This article advances mutism as a creative mode and conceptual tool to treat silence in cinema. Whereas mutism can be a productive concept for the study of auditory and visual absence in a broader...

L’essai se confronte à la nécessité de rendre plus précise et, par là même, de transformer la notion nancyenne d’être-avec-les-autres. C’est seulement s’il implique un être avec les autres qui ne puisse jamais appartenir à aucune communauté que l’être-avec-les-autres se présente comme la relation absolue et absolument indissoluble : la relation de toutes les relations qui est immédiatement une relation dont le corrélat n’est pas donné. Selon la structure infra-négative de cet être-avec-sans, les communautés ne peuvent se soumettre à des (...) systèmes « symboliques », ni être saisies « comme telles » par elles-mêmes ou par les autres, ni se présenter ou se représenter elles-mêmes dans un corpus philosophique. L’être-avec-les-autres est l’être-sans que l’on appelle « philosophie ». (shrink)

The thesis defended is that ordinary perception does not present us with the existential independence of its objects from itself. The phenomenology of ordinary perception is mute with respect to the subject-object distinction. I call this view "phenomenal neutral monism" : though neutral monists are wrong about the metaphysics of perception (in every perceptual episode, there is a distinction between the perceptual act and its perceptual objet), they are right about its phenomenology. I first argue that this view is not (...) as counter-intuitive as it might initially seem, by stressing (i) that the lack of presentation of the mind-independence of perceptual objects does not entail their being presented as mind-dependent. (ii) That phenomenal neutral monism is true of ordinary perception in the thin sense, but not in the thick sense (that includes expectations, guesses, feelings etc. grounded on thin perception). (iii) That the concept of a perceptual perspective or point of view should not be confused with the concept of the subject or intentional act of perception. Second, I propose three positive arguments in favor of phenomenal neutral monism. (i) It does justice to the recurring idea that only resistance to our will presents us with the world qua independent from us. (ii) It does justice to the recurring idea that the most natural attitude towards the perceptual world is that of being absorbed in it. (iii) It is entailed by the view that intentional acts are phenomenally transparent (a view held by Russell and Moore, and most contemporary representationalists) together with the view that in order to be presented with a relation (here the act-object distinction) one has to be presented with its relata. (shrink)

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)has been identified as part of a supervisoryattentional network for selecting alternativemotor programs in response to top-down corticalprocessing, particularly in situationsinvolving conflicting cognitive tasks.Bilateral lesions to the ACC may be causallyassociated with akinetic mutism, where patientsare unable to voluntarily initiate responses.The clinical and neuroanatomical evidence forthis presumed causal association is examined atlength. However, given the many reciprocalprojections between cerebral, motor, limbic andparalimbic structures within the executivesupervisory network, the association ofvoluntary behavior with a particular structure(the ACC) (...) is highly controversial and thereforepremature at this time. Also considered is theclaim that our subjective sense of voluntarycontrol and free will is simply due toour not having conscious access to theunderlying neural computations that precede our decisions and actions. On thecontrary, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary thoughts and actions mayrather be a matter of temporal and directionallag between parallel computations in differentneural areas. Finally, with reference toDennett, there is an extended discussion ofwhether patients with akinetic mutism are (i) conscious automata, (ii) non-intentional systems, and (iii) in azombie-like state. The relevance of (i)–(iii) for the cognitive neuroscientificliterature is then briefly addressed. (shrink)

Selective mutism is a psychiatric condition that is characterized by a failure to speak in specific social situations despite speaking normally in other situations. There is abundant evidence that anxiety, and social anxiety in particular, is a prominent feature of SM, which is the main reason why this condition is currently classified as an anxiety disorder. Meanwhile, there is increasing support for the notion that autism-related problems are also involved in SM. The present study examined the relations between SM (...) and social anxiety, autistic features, and behavioral inhibition to the unfamiliar. Parents of 172 3- to 6-year-old preschool children completed an online survey for measuring the relevant constructs. Results showed that there were positive and statistically significant correlations between SM and social anxiety, autistic features, and behavioral inhibition. Regression analyses revealed that both social anxiety and autistic features accounted for a significant and unique proportion of the variance in SM scores, and that both of these variables no longer made a significant contribution once behavioral inhibition was added to the model. It can be concluded that while the involvement of social anxiety is unambiguous in SM, autism-related problems are also implicated. Furthermore, behavioral inhibition seems to play a key role in the non-speaking behavior of non-clinical young children. (shrink)

The effects of religion, population sub-division and geography on the prevalence of deaf-mutism were investigated using information collected in the 1921 Census of Punjab. The total sample size was 9·36 million, and comprised data on thirteen Hindu castes, seventeen Muslim biraderis and two Sikh castes. A two-way analysis of variance comparing males in Hindu castes in which consanguineous marriage was prohibited, with males in Muslim biraderis which favoured first cousin marriage, indicated major differences with respect to the patterns of (...) deaf-mutism within each religion. In the Muslim population 9·1% of the relative variation in the prevalence of deaf-mutism was inter-biraderi, 36·8% between geographical regions, and 48·8% an interaction between biraderi and region, whereas among Hindus 46·8% of the observed variation was inter-caste, 12·8% inter-region and 33·6% due to caste–region interaction. From a wider disease perspective the results obtained with the Hindu community indicate the significant genetic differentiation associated with caste endogamy. As the overwhelming majority of Hindu marriages continue to be within-caste, it can be predicted that similar levels of inter-caste differences in disease frequency currently exist. By comparison, the lower level of inter-biraderi variation among Muslims is probably indicative of the dissolution of pre-existing caste boundaries and the resultant gene pool mixing that followed the large-scale conversion of Hindus to Islam during Muslim rule in North India from the 13th to the 19th centuries. (shrink)

This paper presents a case in whom a differential diagnosis of akinetic mutism with a disorder of consciousness was made using diffusion tensor tractography. A 69-year-old female patient was diagnosed with subarachnoid hemorrhage, intraventricular hemorrhage, and intracerebral hemorrhage produced by the subarachnoid hemorrhage. She exhibited impaired consciousness with a Coma Recovery Scale-Revised score of 13 until 1 month after onset. Her impaired consciousness recovered slowly to a normal state according to the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised at 7 weeks after onset. (...) On the other hand, she exhibited the typical clinical features of akinetic mutism. On the DTT performed at 1-month, the upper, and lower dorsal ascending reticular activating systems, which are related to a disorder of consciousness, showed an almost normal state. In contrast, the prefronto-caudate and prefronto-thalamic tracts, which are related to akinetic mutism, showed severe injuries. These DTT results suggested that the patient's main clinical features were not a disorder of consciousness but akinetic mutism. Therefore, DTT for the ascending reticular activating system, and the prefronto-caudate and prefronto-thalamic tracts could provide additional evidence for a differential diagnosis of DOC and AM at the early stages of stroke. (shrink)

Selective mutism is an anxiety disorder in which an individual is unable to speak in certain social situations though may speak normally in other settings (Hua & Major, 2016 ). Selective mutism in adults is rare, though people with this condition might have other methods of communicating their needs outside of verbal communication. Healthcare professionals rely on a patient’s ability to communicate to establish if they have decision-making capacity. This commentary responds to a case of a young adult (...) patient with selective mutism and social anxieties that significantly limited his ability to communicate with anyone in the healthcare team. This required a creative, patient-centered approach to engage in meaningful communication. (shrink)

Selective mutism (SM) is a developmental disorder characterized by a child’s inability to speak in certain contexts and/or in the presence of unfamiliar interlocutors. This work proposes a critical discussion of the most recent studies on SM, with respect to clinical and diagnostic features, as well as the etiology and treatment of this disorder. At present, all research work supports the hypothesis that SM is a complex anxiety disorder with multifactorial etiology (interaction among biological and environmental causes). The latest (...) edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) places SM mutism among “Anxiety Disorders”, and no longer among “Other Childhood, Infant and Adolescent Disorders” (as in DSM-IV). Other important aspects relate to cognitive biases and emotional states at the base of SM, which partly explain the disorder’s persistence and represent an important objective of intervention work. No data in the literature point to a total remission of SM, but good results are achieved with cognitive behavior intervention and multimodal therapy (MMT) involving a variety of child interaction contexts. (shrink)

Northoff provides a compelling argument supporting a kind of “double dissociation” of Parkinson's disease and catatonia. We discuss a related form of akinetic mutism linked to mesodiencephalic injuries and suggest an alternative to the proposed “horizontal” versus “vertical” modulation distinction. Rather than a “directional” difference in patterned neuronal activity, we propose that both disorders reflect hypersynchrony within typically interdependent but segregated networks facilitated by a common thalamic gating mechanism.

“What is the difference between badal and ‘aṭf bayān?” Here is a student question, quite legitimate, which, interestingly enough, does not find an immediate answer. This answer is not found neither in Arabist grammars of Arabic, nor even in the traditional Arab grammars of Arabic which, for many, only rely as a distinction between the two on the sacrosanct ’i‘rāb and in the very restricted framework of the vocative. Thus there is nothing to differentiate two examples given by Ibn Ǧinnī, (...) illustrating respectively badal and ‘atf bayān: qāma ’aḫū-ka zaydun and qāma ’aḫū-ka muḥammadun. Moreover, a grammarian and logician like ’Astarābāḏī even explicitly states that he does not see any clear difference between badal al-kull min al-kull and the ‘atf al-bayān. This criterion is neither distributional, nor inflectional, nor even semantic and pragmatic, even if it results from the latter, but suprasegmental, and it turns out that medieval Arabic grammarians are not deaf to it, as this article will show. (shrink)

d'avec: mutations, mutismes (ad Nancy) -- N'essance (ad Derrida) -- Das Nicht im Satz der Identität -- Le sans de l'etre (ad Derrida) -- Lingua amissa : Vorwort zur spanischen Ausgabe -- Lingua amissa : vom Messianismus der Warensprache -- Messianisches Nicht -- Ou, Séance, touche de Nancy, ici (I) -- Ou, Séance, touche de Nancy, ici (II).

Some vegetative state patients show fMRI responses similar to those of healthy controls when instructed to perform mental imagery tasks. Many authors have argued that this provides evidence that such patients are in fact conscious, as response to commands requires intentional agency. I argue for an alternative reading, on which responsive patients have a deficit similar to that seen in severe forms of akinetic mutism. Akinetic mutism is marked by the inability to form and maintain intentions to act. (...) Responsive patients are likely still conscious. However, the route to this conclusion does not support attributions of intentional agency. I argue that aspects of consciousness, rather than broad diagnostic categories, are the more appropriate target of empirical investigation. Investigating aspects of consciousness provides a better method for investigating profound disorders of consciousness. 1 Introduction2 Responses in the Vegetative State2.1 The imaging evidence2.2 The need for models3 Responsive Patients and Akinetic Mutism3.1 Akinetic mutism3.2 Akinetic mutism as a deficit in intentions3.3 Arguments for the link3.4 Interim conclusion4 Other Models4.1 A deficit in ability?4.2 Modular intentions?5 Consciousness and Method5.1 Are they conscious?5.2 Aspects versus levels. (shrink)

In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism, minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. Brain death does not disrupt (...) somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism’s death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. Brain -based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs. (shrink)

As well as Vico was the first and most persistent to understand myth as a contemporary phenomenon that, far of being in conflict with reason, is originally the instrument for escaping the loneliness of man against the mutism of a meaningless nature, Hans Blumenberg has been in our age who has spoken most forcefully for the rationality of mythical thought, doing it with arguments that the author finds very similar to Vico¿s ones. "Absolutism of reality", "absolute metaphor" and "principle (...) of insufficient reason", the three main elements, according to this reading, of Blumenberg¿s work, share with Vico the same metaphorical sensibility. (shrink)

How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good (...) marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine what a philosophical approach, the one that Jacques Derrida uses on blindness in his Memoirs of the Blind, can bring to Cultural Disability Studies. Using some of the paintings and drawings reproduced in this 1990 work, the present study first intends to show that, for Derrida, it is a particular way of considering the mutism of visual art works that leads to seeing or imagining, in those that show blind people, representations (...) of blindness that have in common to make it a powerlessness. This paper then analyses how, for the philosopher, these same works can be approached by virtue of a second way of considering their mutism, and thus read as giving rise to the idea of a completely different kind of blindness, understood this time as a power that is highly resistant to the narratives that, in history, have made it an powerlessness. Finally, he proposes to complement this way of reading pictorial images of blindness with Stiker’s theorized “Reversal scheme” and the “neo-historicism” applied by Snyder and Mitchell to artistic representations of disability. (shrink)

Au sortir de la guerre, Merleau-Ponty considérait que tout ce qu’on croyait pensé et bien pensé – la liberté et les pouvoirs, la citoyenneté – est en ruine. En 1960, la Préface de Signes semble reconduire le constat, attestant cette fois de l’échec des philosophies de l’histoire dont les Aventures de la dialectique dessinaient le premier volet. Si la critique marxienne apparaissait contribuer à la clarté politique et constituer la réponse adéquate à une période de crise, quelle opportunité reste-t-il au (...) philosophe une fois la rupture avec le marxisme consommée? A l’abandon pur et simple de la philosophie politique suggéré par les interprètes et par le texte de Merleau-Ponty lui-même en certains endroits – « n’est-ce pas un incroyable malentendu si tous les philosophes ou presque se sont crus obligés d’avoir une politique? » (S, 13) – il faut préférer l’alternative de la philosophie militante, mentionnée à partir de 1956 en deux lieux textuels, seule issue possible d’une philosophie ayant abandonné ses droits au système sans se résoudre au mutisme – soit, dans une perspective encore marxiste, l’après devenir-monde de la philosophie. Comment dès lors conjuguer l’apparition du syntagme en 1946, où il semble réservé à la pensée de Marx par contraste avec la philosophie triomphante hégélienne, et son maintien hors du cadre de référence marxien, lorsque ce dernier est devenu, selon les dires de Merleau-Ponty lui-même, un auteur qu’il convient de méditer à la manière d’un classique? L’insuccès des pensées systématiques de l’histoire et des figures classiques de l’engagement (Sartre, Boukharine) dévoile la nécessité pour Merleau-Ponty d’interroger continument son expérience politique et la raison d’être de son militantisme, inscrit dans la chair de l’histoire.As the war ended, Merleau-Ponty considered that everything thought to be good and well thought – freedom, powers, citizenship – was in ruin. In 1960, the Preface to Signs seems to replicate this realization, attesting this time to the failure of philosophies of history of which Adventures of the Dialectic sketched the first phase. If the Marxist critique appeared to contribute to political clarity and to consist in an adequate response to a period of crisis, what opportunities remain for philosophy once the rupture with Marxism is finalized? To the pure and simple abandonment of political philosophy suggested by interpreters and by Merleau-Ponty’s text itself in certain instances – “Is it not an incredible misunderstanding that all, or almost all, philosophers have felt obliged to have a politics?” (S, 5) – one must favor the alternative of militant philosophy, first mentioned in 1956 in two textual locations. This alternative is the only outcome possible for a philosophy that has abandoned its rights to the system without resolving itself to silence. It is, from a still-Marxist perspective, the post becoming-world of philosophy. How, then, can we reconcile the appearance of the phrase in 1946 – where it seems reserved to Marxist thought in contrast with the triumphant Hegelian philosophy – with its retention outside of Marxist references, even as Marx has become, according to Merleau-Ponty himself, a writer who should be reflected upon as a classic? For Merleau-Ponty, the failure of systematic theories of history and of traditional figures of engagement (Sartre, Bukharin) reveals the necessity to continuously interrogate his own political experience and the ground of his militancy, inscribed in the flesh of history.Alla fine della guerra, Merleau-Ponty considerava che tutto ciò che credevamo ben fatto e ben pensato – la libertà e i poteri, la cittadinanza – fosse in rovina. Nel 1960, la Prefazione a Segni sembra ribadire questa constatazione, attestando questa volta il fallimento delle filosofie della storia di cui le Avventure della dialettica disegnavano la prima componente. Se la critica marxiana sembrava contribuire alla chiarezza politica e costituire la risposta adeguata a un periodo di crisi, quale opportunità resta al filosofo una volta consumata la rottura con il marxismo? All’abbandono puro e semplice della filosofia politica suggerito dagli interpreti, nonché in certi passaggi dei testi dello stesso Merleau-Ponty, bisognerebbe preferire l’alternativa della filosofia militante, menzionata a partire dal 1956 in due passaggi, sola via d’uscita possibile da una filosofia che ha ceduto i propri diritti al sistema e che però non vuole ridursi al mutismo. O invece, in una prospettiva ancora marxista, l’epoca successiva al divenire-mondo della filosofia. Come coniugare allora l’apparizione del sintagma nel 1946, apparentemente riservato al pensiero di Marx in contrasto con la filosofia hegeliana trionfante, con la sua salvaguardia fuori dal quadro di riferimento marxiano, dal momento in cui quest’ultimo è diventato, secondo lo stesso Merleau-Ponty, un autore sui cui è necessario riflettere alla maniera di un classico? L’insuccesso delle filosofie sistematiche della storia e delle figure classiche dell’impegno (Sartre, Bucharin) rivela la necessità per Merleau-Ponty d’interrogare continuamente la sua esperienza politica e la ragion d’essere della sua militanza, iscritta nella carne della storia. (shrink)

Qu'y a-t-il de plus paradoxal et de plus profondément décevant que de ne plus pouvoir parler ouvertement aujourd'hui de la beauté sans être soupçonné de naïveté, tant elle a été elle-même frappée de mutisme voire d'interdiction par toutes les "déconstructions" de la métaphysique, toutes les "ruptures" des "avant-gardes artistiques", toutes les industries du divertissement de masse et toutes les formes de nihilisme qui en résultent? La beauté ne continue-t-elle pas, pourtant, de faire l'objet d'une irréductible expérience qui, modestement mais résolument, (...) féconde toujours l'existence humaine, dans sa dimension proprement esthétique, certes, mais aussi dans les domaines éthique (comme en amour et en amitié) et socio-politique (dans le partage du sensible nécessaire à tout sens commun)? C'est à redonner la parole et droit de cité à cette expérience de la beauté que nous espérons ici contribuer, en dialogue avec les Anciens et les Modernes, en nous instruisant à la fois des principes de la philosophie et des révélations de la littérature et des autres arts, comme de la vie la plus quotidienne. (shrink)

K L Kahlbaum published in 1874 the first recorded description of catatonia. Akinetic catatonia is now defined as a neuropsychiatric syndrome principally characterised by akinesia, mutism, stupor, and catalepsy. 1 Even if some advances have been made in the recognition of catatonia, in particular by the development of different rating scales, 1 the pathophysiology of this syndrome is not clearly established. A right handed 14 year old girl presented with akinetic catatonia during an episode of depression in the context (...) of a bipolar type I disorder. Her catatonic status was characterised by akinesia with brief episodic spontaneous stereotyped movements, mutism, no spontaneous oral intake, catalepsy, waxy flexibility, and stupor with brief occasional eye contacts. This corresponded to a total score of 19 on the Northoff Catatonia Scale.1 Electroencephalogram performed one day after onset of symptoms showed diffuse theta activity with sporadic diffuse delta activity. Cerebral magnetic resonance imaging was normal. Brain positron emission tomographies (PET) were obtained on a CTI-Siemens HR+ tomograph. A first PET (PET1) using (18F(- fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) was performed on day 2 in a drug free state. Thereafter, intramuscular injection of 2 mg of lorazepam induced rapid clinical remission of the akinetic phase. Oral lorazepam was then given (3.75 mg/day) during five days. On day 8, a second PET with FDG was performed while the patient was treated by olanzapine (15 mg/day) and presented hyperactivity, logorrhoea, and disinhibition characterised by uncontrolled social interactions and physical contacts. Neuropsychological testing performed some days after remission revealed no apraxia or language disturbances but dysfunction of executive tasks manifested in the revised Wisconsin card sorting, the Tower of London, Stroop, and Trailmaking tests. Voxel based analyses comparing patient’s cerebral glucose metabolism with that of 29 right handed healthy controls (16 women and 13 men, mean age 32) were performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM99) (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK).. (shrink)

When Russell argued for his ontological convictions, for instance that there are negative facts or that there are universals, he expressed himself in English. But Wittgenstein must have noticed that from the point of view of Russell's ideal language these ontological statements appear to be pseudo-propositions. He believed therefore that what these statements pretend to say, could not really be said but only shown. Carnap discovered a way out of this mutism: what in the material mode of speech of (...) the object language looks like a pseudo-proposition can be translated into a perfectly meaningful proposition in the formal mode of speech (in the metalinguistic mode of speech of the logical syntax of language). But is this ascent into the metalanguage necessary? Taking advantage of Lésniewski's logical system there exists another way outwe can expand the number of categories of our ideal language. But Leniewski's formulas raise another profound problem, the problem of semantical muteness (cf. W. G. Lycan Semantic Competence and Funny Functors Monist 64 (1979), 209–222). (shrink)

La dimension artistique du mémorial de Peter Eisenmann a été peu considérée. A la croisée de l'architecture et de la sculpture, il convient d'étudier sa dimension urbaine et de relever son identité comme monument in situ. Les réflexions du philosophe Derrida sur le déconstructivisme architectural, notamment de Libeskind, sont capitales. Comme le dit Habermas, son défenseur majeur, le monument s'adresse aux descendants allemands des bourreaux. Notre essai propose une lecture adornienne du mémorial qui dépend de l'art abstrait et de sa (...) métexis aux ténèbres. Le mutisme du mémorial implique une réflexion sur les questions de l'infigurable et de l'ineffable concernant la Shoah. Si le sens de l'oeuvre semble être absent, cela peut s'expliquer par la déclaration de Ruth Klüger, selon laquelle l'extermination des juifs par les nazis est un non-sens absolu. Le monument invite à ouvrir le champ de la mémoire et contient un avertissement : l'autodestruction de l'espèce humaine. (shrink)

According to Vera Moser, the first professorship of healing pedagogy, Heilpädagogik at the University of Zürich in 1931, established pedagogy of the disabled as an academic discipline. Through the definition of the smallest common denominator for all disabilities, which Heinrich Hanselmann called “weakness of the soul,” a connecting element of “imbecility, deaf-mutism, blindness, neglect and idiocy” was established. Under Nazi rule, school pedagogy advanced to völkisch, nationalist special pedagogy, shifting from the category of “innate imbecility” to a broader concept (...) of disability. As an outcome of these programs and policies, 300,000 people with disabilities were killed as a part of the “T4 Aktion.” Within just a few decades after World War II, special pedagogy expanded its sphere of influence through professionalization and institutionalization in West and East Germany and across Europe. This paper explores how special pedagogy aligned itself with the Nazi regime’s discourse and policy on eugenics and race hygiene, leading to the murder and mass sterilization of “disabled” children and adults. It probes questions regarding the extent to which the professionalization of special pedagogy has drawn from the Nazi-era terminology of the deficient and foreign to legitimate the contemporary migrant bias in German and Austrian special pedagogical care. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la perception? Par elle, que nous disent les sens du monde, de l'autre et de nous-mêmes? Rien! Les sens sont muets. Ils n'ont rien à nous dire! Telle est la réponse de Jocelyn Benoist. Il est essentiel, pourtant, que nous puissions en parler. Seulement c'est nous qui parlons, non eux. Et si, voulant faire droit à la réalité de notre expérience sensible. nous commencions par renoncer à la traiter d'abord comme un discours? Le mutisme des sens demeure traversé (...) de bruits. Jocelyn Benoist, envers et contre un certain traitement philosophique de la perception - qui la confond avec la connaissance que nous pouvons en tirer ou le sens que nous pouvons lui donner -, nous invite à écouter en elle le bruissement du sensible. Selon lui, pour rendre celui-ci pleinement audible. il faut congédier ce que la philosophie aujourd'hui appelle le "problème de la perception" et, peut-être, renoncer au concept même de "perception" tel que nous l'héritons de la philosophie moderne, au profit d'une enquête sur la texture réelle et poétique du sensible. (shrink)

Coma, vegetative state, lock-in syndrome and akinetic mutism are defined. Vegetative state is a state with no evidence of awareness of self or environment and showing cycles of sleep and wakefulness. PVS is an operational definition including time as a variable. PVS is a vegetative state that has endured or continued for at least one month. PVS can be diagnosed with a reasonable amount of medical certainty; however, the diagnosis of PVS must be kept separate from the outcome. The (...) patient outcome can be predicted based on etiology and age. Using outcome probabilities and etiology as criteria, patients can be subdivided in 5 groups and reasonable management guidelines can be suggested. Three levels of care can be provided to PVS patients: high technology, supportive and compassionate care. Pragmatic options for the various subgroups of patients are suggested. Management decisions will remain difficult for both the family and the health-care team. The role of the physician in these difficult cases is to share the decision-making with the family. (shrink)

Comment le silence agit-il au cinéma? Qu'est-ce qui permet d'identifier ce phénomène? Implique-t-il la disparition intégrale de la matière sonore ou seulement sa minimalisation à l'intérieur d'un film? Son intervention, ponctuelle ou durable, tend à engager une raréfaction, voire une suppression, des paroles et de la musique, mais pas forcément de tout bruit. Des lieux particulièrement silencieux, ainsi que le mutisme ou la surdité d'un personnage, sont également propices à l'instauration de telles situations audiovisuelles. Cet ouvrage analyse, à travers une (...) approche généalogique et herméneutique, la présence du silence dans le cinéma contemporain sur le double principe d'héritages figuratifs et de ruptures discursives. Il s'appuie sur un corpus de films réalisés entre autres par Robert Bresson, Marguerite Duras, Andrei Tarkovski, Theo Angelopoulos, Tsaï Ming-liang, Béla Tarr, Pedro Costa ou Sharunas Bartas. Au-delà des considérations esthétiques, le livre interroge aussi les valeurs anthropologiques, morales, sociales et/ou politiques qui se glissent derrière ces manifestations concrètes du silence. Celui-ci nous invite, tant sur le plan éthique que sensible, à repenser notre rapport fondamental au monde."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Aux XIIe-XIVe siècles, l'image de l'adolescente (âgée de douze à seize ans) apparaît très contrastée. Dans les fabliaux, la jeune fille est un personnage soumis à l'autorité parentale, sans épaisseur, muet et sédentaire, objet de fantasme. Dans les récits de miracles, au contraire, c'est un personnage très positif, qui manifeste une relative autonomie dans le processus miraculeux, sublimé et sacralisé en tant que vierge. Ces contrastes de perception tiennent au type de documentation utilisé. Ils reposent sur une série d'oppositions (autonomie (...) / dépendance, mutisme / parole pour Dieu, virginité / sensualité) qui rendent compte d'un regard de clerc sur l'adolescente très ambigu et de la nécessité, pour les hommes d'Eglise, de contrôler le corps de la jeune fille. (shrink)

L’idée selon laquelle le temps, son organisation, sa discipline est un facteur discriminant permettant de séparer nettement la période industrielle de celle qui la précède a longtemps prévalu chez les historiens. Cet article s’inscrit en faux contre cette thèse : les conflits autour du temps de travail doivent être inscrits dans la longue durée des rapports sociaux de production. Nous dressons ici une esquisse large des conflits où le temps est un élément de la mobilisation des travailleurs, du XIVe au (...) premier XIXe siècle. Alors qu’au Moyen-Âge, certains conflits portent clairement sur la remise en cause de la définition du temps de travail, à partir du XVIIe siècle, le thème semble s’estomper. Mais apparaissent alors des conflits qui portent sur le contenu du travail effectué dans un temps donné. La première industrialisation ne change pas véritablement la nature des revendications. Elles proviennent encore majoritairement d’ouvriers engagés dans des activités traditionnelles. Les ouvriers d’usine, quant à eux, ne sortent globalement pas de leur mutisme avant les décennies 1860/1870. (shrink)

It is an important feature of creatures like us that our various motivations compete for control over our behaviour, including mental behaviour such as imagining and attending. In large part, this competition is adjudicated by the stimulation of affect — the intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant aspects of experience. In this paper I argue that the motivation-affect system controls a sub-type of attention called 'alerting attention' to bring various goals and stimuli to consciousness and thereby prioritize those contents for action. This (...) view allows me to flesh out the global workspace theory of consciousness, as well as some of the phenomenal characteristics of conscious experience. (shrink)

El pensamiento filosófico de Sõren Kierkegaard se construye desde problemáticas existenciales del sujeto, como la angustia, la desesperación y el ensimismamiento. La literatura de Ernesto Sábato se desenvuelve entre aquellas problemáticas. El presente artículo propone la lectura del Informe sobre Ciegos como una forma de acceder, desde una perspectiva vivencial, a la complejidad del pensamiento existencial kierkegaardiano.