Humanist concerns to empower human beings and to promote justice inspired the modern argumentation movement. Turning to audience adherence and acceptability of inferential links raised a spectre of pernicious relativism that undermines concerns for justice. Invoking Perelman’s universal audi-ence as a remedy only begs the question with ‘whose universal audience?’ and frustrates fulfilling the jus-tice commitment. Turning discourse toward the common good better addresses concerns of justice and social justice.

Following his retirement fromUniversity teaching in 1972 Bocheski focusedincreasingly on metaphilosophical issues. Someof these he considered in occasional papers,autobiographical essays, as well as interviews,often giving expression to views that are asrefreshing as they are – sometimes –surprising. Bocheski in his later years becamesomething of an iconoclast, sharply criticalof, indeed hostile to, much of what isparadigmatically taken to be `philosophy'. Inthis paper, I draw out and examine some aspectsof Bocheski's virtually anti-philosophicalattitudes and try my hand at an analysis ofwhat appears to (...) have become the Bocheski'smain underlying motivation in this respect: theless than happy interplay of religious faith,Weltanschauungen, and philosophy caughtbetween two seemingly persistent butconflicting inclinations of the human spirit tosubmit to the authority of some `total' picture. (shrink)

Mersenne's answer to Pyrrhonism begins with a great deal of bombast in his dedicatory letter to the king's brother. The sceptics are the enemies of science, they are unworthy of being called men. Since they cannot support the light of truth within themselves they try to limit all human knowledge to the outward appearance of things, and to reduce mankind to a state as lowly as the stupidest animals. The sceptics are the enemies of God and science. What Mersenne was (...) seeking was a rational way of supporting simultaneously the truths of religion and of physics against the attacks of the Pyrrhonists and the Renaissance humanists. The only sceptic that Mersenne names is Sextus Empiricus. He probably had seen Gassendi's work since they had become friends around this time, and had joined forces in attacking the pernicious influence of the alchemist and Rosicrusian, Robert Fludd. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the problem of modernity, formulated as the following multivalent question: How should we understand the scope, character, and limitations of our historical age? The study approaches this question from the point of view of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. We will, first, clarify how Heidegger and Gadamer think about modernity, thereby shedding light on their widely misunderstood intellectual relationship; and, next, uncover and defend a distinctively Gadamerian response to modernity as a viable argument, and (...) as potentially more coherent and hopeful than Heidegger’s answer to the problem of the modern age. -/- In the first part, I present my reading of how these figures think about modernity. I outline Heidegger’s deconstruction of the modern age, that is, his main critique of modernity and his account of the movement into a postmodern future. Next, I motivate a contrast between Heidegger’s vision of modernity and Gadamer’s. Contrary to numerous misreadings, Gadamer proceeds along his own path of thinking, one that crucially begins with Heidegger but goes its own direction by advancing past the shortcomings of Heidegger’s thinking of modernity. -/- The next part outlines my interpretation of Gadamer’s post-Heideggerian response to the modern age, arguing that he accomplishes this task by rediscovering what remains most true and meaningful in the guiding metaphors of the modern age, while criticizing the pernicious elements of modernity’s bequest to the present. First, I reconstruct and defend Gadamer’s rehabilitation of modernity’s guiding epistemic metaphors, namely, transcendental thought, humanism, experience, objectivity, and curiosity, against the backdrop of his critique of other elements of modernity’s epistemic regimes. Next, I make the same type of argument with regard to guiding ocular metaphors of infinity, perspective, and mirroring. -/- A speculative Conclusion, on the political implications of Gadamer’s differences from Heidegger, suggests that the Gadamerian rehabilitation of modernity successfully engenders a more genuinely hopeful response to modernity than Heidegger provides. This short Conclusion again makes the case for Gadamer’s appreciable advancement beyond Heidegger. (shrink)

Currently held conceptions of autonomy that inform biomedicine are inadequate and oppressive. Liberal notions of individualism are anti-humanist and constitute pernicious socialization, which leads to internalized oppression and dehumanization, especially among already oppressed groups. Women in recovery from addiction and other mental illnesses are especially affected by anti-humanist conceptions of autonomy. I argue that these women need to receive treatment that supports autonomy through supplementing psychiatric and rehabilitative therapy with humanistic education and group therapy. Treatment must encourage the construction (...) of healthy social interaction that augments a sense of supported autonomy. (shrink)

While typically unapologetic in expressing admiration, notably Gilles Deleuze admits his concern one time, in passing, that Gilbert Simondon's thought might hide a pernicious kind of ‘disguised moralism’, in which the form of the transcendent lurks, the enemy of the philosophy of immanence. Might there in fact be an ulterior motive in Deleuze's concern? But might this potential critique invite its own reversal? That is, might Deleuze's accusation be in fact a strategy for teasing out what, perhaps, is unrecognisable (...) as such, but structurally essential for how Simondon constructs his onto-epistemological goals? Moreover, might this Simondonian response, unmasked, not only deflect but anticipate a ‘critique’ like Deleuze's? Extending this question further reveals I believe the implications for Simondon's ‘ethics without morality’, bringing him closer to Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza. As a result, Deleuze's ‘critique’ invites the question: ‘What exactly is Spinozan in Simondon's ethics?’ Such a question compels our re-evaluation of humanism, its underlying prerogatives, if now in light of its consequences, the re-evaluation of poststructuralism: first, because it is predicated on the critique of the humanistic subject and, second, because ‘poststructuralism’ has come to designate how Simondon's relatedness is determined to Deleuze. (shrink)

This book consists of the papers by Northrop Frye, Stuart Hampshire, and Conor Cruise O'Brien read at the inauguration of the Society for the Humanities. The topic was eminently suitable for the inauguration because it provided the occasion for three respected humanistic scholars to reflect on the fragile status of scholarship in our troubled times. While each defends the virtues of objectivity and detachment in scholarship, each is aware how easily these virtues can and do degenerate into vices. Frye sketches (...) the balance that must exist between the scholarly virtue of detachment and the moral virtue of concern. The latter includes the sense of importance of preserving the integrity of the total human community. While Hampshire basically accepts the tension that Frye delineates, he explores in greater depth the ways in which committed scholarship in the humanities is an imaginative working out of personal problems felt to be urgent. Lest his colleagues commit the sin of smugness, O'Brien's more astringent paper focuses on the subtle, pervasive pressures of modern politics that perniciously distort scholarship. The papers, together with Black's urbane introduction, are gentle but elegant reminders of the ideals of humanistic scholarship and the ways in which they are threatened in the contemporary marketplace.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Western Marxism, since its Western deviation and theoretical development in the 1920s, developed in diverse ways that has reflected the broader philosophical environment. First, a theory of conscio...

This is a major contribution to political theory and philosophy.

Levinas on the possibility and need for humanist ethics In Humanism of the Other, Emmanuel Levinas argues that it is not only possible but of the highest exigency to understand one's humanity through the humanity of others. In paperback for the first time, Levinas's work here is based in a new appreciation for ethics and takes new distances from phenomenology, idealism, and skepticism to rehabilitate humanism and restore its promises. Painfully aware of the long history of dehumanization that (...) reached its apotheosis in Hitler and Nazism, Levinas does not underestimate the difficulty of reconciling oneself with another. The humanity of the human, Levinas argues, is not discoverable through mathematics, rational metaphysics, or introspection. Rather, it is found in the recognition that the other person comes first, that the suffering and mortality of others are the obligations and morality of the self. (shrink)

Narain, Vin It seems that primitive man, everywhere and in every culture, had an instinctive belief in some sort of existence after death. For the primitive psyche perhaps there was no other way to come to terms with the dread and mystery of death. As the traditional religions evolved, elaborate myths were created, claiming that every man had an immortal soul that survived his bodily death. In a masterstroke (deliberate or otherwise) traditional religions linked the fate of this immortal soul (...) with good behaviour in this life. Ordinary people, conditioned as they were from early childhood to adapt to regimes of earthly reward and punishment, readily accepted this vastly magnified scheme of reward and punishment that extended into eternity. Morality, which really had its roots in human nature, became a prisoner of reward and punishment. 'RAP morality' is perhaps a good name for it. RAP morality gave religion an iron grip on the lives of people. (shrink)

This book seeks to explain the critiques of humanism and the "negative" philosophical anthropologies that dominated mid-century philosophy and traces the ...

Addresses Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi’s neo-Confucianism from the perspective of contemporary ecological humanism. In this novel engagement with Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), Nicholas S. Brasovan presents Wang’s neo-Confucianism as an important theoretical resource for engaging with contemporary ecological humanism. Brasovan coins the term “person-in-the-world” to capture ecological humanism’s fundamental premise that humans and nature are inextricably bound together, and argues that Wang’s cosmology of energy (qi) gives us a rich conceptual vocabulary for understanding the (...) continuity that exists between persons and the natural world. The book makes a significant contribution to English-language scholarship on Wang Fuzhi and to Chinese intellectual history, with new English translations of classical Chinese, Mandarin, and French texts in Chinese philosophy and culture. This innovative work of comparative philosophy not only presents a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of Wang’s thought but also shows its relevance to contemporary discussions in the philosophy of ecology. “This is a fine study of Wang Fuzhi’s complex and fascinating neo-Confucian cosmology. I learned an immense amount about one of China’s last great Confucian intellectuals.” — John Berthrong, author of Expanding Process: Exploring Philosophical and Theological Transformations in China and the West. (shrink)

In this second edition, Joseph Rychlak has retained his analysis of the philosophical antecedents of psychology and, at the same time, has considerably revised more complicated material illustration rigorous humanism to make the book more accessible for students. Rychlak here offers an analysis of the philosophical traditions underlying the social sciences and shows how functionalism came to dominate the modern science of psychology in America.

Resumen: Cómo ver la reforma de la iglesia católica en el siglo XVI y su relación con la virtud es un tema importante en el estudio de la filosofía humanista. Los humanistas enfatizan que la educación virtuosa es la base para cultivar la personalidad y creen que restaurar las virtudes de la iglesia es la “cura” para los males de la iglesia moderna temprana. Consilium de emendanda Ecclesia (1537) es la práctica de la virtud de los humanistas católicos. Esto se (...) refleja en propuestas para fortalecer las normas educativas y las disciplinas socio-morales y enfatizar el perfeccionamiento de la virtud clerical como la fuerza impulpara la reforma. Además, bajo la guía de la ética de la virtud, la política de la virtud se convierte en la ideología guía de la práctica política de esos humanistas, donde reconocen la autoridad del papa y de la iglesia y asocian la virtud con la legitimidad del poder. La filosofía de la virtud en Consilium forma el fundamento ideológico para la reforma de la iglesia católica. El erudito chino antiguo Dong Zhongshu (179-104 B.C.) practicó una política similar de la virtud. En las exubergemde la primavera y el otoño, combinla legitimidad del gobierno con la virtud basada en el derecho divino de los reyes, perpetuasí el concepto confuciano del “sabio”. Tanto humanistas católicos como Dong enfatizaron la importancia de la virtud de los gobernantes como agentes de Dios. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The present paper defends the thesis that Spenser's recovery of place, as enacted in 'The Faerie Queene,' Book VI, can be linked in a direct way to his use of a poetic phenomenology which informs and clarifies his work as an epic writer. Spenser's "Book of Courtesy" enacts a Neo-Platonic movement from the lower levels of temporal existence to an exalted vision of spiritual perfection. The paper explores this movement along phenomenological lines as a mysterious adventure that embraces self and (...) other, personality and community, aesthetics and ethics, in a sequence of images that opens up a new interpretation of imaginative fulfillment. -/- . (shrink)

As the decades passed, and the ‘humanists’ of the sixteenth century receded into history, they were increasingly seen as being not just students of pre‐Christian cultures but advocates for those cultures. Many of the values associated with this humanism can be held and are held by people as part of a wider assortment of beliefs and values, some of which beliefs and values may be religious. There may also be people who self‐identify as ‘Christian’ (or ‘Sikh’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Jewish’, or (...) whatever) for ethnic or political reasons but who have humanist convictions and no religious beliefs. Many traditional accounts of the origin of human morality have it that morality came to us from outside ourselves. Plainly, belief in theistic religions like Christianity or Islam is incompatible with a humanist view: the ability of the God to interfere at will with nature fatally disrupts the assumptions of naturalism. (shrink)

At the end of his life, Stuart Hall called for the reengagement of Cultural Studies and Marxism. This paper contributes to this task. It analyses Stuart Hall’s works on communication and the media.The goal of the paper is to read Stuart Hall in a manner that can inform the renewal of Marxist Humanism and the development of a Marxist-Humanist theory of communication. This involves reconstructing elements of Hall’s approach, criticising certain aspects of his work, and through this engagement developing (...) new theory elements.The article’s analysis of Stuart Hall’s theory of communication and the media is conducted in four steps. First, the paper reengages and re-evaluates what Hall called the two paradigms of Cultural Studies: Structuralism and “Culturalism”/Humanism. It discusses the role of human agency in society. Second, the paper engages with Hall’s and Althusser’s notions of articulation and sets the notion of articulation in relation to the concept of communication. Third, it discusses the relationship between communication and work in the context of Hall’s works. Fourth, the article revisits and engages with Hall’s encoding/decoding-model in the context of digitalisation.This paper grounds a dialectical concept of communication that is based on the dialectic of articulating and articulatedness, the dialectic of work and communication, as well as the dialectic of communication in the public sphere and society’s power forcefields. It shows how a critical, dialectical theory of communication benefits from engagement with Stuart Hall’s works. The present work argues with, for, against, and beyond Stuart Hall in order or productively draw on ideas that emerge from this engagement. (shrink)

This chapter is meant to give an interpretation of humanism and to indicate what this implies for the hopes one might have for the future. A meaning frame is a set of assumptions, principles, and values embedded in a cultural environment, in groups and organizations, social institutions, and, last but not least, in (memories of) important life experiences and a network of relatives, friends, exemplary figures. A meaning frame provides orientation with a sense of direction, stability, identity, continuity, and (...) with the criteria to evaluate situations and life course. Interpreting humanism as a meaning frame implies that it is more than a moral, ethical, and political position. The ethical aspect of a meaning frame is often a very important one, but the meaning frame is not an ethical frame only. In principle there are as many meaning frames as there are human beings. (shrink)

In this article, I motivate for the view that the best account of the foundations of morality in the African tradition should be grounded on some relevant spiritual property—a view that I call ‘ethical supernaturalism’. In contrast to this position, the literature has been dominated by humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics, which typically is accompanied by a direct rejection of ‘ethical supernaturalism’ and a veiled rejection of non-naturalism. Here primarily, by appeal to methods of analytic philosophy, (...) which privileges analysis and argumentation, I set out to challenge and repudiate humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics; I leave it for a future project to develop a fully-fledged African spiritual meta-ethical theory. (shrink)

Teksten, beschouwingen en biografische gegevens van en over de vrijdenker, humanist en Multatulikenner Piet Spigt (1919-1990).

Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.

This book challenges the common view that classical education in 19th-century Germany was dominated by a progressive ideal called neohumanism. The prevailing ideal of education at the German Gymnasien was emphatically traditional and is best described as classical humanism. Moreover, this 19th-century classical humanism dynamically related to modern society and should therefore be seen as the continuation of a living tradition.".

One hundred years have passed since the birth of Bertrand Russell, major English bourgeois philosopher of the twentieth century, logician, mathematician, sociologist, publicist, and Nobel Laureate for literature, who died two years ago. Russell was a philosopher who always sought truth, who tried to use for philosophy the lessons and achievements of diverse sciences, who responded deeply to social events in England and other countries, and who participated actively in them. He was a prominent public figure, a passionate humanist, and (...) a fighter against militarism and for peace and just relations among peoples. The literature on Russell is enormous. (shrink)

"Oser examines the twentieth-century literary clash between a dogmatically relativist modernism and a robust revival of Christian humanism.

This paper aims to articulate and clarify the very essence of humanism and then contextualize it to the Ethiopian context. In this case, I believe that a humanistic philosophy for education is the best approach that helps students become holistic beings – citizens who are both morally/intellectually and economically capable, autonomous, critical and responsible. Students of Ethiopian Higher Education Institutions, however, are characterized by a dearth of humanistic elements for education. They are marred with intellectual and moral decadence. The (...) methodology is qualitative for it largely depends on reviewing literatures and policy documents on the issue. The upshot of this paper is that the ideals of humanism in education is not an extra – icing on the cake- it is an essential tool that would clean the academic environment from the entrenched overall moral and intellectual decay permeating EHEIs. (shrink)