Acts of moral heroism are often described by heroes as having been in some sense or another required. Here I elaborate two rival strategies for accounting for what I call the requirement claim. The first, originating with J.O. Urmson, attempts to explain away the phenomenon. The second and more popular among moralists is to treat the requirement claim as a moment of moral insight and to make sense of it in terms of moral duty. I argue (...) that both of these strategies are flawed, in that both fail as an account of the phenomenon in question and are independently problematic. I propose a third, alternative account of the requirement claim based on the concept of practical necessity, which, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of the other views. (shrink)

Agents’ self-reports in cases of reactive heroism often deny the optionality, and hence the supererogatory status, of their actions, while conversely supporting a view of these actions in terms of nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. Taking such claims seriously thus makes it puzzling as to why such cases elicit strong approbation. To resolve this puzzle, I show how this necessity can be understood in the predispositional embodied terms of unreflective ethical expertise, such that the agent may be said literally to incarnate (...) generally accepted norms of a shared ethical environment. On this basis I argue that the object of the relevant approbation is the agent’s embodied predispositionality itself—expressing a deep continuity with her social context, it is in virtue of this alone that her action can be both spontaneous and ethically outstanding. By way of conclusion I briefly discuss how this suggests an important categorial distinction between heroism and saintism. (shrink)

What sort of person chooses to remain in a place like Rwanda when an easy exit is offered, when leaving seems the only safe or sane option, and when one is not directly connected to the would-be victims? And how does this person come to develop a circle of care that is expansive enough to include those who are radically Other? In what follows, I consider these questions through a detailed examination of the recent example of Paul Rusesabagina, the Hutu (...) hotel manager in Kigali, Rwanda, who sheltered more than a thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu refugees during the hundred-day genocide. I argue that Rusesabagina was primarily motivated by an awareness of his own mortality, his personal history, a desire to distance himself from the negative behavior of Hutu like himself, and a strong identification with the Tutsi refugees under his protection. (shrink)

The growing field of machine morality has becoming increasingly concerned with how to develop artificial moral agents. However, there is little consensus on what constitutes an ideal moral agent let alone an artificial one. Leveraging a recent account of heroism in humans, the aim of this paper is to provide a prospective framework for conceptualizing, and in turn designing ideal artificial moral agents, namely those that would be considered heroic robots. First, an overview of what it (...) means to be an artificial moral agent is provided. Then, an overview of a recent account of heroism that seeks to define the construct as the dynamic and interactive integration of character strengths and situational constraints that afford the opportunity for moral behavior . With this as a foundation, a discussion is provided for what it might mean for a robot to be an ideal moral agent by proposing a dynamic and interactive connectionist model of robotic heroism. Given the limited accounts of robots engaging in moral behavior, a case for extending robotic moral capacities beyond just being a moral agent to the level of heroism is supported by drawing from exemplar situations where robots demonstrate heroism in popular film and fiction. (shrink)

Heroism and Wisdom is an interdisciplinary work dissecting the lives, philosophies, and works of fourteen historically significant Italian figures to examine the topics of Italian history, culture, and moral psychology of notions such as practical wisdom, heroism, authenticity, honor, will to power, and leading a meaningful human life.

In his monumental work, “War and Peace,” Leo Tolstoy boldly confronts the traditional depiction of heroism in the context of war. He meticulously deconstructs the archetype of the flawless leader, replacing it with a diverse ensemble of characters who redefine heroism through their actions, motivations, and in some instances, their pursuit of a meaningful life. This essay delves into Tolstoy’s innovative portrayal of heroism through an array of characters, both historical figures like Napoleon Bonaparte and Mikhail Kutuzov, (...) and fictional personas such as Prince Andrew Bolkonsky, Nicholas Rostov, Feodor Dolokhov, Captain Tushin, Pierre Buzukhov, and Platon Karataev. Tolstoy invites readers to perceive heroism not as grandiose acts or military prowess, but as the quiet strength, resilience, and moral compass exhibited by unsung heroes. The essay explores this theme through a diverse cast of characters, from unassuming soldiers like Captain Tushin to self-serving figures like Dolokhov, and disillusioned idealists like Pierre and Andrei. Contrary to the image of the glory-seeking conqueror, Tolstoy portrays heroism as the right way of being, embodied by ordinary people. The essay argues that true heroes prioritize duty, empathy, and a commitment to a greater purpose. The analysis extends beyond the battlefield, underscoring the heroism of resilience and compassion embodied by the peaceful survivor Platon Karataev. Lastly, the essay scrutinizes the complexities of heroism, acknowledging the imperfections of some heroes and the power of collective action. By dismantling the myth of the infallible leader, “War and Peace” urges us to recognize the various forms heroism can take and to celebrate the unsung heroes who shape our world. This essay encapsulates the essence of Tolstoy’s view of individual character and ethical and religio-philosophical views of individuals by providing a comprehensive overview of its key arguments and themes. Keywords: Leo Tolstoy (the author), Heroism (central concept), Redefinition (how Tolstoy challenges traditional views), Ordinary Individuals (focus on non-traditional heroes), Quiet Strength (inner fortitude over outward displays), Resilience (ability to bounce back from adversity), Empathy (capacity to understand and share feelings), Moral Compass (strong sense of right and wrong), Duty (fulfilling obligations), Greater Purpose (contributing to something larger than oneself), Deconstructing the Myth (breaking down the idea of the infallible leader), UnsungHeroes (those who deserve recognition but are often overlooked), Flaws of Heroes (heroes are not perfect), Collective Action (heroism emerging from a group), War and Peace (the specific literary work analyzed). (shrink)

Philosophers are by now familiar with “the” paradox of supererogation. This paradox arises out of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose this. This paradox is not our topic in this paper. We mention it only to set it to one side and explain our subtitle. In this paper we introduce and explore another paradox of supererogation, one which also deserves serious philosophical attention. (...) People who perform paradigmatic acts of supererogation very often claim and believe that their acts were obligatory. Plausibly, this is simply a mistake insofar as the actions really are “above and beyond the call of duty,” as common sense would have it. The fact that moral heroes tend to view their actions in this apparently mistaken way is puzzling in itself, and we might learn something interesting about the moral psychology of such individuals if we could explain this tendency. However, this puzzling aspect of the moral psychology of moral heroes is also the chief ingredient in a deeper puzzle, one perhaps more worthy of the title “paradox.” In this paper we present and try to resolve this paradox. The paradox arises when we combine our initial observation about the moral psychology of moral heroes with three plausible claims about how these cases compare with one in which the agent realizes her act is “above and beyond.” The first of these three additional claims is that the agent who mistakenly claims that the act is obligatory is no less virtuous than someone who performs such an act whilst correctly judging it to be obligatory. The second is that the agent who makes such a mistake would display more moral wisdom if she judged the act to be supererogatory. The third is that there is no other relevant difference between the two agents. These three claims, together with a plausible principle about the way in which the virtues work, give rise to a paradox. We consider several ways in which this paradox might be resolved. We argue that the most plausible resolution is to reject the claim that there is no other relevant difference between the two agents. More specifically, we argue that a relevant difference is that the agent who makes this mistake does so because of the depth of their commitment to certain moral values, and that this is itself an important moral virtue: moral depth. (shrink)

The field of mindfulness and the emerging science of heroism have a common interest in the causes and conditions of selfless altruism though up to this point there has been little cross-pollination. However, there is increasing evidence that mindfulness training delivers heroically relevant qualities such as increased attentional functioning, enhanced primary sensory awareness, greater conflict monitoring, increased cognitive control, reduced fear response, and an increase in loving kindness and self-sacrificing behaviors. Predicated on the notion of a “no self,” traditional (...) mindfulness and its focus on enlightenment and selfless service may in fact be ideally suited to the development of the elusive “trait” (predictable) versus “state” (intermittent) heroic character. Interweaving observations and questions drawn from the science of heroism, the article explores the relevant theory, practices, and scientific outcomes of mindfulness. It finds that there is evidence that heroically relevant qualities are trainable with the suite of mindfulness techniques and that an enduring experience of selflessness and service of others (the enlightened hero) may well be within the grasp of the serious practitioner. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ayn Rand's new concept of morality is contrasted with familiar concepts according to which morality is an imposition on an individual that demands that he forgo his own interests as a sacrifice, whether to other people or to God. This chapter explores Rand's view that man's life is the standard of value and looks at each value that John Galt describes as supreme and ruling and, then, at the range of other values that Rand thinks man's life. (...) In discussing the supreme and ruling values, the chapter considers the three virtues that correspond to them: rationality, productiveness, and pride. It also looks at the four remaining virtues Rand identifies such as independence, integrity, honesty, and justice. Rand's conception of justice and the facts it recognizes is powerfully illustrated in Atlas Shrugged. Finally, the chapter examines Rand's view of heroism, which is closely connected with her ethics. (shrink)

For thousands of years people have saved their loudest praise for individuals who made ?the ultimate sacrifice.' Recently, however, many people have begun to equate suicide terrorism with sacrificial heroism. These assertions benefit from a general lack of conceptual clarity regarding the nature of sacrificial heroism itself. Therefore, this paper aims to explore, describe, and define sacrificial heroism, arguing that it requires two primary things: the risk of something highly valued; and the attempt to achieve a directly (...) morally positive result. The paper then reviews four representative scenarios, including two types of suicide terrorism and two types of sacrificial heroism, in order to highlight several critical differences between those actions that deserve to be praised as supremely heroic and those which clearly do not. (shrink)

This paper uses E. M. Forster’s novel Howards End to help articulate what I describe as a moral pluralist approach to moral conflict. Moral pluralism, I argue here, represents a way of responding to the moral conflicts we encounter in our lives, rather than the mere acknowledgment of their inevitability, as suggested by value pluralists like Isaiah Berlin. The tragic view of moral conflict epitomized by Sophocles’ Antigone and endorsed by most theories of value pluralism, (...) tells us that we must choose between moral commitments and reconcile ourselves to the moral regrets that inevitably follow from moral choice. The moral pluralist view, in contrast, suggests that we should seek means, however imperfect, of satisfying conflicting moral commitments and minimizing causes for moral regret. That view, I argue, drives the words and actions of Forster’s heroine in Howards End, Margaret Schlegel. Confronted with a battle between a willful patriarch and a self-righteous sister, a conflict that maps neatly onto the central conflict in Sophocles’ tragedy, Margaret refuses to take sides without refusing to make moral choices. And in doing so, she comes to exemplify an unexpected kind of moral heroism. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to examine the question as to whether self-sacrifice is intrinsic to moral action. The conclusion is that though some moral deeds can be free of appreciable self-sacrifice, most of the time some degree of self-sacrifice is called for. The necessity is not conceptual but built into the lives of most people. The paper is especially interested in a person's refusal to go along with or actively cooperate with wrongdoing, even when there (...) is some risk; and positively giving assistance to those who are oppressed or persecuted, and again when there is some risk. Abstaining from violating the rights and entitlements of others is not enough to be moral, indispensable as it is. An important issue is what degree of self-sacrifice is called for, which, when not risked or endured, allows us to think that immorality has been committed. I follow the standard practice of distinguishing between moral heroism and moral obligation. Moral heroism is exemplified by Socrates who at risk to his life refused to cooperate with the unjust command of the Thirty to seize an innocent man and hand him over for execution. The paper holds that one's basic rights set the limits to the extent of self-sacrifice that one can be obliged to risk or endure. The first part of the paper is devoted to Socrates and to the way in which his moral heroism is not a model for the moral person's action, but rather an inspiration to think hard about what self-sacrifice is demanded, short of his. I locate in the golden rule, the precept that urges us "always to treat others as you would like them to treat you", the best single moral precept. The second part of the paper is on the golden rule. But the precept must be revised somewhat in accordance with the limits on self-sacrifice set by the preservation of one's basic rights. The consequences of the golden rule for political involvement is also discussed. The paper also looks at self-denial, especially as it is taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Self-denial in its most extreme form counsels martyrdom or passive non-resistance and even cooperation with one's oppression. Thus, extreme self-denial is perhaps not a moral phenomenon at all, though in its less extreme forms, it is one of the best aspects of civilized life. There are undeniable affinities between self-sacrifice and self-denial. (shrink)

What is morality? How many moral values are there? And what are they? According to the theory of morality-as-cooperation, morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory predicts that there will be as many different types of morality as there are different types of cooperation. Previous research, drawing on evolutionary game theory, has identified at least seven different types of cooperation, and used them to explain seven (...) different types of morality: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. Here we explore the conjecture that these simple moral ‘elements’ combine to form a much larger number of more complex moral ‘molecules’, and that as such morality is a combinatorial system. For each combination of two elements, we hypothesise a candidate moral molecule, and successfully locate an example of it in the professional and popular literature. These molecules include: fraternity, blood revenge, family pride, filial piety, gavelkind, primogeniture, friendship, patriotism, tribute, diplomacy, common ownership, honour, confession, turn taking, restitution, modesty, mercy, munificence, arbitration, mendicancy, and queuing. These findings indicate that morality – like many other physical, biological, psychological and cultural systems – is indeed a combinatorial system. Thus morality-as-cooperation provides a principled and powerful theory, that explains why there are many moral values, and successfully predicts what they will be; and it generates a systematic framework that has the potential to explain all moral ideas, possible and actual. Pursuing the many implications of this theory will help to place the study of morality on a more secure scientific footing. (shrink)

For a homicidal tyrant Domitian was disconcertingly droll. A number of examples of is ‘sardonic wit’ survive. One of them was so good that Marcus Aurelius supposedly repeated it, and attributed it to Hadrian rather than Domitian on the grounds that good sayings had no moral force if they came from tyrants.3 Domitian also possessed a talent for writing. Suetonius and Tacitus claim that his interest in literature was merely a pretence, but Domitian′s contemporaries claim for him genuine ability, (...) and here for once they seem much closer to the mark, as Coleman argues. (shrink)

“Only connect …,” the epigraph of Forster's Howards End, offers itself as a model of moral diplomacy. The efficacy of genuine human connection—whether it takes the form of creative action or of decent human relations—in containing and civilizing force is an idea that informs the novel's conception of what constitutes and ensures civilized life. Forster regarded propriety and convention as expressions of force and so applauded any assault on conventional feeling as an act of moral heroism. This (...) essay introduces the third installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Peace by Other Means”: it explores and indeed extols the moral efficacy of connection in containing force and resolving conflicts, but it also contemplates the obstacles to connection, which Forster dramatizes with his characteristic honesty. (shrink)

This article sheds light on moral education from an exemplarist perspective. Following Linda Zagzebski's Exemplarist Virtue Theory, we relate several fundamental exemplarist intuitions to the classical virtue ethical debate over the unity-disunity of the virtues, to endorse a pluralistic exemplar-based approach to moral education ("Empe"). After a few preliminary remarks, we argue that Empe amounts to defending "a prima facie" disunitarist perspective in moral theory, which admits both exemplarity in all respects (moral sainthood) and single-domain exemplarity (...) (moral heroism). Then, we evaluate the effectiveness of heroes and saints for moral education, according to four criteria derived from Empe. This analysis allows us to conclude that moral education should value both kinds of exemplars and, therefore, adopt weaker standards of exemplarity than the unitarist's ones. (shrink)

Introduction The Odyssey is a poem of paradox. On the one hand, it is the "most teleologi- cal of epics,"' a story of a man's desire, long frustrated but ...

For years, moral language has been the province of the Right, as the Left has consoled itself with rudderless pragmatism. In this profound and powerful book, Susan Neiman reclaims the vocabulary of morality--good and evil, heroism and nobility--as a lingua franca for the twenty-first century. In constructing a framework for taking responsible action on today's urgent questions, Neiman reaches back to the eighteenth century, retrieving a series of values--happiness, reason, reverence, and hope--held high by Enlightenment thinkers. In this (...) thoroughly updated edition, Neiman reflects on how the moral language of the 2008 presidential campaign has opened up new political and cultural possibilities in America and beyond. (shrink)

Are ordinary moral agents able to follow the moral lead of heroes and saints? In her Exemplarist Moral Theory Linda Zagzebski provided an exemplarist account to morality grounded on admiration. She focused her research on three possible kinds of exemplar: the saint, the hero and the sage. In this paper, I hold that there are at least two possible ways of following an exemplar (inference and strict emulation). Furthermore, I will try to show that when we take (...) morally exceptional agents (in particular heroes and saints) as exemplars to be emulated, some theoretical and normative problems arise. In particular, I will outline the Feasibility Problem, the Non-motivating Admiration Problem and the Distortion of Duty. Given these issues, I suggest an account of supererogation for this moral approach. I argue that this will provide some theoretical advantages for exemplarism, together with a new attention for extraordinary moral acts. The admiration of praiseworthy deeds, similarly to exemplars, can provide valuable moral guidance. (shrink)

In Coogan's Bluff (1968) and the Dirty Harry films, Clint Eastwood's characters often invoke luck when they want unpredictable others to assume some responsibility to stop violence, thereby implicating moral luck in heroism. In the famous ‘Do I feel lucky’ scene from Dirty Harry (1971), Eastwood's character might not be bluffing, but he is giving luck a role in justice. In this case and others, his character's unconventional responsibility should prompt reconsideration of his character's virtue. Viewers must also (...) decide where the deceptive or rule-breaking policeman locates the responsibility for his actions. (shrink)

Such a bewildering and contradictory welter of behaviors and traits are connoted by “honor” and its best equivalents in other languages that analyses of the concept have daunted philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and literary scholars for millennia. Is it an external good given — and revoked just as easily — by others? Or does “honor” name an inner good that’s absolutely in our control: our integrity, our very commitment to right conduct? Is honor a central moral virtue (...) — as when we might say that “all was lost, save our honor”? Or is it a good quality that’s not-quite “moral,” or indeed even an antiquated virtue hostile to true morality? Is the honorable man a heroic figure who protects the weak, or one who can be expected to bully the weak, as in the case of “honor killings”? Is honor aristocratic and inegalitarian, and thus a virtue that enables and ennobles what’s essentially oppression? Or is honor a signal virtue of fair-dealing, fair-fighting, and fair competition, as evidenced in sportsmanship? (shrink)

This article examines the ways in which villainous characters are portrayed in post-classical American films, and examines how these characters are viewed by the cinematic audience in order to ascertain the degree to which the socially and morally understood roles or heroism and villainy might be inverted through cinematic representation. The potential for the inversion of perceived good and evil in the characters that inhabit the films discussed is considered in relation to the aligning and allying capacity of cinema. (...) This work also considers the impact of stars in villainous roles and the significance of generic conventions in rendering the villain apparently inert to a viewing audience. Through considering the formal presentation of characters and scenarios, this work suggests that villainous deeds can be perceived as unthreatening, and even 'moral' to an extent. The purpose of this article is to form an understanding of how audiences engage with iniquitous characters, and to consider the potential spectatorial implications of such a bond. (shrink)

Do moral obligations include all the good that can be possibly achieved? Does every instance of the good always entail obligatory performance? Supererogation is a moral concept that tries to address this claim, by pointing out the existence of a category of morally relevant good acts that go beyond the call of duty. Paradigmatic examples of this category of acts are represented by deeds of heroism and sanctity, where the agent is sacrificing herself in order to benefit (...) the others in an exemplary way. However, supererogation is not limited to extreme and utmost cases of generosity, but it has much to do with our everyday life. From a moral point of view, making a small donation to the local children‘s hospital is considered to be morally good, but optional. (shrink)

Although there is no questioning the heroism of those who “rebel against the selfish replicators” their task seems very nearly insurmountable. I question whether anyone can formulate a broadly acceptable moral system that will not in some respects be constrained by the legacy of generations spent as selfish and kin‐selected replicators.

Here is an in-depth look at the role myth, mortality, and religion play in J. R. R. Tolkien's works such as The Hobbit, The Lord of the Rings, and The Silmarillion -- including Tolkien's private letters and revealing opinions of his own work. Richard L. Purtill brilliantly argues that Tolkien's extraordinary ability to touch his readers' lives through his storytelling -- so unlike much modern literature -- accounts for his enormous literary success. This book demonstrates the moral depth in (...) Tolkien's work and cuts through current subjectivism and cynicism about morality. A careful reader will find a subtle religious dimension to Tolkien's work -- all the more potent because it is below the surface. Purtill reveals that the author's fantasy stories creatively incorporate profound religious and ethical ideas. For example, Purtill shows us how hobbits reflect both the pettiness of unimaginative parochial humanity and the unexpected heroism of ordinary people in crisis. Purtill effectively addresses larger issues of the place of myth, the relation of religion and morality to literature, the relation of Tolkien's work to traditional mythology, modern fantasy and science fiction, and the lessons Tolkien's work teaches that are applicable to our own lives. Book jacket. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Call to Arms? —Militarism, Political Unity, and the Moral Equivalent of WarJohn Kaag1. IntroductionIn 1906, William James presented “The Moral Equivalent of War” and turned his attention to a question that has for better and for worse defined the American political landscape, namely, the question of how to maintain political unity and civic virtue in the absence of an immediate and galvanizing threat. Today, even in (...) a time of war, this question remains as pressing as it is perplexing. Indeed, it seems perplexing that the question often appears so very pressing. This problematic seems to warrant a detailed investigation if we are to propose viable and philosophically sound alternatives to the presumed military ethos and the political unity it seems to beget. In developing alternatives, James suspects that instead of jettisoning this unifying ethos we ought to admit the benefits of some of its aspects while owning up to, and mitigating, its destructive tendencies. This task seems challenging, if not wholly impossible, in light of the current geopolitical situation. It seems fair—if only slightly ironic—for American philosophers to explore the possibilities of this project.This paper aims to revisit several key points in James’s “The Moral Equivalent of War” and in his article “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings.” In so doing, it has two related purposes. First, it presents James as an overtly social-political thinker, challenging the notion Cornel West expressed, that “James had nothing profound or even provocative to say... in regard to politics” (West 60). Secondly, and more specifically, I argue that these essays shed theoretical light on the related topics of military action, social-political commitment, and personal virtue. In the first three sections of the paper, I show how James’s comments continue to enlighten our political situation with astonishing, if not disturbing, clarity. As a brief analysis of Cold War [End Page 108] history exposes, James is surprisingly prescient in identifying the perceived relationship between threat and the coalescence of political organization. In the face of an external or internal threat, certain portions of domestic populations tend to “rally around the flag,” committing themselves to protective and military purposes. Echoing James, Randolph Bourne (a student of John Dewey) puts this point nicely when in 1918 he suggests that “war is the health of the state” (James, “Moral Equivalent” 349). James predicts that, in the absence of imminent danger, the health of states and the personal virtues of their citizens will decline. This point has been born out in several historical cases but seems to beg several questions: What sort of political unity might be developed without the threat of the disastrous consequences of military assault and occupation? Is the health of the state a good that we ought to seek? If so, what sort of political unity is best? James begs these questions but leaves it to us to answer in a thoroughgoing way. In the last two sections of the paper, I begin to formulate this answer along Jamesian lines.In “The Moral Equivalent of War,” James makes the seemingly odd suggestion that individuals might sublimate the warrior ethos by waging a “war against nature,” coordinating their energies in order to counteract the natural dangers and deficiencies that jeopardize our projects and purposes. I will examine this argument in light of the political context of collective action and environmental stewardship in the 1970s and expose the argument’s strengths and limitations. This discussion revises the way in which many contemporary scholars read James’s suggestion that we might fight or “war against nature.” I conclude this discussion by turning to James’s thesis in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” namely, that we suffer from the inability to see and recognize the inner meaning of the lives of others. (James, “Certain Blindness” 326). This thesis is at the crux of James’s understanding of political unity and must be brought into dialogue with his 1906 address on the moral equivalent of war. At first glance, the meliorism of “On a Certain Blindness” and the heroism of “The Moral Equivalent of War” seem to stand in marked opposition. I intend to demonstrate the complementary... (shrink)

Over the past few decades, scholars have reassessed the role of amour-propre in Rousseau’s thought. While it was once believed that he had an entirely negative valuation of the emotion, it is now widely held that he finds it useful and employs it to strengthen moral attachments, conjugal love, civic virtue and moral heroism. At the same time, scholars are divided as to whether this positive amour-propre is an antidote to the negative or dangerous form. Some scholars (...) are confident that ‘inflamed’ amour-propre can be overcome while others adopt a more fatalistic view. While mindful of Rousseau’s pessimism in his most famous works, this essay seeks to identify a middle position. By contending Rousseau’s discussion of amour-propre is largely concerned with the problems surrounding identity construction in commercial, urban societies, it will be argued that amour-propre can be lessened to manageable levels in more rural societies, that is, agrarian provincial life. (shrink)

Clinical Ethics, Ahead of Print. This paper is a response to a recent BMJ Blog: ‘The duty to treat: where do the limits lie?’ Members of the Surrey Heartlands Integrated Care Service Clinical Ethics Group reflected on arguments in the Blog in relation to resuscitation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Clinicians have had to contend with ever-changing and conflicting guidance from the Resuscitation Council UK and Public Health England regarding personal protective equipment requirements in resuscitation situations. St John Ambulance had different guidance (...) for first responders.The situation regarding resuscitation led the CEG to consider ethical aspects of health care professionals’ responses to the need for resuscitation during COVID-19. Members agreed that professionals should, ideally, have the level of PPE required for an aerosol generating procedure. However, there was no consensus regarding professionals’ duty to care when this is not available. On the one hand, it was agreed that the casualty/patient’s interests regarding resuscitation should be prioritised due to professionals’ contract with the public and professional privilege. On the other hand, risk thresholds were considered relevant to individual decision-making and professionals’ duty to care. All agreed that decision-making should not be influenced by rewards or reprimands. It was agreed also that decisions to resuscitate should not be considered as moral heroism or supererogatory - regardless of PPE availability - but rather as ‘minimally decent’. We agreed that it may be acceptable for professionals, with good reasons, to opt out of resuscitation attempts and these should be reflected on and discussed before the event. (shrink)

Supererogation has gained attention as a means of explaining the voluntary behaviours of individuals and organizations that are done for the benefit of others and which go above what is required of legislation and what may be expected by society. Whilst the emerging literature has made some significant headway in exploring supererogation as an ethical lens for the study of business there remain several important issues that require attention. These comprise, the lack of primary evidence upon which such examinations have (...) been made, attention has been given to only singular pro-social acts of organizations, and the focus has been upon the actions of large organizations. Furthermore, Heyd’s (Supererogation, Cambridge University Press, 1982) original taxonomy of six supererogatory acts, comprising Moral Heroism, Beneficence, Volunteering, Favour, Forgiveness and Forbearance, has been considered to be complete and other forms of supererogatory acts have not yet been explored. In order to address these gaps this study poses the research questions: First, it studies how a single, contemporary SME performs multiple supererogatory acts in its attempts to address its social and environmental goals that go beyond CSR. Second, it seeks to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of Heyd’s (Supererogation, Cambridge University Press, 1982) taxonomy of six forms of supererogation through the capture of primary data. This research makes a three-year case study examination of a single SME that has been formally recognized for its work in addressing social and environmental issues at local, national and global levels. Primary data are acquired of the supererogatory acts that it performs through a three-year participant observation case study, utilizing 61 interviews and 3 focus groups with internal and external stakeholders. In doing so, it addresses the empirical limitations of the extant research, substantiates each of the forms that supererogatory acts may take, and makes a contribution to the theory of supererogation by identifying a further class of act that is ‘Sharing’. (shrink)

Dive into the moral philosophy at the heart of all four seasons of NBC’s The Good Place, guided by academic experts including the show’s philosophical consultants Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and featuring a foreword from creator and showrunner Michael Schur Explicitly dedicated to the philosophical concepts, questions, and fundamental ethical dilemmas at the heart of the thoughtful and ambitious NBC sitcom The Good Place Navigates the murky waters of moral philosophy in more conceptual depth to call into (...) question what Chidi’s ethics lessons—and the show—get right about learning to be a good person Features contributions from The Good Place’s philosophical consultants, Pamela Hieronymi and Todd May, and introduced by the show’s creator and showrunner Michael Schur Engages classic philosophical questions, including the clash between utilitarianism and deontological ethics in the “Trolley Problem,” Kant’s categorical imperative, Sartre’s nihilism, and T.M Scanlon's contractualism Explores themes such as death, love, moral heroism, free will, responsibility, artificial intelligence, fatalism, skepticism, virtue ethics, perception, and the nature of autonomy in the surreal heaven-like afterlife of the Good Place Led by Kimberly S. Engels, co-editor of Westworld and Philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I argue for an Aristotelian way of accommodating supererogation within virtue ethics by retrieving an account of moral heroism and providing a picture of different degrees of virtue. This, I claim, is the most appropriate virtue-ethical background allowing us to talk about supererogation without falling prey to several dangers. After summarizing the main attempts to deny the compatibility of virtue and supererogation, I will present some recent proposals to accommodate supererogation within virtue ethics. Next, I (...) will argue that these proposals raise substantial worries. I will then offer an analysis of heroism and the degrees of virtue to outline my own alternative definition of supererogation in terms of heroic virtue. (shrink)

When Urmson first challenged moral philosophers to account for the phenomenon of supererogation, contemporary virtue ethics was just in its infancy. So, virtue ethicists were understandably delayed in taking up that challenge, and thus the relationship between the two remained opaque. What little discussion of virtue and supererogation there was focused on the ancients rather than their contemporary intellectual heirs and tended to be skeptical about the compatibility of supererogation and virtue ethics. Lately, this has begun to change. A (...) number of philosophers have developed and defended sophisticated virtue-ethical accounts of supererogation. But doubts linger. Recently, important proponents of virtue ethics have argued that the intuitions underlying Urmson’s challenge can and should be accommodated without embracing supererogation, or by giving a highly revisionary account of it. In this essay, I confront these lingering doubts. In doing so, I hope to suggest that there is a good reason why virtue-ethical accounts of supererogation have lately proliferated. There are still some intuitions about moral heroism, and moral goodness more generally, that resist capture in a virtue ethics that deflates or eliminates the category of supererogation altogether. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Importance of What Psychiatrists Care AboutJohn M. Talmadge (bio)Keywordspost-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), psychotherapy, Frankfurt, veteransChristopher Bailey's account of his conversation with Colin, an unhappy man who feels regret about the absence of heroism in his own life, is both poignant and evocative. The emptiness that Colin feels illustrates aspects of the human condition central to definitions of psychotherapy for the past century or so. In this brief (...) commentary, I have three observations. First, the life of the therapist intertwines, however briefly, with the life of the patient. The light brought by the therapist may be like a candle, beacon, or flashbulb. Regardless of the therapist's strategic decisions and elected action, the patient may still end up in the dark. Second, I believe that this vignette illustrates the value of Professor Harry Frankfurt's ideas as expressed in his essay, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person.” And third, the tortuous journeys of psychotherapy may frighten and excite even the most temperate, contemplative clinician. In this third realm, where therapists create strategies for conversations about life, I also want to mention the work of Otto Rank.We have only a glimpse of Colin's life, but Dr. Bailey raises an issue of universal importance in helping others. The concept of moral heroism dates from the stoics, but the twentieth century merged psychology, theology, and philosophy in addressing the importance of significance, self-affirmation, and anxiety.Colin feels as though he has missed an opportunity for heroism, and Dr. Bailey is trying to help him feel better. Setting aside the technical problems imposed by a clinical setting, let us stipulate that there are two distinct aspects of psychiatric care: one is medical, formal, and biological; and the other is interactive, personal, and philosophical. With regard to the former, the psychiatrist is uniquely qualified to assist with medication, refinement of diagnosis, and remediation of illness. Regarding the latter, the psychotherapist may see the patient as an object, treated behaviorally, which is not necessarily bad or wrong, and solutions may be fairly procedural and simple. Dr. Bailey, however, sees Colin's problem as somewhat deeper than that, and I agree.Having a theory of human nature is one thing, but being in a relationship with another person requires action as well as contemplation. Like the parable of the two monks meeting in the forest, one turns to the other and says, “I’m lost.” The other monk replies, “I am also lost!” After a moment, the first says, “I don’t know the way out, but I know some ways that don’t lead out.” The second monk thinks for a moment and adds, “Me too. Perhaps we can find the way out together.” [End Page 241]When Harry Frankfurt (1988) first wrote about the importance of what we care about, he observed that conscious beings (as opposed to young children, who have not fully developed the capacity for self-reflection) exhibit conflicts of will. The concept of the person, he says, includes more than the nature of our knowing (epistemology) and the matter of our behavior (ethics). Those who are uniquely human have the capacity to consider and understand what they really care about, what matters most. In an elegant lecture series he sums this up as “taking ourselves seriously, and getting it right.” His work is valuable, not only for his keen insights and observations, but also because his thought is so accessible to those of us who are not trained philosophers.Frankfurt rightly points out that philosophy has largely neglected the study of personality, leaving that to the psychologists and social scientists. He never ventures into the world of diagnosis and treatment, and rightly so; he defines his interests narrowly and effectively, assuming for the sake of his arguments that he is describing someone not burdened by mental disease or defect. At the same time, he engages head-on the complexity of life and personal will. He offers a way to think about human will, but he does not say what we should necessarily do, nor for that matter when we should intervene, when it comes to the will of... (shrink)

In this introduction to part three of the Common Knowledge symposium “Fuzzy Studies: On the Consequence of Blur,” the journal’s editor argues that blur is not a medium of concealment, confusion, or evasion. Making distinctions between kinds of relative unclarity, he reserves the word blur for the kind that results from de-differentiating objects or qualities or states of affairs whose differences have been overstated. To refine what blur is and is not, he compares kinds of unclarity found in images by (...) Giotto, Rubens, Hokusai, Kunitora, Manet, Zeshin, and Richter. With reference to art criticism by Hubert Damisch, Wayne Andersen, Anthony Hughes, Robert Storr, Julian Bell, Christopher Prendergast, and especially T. J. Clark, he agrees that choosing between focus and blur can be a moral decision, though not in the sense for which Clark arraigns the Impressionists. Characterizing the way of seeing that Clark encourages in The Painting of Modern Life as a form of staring, this essay argues that “lean and hungry looking” is indecent, whereas unfocused receptivity is irenic. What Bell calls the “aestheticized halfheartedness” of Manet is redescribed here as a genre of moral heroism, and the essay concludes that it is differentiation that is on morally shaky ground. (shrink)

In this article, we review the psychology of hero development and hero worship. We propose that heroes and hero narratives fulfill important cognitive and emotional needs, including the need for wisdom, meaning, hope, inspiration, and growth. We propose a framework called the heroic leadership dynamic to explain how need-based heroism shifts over time, from our initial attraction to heroes to later retention or repudiation of heroes. Central to the HLD is idea that hero narratives fulfill both epistemic and energizing (...) functions. Hero stories provide epistemic benefits by providing scripts for prosocial action, by revealing fundamental truths about human existence, by unpacking life paradoxes, and by cultivating emotional intelligence. To energize us, heroes promote moral elevation, heal psychic wounds, inspire psychological growth, and exude charisma. We discuss the implications of our framework for theory and research on heroism, leadership processes, and positive psychology. (shrink)

The sacrifices of nurses in hard-hit cities during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic and of family caregivers for people with late-stage Alzheimer’s disease present two puzzles. First, traditional accounts of supererogation cannot allow for the possibility of making enormous sacrifices that make one’s actions supererogatory simply to do what morality requires. These caregivers, however, are doing their moral duty, yet their actions also seem to be paradigmatic cases of supererogation. I argue that Dale Dorsey’s new account of (...) supererogation can solve this puzzle. Second, these caregivers often deny that they are heroic, but standard explanations of these assertions either diminish their sacrifice, say they are confused, or attribute to them a vice. If we want to understand them without diminishing them, we should instead see their denials as a response to what Beth DeVolder calls compulsory heroism. Compulsory heroism occurs when someone is foisted into the role of hero for doing their moral duty as a distraction from the social realities that make doing their duty involve inordinate sacrifice. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Origins of the Ateneo de la Juventud The Lectures at the Ateneo de la Juventud The Ateneo de la Juventud and the Mexican Revolution References Further Reading.

Humanitarian aid workers typically reject the accolade of hero as both untrue and undesirable. Untrue when they claim not to be acting beyond the call of duty, and undesirable so far as celebrating heroism risks elevating “heroic” choices over safer, and perhaps wiser ones. However, this leaves unresolved a tension between the denial of heroism and a sense in which certain humanitarian acts really appear heroic. And, the concern that in rejecting the aspiration to heroism an opportunity (...) is lost to inspire more and better humanitarian action. Having set out this problem in more detail in Part I, the argument in Part II will suggest that a virtue ethics approach to humanitarian moral obligations can make good sense of our intuitions concerning the role of heroism in humanitarian action. In Part III I will argue that at least “professional” humanitarians, instead of rejecting heroism, should aim to be heroes, in the sense of displaying a virtue of humanity in high-stakes contexts, because this is consistent with the aim of humanitarian action. Finally, some lingering problems of demandingness and motivation are considered. (shrink)

This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral (...) goodness is more multi-faceted. My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness: the essay examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of moral admirableness, and I hope to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in our everyday understanding of goodness. Along the way, I give an account of what makes actions heroic, of whether such actions are supererogatory, and of what, if anything, is wrong with moral deference. At the close of the essay, I begin to explore the flipside of these ideals: villainy. (shrink)

Contemporary moral philosophy tends to equate what is moral with what is obligatory. Hence, there is a tendency to exclude all virtues from what is moral because they are dispositions other than the one morally good disposition to fulfill obligations out of a sense of obligation. This has the effect of excluding much of what we admire about persons from moral philosophy and from the moral life. This essay argues that there are at least two (...) virtues, both forms of love, moral perceptivity and moral tenacity, which are moral and obligatory. The author explores some of the relationships of these two moral virtues to the traditional theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, and to heroism and saintliness. (shrink)

A common argument for the social value of sport is that athletes serve as heroes who inspire people – especially young people – to strive for excellence. This argument has been questioned by sport philosophers at a variety of levels. Not only do athletes seem unsuited to be heroes or role models in the conventional sense, it is unclear more generally what the social and educational value of athletic excellence could be. In this essay, I construct an argument for the (...) social and educational value of sport built upon the relationship between athletes, heroes, and the song culture that celebrated them in ancient Greece. On this model, athletes are neither heroes nor role models in the conventional sense. Rather, athletes, athletics, and the poets who extolled them were part of a cultural conspiracy to celebrate and inspire virtue by connecting a community with its heroic past. Festivals such as the Olympic Games, but also local events such as funeral games, educated and unified communities by cultivating an aesthetic appreciation for virtue and by inspiring youth to strive for it. Ancient athletes were not heroes, rather they re-enacted heroic struggles, thereby experiencing heroic virtues, and inspiring both artists and spectators to bond with the higher ideals implied by their shared belief in divine ancestry. In this way, athletes, athletics, and the media that celebrated them played important social and educational roles. Insofar as modern sport performs a similar service, its association with heroism and with moral education may ultimately be justified. (shrink)

Introduction : saving liberal democracy from itself -- Individualism versus individuality -- Interference, independence, and what's worth doing -- Autonomy -- Freedom, rights, and conflicts between values -- Ethics and rules -- Exploring consequences -- The ethical point of view -- Objective ethics : the good -- Objective ethics : the right -- Negotiating ethically -- Why think ethically? -- Ethical heroism -- Afterword.

In this entry I will introduce two such puzzles that relate to the heroic actions and testimony. I will first introduce the basic idea of supererogation and why some heroic actions give us reason to accept the existence of supererogatory actions. I will then introduce the problem that supererogation raises for moral theory and explain the main responses that have been offered to this problem. I will then explain two related problems that arise from the way that heroes describe (...) their actions and explore how moral philosophers might respond to these problems. (shrink)

The exploration of philosophical ideas within Beethoven's vocal suites provides a vital lens through which one can better understand his musical oeuvre, particularly in the debate between classicism and romanticism. This study dissects Beethoven's compositional evolution across three distinct phases: the formative years (1782-1801), the middle period (1802-1812), and the late stage (1813-1827), each marked by varying degrees of engagement with philosophical themes such as Enlightenment, heroism, and idealism. These themes are not merely aesthetic choices but reflect deep spiritual (...) and existential inquiries prevalent during Beethoven's time. Specifically, the Gellert Collection of Religious Songs, an essential work from Beethoven's repertoire, is scrutinized to uncover how it encapsulates the spiritual values and philosophical dialogues between classicism, emphasising order and rationality, and romanticism, which champions emotion and individualism. This analysis reveals how Beethoven’s vocal music serves as a medium for philosophical reflection and spiritual expression, mirroring the broader cultural shifts towards individual moral and spiritual autonomy that characterized the transition from Enlightenment ideals to Romantic values. (shrink)

When soldiers come home from war, some experience lingering emotional effects from the choices they were forced to make, and the outcomes of these choices. In this article, we consider the gap between objective assessments of blame and subjective assessments of self-blame, guilt, and shame after war, and we suggest a way of understanding how soldiers can understand their moral responsibility from both of these vantage points. We examine arguments from just war theory regarding the objective moral responsibility (...) of combatants and consider the role moral luck plays in our assessment of moral responsibility. We then use P.F. Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes to demonstrate the limitations of focusing excessively on the objective stance to determine the blameworthiness of soldiers. We argue that we should think about blame alongside moral emotions like guilt and shame, which will allow us to better understand subjective blame and the experiences of soldiers who blame themselves after war. We claim that objective determinations of heroism or responsibility do not adequately capture the complexity of moral emotions for soldiers returning home after war. As part of a shared moral community, civilians owe veterans more than automated responses based on the civilian experience. (shrink)

Für Emerson ist die self-reliance die Haupteigenschaft des großen Menschen, sie ist das Ergebnis von Selbsterkenntnis und Selbsbeherrschung. In moralischer Hinicht ist die self-reliance der Ursprung für den Heroismus, auf intellektuellem Gebiet ist sie die Quelle des Genies. Das Thema der self-reliance ist der Hauptgrund für die Atraktivität, die die Werke des Amerikaners auf Nietzsche ausüben. Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich dieses Thema durch den sich über einen Zeitraum von fünfundzwanzig Jahren ersteckenden Dialog mid Emersons Texten. Es stellt in (...) Nietzsches Werk einen Zusammenhang zwischen Schopenhauer als Erzicher und Zarathustra her, die beide Nietzsches Ideal des Ausnahmeindividuums verköpern, das über und gegen seine Zeit lebt.For Emerson self-reliance is the fundamental characteristic of a great man, being the product of self-acquaintance and self-possession. From a moral point of view, self-reliance is the origin of heroism, in the intellectual field it is the source of genius. The theme of self-reliance is the primary reason for the attraction that the American author's works exercised on Nietzsche. Like a fil rouge this theme runs through the virtual dialogue that he held with Emerson's writings over a period of more than twenty-five years. It generates in Nietzsche's work a continuity between Schopenhauer the educator and Zarathustra, who both incarnate the Nietzschean ideal of an exceptional individual who lives above and against his own time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Exemplarities: A Response to Timothy Hampton and Karlheinz StierleFrançois Cornilliat*Karlheinz Stierle and Timothy Hampton have both played a major part in defining and mapping the much-debated subject of exemplarity: Stierle as early as 1972, in his ground-breaking article for Poétique, 1 Hampton in his acclaimed 1990 book, Writing from History. 2 While their approaches have a lot in common, they also reveal a number of important differences, and it (...) seems to me that those differences teach us something not only about the problem of exemplarity in the Renaissance but also about the role played by that notion in our latest effort to capture that mercurial era. In what follows I will—somewhat unfairly—focus on the conceptual differences revealed by our authors’ contributions and reflect on what they suggest regarding the problematic usefulness of the exemplary in the Renaissance as well as in Renaissance studies.A convenient place to start, to differentiate the two contributions, is the status of the emerging genre of the novella vis-à-vis the problem of exemplarity. For Stierle “contingency is the real poet of the novella.” For Hampton, the novella genre also marks a shift in the regime of exemplarity, but the “real poet of the novella” is not exactly contingency; it is not exemplarity either, but some kind of sub-species. Yet to define that sub-species in Hamptonian terms is to abandon the immanent or “formal” descriptions practiced in the discipline of “pure” poetics. It would not be sufficient, for instance, to decide that the novella poetic principle is “political exemplarity,” [End Page 613] as opposed to “moral exemplarity.” Hampton tells us that the Heptameron recasts the fictions of aristocratic heroism “as tales whose exemplarity is moral, rather than political.” But such a recasting, seen from another level of interpretation, is indeed a political gesture.Whatever is political—as a topic—in the romance genre, is anachronistic and fictional; it is a set of poetic tricks appealing only to private fantasy. Fantasy, however, still has the capacity to mistaking itself for a pertinent social ambition and a program for action, as in the case of Don Quixote. This makes it all the more visible as a symptom of displaced politics. Whatever is moral—as a topic—in the novella genre, bears witness to the prince’s reinforced power to define what noble people are supposed to do—to talk about, that is, within closely guarded borders. The “moral” is, if considered in its infrastructure, a topic mapped by the political; similarly the production of discourse, the very domain of rhetoric or poetics is recast as the new type of political “action” expected from the former ruling class. So the “real poet” of the novella splits in two; and in that sense, one could say that the novella has no such thing as a “real poet.” The poets of the novella are a class whose conception of exemplarity has just been redefined by the prince. One could say that the “real poet” is the prince or the emerging nation state, but this would overlook the division of tasks between the poet and the prince. Instead of expressing the values of its own politics, the poetic class of the Heptameron’s narrators fundamentally exemplifies those values which the prince or the state allows them to have. Conversely, it is not the prince who does the talking or the writing in this exemplification process. And this, incidentally, leads us to a perhaps naive question about the status of the Queen of Navarre as an author vis-à-vis this new princely role: is she on one side or the other, is she a go-between?At any rate, exemplarity also splits: a good exemplar of those recast values (say, honnesteté) also exemplifies something else which is not set within those values per se but has to do with who institutes them, and why. In other words a good exemplar is also, from an interpretative standpoint, immediately a symptom, insofar as it is an operator for some invisible casting. Behind a “I want to be like x” kind of statement lurks an “I want you to be like that,” with the latter... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in DialogueDavid M. JohnsonChristopher Gill. Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. vii 1 510 pp. Cloth, $85.Gill’s book is a wide-ranging attempt to improve our understanding of Greek poetic and philosophical thinking about the self and its role in ethics. His thesis is that the Greeks had an “objective-participant” model (...) of personality which is different in important ways from the various “subjective” and/or “individualist” models which have often formed the basis of modern interpretations. While the subjective understanding of the person privileges a unitary first-person perspective in a Cartesian way, Gill argues that the Greeks—as do some modern thinkers—speak of an interplay between parts that is best studied from the outside. The individualist strand of thought makes individual autonomy a keystone of morality in a way indebted to Kant; Gill argues that the more communal mode of ethics advocated recently by Williams and MacIntyre is closer to the Greek ideal. Gill is surely right that Cartesian and Kantian assumptions have had a distorting effect on some readings of Greek texts, and he has made important progress by presenting a different framework based on modern work touching on Greek thought about ethics and the self.After an introduction spelling out his objective-participant framework Gill devotes his first chapter to Homeric decision-making and a critique of the interpretations of Snell and Adkins. It is a mistake, he argues, to make self-consciousness the criterion for a full-blown concept of the self or for what counts as moral decision making. Homeric deliberations are closer in form to Aristotle’s thinking about decision making and the modern action theory which has reasons (whether conscious or not) replace the will as the basis for action. Nor are the Homeric heroes rightly criticized for allowing shame and their status to be considerations in their decision making; as Williams has argued, internalized shame can be a rather effective ethical motivator, and as both he and MacIntyre have argued, there is much to be said for allowing one’s place in society to inform one’s decision making. Gill’s argument here does not seem particularly novel, as his frequent citation of Williams and MacIntyre makes clear, but he does apply it thoroughly to four important Iliadic monologues in a way which clarifies these ideas and confirms their relevance for Homer.The second chapter provides an analysis of why we feel sympathy for the problematic heroes of Greek epic and tragedy, particularly Achilles and Medea, despite their controversial deeds. Here Gill rejects the views of Bradley and Butcher, who argued that it was the power of the character’s self-conscious personality that won us over, and the structuralist view of Redfield, who made [End Page 119] Achilles a mediator between the need to protect society and the desire for personal glory. Gill interestingly—and originally, as far as I know—argues that it is rather the hero’s acting out of an ethically exemplary gesture, based on implied or explicit second-order reasoning about the best sort of human life, that gains our interest and sympathy. For Gill it is important that the hero’s ethical position fall within the communal framework of his or her society: Achilles’ refusal to return to the fight is his way of showing how Agamemnon has undermined the code of heroic reciprocity; Medea’s murder of her children is, even more paradoxically, her means of showing Jason the importance of the bonds of philia.Taking Achilles as our example, Gill rejects the view of Parry and Whitman that Achilles’ heroism is deeply subjective. Gill argues that Achilles, in his great speech of book 9, is not rejecting the heroic code itself but only Agamemnon’s perversion of it. While this reading makes good sense of much of Achilles’ speech in Iliad 9, it is difficult to square with the end of the speech, in which Agamemnon seems to have faded from view, leaving Achilles to question the heroic code itself. This is not to say that Achilles puts... (shrink)