Context: The dominant approach to the study of perception is representational/computational, with an emphasis on the achievements of the brain and the nervous system, which are taken to construct internal models of the world. Alternatives include ecological, embedded, embodied, and enactivist approaches, all of which emphasize the centrality of action in understanding perception. Problem: Despite sharing many theoretical commitments that lead to a rejection of the classical approach, the alternatives are characterized by important contrasts and points of divergence. Here we (...) focus on the enactive and ecological approaches, in particular, on how they construe the status of the environment and the content of perception. Method: We begin with a review of James Gibson’s ecological psychology, highlighting it as a psychology for all organisms not just humans. Against this backdrop, we consider enactivist arguments against direct perception - a central assertion of the ecological approach - and in favor of interpreting the activity of perceptual agents as a kind of construction of a perceptually meaningful world. Results: We assess the merits of this interpretation and we conclude that it cannot be grounded on fundamental principles such as thermodynamics and organism-environment mutuality. Implications: As a consequence, enactivism remains close to representationalism and entails a form of dualism. Constructivist content: We advance a criticism of the constructivist foundations of the enactive approach to perception. Perception-action mutuality at the heart of enactivism does not require mental construction; indeed, perception-action mutuality obviates construction. (shrink)

This book defends the constructivist view of science, namely, the view that scientific theories are mental constructions in the mind of the scientist, rather than the realist view that scientific theories are accounts of what nature itself is like. To prove this point, evolution theory is contrasted with "creation science" as two paradigms or extremely divergent theories, each of which, as a mental construct, explains the data or facts of the natural world equally well. Contents: Realism vs. Constructivism; (...) Meaning and Reference in the Natural Sciences; The Role of Paradigm in the Creationism Controversy; Science As Mental Construction. (shrink)

Geometry, etymologically the “science of measuring the Earth”, is a mathematical formalization of space. Just as formal concepts of number may be rooted in an evolutionary ancient system for perceiving numerical quantity, the fathers of geometry may have been inspired by their perception of space. Is the spatial content of formal Euclidean geometry universally present in the way humans perceive space, or is Euclidean geometry a mental construction, specific to those who have received appropriate instruction? The spatial content (...) of the formal theories of geometry may depart from spatial perception for two reasons: first, because in geometry, only some of the features of spatial figures are theoretically relevant; and second, because some geometric concepts go beyond any possible perceptual experience. Focusing in turn on these two aspects of geometry, we will present several lines of research on US adults and children from the age of three years, and participants from an Amazonian culture, the Mundurucu. Almost all the aspects of geometry tested proved to be shared between these two cultures. Nevertheless, some aspects involve a process of mental construction where explicit instruction seem to play a role in the US, but that can still take place in the absence of instruction in geometry. (shrink)

There have been very few studies of the Daoist conception of time in either the West or the East. The only explicit study on this topic in the English literature is David Chai’s (2014). Chai maintains that “human measured time” manifested in myriad things in the Daoist universe is merely a mental construction, whereas the authentic time is cosmological time, which consists of neither an A-series (which is ordered by non-reducible pastness, presentness, and futurity) nor a B-series (which (...) is ordered by earlier-than relations) but something without order and directionality. In this paper, I start with Daoist texts (i.e., Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi) about fundamental reality and time. I then explain and analyze Chai’s interpretations of these texts. Lastly, I argue that Chai’s interpretations violate an important Daoist principle. In addition, the idea that human measured time is merely a mental construction is not the best available interpretation of the texts. (shrink)

Mental Spaces is the classic introduction to the study of mental spaces and conceptual projection, as revealed through the structure and use of language. It examines in detail the dynamic construction of connected domains as discourse unfolds. The discovery of mental space organization has modified our conception of language and thought: powerful and uniform accounts of superficially disparate phenomena have become available in the areas of reference, presupposition projection, counterfactual and analogical reasoning, metaphor and metonymy, and (...) time and aspect in discourse. The present work lays the foundation for this research. It uncovers simple and general principles that lie behind the awesome complexity of everyday logic. (shrink)

We challenge the idea that a cognitive perspective on therapeutic change concerns only memory processes. We argue that inclusion of impairments in more generative cognitive processes is necessary for complete understanding of cases such as depression. In such cases what is identified in the target article as an “integrative memory structure” is crucially supported by processes of mental model construction.

Most research on aboriginal mind and mental health has sought to apply or confirm preexisting European-derived theories among aboriginal people. Culture has been underappreciate. An understanding of uniquely aboriginal models for mind and mental health might lead to more effective and robust interventions. To address this issue, a core group of elders from five separate regions of North America was developed to help determine how aboriginal people conceived of mind, self, and identity before European contact. The process utilized (...) for this study is iterative and involves discussions of teachings, traditional stories, and elder's comments on conclusions drawn. The elders endorsed a relational theory of mind in which mind exists between people as a product of the stories told and created within and by that relationship. Mind is distinguished from consciousness which is without language and exists within the individual as awareness. Language immediately results in an "out there" orientation in which two or more individuals generate stories about their experiences. The community is the basic unit of study for mind and mental health, and mental "illness" is not distinguished from physical "illness," but rather all are seen as a continuum of suffering and pain. What emerged from this research is that North American theories of mind are more closely related to Daoist and Shinto theories than to the logical positivism which drives most of North America's conventional psychology and psychiatry. Within European traditions, however, the philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin with his emphasis on a dialogical self coupled with system theory comes closest to resembling North American aboriginal theories. This model explains why ceremony and ritual, community interventions, talking circles, and family therapy are more compatible with aboriginal thought than conventional North American biomedicine and psychology. (shrink)

The only commonality between the various psychiatric disorders is that they reflect contemporary problematic behaviors. Some psychiatric disorders have a substantial genetic component, whereas others are essentially shaped by prevailing environmental factors. Because psychiatric ailments are so heterogeneous, any universal explanation of mental illness is not likely to have any clinical or theoretical utility. (Published Online November 9 2006).

Introduction:The concept of mentalizing is nowadays widely used in research as well as in clinical practice. Despite its popularity, the development of an economic assessment is still challenging. The Mentalization Scale appears to be a promising measurement with good psychometric properties but lacking convergent validity with the Reflective Functioning Scale.Objective:This study aims to test the construct validity of the Mentalization Scale through correlations with the gold standard, the Reflective Functioning Scale, within a clinical sample. Furthermore, it was of interest to (...) replicate its internal consistency.Methods:Twenty-six inpatients of an acute psychiatric ward in Vienna were given the Mentalization Scale (MentS). They were interviewed with the Brief Reflective Function Interview, which was coded with the Reflective Functioning Scale. Correlations and internal consistency were calculated.Results:Concerning the primary aim of this study, the validity was satisfactory for the MentS whole-scale mentalizing as well as for the subscales self- and other-oriented mentalizing. Internal consistency was lower to the findings of the developer and close to the 0.70 threshold.Conclusion:Our findings could foster the psychometric properties of the MentS. Furthermore, the MentS seems to be a promising measurement tool for detecting different dimensions of reflective functioning. Limitations and further research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper deals with some formal properties of objects that are supposed to be internal to persons, that is, mental structures and mental functions. Depending on the ways of talking about these internal objects, they will appear different. Two types of discourse will be presented, to be called the realist and the nominalist discourses, and for eachdiscourse I will focus upon the construction of `self'.The realist discourse assumes an identity between the person and his construction of (...) himself. I will illustrate this discourse in terms of Descartes' ideas on himself as a `thinking substance'. The nominalist discourse assumes an impossibility to attain this identity, and instead to imply a complementarity between the person and his self-construction. I will illustrate this discourse in terms of the problems both William James and Sartre discerned when a conscious person chases after his own consciousness (termed `judging thought' and `pour-soi' respectively). (shrink)

Psychological construction represents an important new approach to psychological phenomena, one that has the promise to help us reconceptualize the mind both as a behavioral and as a biological system. It has so far been developed in the greatest detail for emotion, but it has important implications for how researchers approach other mental phenomena such as reasoning, memory, and language use. Its key contention is that phenomena that are characterized in (folk) psychological vocabulary are not themselves basic features (...) of the mind, but are constructed from more basic psychological operations. The framework of mechanistic explanation, currently under development in philosophy of science, can provide a useful perspective on the psychological construction approach. A central insight of the mechanistic account of explanation is that biological and psychological phenomena result from mechanisms in which component parts and operations do not individually exhibit the phenomena of interest but function together in an orchestrated and sometimes in a complex dynamical manner to generate it. While at times acknowledging the compatibility of the mechanist approach with constructionist approach (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), proponents of the constructionist approach have at other times pitched their approach as anti-mechanist. For example, Barrett (2009) claims that the psychological constructionist approach rejects machines as the primary metaphor for understanding the mind, instead favoring a recipe metaphor; constructionism also purportedly rejects the “mechanistic” picture of causation, which it portrays as linear or sequential in nature (see also Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). While some mechanistic accounts do fit this description, we will see that the mechanisms generating phenomena can be complex and dynamic, producing phenomena far less stereotypic and more adaptive than people often associate with machines. Our goal, however, is not just to render constructionism and mechanism compatible. Philosophers of science have been examining the nature of mechanistic explanation in biology with the goal of gaining new insights into the operation of science. We will identify some of the places where the mechanistic account can shed new light on the constructionist project. (shrink)

PERRON A and HOLMES D. Nursing Inquiry 2011; 18: 191–204Constructing mentally ill inmates: nurses’ discursive practices in correctionsThe concepts of discourse, subjectivity and power allow for innovative explorations in nursing research. Discourse take many different forms and may be maintained, transmitted, even imposed, in various ways. Nursing practice makes possible many discursive spaces where discourses intersect. Using a Foucauldian perspective, were explored the ways in which forensic psychiatric nurses construct the subjectivity of mentally ill inmates. Progress notes and individual interviews (...) constitute discursive spaces within which nurses construct patients’ subjectivities. Progress notes provide a written (and permanent) form of discourse, while interviews set the space for a more fluid and contextual form of discourse. We identified five types of subjectivities – the (in)visible patient, the patient as risk, the deviant patient, the disturbed patient and the disciplined patient. These subjectivities were rooted in various types of discourses circulating in the selected setting. Despite the multiple discursive dimensions of forensic psychiatric nursing, progress notes remain the main formal source of information regarding nursing care even though it is not representative of the care provided nor is it representative of nurses’ complex discursive practices in corrections. (shrink)

Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We (...) administered tasks with continuous, semi-continuous, and discontinuous conditions as between-subject factor (experiment 1) and as within-subject factor (experiment 2). Construction and revision followed distinct cognitive principles in the changeless conditions of experiment 1. With increased task demands due to switches between different continuity conditions (experiment 2), reasoners adapted the principles they used for model revisions to the principles which they had used during antecedent constructions. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a framework where possible relations between learning and mental models are explored. In particular, I’ll be concerned with non-symbolic gestures accompanying discourse and their role in inducing the construction of models and therefore deep comprehension and learning in the listener. Also, I’ll be concerned with cognitive and socio-cognitive conflicts and their roles in inducing construction of alternative models of a problem and therefore in learning to reason. Human ability to learn is of (...) great importance for individuals interested in change. Indeed, to learn both declarative and procedural knowledge means to change, and in order to be able to intervene on change in a desired way it is necessary to have a theory of the mental representations and processes involved in learning and a theory of the communication and contexts that favour learning. (shrink)

The discursive production of the ‘self in the context of mental health care has potential implications for how the subjects of intervention come to understand and experience themselves. Eating disorders provide an illustrative example of the ways in which conceptualizations of the self that structure mental health practices can be gendered, because they are mainly diagnosed in women and dominant explanations of their origins are feminized. This discourse analytic study examines the gendered nature of mental health workers’ (...) constructions of the eating-disordered self through the psychological construct of ‘identity’, examining the dominant discourses implicated in the feminization of deficient identity, and addressing the implications of this construction for mental health practice. (shrink)

Pierre-Henri Castel provides a short but richly argued precis of his recently published two-volume 1,000-page masterwork on the history of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Having not read the as-yet-untranslated books, I write this commentary from Plato’s cave, trying to infer the reality of Castel’s analysis from expository shadows. I am unlikely to be more successful than Plato’s poor troglodytes, so I apologize ahead of time for any misunderstandings. Moreover, I cannot assess Castel’s detailed evidential case for his substantive theses.1 I thus focus (...) on some key philosophical issues that impinge on an area of my concern, the concept of mental disorder. Castel is a rare breed of French.. (shrink)

Au sujet de la mémoire on a couramment deux présupposés. En parlant de la mémoire, on semble la considérer comme une faculté unifiée. Et on a l’habitude de la penser comme une faculté conservatrice. C’est pourtant une image bien différente qui émerge de la recherche contemporaine. Dans ce texte, nous proposons une histoire de l’émergence de l’hypothèse d’une dimension constructive de la mémoire épisodique, en dégageant trois dimensions de la construction : une dimension culturelle, une dimension intersubjective, et une (...) dimension individuelle. Le souvenir se (re)construit à l’intérieur et en fonction de cadres culturels, de relations à autrui, et de projections dans le temps. (shrink)

Matthew Soteriou provides an original philosophical account of sensory and cognitive aspects of consciousness. He explores distinctions of temporal character in our mental lives--especially in relation to the exercise of agency--and illuminates the more general issue of the place and role of mental action in the metaphysics of mind.

This article considers the social construction of mental toughness in line with prevailing social attitudes towards success and dominance in elite sport. Critical attention is drawn to the research literature which has sought to conceptualise mental toughness and the idealistic rhetoric and metaphor with which it has done so. The concept of mental toughness currently reflects an elitist ideal, constructed along the lines of the romantic narrative of the ‘Hollywood hero’ athlete. In contrast, the mental (...) and moral virtues which should form the basis of mental toughness are often neglected when an athlete ‘fails’. Currently, mental toughness exists as a characteristic used to describe successful athletes and is only applied in hindsight. Finally, we recommend that the morally problematic association of mental toughness (within the media, society, and the research community) with ultimate success needs to be removed in order to rescue the concept from the elitist discourses which currently surround and suffocate it. (shrink)

Without a better understanding of mental disease, patients diagnosed with a mental disease may be mistreated clinically and/or socially, and caregivers and families may be wrongfully blamed for causing the disease and/or for not effectively helping and developing meaningful relationships with the patient as person. In trying to understand mental disease and why its various dimensions raise difficulties for our systems of classification and our medical models of diagnosis and treatment, a framework is required. This framework will (...) connect metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical considerations in ways that are mutually supportive and illuminating. This, in turn, will benefit those who are diseased and those persons who study, classify, diagnose, and treat disease. (shrink)

RESUMEN Las concepciones de salud mental son variadas y se han ido sucediendo de manera que cada una ha ido aportando nuevos matices a las anteriores, generando una nueva visión cada vez, donde las necesidades de la propia sociedad, han ido conformando una conceptualización de la salud mental de acuerdo con el contexto histórico, la disciplina y su modelación según las exigencias y particularidades de la sociedad y la cultura vigentes. Por consiguiente, se hace necesario replantear los conceptos (...) desde los que se interpreta la idea de salud mental, si guardan o no relación con definiciones universales o a concepciones construidas a partir de los diferentes planteamientos de salud-enfermedad. En consecuencia, es importante el aporte que se puede realizar desde la investigación para llegar a una construcción del concepto de Salud Mental que considere la multidisciplinariedad. Bajo esta perspectiva, se contextualiza el concepto de salud mental desde lo multidisciplinario. ABSTRACT There are several mental health conceptions which have been followed by others in such a way that each one of them has contributed to the previous ones, generating a different view each time, where the needs of society itself have made a conceptualization of mental health according to the historical context, discipline and model according to the requirements and particular features of society and the current culture. Therefore, it’s necessary to rethink the concepts from which the idea of mental health is interpreted, if it’s related to universal definitions or not, or to conceptions made from different approaches on health-disease. As a result, the contributions that can be made from research to achieve the construction of a multidisciplinary Mental Health concept are important. From this perspective, the concept of mental health is contextualized from a multidisciplinary point of view. (shrink)

As mental health nursing roles expand, is education expanding mental health nurses? an emotionally intelligent view towards preparation for psychological therapies and relatedness Mental health nurses (MHN) in the UK currently occupy a challenging position. This positioning is one that offers a view of expanding roles and responsibilities in both mental health act legislation and the delivery of psychological therapies, while simultaneously generic pre‐registration training is being considered. Clearly, the view from this position, although not without (...) challenge and internal discipline dispute, can also offer growing professional prestige, influence and respect from other health disciplines, as well as the wider public. Conversely, if the training, education and strategic enactment for new MHN roles is formulated and delivered from predominantly non‐MHN axiomatic and epistemological stances, MHN identity can be seriously and potentially permanently diminished. This paper offers the construct of emotional intelligence as a framework to respond to these future challenges through making individual MHN enablement a primacy. This enablement of MHNs through enhanced emotional intelligence competencies is argued as requiring priority over the standard approach of enhancing strategies alone. (shrink)

Nurses working in correctional and forensic mental health settings face unique challenges in the provision of care to patients within custodial settings. The subjectivities of both patients and nurses are subject to the power relations, discourses and abjection encountered within these practice milieus. Using a poststructuralist approach using the work of Foucault, Kristeva, and Deleuze and Guattari, this paper explores how both patient and nurse subjectivities are produced within the carceral logic of this apparatus of capture. Recognizing that subjectivities (...) are fluid and dynamic, and capable of change, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of deterritorialization will illustrate opportunities for resistance, where nurses can begin to practice outside the dominant carceral logic (and restrictions) of the system. (shrink)

What is it to remember an episode from one’s past? How does episodic memory give us knowledge of the personal past? What explains the emergence of the apparently uniquely human ability to relive the past? Drawing on current research on mental time travel, this book proposes an integrated set of answers to these questions, arguing that remembering is a matter of simulating past episodes, that we can identify metacognitive mechanisms enabling episodic simulation to meet standards of reliability sufficient for (...) knowledge, and that the subjective experience of reliving the past is a precondition for the reliability of simulational remembering. The resulting account of memory, memory knowledge, and their evolution will be of interest both to philosophers interested in empirically-informed approaches to memory and to psychologists interested in the philosophical implications of empirical memory research. (shrink)

A review of Matthew Soteriou's 'The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action'.

In this paper, I argue for a new way to understand the integration of facts and values in the concept of mental disorder that has the potential to avoid the flaws of previous hybrid approaches. I import conceptual tools from the account of procedural objectivity defended by Helen Longino to resolve the controversy over the definition of mental disorder. My argument is threefold: I first sketch the history of the debate opposing objectivists and constructivists and focus on the (...) criticisms that led to the emergence of the debate. Second, I offer a reconstruction of the “Natural Function Approach” argument to make explicit an unsound assumption underlying this approach. The reconstruction will allow me to show that the NFO’s argument depends on the ideal of value-free science that I will criticize. Then I propose an alternative ideal for psychiatry: social objectivity. I argue that the concept of mental health should be seen as “socially objective” rather than value-free, moving the debate towards the social procedures by which the definition is produced rather than the normative and factual content of its definition. (shrink)

The study of human-human communication and the development of computational models for human-agent communication have diverged significantly throughout the last decade. Yet, despite frequently made claims of “super-human performance” in, e.g., speech recognition or image processing, so far, no system is able to lead a half-decent coherent conversation with a human. In this paper, we argue that we must start to re-consider the hallmarks of cooperative communication and the core capabilities that we have developed for it, and which conversational agents (...) need to be equipped with: incremental joint co-construction and mentalizing. We base our argument on a vast body of work on human-human communication and its psychological processes that we reason to be relevant and necessary to take into account when modeling human-agent communication. We contrast those with current conceptualizations of human-agent interaction and formulate suggestions for the development of future systems. (shrink)

Accurately assessing youth mental health involves obtaining reports from multiple informants who typically display low levels of correspondence. This low correspondence may reflect situational specificity. That is, youth vary as to where they display mental health concerns and informants vary as to where and from what perspective they observe youth. Despite the frequent need to understand and interpret these informant discrepancies, no consensus guidelines exist for integrating informants’ reports. The path to building these guidelines starts with identifying factors (...) that reliably predict the level and form of these informant discrepancies, and do so for theoretically and empirically relevant reasons. Yet, despite the knowledge of situational specificity, few approaches to integrating multi-informant data are well-equipped to account for these factors in measurement, and those that claim to be well-positioned to do so have undergone little empirical scrutiny. One promising approach was developed roughly 20 years ago by Kraemer and colleagues. Their Satellite Model leverages principal components analysis and strategic selection of informants to instantiate situational specificity in measurement, namely components reflecting variance attributable to the context in which informants observe behavior, the perspective from which they observe behavior, and behavior that manifests across contexts and perspectives. The current study represents the first construct validation test of the Satellite Model. A mixed-clinical/community sample of 134 adolescents and their parents completed six parallel surveys of adolescent mental health. Adolescents also participated in a series of simulated social interactions with research personnel trained to act as same-age, unfamiliar peers. A third informant viewed these interactions and completed the same surveys as parents and adolescents. We applied the Satellite Model to each set of surveys and observed high internal consistency estimates for each of the six-item trait, context, and perspective components. Scores reflecting the trait, context, and perspective components displayed distinct patterns of relations to a battery of criterion variables that varied in the context, perspective, and source of measurement. The Satellite Model instantiates situational specificity in measurement and facilitates unifying conceptual and measurement models of youth mental health. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to determine the mental space of national identity by analyzing the semantic component of the national anthem. The national anthem can be considered as a social code that forms a citizen and as an ordinary text with its semantic structured levels. The national anthem is a political symbol and therefore forms two meanings: intent and influence. In the study, we combine the theory of mental spaces by G.Fauconnier and Ch.Fillmor’s frames semantics to (...) visualize the conceptual model of Ukrainian national identity. Research results: Designating the national anthem as a patriotic work that describes and symbolizes the history and traditions of the country, we articulate the generation and manifestation of social values by the anthem. Based on this position, the article proposes a conceptual model of the mental space of the Ukrainian national identity, which was initiated by the anthem of Ukraine. The basis of the scheme is a figurative fusion of three macro-worlds: Glory-Ukraine-Freedom, which symbolizes the value component that holds around itself the basic concepts of national identity.The article compares the text of the national anthem «Shche ne vmerla Ukraina…» written by P.Chubinsky and the text edited by M.Verbitsky. The symbolic construction of the text of Chubinsky’s anthem, published in 1963, broadcasts a conceptual model of future actions. The names Zalizniak, Nalyvaiko, Triasylo embody the ideal of Cossack chivalry, past times, which are the basis for future generations to follow. The concept of “national identification borders” includes not only geographical names, the Black Sea, the Carpathians, the Dnipro (in the text «from the Syan to the Don»), but also indexical categories – «inviolability», «integrity of the state», «integrity of the territory», «unitaryness», and as well as symbols embodied in names, for example, Crimea, Odesa, Lviv, Kharkiv. In the context of the semantic analysis of the text of the national anthem, its influence on the mental state of the state is recognized, which is reflected in the global peace index and the global terrorism index. A nation can be presented with ethnic, territorial, cultural, and political components. But there must also be abstract ideas, a mental space that makes it visible. (shrink)

Central to ethical debates in contemporary mental health research are the rhetoric of parity of esteem, challenges underpinned by the social construct of vulnerability and the tendency to homogenis...

Mental rotation of emotional and neutral stimuli The main aim of the study was to create and validate emotional version of mental rotation task. As all previously conducted experiments utilized neutral material only, such an attempt seemed necessary to confirm the generality of mental rotation effect and its properties. Emotional MRT was constructed using photos of negative facial expressions; a compatible neutral MRT was also created, for detailed comparisons. 2- and 3-dimensional figures and hexagrams served as affect-free (...) stimuli. In three experiments, emotional MRT version was proven to be valid, whereas only hexagram-based neutral MRT version yielded the expected results. A number of differences between the two versions emerged, concerning response times, accuracy and difficulty of trials. The neutral/emotional MRT procedure, although needing more research, seems to give stable results, making the study of content-bound imagery possible. (shrink)

Feminist analyses address the way differences between the sexes are conceptualized and operationalized in society. In this paper, I discuss how violence by men and women is conceptualized as different in the psychological scientific discourses of forensic mental health. I suggest that these empirical discourses perpetuate assumptions of difference and discourage examination of similarities. Specifically, I will argue that neutralization techniques are frequently used that reduce women’s agency and responsibility for violence compared to their male counterparts, and compared to (...) nonoffending women. I discuss the implications for violence research and interventions for violence perpetrators. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...) constructivist and biological approaches of mental illness. In order to do so, we will use some recent propositions by philosophers of biology, specifically ideas put forth by «developmental system theory» and the notion of «generative entrenchment». (shrink)

The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another.

Mental representation is one of core theoretical constructs within cognitive science and, together with the introduction of the computer as a model for the mind, is responsible for enabling the ‘cognitive turn’ in psychology and associated fields. Conceiving of cognitive processes, such as perception, motor control, and reasoning, as processes that consist in the manipulation of contentful vehicles representing the world has allowed us to refine our explanations of behavior and has led to tremendous empirical advancements. Despite the central (...) role that the concept plays in cognitive science, there is no unanimously accepted characterization of mental representation. Technological and methodological progress in the cognitive sciences has produced numerous computational models of the brain and mind, many of which have introduced mutually incompatible notions of mental representation. This proliferation has led some philosophers to question the metaphysical status and explanatory usefulness of the notion. This book contains state-of-the-art chapters on the topic of mental representation, assembling some of the leading experts in the field and allowing them to engage in meaningful exchanges over some of the most contentious questions. The collection gathers both proponents and critics of the concept of mental representation, allowing them to engage with topics such as the ontological status of representations, the possibility of formulating a general account of mental representation which would fit our best explanatory practices, and the possibility of delivering such an account in fully naturalistic terms. (shrink)