In this paper, I first argue for a relational account of the concept of ontological form and its difference from being. The former is explicated by the concepts of character-neutral internal relation and existence or being and that the ontological forms of entities consist in these formal ontological relations in which the entities stand. Secondly, I apply this account to ontological categories and their membership-determination, existence and reality. Here I also defend a relational view that (...) categories are construed as pluralities of entities standing in the same formal ontological relations in the same order. Formal ontological relations are not additional entities to their relata because they are internal relations. Therefore, categories do not exist as entities numerically distinct from their members. Yet their membership is determined by formal ontological relations actually holding among entities. My accounts are nominalist since ontological forms and categories are not universal or general entities of any sort. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a solution to an almost ignored problem in metaphysics and metametaphysics: what is categorial fundamentality and non-fundamentality? My proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s view on the issue. By means of the newcomer notion of generic identity, I can give an account of something that Lowe did not explicate: the constitution of formal ontolog- ical relations. Formal ontological relations (e.g. instantiation) are internal relations that deter- mine ontological form and category-membership. I argue (...) that categorial fundamentality is hav- ing membership fully determined by a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order and categorial non-fundamentality is having membership at least partly determined by a derived formal ontological relation in an order. In contrast to Lowe, my proposal does not pre- suppose non-modal essentialism. (Please, ask for the penultimate draft.). (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a solution to an almost ignored problem in metaphysics and metametaphysics: what is categorial fundamentality and non-fundamentality? My proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s view on the issue. By means of the newcomer notion of generic identity, I can give an account of something that Lowe did not explicate: the constitution of formal ontolog- ical relations. Formal ontological relations (e.g. instantiation) are internal relations that deter- mine ontological form and category-membership. I argue (...) that categorial fundamentality is hav- ing membership fully determined by a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order and categorial non-fundamentality is having membership at least partly determined by a derived formal ontological relation in an order. In contrast to Lowe, my proposal does not pre- suppose non-modal essentialism. (Please, ask for the penultimate draft.). (shrink)

In his recent book, The Universe As We Find It, John Heil offers an updated account of his two-category ontology. One of his major goals is to avoid including relations in his basic ontology. While there can still be true claims positing relations, such as those of the form “x is taller than y” and “x causes y,” they will be true in virtue of substances and their monadic, non-relational properties. That is, Heil’s two-category ontology is deployed to provide (...) non-relational truthmakers for relational truths. This paper challenges the success of Heil’s project with respect to causation. The arguments here are not entirely negative, however. An option is made available to Heil’s ontology so that it might, at least to some extent, regain non-relational causings. (shrink)

Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with “ontological category questions”, which are questions concerning (...) the identity of and differences between kinds of entities. We then argue that ontological category questions do not have trivial answers, are meaningful, and cannot be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Easy Ontology hence does not constitute a comprehensive ontological methodology. While some of ontology might be easy, category questions form a central part of ontology and are not answered easily. (shrink)

1. Belief and mental statesDavidson holds that intentional verbs occurring in the form ‘A Vs that p’ signify propositional attitudes. These are, he claims, mental states, and dispositions. Davidson does not conceive of himself as introducing a special technical sense of the common intentional verbs. He insists that ‘the mental states in question are beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on, as ordinarily conceived'. Consequently he contends that believing that p is a mental state, disposition or dispositional state. These (...) class='Hi'>ontological claims about the nature of belief inform his account of the logical form of belief sentences. I shall address the question of whether believing that p can justly be deemed a mental state, a disposition or dispositional state. Subsequently I shall examine Davidson's account of the logical form of belief sentences.Our concept of a mental state, like so many of the concepts which philosophers treat as categorial, is none too sharply defined. It has a respectable use, which can be described. But, like other such general psychological terms, e.g. ‘mental process’, ‘mental activity’, far from being the ‘hardest of the hard’ - a sharply circumscribed categorial term akin to a variable in a well-constructed formal system — it has blurred boundaries and is elastic. Like all our ordinary psychological concepts, it evolved in order to meet everyday needs. As Wittgenstein observed, ‘The concepts of psychology are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly fashioned by science for its own purposes, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry.’Although our ordinary concepts can be replaced by technical ones for specialized purposes, they cannot be abused without generating conceptual confusion and incoherence. If the expression ‘mental state’ is being employed in its ordinary sense, then it is wrong to hold that believing that p is to be in any mental state. If it is being employed in a special technical sense, then those who employ it thus owe us an account of what it means and how it is to be used. This Davidson and the many other philosophers who subscribe to the view that believing is a mental state have not done. Until such an account is forthcoming, one may presume that they think of themselves as deploying our ordinary concept of a mental state. And if so, I shall argue, they are misusing it. (shrink)

We propose category theory, the mathematical theory of structure, as a vehicle for defining ontologies in an unambiguous language with analytical and constructive features. Specifically, we apply categorical logic and model theory, based upon viewing an ontology as a sub-category of a category of theories expressed in a formal logic. In addition to providing mathematical rigor, this approach has several advantages. It allows the incremental analysis of ontologies by basing them in an interconnected hierarchy of theories, with an operation on (...) the hierarchy that expresses the formation of complex theories from simple theories that express first principles. Another operation forms abstractions expressing the shared concepts in an array of theories. The use of categorical model theory makes possible the incremental analysis of possible worlds, or instances, for the theories, and the mapping of instances of a theory to instances of its more abstract parts. We describe the theoretical approach by applying it to the semantics of neural networks. (shrink)

Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. (...) In this metatheory, ontological forms of entities are their standings in internal relations whose holding is neutral on the character of their relata. These relations are “formal ontological relations”. Entities belong to ontological categories because they stand in the same formal ontological relations. We hold a nominalist relationalism about ontological categories and forms. We conclude by showing that our metatheory is useful for understanding categorial fundamentality/non- fundamentality, different formal ontologies, and for unifying metaphysical questions. (shrink)

A network of aligned ontologies is a distributed system, whose components are interacting and interoperating, the result of this interaction being, either the extension of local assertions, which are valid within each individual ontology, to global assertions holding between remote ontology syntactic entities through a network path, or to local assertions holding between local entities of an ontology, but induced by remote ontologies, through a cycle in the network. The mechanism for achieving this interaction is the composition of relations. In (...) this perspective, we introduce the notions of local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, remotely induced composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to remote ontologies through a path of ontologies and alignments in the network, and network induced local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, but through a path of ontologies and alignments forming a cycle starting and ending at the same ontology, to characterize the logical consequences extracted from a network of aligned ontologies, and we propose a category-based methodology for detecting semantic inconsistencies in networks of aligned ontologies, which is based on contravariant representable functors and on the definition of two composition operators suitable for propagating local knowledge through the network. (shrink)

Ontological categories form a network of ties of dependence. In this regard, the richest source of distinctions consists in the medieval discussion on the divisions of being. After a preliminary examination of some of those divisions, the paper pays attention to Roman Ingarden’s criteria for classifying the various types of ontological dependence. The following are the main conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise. Ingarden suggests that (1) the most general principles framing the categories of particulars (...) are based on couples of mutually opposed principles; (2) the most general among these couples of principles appear to be based on three different types of modalities; (3) subsequent couples of opposed principles do not seem to require the introduction of further types of modalities, and (4) the overall typology shows that there are three spheres of being, respectively composed of ideal entities, real entities and intentional entities as contents of psychological acts. (shrink)

This paper is an essay in what Austin (_Proc Aristotel Soc_ 57: 1–30, 1956–1957) called "linguistic phenomenology". Its focus is on showing how the grammatical features of ordinary causal verbs, as revealed in the kinds of linguistic constructions they can figure in, can shed light on the nature of the processes that these verbs are used to describe. Specifically, drawing on the comprehensive classification of English verbs founds in Levin (_English verb classes and alternations: a preliminary investigation_, University of Chicago (...) Press, Chicago, 1993), I divide the forms of productive causal processes into five classes, corresponding to Aristotle's ontological categories: there are processes that cause change in location, in state, and in quantity; and that lead to the creation and destruction of substances. These broader categories are then subdivided into other ones, corresponding to different Levin classes, according to further differences in the causal processes they involve. I conclude by discussing the relevance of this argument to research in metaphysics and experimental philosophy. (shrink)

The main objective of this Element is to reconstruct Aristotle's view on the nature of ontological priority in the Categories. Over the last three decades, investigations into ontological dependence and priority have become a major concern in contemporary metaphysics. Many see Aristotle as the originator of these discussions and, as a consequence, there is considerable interest in his own account of ontological dependence. In light of the renewed interest in Aristotelian metaphysics, it will be worthwhile - both (...) historically and systematically - to return to Aristotle himself and to see how he himself conceived of ontological priority, which is to be understood as a form of asymmetric ontological dependence. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle is most famous for accusing the Cartesian dualist of committing a category mistake. Yet the nature of this accusation, and the idea of a category mistake more generally, remains woefully misunderstood. The aim of this paper is to rectify this misunderstanding. I show that Ryle does not conceive of category mistakes as mistakes of predication, as is so widely believed. Instead I show category mistakes are mistakes of conjunction and quantification. This thesis uniquely unifies and explains the wide (...) variety of Ryle’s remarks, judgments, and arguments. (shrink)

This article concerns existents as a contentious issue in contemporary Abelardian scholarship. More precisely, it concerns the ontological standing of forms in Abelard’s metaphysics. Take, for example, the apple on my desk. What ontological standing does its redness have? Is it an actual entity over and above the apple or is it in some sense “reducible” to it? Abelard, famously, was a nominalist, so the question is not about some purported universal redness. Rather, it is about the particular (...) redness of the particular apple on my desk. The issue is contentious in that the best current accounts of Abelard’s metaphysics disagree strongly about how to answer this question. Here, rather than focusing on Abelard’s own writings – which so far have yielded no definitive answer – I will consider some anonymously transmitted and mainly unedited logical texts from the twelfth century and show how his contemporaries understood Abelard’s view and how the followers of his philosophical nemesis, Alberic of Paris, reacted to it. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Multiplicity How Are Instances of Comics Created? Autographic and Allographic Conclusion Notes References.

This paper challenges the traditional metaphysical assumption that properties can be located in spacetime and examines the ontological implications of categorizing spacetime itself. By introducing a two-category ontology, we argue that attempts to locate properties in spacetime represent a category mistake, as this notion fails to address the fundamental categorization of spacetime. We propose that the notion of instantiation should be conceptually separated from spatiotemporal location, thereby allowing for properties that are Platonic yet immanent. Furthermore, we reevaluate the debate (...) between Platonism and Aristotelianism, advocating that Platonic properties can possess a form of immanence previously thought to be exclusive to Aristotelian frameworks. This reformation not only underscores the need for categorizing spacetime but also reshapes our understanding of the instantiation and immanence of properties within ontological dependence frameworks. (shrink)

The Ontological Square is a categorial scheme that combines two metaphysical distinctions: that between types (or universals ) and tokens (or particulars ) on the one hand, and that between characters (or features ) and their substrates (or bearers ) on the other hand. The resulting four-fold classification of things comprises particular substrates, called substances , universal substrates, called kinds , particular characters, called modes or moments , and universal characters, called attributes . Things are joined together in facts (...) by primitive ontological ties or nexus . This article describes a logic that is meant to capture the basic intuitions behind the Ontological Square. Given a minimal correspondence between atomic logical form and ontological structure, the commitment to nexus as a distinct ontological category entails a rehabilitation of copulae as ties of predication. Thus, the Logic of the Ontological Square is a copula calculus rather than a predicate calculus; its soundness and completeness can be established with respect to a model akin to a so-called first-order semantics for standard second-order logic. (shrink)

Virtually everyone who has advanced an ontology of art has accepted a constraint to the effect that claims about ontology should cohere with the sort of appreciative claims made about artworks within a mature and reflective version of critical practice. I argue that such a constraint, which I agree is appropriate, rules out a one-size-fits-all ontology of contemporary visual art (and thus of visual art in general). Mature critical practice with respect to contemporary art accords artists a significant degree of (...) stipulative authority regarding the features and boundaries of their works. This results in ontological variation among visual artworks. Any claim to the effect that all works belong to the same ontological category will thus come out false or uninformative. Interesting, substantive claims about ontological status can be made only in relation to specific works; that is, we must consider the ontological status of each contemporary artwork individually. The only general ontological claim that can be made about visual artworks (and also about artworks in other forms) is that they belong to the sort of thing that artists create. But this is not a substantive ontological claim. (shrink)

Criticism of post-modernizm and post-colonializm caused to question the mission of anthropology in terms of understanding different societies. Materialist, secular and anthropocentric anthropological approaches based on enlightenment and modern assumptions have faced criticism by many disciplines from philosophy and critical theory to science and quantum theory. Anthropology of religion which is a branch of cultural anthropology is also effected by changes within the broader field of anthropology. The aim of this project is to shed light on the potential of the (...) critical approach, which emerged in anthropology of religion recently and underlined the ontology, to understand religious experiences and practices of different societies. This approach is called ontological turn. In this article, first I point out the historical process in anthropology which led to the turn to ontology. Social structuralism and representationalism which played an important role for the formation of anthropology impacted significantly the ways in which anthropology understands nature and human being. According to these assumptions commonly used in anthropology, while human beings try to understand universal and static natural law principles, they create representations about nature. But, for there is only one nature, there must be only one true representation. This attempt to understand nature through representations created the base for the concepts of belief, knowledge, and mind of Edward Tylor who was the pioneer of cultural anthropology. While the mind refers to rational capacity of human being, belief is an area of irrational representations that human beings pragmatically need. Religious assumptions and practices are listed under incorrect representations. The concept of belief has been frequently used after Tylor as well to understand societies which are located outside of modernity. What ontological turn aims with criticism of conceptual framework is to prevent the domination of Western based reality. Therefore, one of the most emphasized arguments is the multiplicity of reality. This approach of ontological turn is called as taking everything serious. New definitions which are made in a way including the experiences of ethnographic objects mean taking them serious. Acceptance of the concepts by anthropologist in the ethnographic field means acceptance of difference in reality. The act of definition and conceptualizing is the act of creating different realities. In many ethnographic researches, ethnographers choses their concepts before entering to the field. This means that trying to fit differences within existing concepts and confirming the existing thoughts from different perspectives. Understanding ethnographic materials with its own terms or analyzing, explaining or interpreting ethnographic phenomenon by eliminating presumptions was always a concern for anthropology. These questions are asked so commonly that they can be seen as banal questions. The difference of ontological turn is not to ask these questions, but to ask ontological questions as an epistemological approach. The base of this ontological approach is the thought that what forms anthropologists’ perspective are not social or cultural but ontological assumptions. Thus, the question to be asked is how anthropologists’ assumptions about what the world is can be eliminated. To sum up, the idea of taking everything serious in ontological turn aims to eliminate the hierarchy between the subject and object of ethnography. Instead of seeing ethnography as an object of anthropology through modern categories, ontological turn suggests seeing ethnography as a real source to create new concepts and analytical tools. (shrink)

This paper explores some issues concerning the ontology of photography. It would appear that photography’s ontology bears some significant specificities comparing with other art forms. First, the study of negative film and printed photograph relations shows us that photography has a multi-layered ontology, since although the latter is ontologically dependent upon the former, it stands autonomously as work of art. Second, I will consider the problem of forgery in photography. It seems that photographs are autographic and allographic, fakeable and unfakeable. (...) Third, ontological status of negative film will be explored. Apparently, current ontological categories aren’t pertinent as far as negative-photograph’s ontology is concerned. That’s why, relying on Gérard Genette ontological notions, I propose to consider the negative film as «immanence» and the printed photograph as work’s «transcendence». In this regard, printed photograph functions as a manifestation of the negative film. (shrink)

Facets and general categories used in bibliographic classification have been based on a disciplinary organization of knowledge. However, facets and categories of phenomena independent from disciplines can be identified similarly. Phenomena can be classified according to a series of integrative levels (layers), which in turn can be grouped into the major strata of form, matter, life, mind, society and culture, agreeing with Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. Unlike a layer, a stratum is not constituted of elements of the lower ones; rather, (...) it represents the formal pattern of the lower ones, like the horse hoof represents the shape of the steppe. Bibliographic categories can now be seen in the light of level theory: some categories are truly general, while others only appear at a given level, being the realization of a general category in the specific context of the level: these are the facets of that level. In the notation of the Integrative Level Classification project, categories and facets are represented by digits, and displayed in a Web interface with the help of colours. (shrink)

The epistemological and ontological aspect of "interpretation" in the structure of narrative identity is considered. A model for representing the structure of narrative identity in the form of a hermeneutic spiral is proposed. The problem of the significance of the narrative for human existence is analyzed from the point of view of two opposite positions. The first, arguing that the narrative is a "cognitive tool" through which a meaningful order is retrospectively constructed that falsifies the true nature of (...) the subject's experience of existence. The analysis of this point of view is based on the tradition of narrative criticism formed by such philosophers as Arthur Danto, Louis Mink, Hayden White and Peter Strawson, who conceptualize the narrative as a "cognitive tool". The opposite position is a philosophical view of the narrative as an ontological category that characterizes a special way of being a person. The analysis of narrative as a constitutive element of human existence draws on the tradition of the hermeneutic method, the work of Paul Ricœur and Charles Taylor. It is argued that the experience of human existence cannot be reduced solely to narrative, but this does not contradict the fact that narrative interpretations of experience play a constitutive role in human existence. The conclusion is formed that an important element for understanding the ontological meaning of the narrative is the fact that narrative interpretations have a real impact on our existence in the world: they allow us to construct our self, take part in the creation of the intersubjective world and influence how we interact with others. From an empirical point of view, this means that interpretations have real, material, world-forming consequences. Scholars who deny the capacity of narratives to constitute human existence, view the meaning and role of (self-)interpretation from an anti-realist point of view, and adhere to the ontological assumption that there is an experience of understanding reality that does not depend on the human ability to give meanings. (shrink)

The problem is that of how to relate reality to the categories of dyadic ontology. We shall understand by "reality" the immediate object of that which is true. We shall understand by "dyadic ontology" one which assumes a pair of ontological categories as the real. The categories chosen will be those of a class of constants characterized by persistence and a class of variables characterized by change. As one philosophical tradition succeeds another in history, the names will be altered. (...) Again, sometimes the class will be specified and sometimes its elements. The relation between reality and the categories can take any one of the following forms. Persistence is alone real, change is alone real, they are equally real, neither is real. The first will be called idealism, the second nominalism and the third realism. The fourth has no historic tradition in the West. (shrink)

Published in extended form as "Endurants and Perdurants in Directly Depicting Ontologies", -/- We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the enduring entities that participate in such processes. For this purpose we distinguish between ontologies and metaontology. Ontologies are based on very simple directly depicting languages and fall into two major categories: ontologies of type SPAN and ontologies of type SNAP. These represent two complementary perspectives on reality and result (...) in distinct though compatible systems of categories. In a SNAP (snapshot) ontology we have the enduring entities in a given domain as they exist to be inventoried at some given moment of time. In a SPAN ontology we have perduring entities such as processes and their parts and aggregates. We argue that both kinds of ontology are required, together with the meta-ontology which joins them together. On the level of meta-ontology we are able to impose constraints on ontologies of a sort which can support efficient processing of large amounts of data. (shrink)

This book presents a formal and philosophical analysis of language syntax. It refers to some ideas of E.Husserl and G. Frege, to S. Leśniewski's theory of syntactic categories and K. Ajdukiewicz's conception of formal grammar, also to Ch.S. Pierces's distinction between tokens (concrete linguistic entities) and types (ideal linguistic entities) and to A.A. Markov's theory of algorithms. The central aim of the book is - in the spirit of these ideas - to provide both strict yet comprehensive lectures on two (...) axiomatic theories of languages (grammars) irrespective of specific structure of their expression and the notation used in them. The main feature of these theories are that definitions of well-formed expression allow the formulation of algorithms for the examination of syntactic correctness of expressions and that their formalizations are bi-level, in reference to opposite philosophical orientations: nominalistic and idealistic. The theoretical considerations in the book speak in favour of the former. The book contains a translation of the basic contents of the book in Polish "Teorie języków syntaktycznie kategorialnych ("Theories of syntactically categorial languages"), PWN, Warszawa-Wrocław 1985, and extensive Introduction and Final Remarks. In Introduction are discussed the main assumptions, objectives and conditionings of presented theories and intuitive foundations of these theories. Final Remarks are connected with the subject-matter of the book and the ability to build syntax theories in the opposition spirit, because of the Platonic approach to language syntax. -/- . (shrink)

The Spiritual Forms in Nicolai Hartmann’s critical ontology. For a critical-genetic interpretation of The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author critically discusses the theoretical assumptions underlying Nicolai Hartmann’s 1933 The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author deals with the main categorial problems involved in the Hartmannian discussion about the spiritual being, also looking at his previous production. In particular, the Author analyzes the position of the ontic level of spiritual being with respect to the previous three real ontic levels (inorganic, (...) organic, psychological) and the mutual relationship between the three fundamental forms of spiritual being identified by Hartmann (personal, objective, objectified). The Author believes that the 1933 volume has been poorly considered in its direct links with the overall project of critical ontology. (shrink)

Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are ‘relational’ and those that are ‘constituent’ (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle ’s Metaphysics – a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an alternative approach drawing more on (...) the fourfold ontological scheme of Aristotle’s Categories is not committed to this doctrine and may regard individual (or ‘primary’) substances as having no constituent structure, their only possible complexity residing in their possession, in some cases, of a multiplicity of substantial parts. However, as we shall see, this does not imply that such an ontology falls instead into the relational camp: for although it invokes, in addition to the category of individual substance, also those of substantial kind (‘secondary’ substance), attribute, and mode (or ‘individual accident’), it need not and arguably should not take there to be external relations between entities in the different categories. On this view, truths of exemplification and instantiation, such as ‘Dobbin is white’ and ‘Dobbin is a horse’, do not need relational truthmakers. Hence, it can be maintained that there are no such relations as ‘exemplification’ and ‘instantiation’, at most only certain relational truths of exemplification and instantiation – truths whose logical form is relational. Th is being so, I shall argue, such an ontology cannot fairly be classified as a ‘relational’ one. (shrink)

Critical Notice on Organizations as Wrongdoers By Stephanie Collins Oxford University Press, 2023. -/- Extract: What, if any, role does metaphysics have to play in addressing moral questions? When answering questions about moral responsibility, many theories rely on answers to questions about the nature of agency and agents, the persistence of persons and the existence and nature of free will. In recent work in social ontology, philosophers have argued for views of social categories or identities that take ethical and social–political (...) desiderata into consideration in several ways. Some argue for views of gender identities that depend on epistemic and ethical considerations (Bettcher, 2009). Others develop views of gender categories in ways they take to be metaphysically realist, tracking robust explanatory patterns in the world. For instance, Barnes (2017) argues for this interpretation of Haslanger’s views of racial and gender categories. Others argue that injustice and oppression are reflected in the nature of social categories. For instance, while it ought not to be this way, some gender categories are, for instance, trans-exclusionary (Ásta 2018). Indeed, one might even argue that social categories can involve a distinctively metaphysical form of oppression (Jenkins 2020, 2023). It is clear that many philosophers argue in ways that draw close connections between metaphysical and moral theorizing. ... (shrink)

The General Formal Ontology (GFO) is a top-level ontology that is being developed at the University of Leipzig since 1999. Besides introducing some of the basic principles of the ontology, we expound axiomatic fragments of its formalization and present ontological models of several use cases. GFO is a top-level ontology that integrates objects and processes into a unified framework, in a way that differs significantly from other ontologies. Another unique selling feature of GFO is its meta-ontological architecture, which (...) includes set theory into ontology and which accounts for its specific role in common representation approaches. The second level of that architecture starts from the distinction of categories and individuals, which forms the backbone of the world’s structure. Furthermore, GFO comprises several kinds of categories, among them universals and concepts, and it considers several ontological regions and levels. In the context of this special issue paper, we study five pre-determined use cases from the perspective of GFO. The results of these analyses yield insights into how the ontology treats several important notions. Very abridged, this covers material objects and their composition; roles and social entities; properties with their relations to objects and processes, and their changing; changes of processes, including a functional perspective; and, eventually, the nature and changing of concepts as well as terminology. A final part summarizes application projects that use GFO in various contexts. (shrink)

A model of metaphysics associated with EJ Lowe and Tuomas Tahko sees metaphysics as involving a priori knowledge of possible essences, or at least modal facts, and delimiting the actual ‘ontological categories,’ the ultimate and essential divisions of what exists, based on the results of a posteriori scientific investigation. Their approach to metaphysics has been criticized by those who argue that such metaphysics is unsuitably a priori, disconnected with empirical research in natural science, and ends up failing to provide (...) meaningful constraints on metaphysical theorization. I present different epistemological and semantic worries about these accounts to motivate an alternative perspective on which metaphysics centers on form, rather than possibility. This scholastic perspective is shown to incorporate the skeptical insights as constitutive of its approach to existence, by way of the position that ‘being’ is not a genus. Rather, ‘being’ is a determinable. The scholastic approach can thus provide responses to the skeptics, since it denies that ontological categories – in the Lowe/Tahko sense – are what metaphysicians investigate and proposes a different view of ontological categories as classes of forms. (shrink)

This paper gives an account of constructions with the noun 'case' based on truthmaking and argues that 'cases' form their own ontological category.

This article examines Nancy Fraser's attempt to repair the apparent schism between economic and cultural struggles for justice. Fraser has argued that the only analysis equipped to theorize the relationship between economic and cultural injustices is a `perspectival dualist' one, which treats the two forms of injustice as analytically separate and irreducible, at the same time as providing tools for theorizing potential harmonies between the claims of groups agitating for economic and cultural justice. Fraser's contribution has been hugely influential, but (...) this article investigates how a series of significant shifts in her position have cast doubt on the coherence and utility of her approach. Specifically, it examines recent revisions to the social theory underpinning Fraser's account, and shows how a number of (necessary) concessions to `anti-dualist' positions call into question the diagnosis of the schism that her framework seeks to resolve, and undercut her arguments for a `perspectival dualist' approach to social theory. In light of concerns over Fraser's social theory, this article also questions whether the political ideals of recognition and redistribution retain their critical or analytical value. Key Words: anti-dualism • culture • economy • Nancy Fraser • justice • perspectival dualism • ontological dualism • recognition • redistribution. (shrink)

I propose to depict the relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and mathematics as a three-layered model. Philosophy as metaontology creates a metastructure, mathematics as ontology in the form of a condition of philosophy constitutes its situation, and mathematics as a multiple universe of all given axioms, theorems, techniques, interpretations, and systems (set theory, category theory, etc.) is an inconsistent multiplicity. So, we can interpret the relationship between philosophy and mathematics as the one between a metastructure and a situation. By using (...) Easton’s theorem, we come to realise that philosophical concepts in the metastructure “quantitatively” exceed the elements that belong to mathematics as ontology. Therefore, philosophy as metaontology shows the limits of mathematics as ontology. (shrink)

Central to Elements is an assay of the attributional union properties and relations have with their subjects, a topic historically left metaphorical. The work critiques eight Aristotelian assumptions concerning attribute dependence and ‘inherence’, per se subjects, attributes as agent-organizers, and unity-by-a-shared-one. Groups of these assumptions are seen to yield contradiction, vicious regress, or other problems. This analysis, joined with insights from an assay of ubiquitous structure, motivate ten theses explicating attribution and its primary ontic status. The theses detail: attributes proper (...) as individuated instances, structure as instance-generated facts and their two forms of composition, the conditioning role and universal nature of instances’ component intensions, the primacy of attribute instances for generating all forms of composition and complex entities, and identity and indiscernibility criteria for the latter. Principal is the insight that attribution is intension-determined combinatorial agency. It is its systematizing implications that provide solutions to classic problems, e.g., Composition, Individuation, and Universals, and in net generate a comprehensive one-category structuralist ontology. (shrink)

Based on an original interpretation of the core concepts in Nietzsche’s thought, and on their subsequent overcoming, this book embodies a radically new perspective that in essence reconsiders, upon grounded ontological premises and revealed anthropological evidences, both the notions of human and superhuman as still bound to a prevailing standpoint of impotence and limitation. The chief themes of metaphysics, from being to becoming, from entity to identity are all dealt with in the leading terms of the category power and (...) of its dialectical self-negation to inhere in parallel within a far more extended view of the human respecting a dualist assumption and the unfathomable spatio-temporal vastness of the Real in which the phase of man is but infinitesimal. It is supported by more than 500 notes and a glossary with more than 60 key terms, each carefully explained. References are contained to authors spanning millennia and in several fields of knowledge. Narrative suggestions are also included, serving as an aid to the comprehension of the exposition to follow in compliance with the underlying mythical aspect of the argument. A challenge to existing concepts, this book introduces the reader to the actual existence of a human reality which exceeds the hitherto known and considered from whatever point of view and which has remained latent and indistinct under the form of myths, from the dawn of history until nowadays mass media culture as a need of power in an intrinsically powerless human world. Revealed in its necessary function of actual presence antithetical to the limitedness of man, and referred accordingly to the comprehensive meaning of power, this condition radically opposes any limitation thus far ascribed to the human. (shrink)

The way society is organised means that we all get made into members of various types of people, such as judges, wives, or women. These ‘human social kinds’ may be brought into being by oppressive social arrangements, and people may suffer oppression in virtue of being made into a member of a certain human social kind. This book argues that we should pay attention to the ways in which the very fact of being made into a member of a certain (...) human social kind can be oppressive in and of itself. For example, someone who becomes a wife under circumstances where husbands have unjust powers over their wives has suffered a wrong, even if her husband never in fact exercises these powers. The book argues that social movements against racial and gendered oppression, including efforts to advance trans liberation, must get to grips with this phenomenon, and it supplies the conceptual tools needed to do so. The first tool is an analysis of this general form of wrong, termed ‘ontic injustice’. The second tool is an account of ‘ontic oppression’, a particular kind of ontic injustice in which the wrong amounts to a form of oppression, in the sense of being structural and pervasive. The third tool is a pluralist account of race and gender kinds, according to which there is no single social kind that corresponds to a gender category such as ‘woman’, but, rather, there are various different social kinds, each of which is explanatory for different purposes. (shrink)

Species are central to biology, but there is currently no agreement on what the adequate species concept should be, and many have adopted a pluralist stance: different species concepts will be required for different purposes. This thesis is a multidimensional analysis of species pluralism. First I explicate how pluralism differs monism and relativism. I then consider the history of species pluralism. I argue that we must re-frame the species problem, and that re-evaluating Aristotle's role in the histories of systematics can (...) shed light on pluralism. Next I consider different forms of pluralism: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism, which differ in their stance on evolutionary theory. I show that pluralism is more than a debate about the species category, but a debate about which concepts are legitimate and a claim about how they interact with one another. Following that, I consider what sort of ontology is required for different forms of species pluralism. I argue that pluralists who deny the unity of biology will require a further plurality of frameworks, while those that ground their pluralism in evolution need only one framework. Finally, I consider what pluralism means for biological practice. I argue that species concepts are tools, and reflect on how pluralism can illuminate the way systematists approach the discovery of new species of yeast. Pluralism can make sense of the way species concepts are used, and can be developed to aid researchers in thinking about how to use the right tools for the right jobs. (shrink)

Giorgio Prodi was an important Italian scientist who developed an original philosophy based on two basic assumptions: 1. life is mainly a semiotic phenomenon; 2. matter is somewhat a semiotic phenomenon. Prodi applies Peirce's cenopythagorean categories to all phenomena of life and matter: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. They are interconnected meaning that the very ontology of the world, according to Prodi, is somewhat semiotic. In fact, when one describes matter as “made of” Firstness and Secondness, this means that matter ‘intrinsically’ (...) implies semiotics. At the very heart of Prodi’s theory lies a metaphysical hypothesis which is an ambitious theoretical gesture that places Prodi in an awkward position with respect to the customary philosophical tradition. In fact, his own ontology is neither dualistic nor monistic. Such a conclusion is unusual and weird, but much less unusual in present time than it was when it was first introduced. The actual resurgence of various “realisms” make Prodi’s semiotic realism much more interesting than when he first proposed his philosophical approach. What is uncommon, in Prodi perspective, is that he never separated semiotics from the materiality of the world. Prodi does not agree with the “standard” structuralist view of semiosis as an artificial and unnatural activity. On the contrary, Prodi believed semiosis lies at the very bottom of life. On one hand, Prodi maintains a strong realist stance; on the other, a realism that includes semiosis as ‘natural’ phenomena. This last view is very unusual because all forms, more or less, of realism exclude semiosis from nature but they frequently “reduce” semiosis to non-semiotic elements. According to Prodi, semiosis is a completely natural phenomenon. (shrink)

After Kant, the school which further developed Kant's philosophy is the neo-kantianism. This neo-kantianism scholarship is characterized by the simultaneous development of Kant's epistemological and ontological problems. The ontological problem developed around Hartmann, and the epistemological problem developed around Cohen. Here we can see Cohen's achievements. Cohen completes epistemology in Logic of pure awareness(Logik der reinen Erkenntnis). In order to establish his own epistemology, Cohen first completes the problem of aspect category. And Cohen brings the problem of this (...) aspect category in the form of Plato and Aristotle. He connects these aspect categories and Kant's aspect categories. Like this, Cohen completes his perception logic in this aspect category. Plato, Aristotle, and Kant have different categories. Cohen first deals with the problem of the aspect based on the epistemology based on Plato's a priori. Next, he accepts metaphysical aspects of Aristotle's ten categories. Kant's aspect category is different from the other two philosophers. It is, soon, the basis of judgment. Cohen accepts Kant's aspect category of the very basis of his judgment for his epistemology. In this article, we first look at how Cohen embraced Plato, Aristotle, and Kant's view categories for his cognitive logic, and then see how he completed his aspect category. Whether epistemological or ontological, the construction of aspect category is for category theory, which is ultimately related to the laws of nature. Cohen also completes his categorization system in 12 categories, like Kant, centering on three aspect categories. Aristotle's ten categories, Kant's twelve categories, and Cohen's twelve categories eventually start with judgment. And so far, the number of these categories has been limited to twelve. Cohen argues that the number of these categories is likely to increase sufficiently. As science develops and societies become more complex, the number of categories is not as limited as Aristotle and Kant's view, but has the idea that there can be as many. Cohen explains his thoughts as Judgment of Methodology(Ureile der Methodik). We find here the merits of Cohen's cognitive logic. However, Cohen did not leave his view of the increasing number of categories or numbers. This is his disadvantage. The conclusion of this paper is to point out a problem with Cohen's aspect category by discussing the possibility of expanding or increasing the number of categories claimed by Cohen. (shrink)

A key figure in the history of Aristotelianism, Porphyry (AD 232/3 - c. 305) was born in Tyre and was a student of Longinus' in Athens and of Plotinus' in Rome. In his commentary on the Categories, Porphyry provided an authoritative interpretation of a notoriously controversial work. Commentators on Aristotle had disagreed fundamentally over whether the Categories was a work of logic, concerning simple terms or the simple concepts they represent, or a metaphysical work addressing the classification by genera of (...) simple entities or concepts. Approaching the Categories as the first of Aristotle's works in logic, Porphyry adopted an earlier Peripatetic view of the Categories as being concerned principally with terms or linguistic items, which he calls "predicates." He successfully defended the Categories against Plotinus, arguing that while it seemed to attack orthodox Platonism by denying the separation of forms and the ontological priority of the universal, it was in fact entirely compatible with Platonism. Because of Porphyry's intervention, the Categories came to serve as a basic textbook of logic for subsequent Neoplatonist teaching. His commentary influenced the Arabic tradition, and Boethius drew heavily on it as well. The full text of Porphyry's commentary was lost, but the extant version is available here in Steven K. Strange's new translation. Ancient philosophers, historians of philosophy, classicists, and medievalists will welcome its appearance in English. (shrink)

The article aims to show that the task of grounding categorial constituents in the specific founded acts of perception yields the problem field of phenomenological inquiry, within the framework of which remains Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology. To achieve this goal the article reconstructs, first, the problem of the possibility of a priori correspondence between meaning and intuition of the intentional act; second, the phenomenological justification of extension of the traditional concept of truth, as a result of which truth characteristic (...) expands to intentional acts structured in a certain way, namely acts of total agreement between meaning and intuition (identification acts); third, the problem of the “categorial” in the phenomenological analysis of perception, which includes the extension of the concept of perception, limited in transcendental philosophy to the area of sensible intuitions, and justification of the specific categorial acts. On this basis, the article demonstrates that (1) phenomenology in a certain sense continues the project of transcendental philosophy, but the idea of a priori correspondence between notion and intuition within the framework of structural analysis of intentionality forms a new research problem. (2) The phenomenological understanding of truth in terms of the dynamics of empty and filled meaning intention is significant for the concept of truth presented by Heidegger in Being and Time. Heidegger explicates the concept of the truth in fundamental ontology based on the idea of identification. (3) The extension of the concept of object to its categorial constitution justified by Husserl provides fundamental ontology with the research subject. Heidegger interprets the categories, phenomenally represented in acts of categorial intuition, as a priori structures of the being of beings. The study also ascertains that new concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology saturate the conceptual framework of fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger also rethinks the key concepts of phenomenology in accordance with objectives which are different from the original objectives of the project of phenomenology designed by Husserl. (shrink)

In this talk, I propose a new account of ontological form, formal ontological relations, modes of being and hence of specifying the subject matter of metaphysics.

ON A GENERAL READING of the Metaphysics and the treatises of the so-called Organon, the types of assertion which Aristotle would allow as genuine predications seem relatively straightforward. According to the Categories, for instance, a species is characteristically predicated of the individuals falling under it, while genera and differentiae are predicated both of the relevant species and their associated individuals. The predicates are, in these instances, universals in a familiar Aristotelian sense. Furthermore, these intra-categorial predications, such as "Socrates is a (...) man" and "white is a color," are not the only instances of categorial acts. Aristotle also admits certain cross-categorial predications as logically well-formed; for example, "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is in the marketplace". These latter predications are at first glance also intelligible enough, though there are in both cases questions yet to be faced about the logical structure and ontological commitments of such ways of speaking. For Aristotle, one metaphysical theme presented even on the face of these linguistic appearances is the possibility that being a substrate for predication counts as a criterion for ontological primacy or, more generally, that being an ultimate substrate for meaningful discourse is grounds for being primarily real. An obvious corollary to this line of thought is the thesis that whatever might be said of or predicated of such primary substrata is ontologically dependent upon them. Just such a criterion seems to be at work in disqualifying universals from their claim to be substance in a significant sense. Therefore, it would be somewhat surprising to find primary substance appearing anywhere as a predicate. (shrink)

In this paper I shall suggest that philosophy which bases itself firmly inlife is incompatible with idealism. The example of such a philosophy to be discussed is the later work of Wittgenstein, and I shall define in what sense this is ‘based in life’, with particular reference to his concept of ‘Lebensform’, or ‘life-form’. I shall understand idealism to be, in general terms, the doctrine that idea is the primary, or the only, category of being. Various kinds of idealism (...) may then be distinguished according to the precise definition each gives of ‘idea’, and of the category, if any, which is held to be less fundamental. Thus, in brief, in Platonic idealism, absolute immaterial being is ontologically prior to the changing world given to sense-experience; in the idealistic systems of more modern thought, mind is more fundamental than matter; or again, subject, or spirit, is more fundamental than object. While the various systems of idealism are properly classed together so far as they assign priority to the concept idea , it is clear that they differ in their interpretations of the concept. When one has in mind these differences, it is of course misconceived to speak of idealism as a single doctrine; nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose that philosophers have been led to apply the term ‘idealism’ to various systems despite their differences, because there is indeed a common tendency of thought to be found in them. The present paper takes this supposition as a working hypothesis, with the particular aim of establishing that philosophy based in life is incompatible with philosophy based in idea, whatever be reasonably meant by ‘idea’. In brief my argument will be this: that life is no idea. (shrink)

An ontological approach as a tool for managing the processes of constructing mathematical models based on interval data and further use of these models for solving applied problems is proposed in this article. Mathematical models built using interval data analysis are quite effective in many applications, as they have “guaranteed” predictive properties, which are determined by the accuracy of experimental data. However, the application of mathematical modeling methods is complicated by the lack of software tools for the implementation of (...) procedures for constructing this type of mathematical models, creating an ontological model that operates by the categories of the subject area of mathematical modeling, regardless of the modeling object proposed in this article. This approach has made it possible to generate tools for mathematical modeling of various objects based on the interval data analysis for any software development environment selected by the user. The technology of creating the software on the basis of the developed ontological superstructure for mathematical modeling using the interval data for different objects, as well as various forms of user interface implementation, is presented in this article. A number of schemes, which illustrate the technology of using the ontological approach of mathematical modeling based on interval data, are presented, and the features of its interpretation when solving environmental monitoring problems are described. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the characteristics of the conceptuality of fundamental ontology, which are presented through an analysis of existentials as the concepts typical of this philosophical position. The analysis first presents the meaning and role of existentials in relation to the main ideas of fundamental ontology as well as Heidegger’s critique of the categories. The second part of the paper then presents the conceptual character of the existentials through the analysis of the concept of the world and in (...) terms of the conceptual relations they form. The analysis draws on Heidegger’s early ideas about the essential relation between thinking and language in philosophy, according to which the language of philosophy emerges from and indicates how a particular philosopher thinks. (shrink)

In the commentaries on Porphyry Boethius on the one hand explains the properties of predication relation at abstract level, from another hand he supplies some ontological options about what can instantiate the terms of the relation, at the end he seems to prefer the similarities as objects of abstract thought. Other options are anyway present, in the commentary on Categories and in the Theological Treatises. One cannot say that the catalogues are complementary or that the same things are catalogued (...) once only, under the same label. On the contrary, objects such as forms, essences and material components can be considered from points of view that are different and not easily comparable. In the present article I will deal with Boethius’ ontological approach not strictly concerned with the Porphyrian text and riddle. (shrink)

Still, some may still want to say it. If so, my replies may gain nothing better than a stalemate against such persistence, though I can hope that earlier revelations will discourage others from persisting. But two replies are possible. Both come down, one circuitously, to an issue with us from the beginning: whether the language of the right side of (10) is suspect. For if (10) is to support instances for (6) which are about objects, that clause must itself be (...) about objects. (These would be ones assigned by variants of I it mentions to constants it mentions.) Yet Barwise and I would call it implicitly about functions. Ironically, the discussion surrounding (10), hoping to settle that issue, could only do so if the issue were already settled, revealing decisively the ontology of (10). If irritating, this is also inevitable, given the Tarskian spirit of the ensivioned semantics for QLB.A second reply begins by noting that a QLB semantics which implies (10) cannot simply be assumed. Even a QL semantics augmented to imply (11) is not trivial to frame, as I will let readers confirm. On the QLB project, Barwise comments thus:It is not possible to explain the meaning of an essential use of branching quantification ... inductively, by treating one quantifier at a time in a first-order fashion. Some use of higher-type abstract objects is essential. (BQE75)But believers in a modest ontology for QLB can claim a non sequitur here. For (10), as they read it, succeeds without mentioning abstract objects, though not in the “one quantifier at a time” way which Barwise rightly finds impossible. This is not yet to say the same about a QLB semantics implying (10). But that too can be said, as it happens, with as good a conscience as with (10). A suitable treatment can begin by somehow linearizing non QL sentences like (6). Still assuming prefixes whose rows each consist, speaking loosely, of n universal quantifiers followed by a single existential, we could simply line up these rows in any order, with unique deconcatenatability being assured. From then on, it gets both tedious and complex. A full syntax is essential, and some surprising categories arose in mine. I will spare readers all details, except to say that one can indeed “treat one quantifier at a time”, if not “in first-order fashion”: schematic rules for treating n quantifiers at once can be eschewed. Unsurprisingly, heavy use is made of the “depending only on” idiom seen in (10). Nor does it surprise me that this semantics can succeed, with that idiom available. Roughly, if open talk about functions works in a semantics for QLF, what I read as implicit talk about them should work in a semantics for QLB See [6] for a start on a semantics aspiring to handle sentences like (6) without invoking abstract objects. See also my comments on its notion of dependence, in [9]. . So even from a bare sketch, we can see that this new semantics settles nothing. It just leads back to the stalemate. Barwise and I will read crucial clauses as talking implicitly about functions, but this general charge against an idiom is equally deniable wherever the idiom occurs: in a reading for (6), say, or in the metalanguage can hardly repress a motherhood slogan: better dead than obscurely read. But that just denies the denial, unhelpfully. A better comment is the reminder that the claim stays alive only in a form which no one has ever imagined for it. The QLB quantifiers that cannot be shown not to range over objects are not the items anyone would ever have pointed to in illustrating the unkillable claim. (shrink)

"Husserl's work include lengthy treatment of universals, categories, meanings, numbers, manifolds, etc. from an ontological perspective. Here, however, we shall concentrate almost exclusively on the Logical Investigations, which contain in a clear form the ontological ideas which provided the terminological and theoretical basis both for much of the detailed phenomenological description and for many of the metaphysical theses presented in Husserl's later works.

The paper analyses the beginnings of systematic ontology in Jainism, which appears to have began after first century CE, albeit certain ontology-relevant terminology in a nascent form was present earlier. A clear expression of systematic ontological reflection is the existence of models that organize ideas and categories in a more consistent conceptual scheme. Jainism follows similar developments that had earlier taken shape in in the early Buddhist Abhidharma, proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga and proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In addition, the paper argues that the models, (...) five in total, can be used as a methodological tool to distinguish various historical layers in early Jaina writings. (shrink)