazards. This article considers whether it is appropriate to apply a precautionary approach when making decisions about innovative surgery. (shrink)

The novel coronavirus has not only brought along disruptions to daily socio-economic activities, but sickness and deaths due to its high contagion. With no widely acceptable pharmaceutical cure, the best form of prevention may be precautionary measures which will guide against infections and curb the spread of the disease. This study explored the relationship between COVID-19 knowledge, risk perception, and precautionary behavior among Nigerians. The study also sought to determine whether this relationship differed for men and women. A (...) web-based cross-sectional design approach was used to recruit 1,554 participants from all geopolitical zones in Nigeria, through social media platforms using a snowball sampling technique. Participants responded to web-based survey forms comprising demographic questions and adapted versions of the Ebola knowledge scale, SARS risk perception scale, and precautionary behavior scale. Moderated mediation analysis of the data showed that risk perception mediated the association between COVID-19 knowledge and precautionary behavior and this indirect effect was in turn moderated by gender. Results indicate that having adequate knowledge of COVID-19 was linked to higher involvement in precautionary behavior through risk perception for females but not for males. It was also noted that awareness campaigns and psychological intervention strategies on COVID-19 related activities may be particularly important for males more than females. Drawing from the health belief model, we recommend that COVID-19 awareness campaigns should target raising more awareness of the risks associated with the infection to make individuals engage more in precautionary behaviors. (shrink)

In their recent article, Koplin, Gyngell and Savulescu (2019) assess the viability of the precautionary principle as a decision-making tool to determine whether and under what circumstances germline gene editing should proceed. While their survey of different forms of the precautionary principle is illuminating, the most novel contribution is a new account of the precautionary principle, what they dub the Sufficientarian Precautionary Principle (SPP). SPP is meant to avoid several problems with existing accounts, while comporting with (...) at least some of the intuitive force behind the general idea of the precautionary principle. However, as it is only one subsection of a larger paper, SPP is not fully worked out. In this brief response, I will flesh out some problems with SPP as a decision-making tool – particularly that there is a lack of adequate normative justification for adopting it. While this does not constitute a decisive refutation of the approach, SPP needs considerable refinement and clarification before it can be considered viable for use in decision-making. (shrink)

Environmentalists have advocated the Precautionary Principle (PP) to help guide public and private decisions about the environment. By contrast, industry and its spokesmen have opposed this. There is not one principle, but many that have been recommended for this purpose. Despite the attractiveness of a core idea in all versions of the principle—that decision-makers should take some precautionary steps to ensure that threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment and public health do not materialize into harm—even (...) one of the most widely endorsed principles needs considerable specification and refinement before it can be used. Moreover, the PP is an approach or guide to utilizing scientific evidence in social or legal decision-making contexts. In this it does not differ in kind from other approaches to using factual information such as in the law. The law provides some models for different strategies to guide decision-making under uncertainty when factual issues cannot be resolved with certainty. These in turn can help guide the formulation of different versions of PP and help clarify some presuppositions of the principle. Once some plausible versions of PP are articulated, I suggest some applications to existing environmental problems. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle (...) is explicated with the help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action. (shrink)

This paper argues that a precautionary approach to scientific progress of the sort advocated by Walter Glannon with respect to life-extending therapies involves both incoherence and irresolvable paradox. This paper demonstrates the incoherence of the precautionary approach in many circumstances and argues that with respect to life-extending therapies we have at present no persuasive reasons for a moratorium on such research.

This article probes the advisability of regulating U.S. food and drug safety according to the precautionary principle. To do so, a precautionary regulatory regime is formulated on the basis of the beliefs that motivate most proponents of this initiative. That hypothetical regime is critically analyzed on the basis of an actual instantiation of a similarly stylized initiative. It will be argued that the precautionary principle entails regulatory constraints that are apt to violate basis tenets of political legitimacy. (...) The modifications that would change this finding would also change precautionary regulation to the point that it would be indistinguishable from orthodox safety protocols. It is concluded on the basis of its impoverished content that the precautionary principle should not be taken seriously as a formal approach to the regulation of U.S. food and drug safety. (shrink)

Should we allocate costly health care to patients diagnosed with disorders of consciousness (DoC), such as patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state or minimally conscious state? Peterson, Aas, and Wasserman (2021) argue that we should in their paper “What justifies the allocation of health care resources to patients with disorders of consciousness?” Their key insight is that the expected benefits to this patient population helps to justify such allocations. However, their insight is attached to a consequentialist framework aimed (...) at maximizing aggregate social welfare. An alleged virtue of their framework over Braddock’s (2017) approach is their agnosticism about the moral status and rights of DoC patients. In this commentary, however, we argue that their agnosticism is the biggest problem with their approach: failing to treat DoC patients as persons with rights runs the moral risk of violating their rights, which is more serious than the risk of failing to maximize social utility. A better approach that reduces moral risk would incorporate Braddock’s (2017) precautionary presumption of personhood. We should stand in solidarity with DoC patients and treat them as persons with dignity and rights. (shrink)

Present laws and regulations even in democratic countries are not sufficient to prevent the grave environmental threats we face. Further, even environmental ethics, when they remain anthropocentric cannot propose a better approach. I argue that, taking in considerations the precautionary principle, and adopting the perspective of post-normal science, the ethics of integrity suggest a better way to reduce ecological threats and promote the human good globally.

The bioethical literature demonstrates both substantive contest over the moral status of entities such as human embryos, and approaches that aim to find morally sound prescriptions in light of fundamental disagreement and uncertainty about identification of their moral status. Amongst such latter approaches, we find Shaun Pattinson's moral precautionary thesis, for which he provides a renewed defence in his recent book Law at the Frontiers of Biomedicine. Pattinson's overarching moral theory centres on the rights of moral agents. In relation (...) to the question of that theory's application, the moral precautionary thesis addresses how, and with what degree of certainty, one moral agent may identify or recognise another. Pattinson roots his precautionary thesis in the problem of other minds. In this article, I argue that that is a mistaken starting point when held against the consequent epistemic claims that Pattinson makes. Furthermore, in examining Pattinson's reasoning, including against earlier objections that have been levelled, I argue that he generates additional problems for accepting the cogency of his thesis. (shrink)

The precautionary principle (PP) is fundamentally a claim that acting to avoid and/or mitigate threats of serious harm should be accorded high priority in public policy. Over the last three decades, governments and international bodies have endorsed it in principle, and some of them have incorporated it into some areas of policy practice. Yet, PP is controversial in policy circles, public discussion and scholarly discourse. Here the PP literature is reviewed from the perspective of economics, where the tendency is (...) to see theory and methods for rational decision-making under risk and uncertainty as well-established and risk management tools as well developed, and to view the PP with some circumspection. Following a brief introduction to PP concepts, history, applications, and controversies, I review and critique the standard economic approach to decision-making and risk management (here labeled ordinary risk management, ORM), identifying areas of incompleteness especially in the treatment of disproportionate and asymmetric threats. After reviewing some of the more prominent PP controversies in the scholarly literature, I suggest a conceptual framework for a PP that may withstand the major criticisms levied against the PP and make a unique and valid contribution to a decision and risk management arsenal that includes ORM. The framework relates the nature of the threat, the evidence, and the remedy indicated; and each of these elements is discussed in some detail. The scope of this PP is identified in general terms and distinguished from the quantity restrictions and regulatory safety margins that often serve as practical heuristics when ORM-based policies are implemented. Because the PP is clearly identified as a principle, I discuss the role of principles in policy design and implementation, and conclude with some suggestions as to how this PP could guide policy and management. (shrink)

Commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have sparked profound controversies concerning adequate approaches to risk regulation. Scientific uncertainty and ambiguity, omitted research areas, and lack of basic knowledge crucial to risk assessmentshave become apparent. The objective of this article is to discuss the policy and practical implementation of the Precautionary Principle. A major conclusion is that the void in scientific understanding concerning risks posed by secondary effects and the complexity ofcause-effect relations warrant further research. Initiatives to approach the (...) acceptance or rejection of a number of risk-associated hypotheses is badly needed. Further, since scientific advice plays a key role in GMOregulations, scientists have a responsibility to address and communicate uncertainty to policy makers and the public. Hence, the acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension. (shrink)

From over 2000 years ago the ideal expressed in the Hippocratic Oath has encouraged doctors never knowingly to do harm: primum non nocere. Over 25 years ago the management writer Peter Drucker proposed it as the basis of a management ethic, ‘the right rule for the ethics managers need, the ethics of responsibility’.1 He argued then that the rule had wide scope encompassing for instance executive compensation, management rhetoric and the management of business impacts. In 2000 the United Nations Global (...) Compact embodied a Principle 7 enjoining ‘a precautionary approach to environmental challenges’ as defined in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. But what can such precautionary injunctions mean in practice? And what of conflicts with other values? Robin Attfield lays out the key questions he argues need to be asked about the Precautionary Principle if it is to be taken seriously and acted upon soundly. His focus is on the management of vulnerable resources — specifically planetary ecosystems — with whose management knowingly or otherwise we are all concerned. (shrink)

Confronted with the possibility of severe environmental harms, such as catastrophic climate change, some researchers have suggested that we should abandon the principle at the heart of standard decision theory—the injunction to maximize expected utility—and embrace a different one: the Precautionary Principle. Arguably, the most sophisticated philosophical treatment of the Precautionary Principle is due to Steel. Steel interprets PP as a qualitative decision rule and appears to conclude that a quantitative decision-theoretic statement of PP is both impossible and (...) unnecessary. In this article, we propose a decision-theoretic formulation of PP in terms of lexical utilities. We show that this lexical model is largely faithful to Steel’s approach, but also that it corrects three problems with Steel’s account and clarifies the relationship between PP and standard decision theory. Using a range of examples, we illustrate how the lexical model can be used to explore a variety of issues related to precautionary reasoning. (shrink)

In some applications to human beings, the precautionary principle seems to raise specific ethical concerns. For instance, it has been used by a business owner in a court of justice to justify his refusal to hire applicants with a certain geographical origin for safety reasons. Or in public management, the precautionary principle has been used to exclude men who have sexual relations with men from donating blood on the basis of a higher HIV prevalence in this group. Does (...) not the precautionary principle here amount to justifying a form of discrimination? To help analyze what is at stake from a decision-theoretic viewpoint and to consider the possibility of ethical catastrophes, we offer a lexical utility model of the precautionary principle, which generalizes a previous model by Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199:8701–8740, 2021), Steel and Bartha (Risk Anal https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13892, 2022). Traditional expected utility theory also comes out as a special case of the model. Our proposal opens new perspectives for considering ethical dilemmas within a precautionary approach. It is intended to serve as a guiding tool for management teams in socially responsible companies, public institutions, and government agencies. (shrink)

The attempts to mitigate the unprecedented health, economic, and social disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are largely dependent on establishing compliance to behavioral guidelines and rules that reduce the risk of infection. Here, by conducting an online survey that tested participants’ knowledge about the disease and measured demographic, attitudinal, and cognitive variables, we identify predictors of self-reported social distancing and hygiene behavior. To investigate the cognitive processes underlying health-prevention behavior in the pandemic, we co-opted the dual-process model of thinking (...) to measure participants’ propensities for automatic and intuitive thinking vs. controlled and reflective thinking. Self-reports of 17 precautionary behaviors, including regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing a face mask, served as a dependent measure. The results of hierarchical regressions showed that age, risk-taking propensity, and concern about the pandemic predicted adoption of precautionary behavior. Variance in cognitive processes also predicted precautionary behavior: participants with higher scores for controlled thinking (measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test) reported less adherence to specific guidelines, as did respondents with a poor understanding of the infection and transmission mechanism of the COVID-19 virus. The predictive power of this model was comparable to an approach (Theory of Planned Behavior) based on attitudes to health behavior. Given these results, we propose the inclusion of measures of cognitive reflection and mental model variables in predictive models of compliance, and future studies of precautionary behavior to establish how cognitive variables are linked with people’s information processing and social norms. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to review critical emancipatory literature to identify a discourse that could be used to successfully customise generic Enterprise Resource Planning systems to particular user‐needs. The customisation exercise is posited in the context of contemporary society, which has to try to become more sustainable amidst uncertainty about the complex interrelationships between elements of the ecosystem. It raises new challenges for the customisation exercise, that of fostering the precautionary ethos and engaging realistically with complexity and (...) uncertainty inherent in emergent knowledge about ecological resilience.Design/methodology/approachThis is a conceptual paper that draws on published research papers to tease out political constructs which are vital for facilitating sustainable decisions.FindingsThis paper argues that the critical emancipatory influence on systems design has generated attempts to formulate socio‐ethical information systems. However, these systems are limited by their inability to engage with the politics of asymmetrical distribution of power, even though these systems rely on bottom‐up participation to change the status quo. Hence, it is suggested that systems design should learn from Gandhi's experiences in mobilising social reform to instil a precautionary ethos in the context of asymmetrical power relations. The discourse used to customise ERP should facilitate social learning about ecological resilience as it affects the capacity to reform in the interest of sustainable outcomes. It is proposed that the discourse be socially constructed on the vocabulary of integrated risk because it would enable management to take advantage of lived experiences and enhance the organisation's capacity to learn about formulating sustainable business practices.Practical implicationsThe recommended approach to identifying user‐needs is based on Gandhi's tried‐and‐tested approaches of mobilising bottom‐up participation in social reform.Originality/valueThis paper brings in Eastern philosophy into the predominately Western‐dominated systems design arena. Its value lies in its practical applicability to real‐world design challenges. (shrink)

What is the relationship between fear, danger, and the law? Cass Sunstein attacks the increasingly influential Precautionary Principle - the idea that regulators should take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal chains are uncertain and even if we do not know that harms are likely to come to fruition. Focusing on such problems as global warming, terrorism, DDT, and genetic engineering, Professor Sunstein argues that the Precautionary Principle is incoherent. Risks exist on all sides of (...) social situations, and precautionary steps create dangers of their own. Diverse cultures focus on very different risks, often because social influences and peer pressures accentuate some fears and reduce others. Instead of adopting the Precautionary Principle, Professor Sunstein argues for three steps: a narrow Anti-Catastrophe Principle, designed for the most serious risks; close attention to costs and benefits; and an approach called 'libertarian paternalism', designed to respect freedom of choice while also moving people in directions that will make their lives go better. He also shows how free societies can protect liberty amidst fears about terrorism and national security. Laws of Fear represents a major statement from one of the most influential political and legal theorists writing today. (shrink)

One of the major problems in the implementation of the precautionary principle in environmental cases is the estimation of the weight of evidence. In this paper we propose a formal method that determines the weight of evidence based on the specific parameters of a given case. The proposed method is based on an artificial intelligence approach called fuzzy logic, which is commonly used as an interface between logic and human perception, and often applied to computer-based complex decision making. (...) We use one fuzzy expert system that provides a quantification of the estimated environmental damage, and a second fuzzy expert system that computes the weight of evidence in a given case. The proposed expert system can be easily defined and adjusted by regulators and environmental science and policy experts. (shrink)

Lately, nanotechnology has become one of the main topics in the debates regarding what has been called the _Next Industrial Revolution_ within what are known as _emergent technologies_. This paper contains a comparative analysis of the different philosophical groundings, arguments and principles invoked in the official ethical approaches proposed by each of two of the main Western communities. By _official ethical approaches_ or _official positions_ we mean the opinions officially expressed by the government institutions about how ethical considerations prompted by (...) nanotechnologies should be tackled. The analysis is based, then, on the official points of view, expressed through two documents, namely two official releases issued by governmental offices or institutions in both communities, Europe and the United States of America, and considered by the authors as representative of the official opinions of the governmental institutions in each society. (shrink)

En este artículo se estudia el enfoque de las capacidades de Martha Nussbaum como un intento de fundamentar la inclusión de los anima les no humanos dentro de la dimensión cívica de los derechos. En esta perspectiva se pretende establecer ciertos «deberes directos de justicia» para los seres sentientes, poseedores de cierta complejidad, que el Estado debe cautelar y procurar como un mínimo exigido. Tras analizar esta propuesta, se desarrollan algunas de las críticas originadas por la «ética animal» defendida por (...) Nussbaum, entre las que se cuentan las de Donaldson, Kymlicka, Smith, Cortina y Schlosberg. This paper describes the capabilities approach Martha Nussbaum as an attempt to justify the inclusion of non-human animals within the civic rights dimension is studied. In this perspective is to establish certain «direct duties of justice» for sentient beings, possessors of some complexity, that the State must seek precautionary and as a minimum requirement. After analyzing this proposal, they develop some of the criticism caused by the «animal ethics» defended by Nussbaum, among which are counted Donaldson, Kymlicka, Smith, Cortina and Schlosberg. (shrink)

The commercialization of transgenic crops has engendered significant resistance from environmental groups and defensive responses from industry. A part of this struggle entails the politicization of science as groups gather evidence from the scholarly literature to defend a supportive or opposing position to transgenic crop commercialization. The authors argue that novel technology development and associated scientific uncertainty have led to two competing approaches to risk management: precaution and ex post trial and error. In this paper we use the controversies over (...) currently commercialized transgenic crops to analyze the debate over these competing approaches. We also suggest a hybrid approach that incorporates a precautionary selection process, but also relies on ex post trial and error after commercialization. This approach is labeled precaution through experience since the development of a technology’s characteristics would ideally take into account previous experience with similar technologies, or rather technologies with similar applications. The authors argue that substantial public participation and dialogue is needed to identify socially desirable crop traits to guide research and development. Policy tools are also recommended that provide incentives to private-sector firms to engineer the identified traits into crops. (shrink)

Environmental risk assessment is often affected by severe uncertainty. The frequently invoked precautionary principle helps to guide risk assessment and decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. In many contexts, however, uncertainties play a role not only in the application of scientific models but also in their development. Building on recent literature in the philosophy of science, this paper argues that precaution should be exercised at the stage when tools for risk assessment are developed as well as when they (...) are used to inform decision-making. The relevance and consequences of this claim are discussed in the context of the threshold of the toxicological concern approach in food toxicology. I conclude that the approach does not meet the standards of an epistemic version of the precautionary principle. (shrink)

The purpose of the present thesis is to apply philosophical methods to the ongoing debate of the precautionary principle, in order to illuminate this debate. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. Paper I con-cerns an objection to the method of conceptual analysis, the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I argue that the Charge from Psychology is misdirected. In Paper II, the method of conceptual analysis is applied to the concept of precaution (...) which is ana-lysed in terms of precautionary actions. The purpose is explicatory. A definition involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the pre-cautionary principle are discussed. Paper III attempts to provide an ana-lytical apparatus which may be used for finding improved formulations of the precautionary principle. The approach is lexicographical. Several exist-ing and possible formulations of the precautionary principle are examined, and four common elements and a common structure of the precautionary principle are identified. It is suggested that the analytical apparatus pre-sented can be used in negotiations of the precautionary principle. Paper IV questions the soundness of some arguments against the precautionary prin-ciple. Five common arguments are discussed and rejected. In Paper V, two of these arguments are further discussed. I argue that an attempt at rejec-tion of the precautionary principle delivered by John Harris and Søren Holm is unwarranted, because their arguments against it are based on in-terpretations of the precautionary principle that ignore context. Paper VI deals with the idea of de minimis risk. After a discussion of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, I examine one way of deter-mining how small a risk ought to be in order to be disregarded, namely the use of natural risk levels as benchmarks. I argue that this approach fails, even if the distinction between what is natural and what is not natural can be upheld. (shrink)

In the face of criticisms about the current generationof agricultural biotechnology products, some proponents ofagricultural biotechnology offer a ``future benefitsargument''''(FBA), which is a utilitarian ethical argument thatattempts to justify continued R&D. This paper analyzes severallogical implications of the FBA. Among these are that acceptanceof the FBA implies (1) acceptance of a precautionary approach torisk, (2) the need for a more proportional and equitabledistribution of the benefits of agricultural biotechnology, andmost important, (3) the need to reorient and restructurebiotechnology R&D (...) institutions (and the agriculturalbiotechnology community''s values and attitudes) so that futurebenefits are indeed achieved through agricultural biotechnology. (shrink)

The precautionary approach has been widely considered reasonable for many issues in environmental policy, including climate change. It has also been recognized, however, that standard formulations of the precautionary principle suffer from many difficulties. An influential strategy to avoid these difficulties is to formulate a narrow version of the principle on the basis of the maximin rule. Rawls proposed that following the maximin rule can be rational under certain conditions. Defenders of this strategy argue that these conditions (...) are approximated when it comes to issues like climate change. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the Rawlsian conditions do not establish the unique rationality of the maximin rule, hence the precautionary principle cannot be defended on its basis. When the Rawlsian conditions are approximated, other principles can also lead to reasonable choices. In particular, a prioritarian principle can capture the precautionary approach and serve a useful role in climate change policy. I develop this proposal in the second part. (shrink)

This paper provides an ethical analysis of the controversy that arose from the CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing research involving human embryos that was conducted by a research team in Guangzhou, China, in 2015. It is argued that the researchers involved did not overstep ethical boundaries. This was confirmed to be the case in an international meeting of experts that was convened following the controversy. It is further argued that the controversy highlights the tension between two fundamentally different policies on developing genome (...) editing technology – one proactionary and the other precautionary. This paper argues for a third approach, based on the policy of “crossing the river by probing stones”. Such an approach is consistent with current international recommendations to prioritise basic and pre-clinical research, and to allow the application of genome editing technology to somatic human cells. However, the application of the technology in germline genetic modification for human reproduction or enhancement for medical purposes should not be allowed at present. This is because the attending risks are not well understood and could be excessive or extraordinary, with little or no prospect of benefit. In addition, this paper calls for norms and regulations to be developed for genetically modifying non-human living things. [End Page 307] Finally, the paper concludes with a letter that was sent by the author to the New York Times, setting out China’s fundamental stance on genetic modification involving humans and human derivatives. (shrink)

I examine the positive and negative features of synthetic biology (‘SynBio’) from a utilitarian ethical perspective. The potential beneficial outcomes from SynBio in the context of medicine are substantial; however it is not presently possible to predict precise outcomes due to the nascent state of the field. Potential negative outcomes from SynBio also exist, including iatrogenesis and bioterrorism; however it is not yet possible to quantify these risks. I argue that the application of a ‘precautionary’ approach to SynBio (...) is ethically fraught, as is the notion that SynBio-associated knowledge ought to be restricted. I conclude that utilitarians ought to support a broadly laissez-faire stance in respect of SynBio. (shrink)

Many commentators fear that climate engineering research might lead policy-makers to reduce mitigation efforts. Most of the literature on this so-called ‘moral hazard’ problem focuses on the prediction that climate engineering research would reduce mitigation efforts. This paper focuses on a related ethical question: Why would it be a bad thing if climate engineering research obstructed mitigation? If climate engineering promises to be effective enough, it might justify some reduction in mitigation. Climate policy portfolios involving sufficiently large or poorly planned (...) reductions in mitigation, however, could lead to an outcome that would be worse than the portfolio that would be chosen in the absence of further climate engineering research. This paper applies three ethical perspectives to describe the kinds of portfolios that would be worse than that ‘baseline portfolio’. The literature on climate engineering identifies various mechanisms that might cause policy-makers to choose these inferior portfolios, but it is difficult to know in advance whether the existence of these mechanisms means that climate engineering research really would lead to a worse outcome. In the light of that uncertainty, a precautionary approach suggests that researchers should take measures to reduce the risk of mitigation obstruction. Several such measures are suggested. (shrink)

Crises such as water quality, pollution, climate change, overfishing, biodiversity, energy, waste, and carbon sequestration mean that legislation protecting the marine environment is under intense pressure to be effective and to demonstrate positive results in a vast array of public and private spheres. Thus far, scholarship of EU marine environmental law has been focused primarily on (i) interaction with international agreements (ii) spatial/jurisdictional studies (iii) analysis of new laws, plans and programmes (iv) principles (e.g. good environmental status, precautionary (...) class='Hi'>approach, polluter pays) (v) CJEU case analysis (vi) enforcement (vii) specific issues (plastics, litter…). However, over the years the mass constituted by the EU marine environment acquis has grown ever-larger, leading to risks of poor coordination, over-regulation in some areas and lack of regulation in others. By triangulating complementary investigatory methodologies, this study teases out systemic, diachronic and legilinguistic interlinkages—within and across key instruments as well as EU institutions, bodies and agencies. Our results provide avenues for policymakers nationally and at EU level to improve the legibility and coherence of marine environmental regulation—to the benefit of citizens and the wider body of stakeholders, and, ultimately, to benefit the marine world. (shrink)

The rule of law offers legal certainty, laying down boundaries to the state's playing field. The precautionary approach stipulates that the absence of scientific certainty is no reason not to act to prevent harm. Here, uncertainty frames action. The precautionary approach potentially expands the state's playing field, and this expansion might well undermine the precepts of the rule of law. The certainty-uncertainty axis exposes a tension between the rule of law and the precautionary approach (...) in what Ulrich Beck has termed the world risk society in second modernity. It is this tension that is the focus of analysis in this article. (shrink)