The paper examines the political ideas of founding figures of West German political science by engaging with formative texts from the post-war period of neo-Aristotelian (Dolf Sternberger and Siegfried Landshut), Critical Theory (Arcadius R.L. Gurland and Franz L. Neumann), ordoliberal (Alexander Rüstow) and catholic (Ferdinand Hermens) perspective. It is argued that these early German political scientists coincided in the diagnosis of living in a thoroughly politicized post-liberal age. They rejected the separation between empirical and normative political science (...) and devised heterogeneous disciplinary approaches that can be classified as republican, power-realist, and expertocratic. Although democracy was an important point of reference for some of them, it is not tenable, contrary to older historiography and contemporary self-image, to describe early West-German political science as a Demokratiewissenschaft (science of democracy) in overall terms. (shrink)

Excerpt from Some Phases in the Development of the Subjective Point of View During the Post-Aristotelian Period, Vol. 3 1. The Difference In Philosophic Standpoint Between Aristotle And St. Augustine In St. Augustine's philosophy the starting-point is the same as in the beginning of modern thought, namely, the certainty of inner experience. Not even the Skeptic, says St. Augustine, can doubt sensation as such; moreover, this very experience reveals not only the content that had formed the basis of (...) relativistic or positivistic interpretations, but also the conscious self, the perceiving subject. For Aristotle and his contemporaries, perception was essentially a cognitive process, apprehending the forms of sensible objects without the matter. Such apprehension of external objects was regarded as direct, the awareness as awareness of the objectively real character of things. A mind as such perceiving was foreign to their modes of thinking; the person, composite of body and soul, thinks and knows, was their view. There is ample evidence that self-consciousness was recognized by Plato in his theories of sensation; and that Aristotle made a psychological analysis of it as a mental phenomenon, though he utterly disregarded it in his metaphysics and epistemology. In the earlier period, therefore, mind was studied in its manifestations in nature and society; with the close of ancient speculation, the investigation was based predominantly on introspection and the analysis of mental operations of the individual thinker. It is accordingly an interesting inquiry how this change of viewpoint was effected and what were the consequent alterations in scientific method. Though such a development cannot be treated in isolation from the social life, the scope of this paper will allow only most general and cursory references to the social, political, and religious influences affecting the philosophic thought of the post-Aristotelian period. 2. Indications Of Interest In Inner Experience During The Pre-Aristotelian Period The Ionian philosophers viewed physical reality as a concrete whole; there was no antagonism between human nature and universal nature in either theory or practice. Heraclitus revolted from the conception of the world established by tradition and the theories of teachers, over against which he set up the claims of reason. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The Protestant reception both of Aristotle and of the concept of natural law have been the object of renewed attention. The present article aims at a cross-fertilization of these two recoveries: did a specifically Aristotelian approach to natural law play a significant role in classical Protestant thought? The article answers this question by means of a review of the Protestant commentaries on Aristotle’s natural law-passage in Nicomachean Ethics V, 7. Reformation and post-Reformation scholars sometimes offered original readings of (...) this text, but above all they cultivated the various approaches to the passage that had been developed during the medieval period. (shrink)

This book develops a conception of student flourishing as the overarching aim of education. Taking as its basis the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, it provides a theoretical study of the foundations of flourishing that goes well beyond Aristotle's approach. Flourishing as the Aim of Education argues that the 'good life' of the student, to which education should contribute, must involve engagement with self-transcendent ideals and ignite awe-filled enchantment. It allows for social, individual and educational variance within the concept (...) of flourishing, and it engages with a host of socio-political as well as 'spiritual' issues that are often overlooked in literature discussing character education. Each chapter closes with food for thought for practitioners who can directly facilitate student flourishing. An outgrowth of the author's previous monograph Aristotelian Character Education, this book follows new directions in questioning how to educate young people towards a life of overall flourishing. It will be of great interest to researchers, academics and post-graduate students in the fields of character education, moral education and moral philosophy, as well as to educators and policy-makers. (shrink)

It is not unusual for Aristotelian scholars to claim that Aristotle does not have a notion of authority. The argument that insurmountable conceptual-historical barriers make it impossible for a Greek thinker to have something even similar to authority is usually put forward to deny the existence of such a concept in Aristotle. This chapter argues that this type of objection often mistakes the existence of a concept for the existence of a single word or expression used to convey such (...) concept and that Aristotle’s texts are no stranger to a discernible concept of political authority. The claim that Aristotle does not have the notion of political authority is often tied in with a misunderstanding of the concept of authority itself. Once we get to the bottom of the concept of authority as employed by contemporary jurisprudence, it is fairly clear that Aristotle does accommodate such notion. Special consideration is given to the bearing of Hobbesian and Lockean accounts of authority upon Aristotle’s politics. (shrink)

This essay – although aware of the contradiction in terms of the concept of conservative theory – tries to pick out some key notions within the conservative political mindset, and offers an analysis of them by relating them to one another. Beside Aristotelian phronesis or practical wisdom, it focuses on kairos, or the right moment for action. It points out that due to the time constraint inherent in the realm of political action, agents need to acquire a kind of (...) tacit, practical knowledge of how to deal with pressing issues, and phronesis is a term which covers this sort of practical ability. The paper then tries to show that individual action is closely connected to communal interests, differentiates between formal and informal forms of communal knowledge and ends up by referring to Oakeshott’s, MacIntyre’s and Tocqueville’s ideas of communal wisdom and practice. (shrink)

Leading philosopher Peg Birmingham explores the relation between political deception, violence, and law in an attempt to renew the concept of the political.

This essay reevaluates the Weimar writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, specifically, their intellectual efforts to replace the political authority of Kantian liberalism with, respectively, a ‘political theology’ and ‘Biblical atheism’ derived from the thought of early-modern state theorists like Hobbes and Spinoza. Schmitt and Strauss each insisted that post-Kantian Enlightenment rationality was unraveling into a way of thinking that violently rejected ‘form’ of any kind, fixated myopically on material things and lacked any conception of the external (...) constraints that invariably condition the possibilities of philosophy, morality and politics. They considered Kantian reason and liberal politics to pose serious threats to ‘genuine’ expressions of rationality and as dangerous obfuscations of the necessity of political order—of the brute fact that human beings stand in need of ‘being ruled,’ as such. (shrink)

The concept of political difference concerns the distinction between politics and the political. The political refers to the ontological making possible of the different domains of society, including the domain of politics in the narrow sense. Political difference was introduced as a reaction to the theoretical controversy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. This reaction took the form of post-foundationalism. According to Marchart, post-foundationalism does not entirely deny the possibility of grounding. It denies only the possibility of an (...) ultimate transcendent foundation insofar as this ontological impossibility makes possible the historical and contingent grounds in plural.The Heideggerian concept of ontological difference also undermines the possibility of an ultimate ontical ground which establishes the presence of all the other beings. If one wants to think beyond the concept of ground, one should obtain a clear understanding of Being as Being, namely one should grasp the Being in its difference from beings. All the same, Heidegger tends to replace the ontical grounds of metaphysics with Being itself as a new kind of ultimate ontological foundation.On the other hand, one can detect in many points of Heideggerian argumentation traces of a second alternative understanding of ontological difference which does not belong in Heidegger’s intentions and which undermines the primordiality of Being. This alternative understanding establishes a reciprocity between Being and beings. In our view, political difference not only is based in this second way of understanding but, at the same time, develops more decisively the mutual interdependence between Being and beings.In political difference the grounding part, namely the political, possesses both a grounding character and a derivative one. Politics and political both grounds and dislocate each other in an incessant and oscillating, historical procedure which undermines any form of completion of the social. (shrink)

자신의 저술에서 민주주의를 옹호하거나 민주주의자를 자처한 적이 전혀 없음에도 불구하고 루소의 정치철학이 현대 민주주의의 정치원칙를 제공했다는데는 아무도 이의를 제기하지 않는다. 그렇다면 그 정치철학의 어떤 요인이 루소를 현대 민주주의 확립에 있어 가장 영향력 있는 사상가로 꼽히게 만드는가? 본고에서 연구자들은 루소 사상과 민주주의 연관성, 그리고 일반의지론에 대한 기존 연구들의 성과와 한계를 살펴본 후, 루소가 제시하는 “정치적 권리의 올바른 원칙”으로서의 “일반의지” 개념이 고전고대의 정치사상, 특히 아리스토텔레스의 『정치학』을 넘어 민주주의 정치철학의 현대적 전회에 어떤 기여를 하였는지 논한다.BR공화주의 관점에서 볼 때 아리스토텔레스와 루소는 연속성을 가졌다고 생각되어 (...) 왔다. 하지만 본 연구자들은 아리스토텔레스의 『정치학』과 루소의 『사회계약론』을 목차별로 비교·분석한 결과, “민주정(民主政)”에 관해 루소는 그 개념, 내용 및 역사적 평가를 아리스토텔레스와 거의 공유했음에도 불구하고, “일반의지”개념을 축으로 하여, 국가통치의 기조를 덕치주의에서 법치주의 또는 입헌주의로, 통치의 인적 기반을 ‘폴리스적 동물’에서, ‘자유롭고 평등한 인간으로서 주권자 시민’으로 혁명적으로 전형(轉形)하여, 태생적·지연적 인연이 아니라, 주권자 시민들이 이성적으로 동의한 정치적 권리에 근거하여 정립한 헌법적 원칙들에 의거하여 공화국 건국과 통치의 프로젝트를 제시했다는 특이점을 밝혀냈다. 바로 이 헌법기반의 공화국이야말로 현대적 국민국가의 정상적 통치모델로 간주되는 입헌민주주의에 다름 아니며, 결과적으로 루소는, ‘주민’ 또는 ‘인민’의 자연적 필요에 따라 자연발생적으로 성립되는 폴리스의 생태를 논한 현대 이전의 전형적 국가통치론으로서 아리스토텔레스적 개념의 정치학에서 벗어나, 자신의 이성적 국가능력을 자각하여 건국의 협약 당사자로 나선 ‘주권자 시민’이 국가 통치의 담당자라는 입론을 바탕으로 탈(脫)아리스토텔레스적 현대 정치학을 정립하였다. (shrink)

This publication reflects the revival of interest in Theophrastus’ minor works during the last decade,. Coutant’s edition of Theophrastus’ treatise on fire is not to be compared with any of these books. The book contains an introduction on random subjects such as the nature of the work, sources of information, Aristotle’s view of fire, vocabulary, important concepts, and the establishment of the Greek text. There is also a Greek text with critical apparatus, an English translation, a fourteen page commentary, as (...) well as a subject index and an index of Greek nouns occurring in the text. (shrink)

In this paper I shall investigate the nature of education as seen from the neoAristotelian perspective. My thesis is that education should be seen as a part of political activity in the source sense of the term, that is, as an element of human development rooted in the idea of the good, which makes this concept at odds with the modern concepts of politics and education. I start with a brief discussion of the classical concept of politics with (...) special attention being paid to the relation between ethics, education and politics. I then address the changes in the philosophical background of this concept of politics introduced in early modernity, in order to indicate the consequences of this process for education as subordinated to an economy-influenced politics. Following is the discussion of some aspects of contemporary Aristotelianism. I argue for the thesis that education is the basic form of policy understood along Aristotelian lines. (shrink)

In view of the current fragmentation in management and organisation studies, we argue that there is a need to elaborate techniques that help reconcile contradictory and superficially incommensurable standpoints. For this purpose, we draw on ‘pre-modern’ Aristotelian epistemological and methodological sources, particularly the idea of ‘saving the appearances’ (SA), not previously introduced into organisation studies. Using SA as our starting point, we outline a methodology that helps to develop reasonable and acceptable intermediary positions in contemporary debates between ‘modernism’ and (...) ‘post-modernism’. We illustrate the functioning of SA in the case of three issues in the philosophy of science where ‘modernist’ and ‘post-modernist’ scholars seem to have incommensurable standpoints: the nature of scientific knowledge; the conception of causality; and the epistemology of practice. We show in particular how to use the logics of ‘qualification’, ‘new conception’, and ‘complementary combination’ to form the basis for mediating positions which could then be accepted by less extreme proponents of both ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’. (shrink)

This paper investigates two trends which propose an approach to organisations and ethics different from those advocated by the modern tradition. It firste analyses the re-surfacing of the moral and social thinking of Aristotle in the work of a growing number of organisational theorists. It argues that Aristotle’s contemporary resurgence has been partly within the framework of corporate culturism. With this in mind, we reinterpret some elements of the Aristotelian social-moral system in such a way that it can be (...) applied to contemporary organisations. Recognising that some Aristotelian concepts can limit its applicability, we then draw on Levinas’ insights. His approach sheds some post-modern light on the social-moral Aristotelian system, by allowing the emergence of a more human and up-to-date vision of organisations and employee management. We contend that the fusion of both discourses results in a more complete understanding of organisations and its articulation with ethics. (shrink)

According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason (...) to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation. (shrink)

Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature of a criminal (...) act X (the ‘desert basis’) and a fitting sanction Y is insufficiently direct in such cases. I define a new, much narrower account of the kind of criminal wrongdoing which is a more plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: ‘political wrongdoing’, such as electioneering, corruption, or conspiracy with foreign powers. I conclude that widespread blanket and post-incarceration disenfranchisement policies are overinclusive, because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While such overinclusiveness is objectionable in any context, it is particularly objectionable in circumstances in which it has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial injustice. At the same time, current policies are underinclusive, thus hindering the aim of holding political wrongdoers accountable. (shrink)

When analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for (...) the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’. Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible. (shrink)

This thesis is to make sure the art's political possibility especially in the age of the technological reproduction. Since Benjamin declared the death of the 'aura' in the modern art, the concept of the art has been criticized and changed, that of the simulacre which Plato had blamed in his 'republics' newly appeared passing through the post-modern application of Baudrillard. But the simulacre is not negative any more here, even though it was the side effect of the mimesis(the poetic (...) process, so long as it is not oblivious that simulacre is just the fake reality as Plato and Baudrillard said, it was different from the real. The artwork could not be free from the destiny of the dream, for it is available after awakening out of it. In the post-modernism the distinction between the dream and the real disappeared, which could be linked to understanding the fetishism of the technological reproduction widely spreading among the highly industrialized people. The semiology of Saussure could be borrowed to make people isolated of it awakened to the revolutionary subject. That is to say, if the simulacre is like the dreaming, to draw the social revolutionary possibility of it, they need to overcome these fetishism, that is, the learning that this dream is not the reality, and after that they can leap as another subject perceiving the power of that dream. According Freud, the dream is based on the unconscious process of the empty signs. And the teaching of 'the signs of the equivalent differences' in Saussure makes us free from the essentialism of the word(a sort of the fetishism), know that we are so much as the sign or the citizen empty in it, and so get to know that we need another signs, or neighbors even though, and for they are empty, too. The revolutionary subject is not based on the great individual subject but the empty(lost) 'us' that so need to associate each other. And the post-modern art, popular mass art can help us being social subjects. That is what Benjamin had dreamed in post-aura art through 'the artworks in the age of the technological reproduction'. (shrink)

This article discusses the “event” in Merab Mamardashvili’s philosophy. The roots of the post-secular interpretation of the event are traced back to Sören Kierkegaard’s concept of “the moment”, which is posited within a non-classical understanding of temporality and historicity of cognition. The concept of the “event” is also explored in the broader context of non-classical and post-secular Western philosophy of the twentieth century, especially in the works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Marion, who both belong to the phenomenological (...) tradition. The concept of the event in Mamardashvili’s philosophy is explored as one relative to analogous conceptualizations of the event in a post-secular context. (shrink)

For a long time, the concept of moral integrity in politics has been highly controversial. While many look at it from a moralist perspective demanding absolute observance of moral values and principles, some scholars, chiefly Niccolò Machiavelli and his many followers, believe that politics is typically devoid of moral considerations. Others, such as Demetris Tillyris, consider politics to be a distinct way of life with a moral yardstick distinct from ordinary moral standards. All these viewpoints are grounded (...) on divergent understandings of the purpose of political power and how politicians ought to behave. This paper attempts to provide an exposition and critical analysis of the various contestations on integrity in politics. Through a normative ethical approach, it explores diverse theoretical perspectives with the aim of arriving at a comprehensive understanding of moral integrity in politics. The discussion and analysis in this paper are based on the theoretical lenses of the Aristotelian virtue ethics and the morality of power games. (shrink)

The issue, which is at stake here, consists in analysing the modern view of ethics in the context of the social and cultural transformation of the status of the individual. The role of ethics in the history of the modern mind is strictly related to the struggle between liberal individualism and the ge- neric idea of “man,” presented as a social actor in a large political and ideological arena. As a matter of fact, beginning with Illuminism, the radical as- sumption (...) concerning the “human rights” has sev- ered two different directions of thought: 1) The theory of human rights, which are immediately and unconditionally related to the preservation of both negative and positive rights of the individual; 2) the Hegelian and Post-Hegelian view (especially Marxism) – the social and political liberty of the indi- vidual is protected only by the direct intervention of the State. Thus, introducing the traditional concept of “virtue” – following Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory on traditional virtues – into the arena of the modern ethics debate is seen at first as an adven- turous task, but finally, as a possible solution – the neo-Aristotelian view of virtues could be considered as a positive response to the more increasing crisis of traditional values in our society. (shrink)

Social practices are widely regarded as the bedrock that turns one’s spade, beneath which no further justifications for action can be found. Followers of the later Wittgenstein might therefore be right to agree with Heideggerians and neo-pragmatists that philosophy’s traditional search for first principles should be abandoned. However, the concept of practices has played a very different role in the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. Having once helped lead the assault on foundationalism in both moral and social philosophy, his elaboration of (...) an Aristotelian’ concept of practices in After Virtue has since led him to embrace a metaphysical teleology. This paper attempts to outline MacIntyre’s Aristotelian concept, and to identify its ethical, political and philosophical significance. (shrink)

Jus post Bellum is, like Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus post Bellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus post bellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while respecting the rights of (...) the aggressors, [2] punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus post bellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus post bellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus post bellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus post bellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Introduction to the OneThe Concept of One: From Philosophy to Politics -Artemy Magun Part I. Metaphysics of the One and the Multiple1. More than One -Jean Luc Nancy 2. Condivision, or Towards a Non- communitarian Concatenation of Singularities -Gerald Raunig 3. Unity and Solitude -Artemy Magun 4. The Fragility of the One -Maria Calvacante 5. The One: Construction or Event? For a Politics of Becoming -Boyan Mancher Part II. 20th-Century Thinkers of Unity and (...) Multiplicity 6. Truth and Infinity in Badiou and Heidegger -Alexey Chernyakov 7. Complicated Presence: The Unity of Being in Parmenides and Heidegger -Jussi Bachman 8. The Universal, the General, the Multiple in the Perspective of a Political Utopia: Deleuze and Badiou on the Event -Keti Chukhrov 9. Humanity, Unity and the One -Nina Power Part III. Unity and Multiplicity in Nature 10. Elemental Nature as the Ultimate Common Ground of the World Community -Susanna Lindberg 11. Vegetative Democracy, or the Post-metaphysics of Plants -Michael Marder Part IV. Unity in Action: Forms of Political Consolidation in the Case of Contemporary Russia12. Collectivity in Post-revolutionary Russia -Igor Tchubarov13. Street University: Production of Collective Time and Public Space -Pavel Arsenyev 14. Fighting Together: the Problem of Solidarity -Carine Cle;ment Part V. E Pluribus Unum: Res Publica and Community 5. How Does One Constitute the One? Theology of the Icon, Theory of Non-representative Art and of Non-representative Politics -Oleg Kharkhodin 12. Drawing Lots in Politics: Unity and Totality -Yves Sintomer. (shrink)

My thesis is that Albert Camus offers key elements of a viable nonmetaphysical, post-secular ethical and political anthropology and explanation of evil. Idefend my thesis in two parts. First, I explicate and analyze Camus’s remarks on human nature and injustice primarily in his political essay The Rebel. Camus offers a nonmetaphysical picture of human nature, inspired by the Greeks, as that out of which rebellion to oppression springs but also as that which frustrates any final resolution to the problems (...) of history. Secondly, I offer a reading of The Fall. I argue that Camus’s depiction of human nature in this work, contrary to typical readings, highlights his appreciation of the insight and pragmatically desirable consequences of the Christian concept of sin. I show thatCamus depicts the possibility of a “healthy” guilt, a guilt linked to the pursuit of freedom and a responsibility to self and to others. (shrink)

We live in a society we may often perceive as unfair and oppressive. When political and social oppression becomes suffocating, rebellion against such oppression emerges as the sole viable course of action. An oppressed social climate harbors feelings that could lead to revolutionary fervor. This work intends to deal with the topic of revolution, in line with predominantly theoretical-moral connotations, tending towards social ethics. Drawing on a phenomenological analysis of revolution, this work endeavors to delineate the form of justice that (...) should prevail amidst the fragile times we are living in. In effect, it proposes a path which crosses different ethical-moral matrices, which are linked to the epistemic context surrounding the concept of revolution, to finally arrive at proposing a new moral typology of justice. This theoretical scenario gives us the possibility of categorizing the revolutionary phenomenon within different dynamics, functions, and perspectives, opening up glimmers of criticism and reflection on our times. Furthermore, the research aims to demonstrate how the topic of revolution is not a theme of a “univocal” nature. It can be understood in various ways. From a first point of view, the revolution could be interpreted positively or negatively, depending on the meaning we attribute to the concepts of revolution and justice. Revolutionary justice, if oppressive and unequal, can indeed become a new form of injustice. Moreover, depending on how we interpret pre-revolutionary feelings, the concept of limit could vary in its ontological dimension. Within the branch of social and moral philosophy, this analysis will be conducted according to an analytical method. The method used concerns first of all the critical analysis, as the in-depth study of various concepts, such as e.g. the concepts of limit, shame, indignation, resilience, disobedience, vulnerability, temperance, consciousness, equality, difference, freedom, love, hope, honesty, trust, compassion, empathy, and care. The methodology also concerns the use of original expository plots, capable of crossing epistemic boundaries. (shrink)

Many scholars have suggested that Aristotle’s famous aphorism ‘treat equals equally, unequals unequally’ is a formal, and thus impractical, theory of equality. This dissertation aims to criticise the popular view that Aristotle’s theory of equality is purely formal and to develop and defend an interpretation which will pay attention to the substantive elements. The first chapter argues that Aristotle provides us with a spectrum from formal to substantive equality. At the formal end, we have the abstract principles of formal fairness (...) and proportionality, while at the substantive end we can find information for the designation of the appropriate variable of comparison between people or treatments in various domains of social interaction. The second chapter argues for an account of commensurability based on Ph. VII.4. I claim that, in any comparison, the term ‘equal’ should be predicated synonymously of the people or treatment compared, while at the same time they should not admit to difference in species; such an account, I suggest, is also compatible with Aristotle’s theory of economic value in EN V.5. The third chapter presents the Aristotelian account of equality in distributions. I focus on Aristotle’s theory of political distribution in Pol. III, where he puts forward two distinct criteria: political capacity and contribution to the polis. I also examine Aristotle’s moderate suggestion for equalisation of property by the means of public property and taxation. The fourth chapter criticises the popular line that Aristotle holds an inconsistent theory of corrective justice, because in EN V.4 he suggests that people should be treated as equal before the law, while in the first lines of EN V.5 he allows for hierarchical considerations. I eliminate this apparent inconsistency by claiming that the former deals with the compensatory, while the latter with the punitive element of corrective justice. The fifth chapter explores the role of equality within the private domain, mainly in the household and in various types of friendship. I propose that Aristotle offers two types of superiority, one based on actuality and a second based on function, which are not mutually exclusive. To summarise, by examining Aristotle’s responses to various problems about equality and hierarchy I conclude that although he possesses the theoretical tools to argue for ‘inalienable’ metaphysical equality of human beings which will make equality an individual entitlement or right, based on his principle of individuation in Metaph. Z.8, he prefers not to utilise this thesis for political purposes. Instead, he reduces equality to justice (inequality is unjust, since it violates principle of formal fairness which is fundamental for justice) and a set of pragmatical considerations (e.g. concord and the optimal outcome for the polis). He prefers to argue that equality or hierarchy of people or treatments is related to, and defined by, the particular institution that we examine. (shrink)

"In this fresh critique of Rawls’s political liberalism, Dostert offers a bold and stimulating account of the political potential of religion that actually enhances the prospects of a genuinely democratic public discourse. Drawing lessons from the civil rights movement to the Jubilee 2000 effort, _Beyond Political Liberalism_ presents a profoundly hopeful challenge to the ways of thinking about liberalism and religion that dominate both political science and religious studies today. Setting aside worn diatribes and tattered dichotomies, _Beyond Political Liberalism _constructs (...) a promising vision of religion's role in liberal society that will be of interest to anyone concerned about the future of contemporary western culture." —_Daniel M. Bell, Jr., Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary_ "This is a fine book. It is clearly written, accessible to a broad audience, and of special relevance now, both in academia and in the larger political and intellectual culture." —_Eldon Eisenach, University of Tulsa_ In _Beyond Political Liberalism,_ Troy Dostert offers a critical examination of political liberalism, the approach to liberal political theory advanced most forcefully in the later work of John Rawls. Political liberalism's defenders claim that an “overlapping consensus” of shared values holds out the strongest prospects for regulating democratic politics in light of our moral diversity. Dostert contends, however, that the attempt to establish such a consensus in fact works to restrict and control the presence of religious and other moral perspectives that can ennoble and invigorate public life. Dostert argues that there is a steep price to be paid for this conception of politics, for what results is a political vision characterized by a profound distrust and fear of citizens' comprehensive convictions—the animating source of many citizens' political activity. He suggests that a “post-secular” ethics is a more appropriate response to moral diversity than restricting and managing the presence of religion and other moral perspectives in public life. By drawing on the religious witness of the civil rights movement and the work of theologian John Howard Yoder, Dostert elucidates several core dialogic practices and illustrates their value through a consideration of the contemporary debates surrounding international debt relief and abortion. (shrink)

The article devoted to the analysis of theoretical and conceptual developments of the Russian Social Democrats in the emigrant period. The authors note that the concept of democratic socialism, which began to be formed in 1917, was considerably amended and deepened when the Mensheviks created a new party program developed in 1922-1924. The significance of this program of the RSDLP is practically not evaluated in the science literature. In the analysis of Soviet historiography, the authors of the article outlined the (...) lack of attention to the projects of the Mensheviks in emigration, as the researchers insisted on the collapse of the RSDLP in post-October period. Some of modern researchers are highly skeptical about the intellectual developments of the Russian Social Democrats after the events of October 1917. However, the authors identified a number of innovative elements in the projects of the Mensheviks in this time. The new party program is an original stage in the formation of the concept of post-revolutionary development of Russia. In the course of the inner-party discussion, the differences in assessing the degree of Russia’s readiness for socialist transformation, as well as the Bolshevik experiment with various internal political trends, were sharply denoted. The article analyzes the positions of representatives of the official Mensheviks and the right wing of the party. The authors acknowledge the significant transformation of the political attitudes of the Mensheviks, pointing to some delusional and utopian nature of a number of program theses. (shrink)

This chapter takes off from Max Weber’s famous lectures on poli­tics and science as ‘vocations’ to explore the concept of ‘modal power’, that is, the power to determine what is possible. Politics and science are complementarily concerned with modal power, in ways that go to the heart of Michael Dummett’s influential metaphysical characterisation of the antirealism/realism distinc­tion, which the chapter pursues across several philosophical fields, including logic, epistemology, jurisprudence and finally historiog­raphy. The chapter adopts a ‘post-truth’ perspective in (...) the sense that modal power is treated from an ‘antirealist’ standpoint, in which ‘the name of the game’ is to expand one’s own sphere of possible action while constraining that of the opponent. That world of constrained possibilities is the ‘actual’ world, whose rela­tionship to other possible worlds fluctuates over time in ways that resemble quantum effects but are most clearly captured by ‘revi­sionist’ historiography. The chapter ends with a discussion of the contrasting attitudes to such historiography in politics and science. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy (...) and solidarity. In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement. (shrink)

A Lacanian Conception of Populism takes issue with traditional theories of populism, which seek to equate populism with hegemony, arguing that these are not only different but even incompatible logics. Timothy Appleton contends that one of the main differences between populism and hegemony has to do with the social totality: whilst hegemony absolutises it, populism eviscerates it, setting in its place an - apparently paradoxical - dispersion of singular instances of 'the people'. The book considers the work of Laclau, (...) Badiou, Žižek and Rancière, before arriving at a novel conceptualisation that Appleton dubs 'the populism of singularities'. In the second half of the book, the author draws out the consequences of this concept for contemporary political theory: the question of how to define 'left' and 'right'; the question of popular enthusiasm and affect; 'truth' versus 'post-truth'; the question of leadership; populism and nationalism; and the relation between populism and political parties. A Lacanian Conception of Populism will be key reading for academics and scholars of political theory, political philosophy, post-Marxist thought, Discourse theory and psychoanalysis. It will also be of interest to those working in the areas of populism studies, cultural studies, gender studies and queer theory. (shrink)

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, a number of ‘liberal Jesuit scholastics’ produced the last great synthesis of Aristotelian psychology with Christian theology. In this magnificently sympathetic reconstruction of their systems of the soul, Dennis Des Chene rescues Toletus, Suarez, and the other ‘schoolmen’ from neglect which resulted from scornful dismissals by Descartes and his fellows. Deliberating bypassing the political and medical contexts of their work, and focusing almost exclusively on Jesuit rather than other, ‘dissident’ Renaissance Aristotelianisms, (...) Des Chene focusses intensely on intellectual history, what he calls at one point ‘the flurry of subtleties’ of these astonishing systematic commentaries on Aristotle. (shrink)

The article makes a detailed analysis of the understanding of women in the philosophical works of Corpus Aristotelicum. It is established that the specificity of the view of this ancient thinker on the problem of research is due to the fact that he considers it in the whole body of his philosophical works, reflecting on it in logical, ethical-aesthetic and socio-philosophical aspects. It has been found that the key issue around which Stagirite reflects on women is the concept of «domination». (...) In the context of reflections on domination, he emphasizes that in the ontological context, women are not inferior to men, but in marital and family relations, a woman must obey a man. At the same time, it is proved that Aristotle speaks only briefly about the possible need for education and upbringing of women, and mentions it not for the benefit and self-development of women, but only to avoid all sorts of chaos and disorder in a particular society. However, he notes that a woman can hold a high position if she has a good reputation and authority among citizens who pursue politics. It is argued that the ancient thinker emphasizes that there are a number of issues, namely those concerning children, in which women clearly understand each other better, and emphasizes that they should deal with them and resolve disputes under their guidance. It is interesting that in the context of this issue, Aristotle mentions there is an image of a Delphic knife [Polit.1252b1–7], because he used in various aspects - military, domestic and sacred. As we can see, this ancient philosopher continues Plato's opinion that it is impossible to «spray» on certain goals and objectives, because, mainly, it leads to mistakes, tragedies, etc. Everyone, including women, must do their job, which is given to them by nature. This does not diminish this or that personality, but on the contrary makes it unique and inimitable among all creations. (shrink)

What makes the paper relevant is modern strategies of neoliberal politics, according to which the political life of citizens is replaced by everyday politics of individuals. It has been established that the modern concepts of everyday politics of homo sacer and homo sucker contain the limit of ideas about the political life of citizens. The paper considers an ontological model of the political life of citizens built on the basis of thinking as form-of-life (Agamben). The return to (...) the ontological level of research can be explained by the fact that in modern conditions, the survival of a person depends directly on the person’s ability to think. Thinking as the form-of-life of a community is seen as a force that allows citizens to resist not only the inertia of social existence, but also the life watched carefully by the authorities. The paper presents two interpretations of political life based on the following statements: ‘I think, therefore I resist’ (Badiou) and ‘I resist, therefore I think’ (Arendt). (shrink)

Aneivas and Nişancıoğlu’s provocative book,How the West Came to Rule, attempts to provide an alternative account of the origins of capitalism to both ‘Political Marxism’ and ‘World-Systems Theory’. By making uneven and combined development a universal dynamic of human history and by utilising a flawed concept of ‘Eurocentrism’, however, they introduce a high degree of causal pluralism into their analysis. Despite important insights into the specific dynamics of different pre-capitalist forms of social labour, their account of the origins of capitalism (...) inHow the West Came to Rulesuffers from causal indeterminacy and historical inaccuracies. (shrink)

This book explores how one can fashion political and legal institutions to govern the people, all together, on this earth. For centuries, there have been articulated issues of morality and ethics within a language of universalism. Exemplary is the “universalist moral standpoint” adopted by “the discourse theory of ethics.” The book's conception of this future is not fully specified, but at a minimum it involves separating the demos from the ethnos. In practice, this means establishing forms of democratic authority (...) that fly free from the historical specificity of national boundaries. Universal cosmopolitanism presently faces two barriers to its success: necessary boundedness of democratic authority; and the historically specific forms of national solidarity represented by the ethnos. (shrink)

This article revisits Dolf Sternberger’s 1960 theory, which, in explicit opposition to Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy thesis, found the essence of politics and the political in peace. The essay contextualizes Sternberger’s propositions by relating them to his immediate post-1945 considerations – such as normalizing domestic politics, jettisoning authoritarianism, and laying the conceptual foundations for the nascent political science – and thereby reconstructs the questions his theory of the political sought to answer. The analysis shows in detail how the (...) key elements of Sternberger’s 1960 theory derived from the late-1940s: rather than reflecting an already normalized political situation or proposing naïve pacifism, Sternberger’s text took political conflicts seriously and provided an outline of a desired but only prospective political peace amidst a crisis. Despite substantial polarity, Sternberger’s view is largely compatible with Schmitt’s theory once we remove context-induced polemics and grave misinterpretations – and carries potential for systematic political theorizing. (shrink)

The human relation to things in the world is at stake in the so-called post-humanist era where the distinction between human and non-human is blurred, as indicated in a term like ‘the nano-self’. How should we understand the nature of our relation to things in this era? Or how can we describe an educationally meaningful relation we as human agents can make in relation to things, artificial and natural, in the face of this technologically hybrid and ever-dehumanizing tendency of (...) society? Well-known for his actor-network theory, Bruno Latour, an influential materialist and philosopher of technology, says that ‘objects’ have agency as much as humans; so we need to be able to translate the language of things into the language of men or vice versa as a way of co-shaping the world we live in. What does this mean and how can we do so? In carefully examining his theory, the essay attempts to explore and reformulate his account of the mediating role of human agency to see if it can provide us with an educationally plausible post-humanist concept of human agency, which can lead us into an ecologically ethical and politically responsible approach to education in general, and science education in particular. (shrink)

Political ecologists--the theorists of the Green movement--assert that if we do not fundamentally change the way in which our society makes use of nature, then we will destroy the physical basis of our social existence within the foreseeable future. In the light of this insight, this book is concerned to unearth the foundations of our cultural attitudes towards nature and to start the process of building philosophical foundations that could provide the basis of a sustainable relationship between society and the (...) environment. The objective is to provide a critique and reorientation of social theory at the level of epistemology and to question the nature of rationality; the role of ideology and assumptions about human nature which underpin conventional academic social theory. The heart of the analysis comprises a critique of the core values of the Enlightenment that have shaped modern Western thought: Science; Progress and Individualism. To political ecology these represent fundamental problem concepts and the intention of this book is to broaden and deepen our understanding of existing social processes particularly those identified as the 'post-modern' condition of aimless consumerism in relation to environmental issues. The analysis includes sketches of concepts and practices with which political ecology might transcend these values and shows how transformed attitudes can contribute towards solving environmental problems. This is a challenging and original synthesis of philosophy and theory directed towards the greatest issue of our time. It will be essential reading for everyone concerned with the future of the planet. (shrink)

The author presents the Aristotelian conception of capacity/potentiality (dunamis) – one of the most important in Aristotle’s metaphysics. A closer inspection allows to draw conclusion, that the concept of capacity is an important link between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (metaphysics on the one side, and practical – ethical, rhetorical, political – skills, on the other). A picture of the connection between theory and practice is based on the most important parts of Metaphysics (books delta and theta), it relates metaphysical (...) definitions to an essential element of Aristotelian practical philosophy – the concept of virtue (aretê). In the practical works of Aristotle, we can find different definitions of aretê: in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines aretê using the notion of disposition (hexis), but in Rhetoric he formulates a definition based on the concept of capacity. Distinctive analysis of this inconsistency shows the significance of capacity in The Stagirite’s philosophy. (shrink)

Aristotle's assertion inPolitics1.2 that there is a natural impulse to form political communities is immediately contraposed with the claim that the person responsible for their foundation is the cause (αἴτιος) of the greatest of goods (Pol. 1253a33). The attribution of an essential role to the legislator as an efficient cause appears to clash, however, with Aristotle's political naturalism. If thepolisexists by nature and humans are by nature political animals (1253a1–2), then the question arises as to why active intervention by the (...) legislator is necessary for apolis. Conversely, if thepolisis an artefact of practical reason, then Aristotle's distinction between products of the intellect and natural entities seems to preclude the status of thepolisas natural. In light of this apparent tension between different aspects of Aristotle's account of the origins of political communities, the current paper seeks to demonstrate their reconcilability. Section 1 considers the role of the Aristotelian legislator in light of broader Greek assumptions regarding law-making. Section 2 then considers the status of law-making expertise (νομοθετική) as part of political science (πολιτική) and examines the mode of practical reason that is exercised by the legislative founder. Finally, in section 3, and building on recent interpretations which have emphasized that Aristotle operates with an extended teleological conception of nature, I argue that acts of legislative founding and nature can consistently serve as joint causes of thepolis, because the ‘products’ of the practical rationality of the architectonic legislator are themselves an expression of distinctly human nature. (shrink)

Beginning with the sources of the dispute over the meaning of the modern democratic ideal, this article shows two opposing, anthropological positions pr...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.2 (2003) 172-176 [Access article in PDF] The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Ross Wolin. Series ed. Thomas W. Benson. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. Pp. xviii + 256. $34.95, cloth. Ross Wolin's The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke offers its readers an interesting mix of intellectual history and conceptual explication, along with an element of biography, which Wolin performs (...) in an effort to trace the movements of Burke's thought as it developed over time within particular socio-political circumstances. The book is divided into three parts, each corresponding to Wolin's three-part division of Burke's intellectual [End Page 172] career. Part I, "Towards a Better Life through Art, Criticism and Politics," begins with a chapter on Burke's formation as a critic in the bohemian, avant-garde culture of post-World War I Greenwich Village. Wolin offers an account of how the dynamics of this social milieu prompted Burke to incorporate politics into his already established aesthetic interests, and of this fusion's manifestation in left-leaning periodicals of the time. While some might be tempted to see this first chapter as having limited value in comparison to Jack Selzer's richly detailed Kenneth Burke in Greenwich Village : Conversing with the Moderns, 1915-1931, it should be noted that Wolin does a fine job of helping his readers—in chapter one and those which follow—to understand explicitly how specific contexts shaped Burke's ideas and his rhetoric (something that Selzer's book does not do). Wolin is particularly adept at showing how, for Burke, there is an inextricable link between aesthetics, rhetoric, politics, and social life in general. This aesthetic-rhetorical connection to politics and life, argues Wolin, is key to understanding all of Burke's work. According to Wolin, equally important is how this connection informed the essays that comprised Burke's Counter-Statement, which Wolin sees as the seed from which all of Burke's theoretical and critical writings grew. For Wolin, to understand Burke one must understand Counter-Statement, and understand it within the historical circumstances that prompted and shaped its concepts and their rhetorical presentation.Chapter two is thus devoted to a discussion of the significance of Counter-Statement within Burke's oeuvre. It is in Counter-Statement, Wolin contends, that one can discern not only the fundaments of Burke's later work but also the "Critics Credo" that organized Burke's rhetorical efforts from Permanence and Change to The Rhetoric of Religion. Wolin's attempt to demonstrate the operation of this credo in all of Burke's books as an organizing principle pushes the limits of credulity at times, but readers should not let this obscure the insight Wolin offers us into Burke's responses to and interventions in early twentieth-century intellectual culture. Chapters three, four, and five comprise Part II of Wolin's book, "The Tactics of Conflict and Cooperation," which discusses in succession the three books that followed Counter-Statement chronologically: Permanence and Change, Attitudes Towards History, and The Philosophy of Literary Form. In these chapters, Wolin makes numerous interesting and novel points about Burke's thought. In the chapter on Permanence and Change, for example, Wolin highlights the conception of ethics implicit in that work, one that has its roots in poetics (particularly tragedy) and which refuses "to supplant traditional [End Page 173] ethics with another system [that is] equally fixed" (77). Although he does not state this, implicit in Wolin's reading is the suggestion that within Burke's work lies an alternative to the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and Habermasian universal pragmatics so many rhetorical scholars seem to embrace when theorizing a rhetorical ethics. (A "dramatistic" ethics of discourse and public life is, I think, an untapped potential of Burke's work.) Part III, "The Tactics of Motivation," offers similarly insightful and contextualized readings of A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, The Rhetoric of Religion, and Language as Symbolic Action. Particularly interesting is Wolin's discussion in chapter seven of the importance of style... (shrink)

The modern world was in part born as a reaction against Aristotelianism. However, the image of Aristotle to which modern philosophers reacted was partial, to say the least. Paradoxical though it may seem, today, more than twenty-three centuries on, we may now be in the most advantageous position for understanding the Stagirite's philosophy and applying it to contemporary problems. The present book contributes to the forming of an idea of Post-modern reason inspired by a constellation of Aristotelian concepts, (...) such as prudence (phronesis), practical truth (aletheia praktike), science in act (episteme en energeiai), metaphor (metaphora), similarity (homoiosis) and the imitation-creation pair (mimesis-poiesis). They all form an interconnected network and together they make up an idea of reason that may prove suitable for the present. These concepts offer the most promising basis for undertaking a series of urgent reconciliations: of facts and values, of means and ends, of theoretical and practical reason, of intelligence and emotion. Aristotle's notions could help solve many dualisms of modern times. He offers a third way between identity and difference in ontology and politics, between algorithm and anarchism in methodology, between naïve realism and plain relativism in epistemology, between equivocity and univocity in language, between Enlightenment and Romanticism in culture... On the way, this shift facilitates the relationships between science, arts and ethics - the three parts of the sphere of culture which Modernity had separated - as well as the integration of the sphere of culture itself with the world of life. (shrink)

This chapter emphasizes four crucial differences that serve to distinguish the proto-Marxist interpretation from the standard post-Kantian framework. The first and foundational difference involves the existence of final causality or internal purposiveness in nature. The now-standard post-Kantian interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel presupposes Sellars's core distinction between the realm of "empirical description" and the "space of reasons", a distinction that necessarily presupposes the absence of final causality in nature. The proto-Marxist framework approaches Hegel as the first modern (...) philosopher to overcome the strained but stubbornly persistent fantasy of pure mechanism and to recognize the ineliminable role of Aristotelian final causes in even the most basic domains of nature. The third difference involves the nature of Hegel's dialectic. Fourth, these competing frameworks provide divergent accounts of the constitution of the object. The post-Kantian framework plainly acknowledges Hegel's tendency to talk about organisms, artworks, and institutions as purposively structured wholes that cannot be properly explained in terms of causal laws. (shrink)

This text maps out a territory for political philosophy of mind, with emphasis on habit, affect and an expanded notion of the social niche. We first survey the historical development of classic philosophy of mind towards the articulation of political philosophy of mind and discuss further influences for the field. We then outline commitments to relationality, dynamism, and emergence, to adopt a post-cognitivist view of cognition as embodied and situated, as ongoing dynamic interaction with the environment. We propose to (...) move beyond the user/resource framework dominant in extended mind approaches and to surpass what Jesper Aagaard calls the “dogma of harmony” prevalent in 4E approaches. Moving beyond the individual subject, towards situated agents shaped by institutional procedures, social domains and subjectification practices, we highlight the role of affect and habit in processes of societal mind-shaping. We propose a critical methodology: inverting key concepts from philosophy of mind to bring out their ambivalent standing amidst oppressive and exploitative social structures, thereby expanding the purview of the socio-material niches in which cognitive and affective capacities are developed and expressed. We discuss work on habit in the enactivist and pragmatist traditions to put our method of concept inversion and niche expansion to work. The article is meant to be an introduction and invitation to join an emerging scholarly effort at the intersection of philosophy of mind, 4E cognitive science and social as well as political philosophy. (shrink)