El sistema filosófico de Spinoza no puede ser considerado en rigor como panteísta, sino panenteísta. Este artículo intenta reforzar esta tesis analizando los conceptos de Natura naturans y Natura naturata, a veces confundidos en la obra de Spinoza. Se establece además una comparación de ambos conceptos en Spinoza y en David Nieto, autor de una obra titulada De la divina providencia, o sea naturaleza universal o natura naturante, al tiempo que se señalan las diferencias entre las (...) concepciones inmanentes de la divinidad de ambos autores. (shrink)

From 1801–1807 Schelling continued to refine his early attempts at Naturphilosophie in the metaphysical framework of a transcendental Spinozism that he initially called Identity Philosophy. While mathematics and geometry provided the model for identity and its quantitative differentiation in early versions of identity theory, from 1804–1807, logic and theory of language offered a model of identity capable of unknotting persistent Spinozistic puzzles such as the connection between natura naturans and natura naturata—the absolute and its potencies—and the ontological (...) status of the individual. Schelling’s initial concepts of identity as “indifference” or “the identity of identity and difference,” themselves the offshoot of meditations on polarity and repeating structure in the philosophy of nature, make way for logical concepts such as “expression” or “affirmation” and the propositional operator “bond” or “Position” found in the copula. The new essays approach ultimate reality through Spinoza’s disjunction of God or nature, or productive and produced nature; so in addition to identity theory, a general metaphysics of nature prefaces treatments of specific natural phenomena. These dual metaphysics of God and nature inject a dynamic or expressive movement into identity that is not yet the unfolding of identity as grounding-and-division that Schelling will articulate in the 1809 Freedom Essay, but it carries a sense of motion and differentiation—or evolution and unfolding—not found in his earlier attempts. The entire identity philosophy period is best viewed as a step in Schelling’s lifelong project of reworking Spinoza by adding life and spirit to nature. (shrink)

Existence has its own essence. A grasp of that essence is of course not yet a grasp of Existence itself. The fact that a grasp of an essence is not yet a grasp of that of which it is the essence is not peculiar to Existence. Nothing--not only Existence--is identical with its essence. The essence of an Actuality is distinct from the Actuality, and he who, with Aristotle, holds that knowledge is confined to a grasp of eternal essences is forced (...) to hold that the Actuality, as over against these, is possessed of non-graspable accidents. Nor is the essence of an Ideal identical with that Ideal. The Ideal is normative, intrudes on other modes of being, and has a temporal role. He who with Hegel views the Ideal as an essence, is forced to distinguish it from itself as working through time to constitute history. There is for Hegel a "cunning" to reason which makes it operate as an agency and foil for itself; but this is but to say that there is a real distinction for him between reason as an unchanging essence, and reason as a changing, effective, historically significant Ideal. And finally the essence of God is distinct from God himself. God is active, a judge and preserver, whereas his essence is but his unity as distinct from him, the being who has unity. He who, with Spinoza, tries to identify God and his essence must, in order to take account of what has been termed God's will, providence, creative activity, and his footstool the world, distinguish between God in himself and God's multiple transitory modes, or between natura naturans and natura naturata, the essence of God and the being of God. (shrink)

Meaning and nature are this book’s principal topics. They seem an odd couple, like raisins and numbers, though they elide when meanings of a global sort—ideologies and religions, for example—promote ontologies that subordinate nature. Setting one against the other makes reality contentious. It signifies workmates and a coal face to miners, gluons to physicists, prayer and redemption to priests. Are there many realities, or many perspectives on one? The answer I prefer is the comprehensive naturalism anticipated by Aristotle and Spinoza: (...) "natura naturans, natura naturata." Nature naturing is an array of mutually conditioning material processes in spacetime. Each structure or event—storm clouds forming, nature natured—is self-differentiating, self-stabilizing, and sometimes self-disassembling; each alters or transforms a pre-existing state of affairs. This surmise anticipated discoveries and analyses to which neither thinker had access, though physics and biology confirm their hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the question this book considers: Is reality divided:nature vrs. lived experience? Or is experience, with all its meanings and values, the complex expression of natural processes? (shrink)

Introduction:Can nature be controlled?. Autonomous nature -- Greco-Roman concepts of nature -- Christianity and nature -- Nature personified : Renaissance ideas of nature -- Controlling nature. Vexing nature : Francis Bacon and the origins of experimentation -- Natural law : Spinoza on natura naturans and natura naturata -- Laws of nature :Lleibniz and Newton -- Epilogue : rambunctious nature in the twenty-first century.

Nature and Spirit: An Essay in Ecstatic Naturalism develops an enlarged conception of nature that in turn calls for a transformed naturalism. Unline more descriptive naturalisms, such as those by Dewey, Santayana, and Buchler, ecstatic naturalism works out of the fundamental ontological difference between nature naturing(natura naturans) and nature natured (natura naturata). This difference underlies all other variations within a generic conception of nature. The spirit operates within a generic conception of nature. The spirit operates within a (...) fragmented nature and has its own unique locations. Ecstatic naturalism does not eulogize spirit nor impose a process theodicy upon nature as a whole but carefully describes the ways in which spirit emerges from finite locations within the world. Methodologically, the text radically regrounds phenomenology so that it can work more closely with a metaphysics seeking the most generic forms of nature. The move from a transcendental phenomenology, which rests upon a profound misconception of the parcel of a radicalized naturalism, makes it possible to show how all orders of relevance are related to nature and to the spirit. This, in turn relocates the human process, with its dialectical tension between finitude and transendence, and places the self fully within the emergent structures of the community of interpreters as that community lives out of hope. The concept of worldhood is regrounded in pragmatic and semiotic terms, thus putting pressure on Heidegger's formulations. Peirce's pragmatic categorical structure is used to show how worldhood differs from any other order within the world. The correlation of the potencies of nature, which are presemiotic and preordinal, wit the orders of the world itself, is possible only through an ordinal phenomenology that remains attuned to the fundamental difference between nature naturing (the potencies) and nature natured (the orders of the world). Finally, the text redefines the divine natures in the light of an ecstatic naturalism that sees god as an order within the world that experiences the fragmented quality of nature. Process theology is challenged for its inability to grasp the tensions between god and the encompassing. Four divine natures are laid bare as they relate to nature and to each other. The work concludes with a description of the divine life in the face of the encompassing. (shrink)

The article considers L.N. Tolstoy not only as a thinker who represents but also accomplishes Enlightenment. Through a comparison of his ideas with philosophy of Spinoza and Diderot, the author clarifies the aspects of the transition from Enlightenment to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. A special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview of Tolstoy and Diderot. The contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of (...) life of the three philosophers is revealed. The author also researches their philosophical interpretations of the nature of creative thought. Diderot describes the nature through the concept of paradoxism, Spinoza describes it with the concept of integrity, and Tolstoy uses the method of cohesion that he founds in literary works. If for the philosophers of European Enlightenment, the way of thinking is directly related to human nature, which is presented as a unity of natura naturans and natura naturata, then Tolstoy considers that the most important is a certain a priori sense of life, which is imbued with faith in God and with an instinct of self-giving that is love for the Supreme and other people. The method of cohesion leads Tolstoy away from the direct continuation of educational ideas, stressing the significance of appealing not only to reason but also to creative intuition. Tolstoy gradually moves away from rational perception of Life to its religious and existential foundations. Tolstoy’s worldview undergoes transition from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a human being who lives by commandments of Christ. Starting from the worldview of Enlightenment, Tolstoy comes to the creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which is relevant to early 20th century. (shrink)

La homogeneidad de la Naturaleza, concebida como un todo racional y la universalidad del método se implican en Spinoza. Del principio de la unidad de la sustancia, o sea de la unidad de la Naturaleza tomada como natura naturans y natura naturata, se sigue que no puede existir un método que preceda al conocimiento filosófico. Ahora, si el carácter indisociable de la filosofía y del mos geometricus es efectivo, se debe a la total inteligibilidad para el hombre (...) de la esencia de Dios y de las cosas, ya que de ella se sigue que el conocimiento verdadero, es decir, adecuado, procede del todo a las partes. Con Spinoza, el racionalismo absoluto quiere acabar con el misterio que rodea la razón o que le subyace, misterio que hacía afirmar a Descartes en su tercera meditación que “es propio de la naturaleza de lo infinito que yo,siendo finito, no pueda comprenderlo”. La filosofía de Spinoza se presenta como un intelectualismo íntegro, una doctrina de la necesidad y de la libertad. Mas, podemos preguntarnos: ¿no hay aquí una contradicción entre necesidad y libertad? ¿Será que la filosofía de Spinoza es incoherente? O, dicho en otros términos, ¿es posible para el hombre actuar dentro de un determinismo tan estricto? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:As Ground of Being, God Favors Good Over Bad Choices:Confucian Response to Wesley J. WildmanBin Song (bio)I. Historical/Historic LocationThroughout the history of Western exploration of worldviews and lifepaths, three figures prominently herald the overarching nature of Wildman's scholarship on science, philosophy, theology, and religion: Aristotle, Spinoza, and Tillich (along with his contemporary counterpart, Robert C. Neville). While the link between Tillich-Neville and Wildman is extensively articulated in Wildman's own (...) writings and the festschrift1 dedicated to him, I will center my discussion on Aristotle and Spinoza.The thoughts of all three aforementioned historical figures constitute a lineage towards merging science, philosophy, theology, and religion into an open inquiry process concerning the foundational conditions of human existence. This inquiry also has profound practical implications for humanity's pursuit of the ultimate meaning and power in life that are larger than any human self. Aristotle's architectonic philosophy, evident in the early currents of Western thought, reveals the organic links among all major disciplines practiced in the modern academy. For Aristotle, "theology,"2 focused on the ultimate cause of the world, is nested within "metaphysics." This discipline delves into the most fundamental natures of reality and is a subset of "theoretical philosophy." This broad category also encompasses sciences such as "mathematics," "physics," and the study of animals and plants—what we now term "biology." In the "practical philosophy," Aristotle crafted his renowned virtue "ethics," advocating for individuals to cultivate stable character traits through a liberal arts education and a well-informed democracy, all in the pursuit of a [End Page 50] eudaimonic, or fulfilling, life. This aspiration for the good life aims to emulate and perpetually approach the achievements of the ultimate reality, the eternally self-contemplating Nous, on a cosmic scale. This grants Aristotle's philosophy a deeply "religious" dimension.3The virtual confluence of "philosophy" and "science" involves mastering all requisite knowledge and tapping into multi-generational and multicultural intellectual assets to support and refine one's theological hypothesis about ultimate reality. Moreover, it entails understanding the practical and religious implications of such theological inquiry. These facets of Aristotle's thought align closely with Wildman's conception of "religious philosophy" or "philosophical theology."4 I contend that if the Western world had consistently embraced Aristotle's liberal arts educational model, without the extended influence of Christian theology on medieval universities, Wildman, as a teacher-scholar, would likely feel entirely at home within a modern branch of the Peripatetic school based in the Lyceum.The affinity between Wildman's religious philosophy and Spinoza's thought is more substantive than formal. The Spinozian notion that equates God with nature echoes Wildman's religious naturalism. Wildman's inclination towards the Plotinus model of ultimate reality as the ground of being, which envisions the emergence of distinct entities from the One akin to "breaking off pieces from an endless and paradoxically edgeless chocolate bar,"5 is reminiscent of Spinoza's distinction between God as "natura naturans" and the world as "natura naturata."6 Furthermore, the "dipolar monism" metaphysics7 Wildman employs to address the hard question in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind is clearly derivative of Spinoza's monistic parallelism between mind and body. [End Page 51]More crucially, by equating God with nature, Spinoza posits that revealed truths about God are merely particular instances of natural truth. The "prophets" described in the Hebrew Bible don't necessarily possess unique wisdom about this natural truth. Instead, they have vivid imaginations, enabling them to employ those particular instances of truth to appeal to the masses' senses, thereby cultivating morality and serving various institutional and political aims. When aligned with natural reason, religion, as thus understood, complements philosophy and science in fostering the humanistic ethics of the general populace. However, when rooted in superstition rather than natural reason, it becomes a source of political manipulation and societal unrest.8 Echoing Spinoza's views on religion, Wildman presents a compelling refutation of the distinction between revealed and natural theology, leaning in favor of the latter.9 Yet, Wildman is still open to retaining "God" as the term for ultimate reality to uphold the moral-guiding role of traditional... (shrink)

I use Jonathan Bennett’s, Gilles Deleuze’s and Pierre Macherey’s interpretations of Spinoza to extract a theory of time and duration from Spinoza. I argue that although time can be considered a product of the imagination, duration is a real property of existing things and corresponds to their essence, taking essence (as Deleuze does) as a degree of power of existing. The article then explores the relations among time, duration, essence and eternity, arguing against the idea that Spinoza’s essences or Spinoza’s (...) eternity are atemporal. Essences and eternity both involve necessary references to time, but the time involved is not that of the “fortuitous sequence of events” apprehended through sensory experience. Rather, the “time” is that implicit in the necessity of God’s self-determination through God’s differentiation into natura naturans and natura naturata, which is involved in the production and differentiation of eternal essences. (shrink)

Les énoncés philosophiques spéculatifs matérialistes de Diderot constituent une ontologie que Diderot expose dans une métaphysique où se nouent trois plans. Le premier est dominé par la catégorie de possible. Diderot pense le possible en termes de possibilité non téléologique : elle concerne le mode de manifestation de l'être. Le deuxième, portant sur la natura naturata et sa connaissance scientifique, s'adosse à la nécessité. Le troisième, s’inscrivant au cœur de la natura naturans et concernant le statut de (...) l'existence des êtres, est l’aléatoire. Comment ces trois plans et ces trois catégories s'articulent-ils rationnellement ? Comment se réalisent-ils dans l’écriture même de la philosophie ?Diderot’s philosophical pronouncements are both speculative and materialist. They make up an ontology and Diderot sets this out in a metaphysics which has three levels. The category of the possible dominates the first level. Diderot thinks the possible in terms of a non-teleological possibiliy, one concerned with the mode in which being manifests itself. The second level, concerned with « natural naturata » and the scientific knowledge that can be had of it, relies on necessity. The third, operating at the very heart of « natura naturans » is concerned with the status of the existence of beings, and is random. How do these three levels and these three categories relate to each other rationally ? How are they realised in the very way that philosophy is written ? (shrink)

The concern of this work is with developing an alternative to standard categories in theology and philosophy, especially in terms of how they deal with nature. Avoiding the polemics of much contemporary reflection on nature, it shows how we are connected to nature through the unconscious and its unique way of reading and processing signs. Spinoza's key distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata serves as the governing framework for the treatise. Suggestions are made for a post-Christian (...) way of understanding religion. Robert S. Corrington's work represents the first sustained attempt to bring together the fields of semiotics, depth-psychology, pragmaticism, and a post-Monotheistic theology of nature. Its focus is on how signification functions in human and non-human orders of infinite nature. Our connection with the infinite is described in detail, especially as it relates to the use of sign systems. (shrink)

Este artigo pensa as contingências decorrentes das máquinas autônomas da natureza no universo das utopias concretas. Pensa como artefatos podem ganhar autonomia diante da irracionalidade da matéria? É sabido que as máquinas utópicas podem exteriorizar um poder desconhecido do ser humano e alcançar uma condição autárquica diante do descaso de seu criador. Ernst Bloch situa tais utopias no 3.º nível da categoria, um ainda-não-ser, que na sua ontologia responde a “possibilidade conforme estrutura do objeto real”. Contingências e imprevisibilidades advindas neste (...) nível determinam a dimensão autônoma das utopias técnicas. A evolução do processo dinâmico e complexo da matéria – natura naturata que se acha velada, uma vez desperta assume a dimensão de natura naturans. A natureza que produz natureza revela que a ação do homem sobre a matéria transforma sonhos utópicos acordados em pesadelos distópicos acordados, determinando uma diversidade de utopias autárquicas que ameaçam a humanidade. Esse contexto recepciona o alvorecer de novas utopias técnicas, que aponta uma não conformidade na geração das máquinas autárquicas bem como, a ausência de uma linguagem ética entre homo utopicus e natura naturans. (shrink)

One of the most peculiar features of Spinoza’s philosophy is his radical interpretation of the notion of freedom. Even though it plays a significant role in his metaethics and political philosophy, freedom is, for Spinoza, a deeply metaphysical notion, rooted in the most fundamental features of his ontology. In this paper, I analyze the internal structure that identifies a being as “free” within Spinoza’s metaphysics. I argue that this structure leads to an internal paradox, entailing that the very component that (...) allows a being its freedom – its essence or nature – is itself externally determined. I further proceed to resolve this issue indicating how Spinoza’s metaphysics of freedom can accommodate this paradox. I conclude by presenting possible solutions for both Natura naturans and Natura naturata, attempting to integrate the notion of metaphysical freedom with more familiar images of ethical and epistemological freedom. (shrink)

Running back then, we can collect a few salient facts about the Invisible World:While things in it are visible, the World itself upon which they are conditioned is not and can not be in principle.Among things in the world, contingency or surprize is a central feature, making possible both the content of perception and the possibility of action, and is in effect some sort of synonym for life. The contingency means both the nondeducibility of what happens as well as the (...) dependence of each thing upon the others in varying degrees of relevance.The World of events and things, certainly ourselves, is composed of singulars, unrepeatable and unique occurrences or things; singularity also derives from the World Itself, the invisible singular condition of Fact.Within the world, each thing appears within a horizon, a last limit of visibility for us wherever we are, but that horizon is itself movable as we move our existential point of view. Beyond one horizon there are other things not too unlike ontologically the ones we see, and so emerges what Jaspers calls a ‘horizon of horizons.’ In short, we remeet that famous ‘etc.’ almost invariably bound up with what the world of things is for us. This ‘horizon of horizons’ itself derives from another aspect of the World as Invisible: its absolute self-enclosed infinity. How else could such an absolute cause or condition express itself seriatim except through endlessness?The last feature we noted was the fracture within the world of things: to wit, that while complete in one sense, in another our world is far from constituting a whole. We are there, too, and are not members of it no matter how much some would like to be so.Singular, unique condition of what is in the world, a world of essential surprize, interdependence, increasingly the Invisible World begins to take on the characteristics of the old philosopher's God, something of the order of Spinoza's God, natura naturans, the world of things being the same substance but taken bit by bit, natura naturata. And if this identity of God and the World seems and has always seemed slightly blasphemous, since God is usually opposed to the World, to soften the blow we might only consider their point of resolution: the Soul, or Transcendental Ego, has the possibility of knowing all this, or at least exploring their unity. To revert to Spinoza again, each Attribute, in his case Extention and Thought, is infinite, but infinite in its own kind. The world of things appears to us indeed infinite, but then it is only a ‘kind’; there is also Thought, or infinite Subjectivity, also infinite in its own kind. And what does thought think about? Well, most usually the world into which it was born; but then it is not long before it perceives the absolute condition of that, and then also there is its reflexivity upon itself. Together, though not by way of summation, the Absolute Source as described is the philosopher's God. Spinoza also said that our Idea of God is identical with God's idea of Himself. (shrink)

This article examines Baruch Benedictus Spinoza conceptual understanding of the proofs for the existence of God. It traces the evolution of this theme pursuant to the metaphysical studies of Moderns Philosophy. Тhe concept of God in the philosophy of Spinoza is considered by exploring the nature of the relations between the transcendent sphere of God and the spiritual world of the human person. Spinoza argues from the possibility of God's existence to God's necessary existence. God is an absolutely infinite substance, (...) necessarily exists, qua Natura Naturans is immutable. God or Nature. The universe is an expression of God's nature, qua Natura Naturata - God is its immanent cause. Spinoza's God is synonymous with Nature. Substance is defined as "in itself". Spinoza understands a substance to be something that is self-caused and self-explained. The transcendence is understood as an ontological category, being discussed in connection with the key themes of Christian philosophy, such as time and eternity, person and history, creation and God etc. Spinoza's concept of God is referring to the God of the monotheistic religions, God as One Substance, pertains to a concept of the oneness of God, is transcendent and therefore "unknowable". Spinoza's definition of God found on the first page of the Ethics: Being absolutely infinite. From the point of view of historiography, the role of the book "Ehtics" by Spinoza is highlighted. (shrink)

In the course of his studies on Kabbalah, Moshe Idel has written on the influence of Kabbalists on philosophy. He suggests that Spinoza was influenced by the Kabbalah regarding his expressions “Deus sive Natura“ and “amor Dei intellectualis.” The 13th-century ecstatic Kabbalist Rabbi Abraham Abulafia and many authors after him cited the numerical equivalence of the Hebrew words for God and Nature: elohim = ha-teba` = 86. This striking numerical equivalence may be one of the sources of Spinoza’s expression (...) “Deus sive Natura.” The same Kabbalist used the Hebrew expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ (“divine intellectual love”), which may underlie Spinoza’s expression “amor Dei intellectualis.” Abulafia’s expression “ahabah elohit sikhlit“ is repeated by the popular 15th-century Maimonidean philosopher, Rabbi Abraham Shalom. (shrink)

Ecstatic naturalism believes that a rich conceptualization of nature should emphasize the reality of a basic ontological difference between a ground that is responsible for generating the world and the encompassing yet incarnate processes of the world. The ontological difference mentioned here is a difference between "nature naturing" (natura naturans) and "nature natured" (natura naturata).1 Ecstatic naturalism takes seriously the difference between nature naturing and nature natured because it is a philosophy that recognizes nature's immanent or incarnate (...) processes of semiotic generation as well as the reality of nature's transcendental generative ground (a ground that "natures" via sign processes).2 Thus .. (shrink)

This paper argues that Spinoza makes a distinction between the constitutive essence of God (the totality of His attributes) and the essence of God per se (His power and causal efficacy). Using this distinction, I explain how Spinoza can conceive of God as being both an immutable simple unity and a subject for constantly changing modes. Spinoza believes that God qua Natura Naturans is immutable, while God qua Natura Naturata is not. With this point established, Curley’s claim (...) that Spinozistic modes are causally dependent on but not properties of God loses much of its attraction. In conclusion, I suggest how God’s essence is related to His attributes and His modes. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende señalar la importancia de la causa inmanente al interior de la doctrina de Baruch Spinoza. La ética es el tratado más importante de Spinoza y reúne el pensamiento maduro del filósofo holandés. La prop. XVIII del libro I tiene un rol fundamental y articula el mundo de la Naturaleza Naturante y la Naturaleza Naturada, mostrando por primera vez la manera en que la causa única se produce y produce todo: de forma inmanente. Intentamos, así, mostrar el rol (...) articulador de la causa immanens en el pensamiento de Spinoza y la importancia de la ética. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

The version of religious naturalism sketched here is called naturism to distinguish it from conceptions of religious naturalism that make fundamental appeal to some idea of deity, deities, or the divine, however immanental, functional, nonontological, or purely valuational or existential such notions may be claimed to be. The focus of naturism is on nature itself as both metaphysically and religiously ultimate. Nature is sacred in its own right, not because of its derivation from some more–ultimate religious principle, state, being, beings, (...) or order of being. Humans, their cultures, and their histories are conceived as integral parts of nature, manifestations of potentialities that lie within it and have been actualized by biological evolution. While there is no purpose of nature, the natural order contains beings capable of purposive behavior. With this purposive behavior, and the goals and ideals implicit in it, humans have the capacity to give significant direction to their ongoing cultural evolution and to discover and maintain their appropriate place within the community of creatures. (shrink)

Understanding emotions — an apparent contradiction. Comments on Andrzej Dąbrowski’s Origins, nature and functions of emotions: This paper offers some polemical comments on Andrzej Dąbrowski’s recently published book Origins, nature and functions of emotions. The background for reflection is Leon Petrażycki’s theory of emotions. The author aims to evaluate Dąbrowski’s presentation of an influential Polish philosopher Leon Petrażycki, considered an important forerunner of the psychosocial theory of law or legal psychologism, who initiated a long‐lasting debate on the role and meaning (...) of emotions. (shrink)