The paper argues that logical reasoning is what constitutes critical thinking because reasoning is normative, and logic provides a norm for reasoning. If a logical way of thinking is simply the same thing as reasoning, then the only limit or constraint of reasoning is the nature of the (logical) “rule” the kind of which is engaged with the practice of reasoning; rather than with either a component of social context or a com- ponent of a purely (...) non-inferential or “immediate” perception of a situation which is called sensitivity toward an object alone. However, such components are built into my analysis of what “reasoning” is. An approach to critical thinking being employed here is “an agent-based approach”. This paper also aims to pave the way for a further discussion on the limit of reasoning in a way that is relevant to the question of how critical thinking or reasoning should be taught in higher education. (shrink)

This volume reflects the development and theoretical foundation of a new paradigm for critical thinking based on inquiry. The field of critical thinking, as manifested in the Informal Logic movement, developed primarily as a response to the inadequacies of formalism to represent actual argumentative practice and to provide useful argumentative skills to students. Because of this, the primary focus of the field has been on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning. Yet the formalist history of the field (...) is still evident in its emphasis, with respect to both theory and pedagogy, on the structure and evaluation of individual, de-contextualized arguments. It is our view that such a view of critical thinking is excessively narrow and limited, failing to provide an understanding of argumentation as largely a matter of comparative evaluation of a variety of contending positions and arguments with the goal of reaching a reasoned judgment on an issue. As a consequence, traditional critical thinking instruction is problematic in failing to provide the reasoning skills that students need in order to accomplish this goal. Instead, the goal of critical thinking instruction has been seen largely as a defensive one: of learning to not fall prey to invalid, inadequate, or fallacious arguments. (shrink)

Michael Huemer () argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library employs critical thinking concepts in the development of productive scientific thought. Readers will learn to reason within the logic of their scientific disciplines and will find their analytical abilities enhanced by the engaging framework of inquiry set forth by Richard Paul and Linda Elder.

In traditional analytic philosophy, critical thinking is defined along Cartesian lines as rational and linear reasoning preclusive of intuitions, emotions and lived experience. According to Michael Gilbert, this view – which he calls the Natural Light Theory (NLT) – fails because it arbitrarily excludes standard feminist forms of argumentation and neglects the essentially social nature of argumentation. In this paper, I argue that while Gilbert’s criticism is correct for argumentation in general, NLT fails in a distinctive and particularly problematic (...) manner in moral argumentation contexts. This is because NLT calls for disputants to adopt an impartial attitude, which overlooks the fact that moral disputants qua moral agents are necessarily partial to their own values and interests. Adopting the impartial perspective would therefore alienate them from their values and interests, causing a kind of “moral schizophrenia.” Finally, I urge a re-valuation of epistemic virtue in argumentation. (shrink)

In this essay Juho Ritola develops a justificationist approach to social epistemology, which holds that normatively satisfactory social processes pertaining to the acquisition, storage, dissemination, and use of knowledge must be evidence-based processes that include appropriate reflective attitudes by the relevant agents and, consequently, the relevant institutions. This implies that the teaching of critical thinking and reasoning in general should strive to bring about such attitudes in students. Ritola begins by sketching a justificationist approach and defending it on (...) a general level against the criticism posed by Alvin Goldman. He then defends it on the level of individual reasoners against the argument set out by Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout. Based on empirical evidence, Bishop and Trout argue that the kind of reflection advocated by a justificationist approach to reasoning leads to worse outcomes than the use of various statistical prediction rules. Ritola, in contrast, maintains that one cannot and should not replace critical reflection on evidence by a mechanical application of rules. Instead, he asserts, statistical prediction rules and empirical evidence regarding our reasoning performance are part of the total evidence that we should reflect on in our critical reasoning. (shrink)

The pace of change in the world is accelerating, yet educational institutions have not kept pace. Indeed, schools have historically been the most static of social institutions, uncritically passing down from generation to generation outmoded didactic, lecture-and-drill-based, models of instruction. Predictable results follow. Students, on the whole, do not learn how to work by, or think for, themselves. They do not learn how to gather, analyze, synthesize and assess information. They do not learn how to analyze the diverse logic (...) of the questions and problems they face and hence how to adjust their thinking to those problems. They do not learn how to enter sympathetically into the thinking of others, nor how to deal rationally with conflicting points of view. They do not learn to become critical readers, writers, speakers and listeners. They do not learn how to use their native languages clearly, precisely, or persuasively. They do not, therefore, become ‘literate’, in the proper sense of the word. Neither do they gain much in the way of genuine knowledge since, for the most part, they could not explain the basis for what they believe. They would be hard pressed to explain, for example, which of their beliefs were based on rational assent and which on simple conformity to what they have been told. They have little sense as to how they might critically analyze their own experience, or identify national or group bias in their own thinking. They are much more apt to learn on the basis of irrational than rational modes of thought. They lack the traits of mind of a genuinely educated person: intellectual humility, courage, integrity, perseverance, and faith in reason.Happily, there is a movement in education today striving to address these problems in a global way, with strategies and materials for the modification of instruction at all levels of education. At its foundation is an emerging new theory of knowledge, learning, and literacy, one which recognizes the centrality of independent critical thinking to all substantial learning, one which recognizes that higher-order, multilogical thinking is as important to childhood as to adult learning, and as important to foundational learning in monological as in multilogical disciplines. This educational reform movement is not proposing an educational miracle cure, for its leading proponents recognize that many social and historical forces must come together before the ideals of the critical thinking movement will become a full academic reality. Schools do not exist in a social vacuum. To the extent that the broader society is uncritical so, on the whole, will be society's schools. Nevertheless, the social conditions necessary for fundamental changes in schooling are increasingly apparent. The pressure for fundamental change is growing. Whether and to what extent these needed basic changes will be delayed or side-tracked, thus requiring new periodic resurgences of this movement, with new, more elaborate articulations of its ideals, goals, and methods — only time will tell. (shrink)

Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal logic, and the Philosophy of Education.

This paper examines Robert Fogelin's suggestion that there may be deep disagreements, where no argument can address what is at issue. A number of possible bases for Fogelin's position are considered and rejected: people sometimes do not have enough in common for reasons to count as reasons; doubt is possible only against the background of framework propositions; key premises may be inarguable; argument must occur within a conceptual framework. The paper concludes by reflecting on why it is important to have (...) a point of view when thinking critically about an argument and whether that fact constitutes a limitation as to what can be achieved by critical thinking. (shrink)

This handbook teaches students to read for deep understanding, properly analyze and assess what they read, and reason within the logic of an author. As part of the Thinker’s Guide Library, this guide includes activities for students to work through in developing close reading skills using the tools of critical thinking.

Counterfactuals are conjectures about what would have happened, had an alternative event occurred. It provides lessons for the future by virtue of contemplating alternatives; it permits thought debugging; it supports a justification why different alternatives would have been worse or not better. Typical expressions are: “If only I were taller …”, “I could have been a winner …”, “I would have passed, were it not for …”, “Even if... the same would follow”. Counterfactuals have been well studied in Linguistics, Philosophy, (...) Physics, Ethics, Psychology, Anthropology, and Computation, but not much within Critical Thinking. The purpose of this study is to illustrate counterfactual thinking, through logic program abduction and updating, and inspired by Pearl’s structural theory of counterfactuals, with an original application to morality, a common concern for critical thinking. In summary, we show counterfactual reasoning to be quite useful for critical thinking, namely about moral issues. (shrink)

This robust, clear, and well-researched textbook for classes in logic introduces students to both formal logic and to the virtues of intellectual inquiry. Part 1 challenges students to develop the analytical skills of deductive and inductive reasoning, showing them how to identify and evaluate arguments. Part 2 helps students develop the intellectual virtues of the wise inquirer. The book includes helpful pedagogical features such as practice exercises and a concluding summary with definitions of key concepts for each chapter. Resources for (...) professors and students are available through Baker Academic's Textbook eSources. (shrink)

Beginning in his PhD program, and over a period of years in the 1960s, Richard Paul thoughtfully examined and deliberately critiqued existing theories of logic and reasoning. He took what was a very narrow conception of reasoning and broadened it to more accurately represent human thinking when people reason. He captured the idea of universal intellectual standards by exploring standards typically used by skilled reasoners, and assembled these standards into a constellation of ideas that is easily understandable. Following the tradition (...) of Socrates, Paul continually emphasized the importance of developing conceptual understandings based in foundational ideas and principles of analysis, and tested through life experience. His work laid the groundwork for what may be termed first principles in critical thinking and for a legitimate field of critical thinking studies. (shrink)

Designed for students with no prior training in logic, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING offers an accessible treatment of logic that enhances understanding of reasoning in everyday life. The text begins with an introduction to arguments. After some linguistic preliminaries, the text presents a detailed analysis of inductive reasoning and associated fallacies. This order of presentation helps to motivate the use of formal methods in the subsequent sections on deductive logic and fallacies. Lively and straightforward prose assists students (...) in gaining facility with the sometimes challenging concepts of logic. By combining a sensitive treatment of ordinary language arguments with a simple but rigorous exposition of basic principles of logic, the text develops students' understanding of the relationships between logic and language, and strengthens their skills in critical thinking. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

PACKAGE THIS TITLE WITH OUR 2016 MLA SUPPLEMENT, Documenting Sources in MLA Style (package ISBN-13: 9781319084387). Get the most recent updates on MLA citation in a convenient, 40-page resource based on The MLA Handbook, 8th Edition, with plenty of models. Browse our catalog or contact your representative for a full listing of updated titles and packages, or to request a custom ISBN. The unique collaborative effort of a professor of English and a professor of philosophy, Current Issues and Enduring (...) Questions is an extensive resource for teaching argument, persuasive writing, and rigorous critical thinking. This extraordinarily versatile text and reader continues to address current student interests and trends in argument, research, and writing.Its comprehensive coverage of classic and contemporary approaches to argument includes Aristotelian, Toulmin, and a range of alternative views, including a new chapter on analyzing and writing about arguments in popular culture. Readings on contemporary controversies (including student loan debt, locavorism, and the boundaries of online privacy) and classical philosophical questions (such as How free is the will of the individual?) are sure to spark student interest and lively discussion and writing, and new e-Pages take advantage of what the Web can do by including videos, speeches, film trailers, and other multimodal arguments. (shrink)

Grennan bases his evaluation of arguments on two criteria: logical adequacy and pragmatic adequacy. He asserts that the common formal logic systems, while logically sound, are not very useful for evaluating everyday inferences, which are almost all deductively invalid as stated. Turning to informal logic, he points out that while more recent informal logic and critical thinking texts are superior in that their authors recognize the need to evaluate everyday arguments inductively, they typically cover only inductive fallacies, ignoring (...) the inductively sound patterns frequently used in successful persuasion. To redress these problems, Grennan introduces a variety of additional inductive patterns. Concluding that informal logic texts do not encourage precision in evaluating arguments, Grennan proposes a new argument evaluation procedure that expresses judgments of inferential strength in terms of probabilities. Based on theories of Stephen Toulmin, Roderick Chisholm, and John Pollock, his proposed system allows for a more precise judgment of the persuasive force of arguments. (shrink)

Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.

An inviting alternative to traditional texts in introductory logic, The Art of Reasoning is widely acclaimed for its conversational tone and accessible exposition of rigorous logical concepts.

We prove that for any finite deduction structure there exists a unique concise-widest chain-preserved split. Based on this result, we propose a logical splitting strategy which enables an agent to split its belief structure such that all the original inference chains can be preserved. The significance of such logical splitting at least is four-fold: (1) It can be used by an agent to separate its concerns appropriately, or even create smaller and smarter clones which could (...) save time and efforts in their deliberation computing; (2) It will enable an agent to adjust its concerns dynamically based on its recognition of the current situation, which may further enable the agent to make rapid and rational decisions when situation shifting occurs; (3) In periodic team synchronization (PTS) domains where agents can periodically synchronize their behaviors with no restriction on communication, it can be employed as a critical process for maintaining the shared mental models among a team of agents; and (4) It is helpful in alleviating the complexity of reasoning about relevant information, and in better anticipating both explicit and implicit information needs based on the recognition of the current situation. (shrink)

Introductory-level undergraduate classes in Logic or Critical Thinking are a staple in the portfolio of many Philosophy programs. A standard approach to these classes is to include teaching and learning activities focused on formal deductive and inductive logic, sometimes accompanied by teaching and learning activities focused on informal fallacies or argument construction. In this article, I discuss a proposal to include an additional element within these classes—namely, teaching and learning activities focused on intellectual virtues. After clarifying the proposal, I (...) identify three reasons in favor of implementing it and I discuss how to implement it, focusing on questions about pedagogical strategies and pedagogical resources. (shrink)

A demanding introduction to logic and critical thinking, this book offers more traditional means of teaching the art of reasoning at a time when the field has become almost mathematical. Francis Dauer has rethought the framework for teaching reasoning in general and formal logic in particular, the desired epistemological context, and the role of the fallacies. The result is a coherent and very readable work, informed by Dauer's extensive experience teaching and writing on the subject.

This work is an introduction to logic, covering what is most commonly taught in the first term of a two-term sequence in logic at four-year colleges and universities. It is designed for use by community college students who plan to transfer credits to four-year institutions. The material covered seeks to maintain logic's place in philosophical thought systems, and avoids political examples in order to appeal to reason and study rather than ill-conceived jokes that often offend students' varying policitcal beliefs. This (...) work concludes with studies in proof constructions and rules and provides explanations of various grading decisions commonly made in logic courses, a unique feature helpful to students and teachers alike. (shrink)

This book covers all the material typically addressed in first or second-year college courses in Critical Thinking: Chapter 1: Critical Thinking 1.1 What is critical thinking? 1.2 What is critical thinking not? Chapter 2: The Nature of Argument 2.1 Recognizing an Argument 2.2 Circular Arguments 2.3 Counterarguments 2.4 The Burden of Proof 2.5 Facts and Opinions 2.6 Deductive and Inductive Argument Chapter 3: The Structure of Argument 3.1 Convergent, Single 3.2 Convergent, Multiple 3.3 Divergent Chapter 4: (...) Relevance 4.1 Relevance 4.2 Errors of Relevance Chapter 5: Language 5.1 Clarity 5.2 Neutrality 5.3 Definition Chapter 6: Truth and Acceptability 6.1 How do we define truth? 6.2 How do we discover truth? 6.3 How do we evaluate claims of truth? Chapter 7: Generalizations, Analogies, and General Principles 7.1 Sufficiency 7.2 Generalizations 7.3 Analogies 7.4 General Principles Chapter 8: Inductive Argument – Causal Reasoning 8.1 Causation 8.2 Explanations 8.3 Predictions, Plans, and Policies 8.4 Errors in Causal Reasoning (Three additional chapters – categorical logic, propositional logic, thinking critically about ethics – are available on the companion website.) -/- Special Features: -/- - The book takes a practice approach to learning how to think critically, so there are LOTS of exercises (within each chapter, focusing on discrete skills, and at the end of each chapter, focusing on more global skills in a cumulative fashion – thinking critically about what one sees, hears, reads, writes, and discusses). -/- - There is an extensive “Answers, Explanations, and Analyses” section that provides not just ‘the right answer’ but explanations as to why the right answer is right and why wrong answers are wrong; when the exercise is not a matter of providing an answer but of analyzing material, a detailed analysis is provided in this section; this feature is intended to help the student fully understand why some arguments are better than others (and why it’s not ‘just a matter of opinion’!). -/- - The regularly-appearing end-of-chapter “Thinking critically when you discuss” exercise is carefully graduated throughout the text, to gently lead students from sounding like a bad tv talk show to being able to hold an intelligent discussion. -/- - The regularly-appearing end-of-chapter “Thinking critically about what you write” exercise assumes almost no skill at the beginning and leads up to, in the last chapter, writing a 2,000 word position paper. -/- - A critical analysis template (a step-by-step approach to critical analysis) is presented in the first chapter and at the beginning of each subsequent chapter, and specific reference to it is made at the beginning of each end-of-chapter “Thinking critically about what you read” exercise (consisting of ten bits of increasing difficulty); this feature is intended to encourage the development of habitual, thorough analysis of arguments. -/- - Actual questions from standardized reasoning tests like the LSAT, GMAT, MCAT, and GRE are included. -/- - Ancillaries include an instructor’s manual; a test bank; PowerPoint slides; downloadable MP3 study guides; and interactive flash cards. (shrink)

Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, Second Edition, provides a nontechnical vocabulary and analytic apparatus that guide students in identifying and articulating the central patterns found in reasoning and in expository writing more generally. Understanding these patterns of reasoning helps students to better analyze, evaluate, and construct arguments and to more easily comprehend the full range of everyday arguments found in ordinary journalism. Critical Thinking, Second Edition, distinguishes itself from other texts in the field by (...) emphasizing analytical reading as an essential skill. It also provides detailed coverage of argument analysis, diagnostic arguments, diagnostic patterns, and fallacies. Opening with two chapters on analytical reading that help students recognize what makes reasoning explicitly different from other expository activities, the text then presents an interrogative model of argument to guide them in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning. This model allows a detailed articulation of "inference to the best explanation" and gives students a view of the pervasiveness of this form of reasoning. The author demonstrates how many common argument types--from correlations to sampling--can be analyzed using this articulated form. He then extends the model to deal with several predictive and normative arguments and to display the value of the fallacy vocabulary. Ideal for introductory courses in critical thinking, critical reasoning, informal logic, and inductive reasoning, Critical Thinking, Second Edition, features hundreds of exercises throughout and includes worked-out solutions and additional exercises at the end of each chapter. An Instructor's Manual--offering solutions to the text's unanswered exercises and featuring other pedagogical aids--is available on the book's Companion Website at www.oup.com/us/wright. (shrink)

'You shouldn't drink too much. The Earth is round. Milk is good for your bones.' Are any of these claims true? How can you tell? Can you ever be certain you are right? For anyone tackling philosophical logic and critical thinking for the first time, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Reasoning Well provides a practical guide to the skills required to think critically. From the basics of good reasoning to the difference between claims, evidence and arguments, Robert Arp (...) and Jamie Carlin Watson cover the topics found in an introductory course. Now revised and fully updated, this Second Edition features a glossary, chapter summaries, more student-friendly exercises, study questions, diagrams, and suggestions for further reading. Topics include: the structure, formation, analysis and recognition of arguments deductive validity and soundness inductive strength and cogency inference to the best explanation truth tables tools for argument assessment informal and formal fallacies With real life examples, advice on graduate school entrance exams and an expanded companion website packed with additional exercises, an answer key and help with real life examples, this easy-to-follow introduction is a complete beginner's tool set to good reasoning, analyzing and arguing. Ideal for students in basic reasoning courses and students preparing for graduate school. (shrink)

The objective of this book is to produce a theory of rational decision making for realistically resource-bounded agents. My interest is not in “What should I do if I were an ideal agent?”, but rather, “What should I do given that I am who I am, with all my actual cognitive limitations?” The book has three parts. Part One addresses the question of where the values come from that agents use in rational decision making. The most comon view among (...) philosophers is that they are based on preferences, but I argue that this is computationally impossible. I propose an alternative theory somewhat reminiscent of Bentham, and explore how human beings actually arrive at values and how they use them in decision making. Part Two investigates the knowledge of probability that is required for decision-theoretic reasoning. I argue that subjective probability makes no sense as applied to realistic agents. I sketch a theory of objective probability to put in its place. Then I use that to define a variety of causal probability and argue that this is the kind of probability presupposed by rational decision making. So what is to be defended is a variety of causal decision theory. Part Three explores how these values and probabilities are to be used in decision making. In chapter eight, it is argued first that actions cannot be evaluated in terms of their expected values as ordinarily defined, because that does not take account of the fact that a cognizer may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform it. An alternative notion of “expected utility” is defined to be used in place of expected values. In chapter nine it is argued that individual actions cannot be the proper objects of decision-theoretic evaluation. We must instead choose plans, and select actions indirectly on the grounds that they are prescribed by the plans we adopt. However, our objective cannot be to find plans with maximal expected utilities. Plans cannot be meaningfully compared in that way. (shrink)

A critical study of McPeck's recent book, in which he strengthens and develops his arguments against teaching critical thinking (CT). Accepting McPeck's basic claim that there is no unitary skill of reasoning or thinking, I argue that his strictures on CT courses or programs do not follow. I set out what I consider the proper justification that programs in CT have to meet, and argue both that McPeck demands much more than is required, and also that it is (...) plausible that this deflated justification can be met. Specitically, I argue that it is reasonable to expect transfer of learning for basic logical skills. Additional topics covered include: the relation ofliberal education to critical thinking, argument analysis, testing for CT, and the value of conceptual or linguistic analysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Logic of Probabilities in Hume's Argument against Miracles Fred Wilson The position is often stated that Hume's discussion of miracles is inconsistent with his views on the logical or ontological status oflaws ofnature and with his more general scepticism. Broad, for one, has so argued.1 Hume's views on induction are assumed to go somethinglike this. Any attempt to demonstrate knowledge ofmatters offact presupposes causal reasoning, but the (...) latter is based not on any perception of necessary connections, but on an unreasoned expectation that because events have been constantly conjoined in the past they will be constantly conjoined in the future. The fact that our past experience gives rise to certain expectations provides absolutely no reason to think that these expectations will be fulfilled. But this is forgotten as soon as he turns to the topic of miracles where the argument requires certain assumptions about laws of nature. Here he claims that the laws of nature arebased upon afirm andunalterable experience and dismisses what he apparently admits to be strong evidence for miracles on the basis of the claim that such events are absolutely impossible. The inconsistency between the discussion of miracles and the earlier discussions of induction and causality is clear. Nonetheless, there is a certain implausibility to this claim that makes it a difficult one to entertain seriously, since it is unlikely that a philosopher as careful as Hume would have failed to recognize the inconsistency if it existed. What I propose here to argue is that there is in fact no inconsistency, and that this becomes clear once one places the discussion ofmiracles in the broader context ofthe overall argument ofthe first Enquiry. In particular, the charge ofinconsistency disappears once one eliminates the caricature ofHume's views on causal reasoning upon which it rests. To come to grips with the discussion of miracles in Hume it is necessary to place that discussion in its historical context. In the generally empiricist atmosphere that developed in Britain following the mid-seventeenth century civil wars, the general defence of the reasonableness of Christianity consisted of two parts. First, it washeldthatrational argument, whether causal or teleological orboth, could yield a reasonable belief that a deity ofa more or less traditional sort existed. Then, second, in order to establish further that Jesus was the Son ofGod it was held that one could rely upon a chain oftestimony Volume XV Number 2 255 FRED WILSON leading back from the present to the past to infer the existence of miracles testifying to the divinity ofJesus. Hume attacks this second inference in the essay on miracles andthe first in the essay that follows in the Enquiries on God's particular providence (the themes of which are developed more fully in the Dialogues on Natural Religion). Given the central place that the appeal to miracles held in Christian apologetics in the 17th and 18th centuries, Hume's systematic attack on the argument from miracles constituted a clear attack on Christianity. To be sure, Hume's argument would never have persuaded JohnWesley, but that would hardly have surprised Hume himself, nor should it surprise us: those in the grips of religious enthusiasm, whether it be John Wesley or Jimmy Swaggart, will hardly be persuaded by rational argument, however much it is still true that they ought to be persuaded by it. The appeal to miracles tojustify specifically Christian beliefs had a long history. One can find it already in the late Roman period in Eusebius. Muslim thinkers were to challenge this traditional defence by arguing that chains oftestimony become more unreliable the longer they become. As for their own Islamic beliefs, these they admitted had also to be justified by an appeal to miracles, but there was, it was claimed, a unique self-justifying miracle in the Koran, the specially revealed Word of God. The critical theme of the Muslim apologists, that the longer a chain of testimony the less assurance it gives of the fact that a miracle had occurred, was developed in Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries.6 It seems to have been introduced by the Oxford orientalist Edward Pocock who had discovered this line of Muslim apologetics while... (shrink)

The Critical Thinking Toolkit is a comprehensive compendium that equips readers with the essential knowledge and methods for clear, analytical, logical thinking and critique in a range of scholarly contexts and everyday situations. Takes an expansive approach to critical thinking by exploring concepts from other disciplines, including evidence and justification from philosophy, cognitive biases and errors from psychology, race and gender from sociology and political science, and tropes and symbols from rhetoric Follows the proven format of The (...) Philosopher’s Toolkit and The Ethics Toolkit with concise, easily digestible entries, “see also” recommendations that connect topics, and recommended reading lists Allows readers to apply new critical thinking and reasoning skills with exercises and real life examples at the end of each chapter Written in an accessible way, it leads readers through terrain too often cluttered with jargon Ideal for beginning to advanced students, as well as general readers, looking for a sophisticated yet accessible introduction to critical thinking. (shrink)

The Critical Thinking Toolkit is a comprehensive compendium that equips readers with the essential knowledge and methods for clear, analytical, logical thinking and critique in a range of scholarly contexts and everyday situations. Takes an expansive approach to critical thinking by exploring concepts from other disciplines, including evidence and justification from philosophy, cognitive biases and errors from psychology, race and gender from sociology and political science, and tropes and symbols from rhetoric Follows the proven format of The (...) Philosopher’s Toolkit and The Ethics Toolkit with concise, easily digestible entries, “see also” recommendations that connect topics, and recommended reading lists Allows readers to apply new critical thinking and reasoning skills with exercises and real life examples at the end of each chapter Written in an accessible way, it leads readers through terrain too often cluttered with jargon Ideal for beginning to advanced students, as well as general readers, looking for a sophisticated yet accessible introduction to critical thinking. (shrink)

This article takes off from Johan van Benthem’s ruminations on the interface between logic and cognitive science in his position paper “Logic and reasoning: Do the facts matter?”. When trying to answer Van Benthem’s question whether logic can be fruitfully combined with psychological experiments, this article focuses on a specific domain of reasoning, namely higher-order social cognition, including attributions such as “Bob knows that Alice knows that he wrote a novel under pseudonym”. For intelligent interaction, it is important that the (...) participants recursively model the mental states of other agents. Otherwise, an international negotiation may fail, even when it has potential for a win-win solution, and in a time-critical rescue mission, a software agent may depend on a teammate’s action that never materializes. First a survey is presented of past and current research on higher-order social cognition, from the various viewpoints of logic, artificial intelligence, and psychology. Do people actually reason about each other’s knowledge in the way proscribed by epistemic logic? And if not, how can logic and cognitive science productively work together to construct more realistic models of human reasoning about other minds? The paper ends with a delineation of possible avenues for future research, aiming to provide a better understanding of higher-order social reasoning. The methodology is based on a combination of experimental research, logic, computational cognitive models, and agent-based evolutionary models. (shrink)

Beginning with a discussion of the Informal Logic Movement and the renewed interest in critical thinking in education, this book critically assesses the work of Robert Ennis, Richard Paul and John McPeck.

Paper presented at the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking meeting in conjunction with the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, April 2004.

The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective Reasoning About Ordinary and Extraordinary Claims explores the essentials of critical reasoning, argumentation, logic, and argumentative essay writing while also incorporating important topics that most other texts leave out, such as "inference to the best explanation," scientific reasoning, evidence and authority, visual reasoning, and obstacles to critical thinking.The text integrates many pedagogical features, including hundreds of diverse exercises, examples, and illustrations; text boxes that apply critical thinking to student experience; step-by-step (...) guidelines for evaluating claims, arguments, and explanations; a glossary of important terms; and many reminders, summaries, and review notes. New to this editionNew sections on topics suggested by reviewers - The coverage now includes more discussion of legal reasoning, rhetorical ploys, informal fallacies, probability and statistics, and necessary and sufficient conditions.New Essays for Analysis - Nine essays, several of them by women authors, have been added to the collection of "Essays for Evaluation" in Appendix A, each article accompanied by writing prompts and linked to writing assignments in every chapter. Four pairs of essays are arranged in a pro/con format, each pair debating a single issue. New topics include homosexuality, feminists and pornography, adultery, airport security screenings, women in Afghanistan, Islamic extremists and free speech, and fear of vaccines.New text boxes on current topics. The division of labor for the text boxes is the same, but some of the content is new. The three types of boxes are "Newsmakers" ; "From the Web" ; and "Further Thought".The chapter objectives now correspond to the point-by-point summary at the end of each chapter.Important Clarifications - The following discussions are now even clearer: scientific conservatism in theory choice, the relationship between enumerative induction and statistical syllogisms, and informal fallacies.Some new discussions: the straw man fallacy, biased opinion polls, dishonest political discourse, and gut reactions and intuitions. (shrink)

Unlike most texts in critical thinking, _Reason in the Balance_ focuses broadly on the practice of critical inquiry, the process of carefully examining an issue in order to come to a reasoned judgment. Although analysis and critique of individual arguments have an important role to play, this text goes beyond that dimension to emphasize the various aspects that go into the practice of inquiry, including identifying issues and relevant contexts, understanding competing cases, and making a comparative judgment._ Distinctive (...) Features of the Text:_ Emphasis on applying critical thinking to complex issues with competing arguments Inclusion of chapters on inquiry in specific contexts Attention to the dialogical aspects of inquiry, including sample dialogues Emphasis on the spirit of inquiry _The Second Edition Features:_ Updated examples and items of current interest New dialogues on vaccination, prostitution, and climate change New material on biases in reasoning, including emotional, psychological, social, and cognitive _The _Reason in the Balance_ Website includes:_ An Appendix on Logic Exercises Quizzes. (shrink)

The article covers such issues as the relevance of the theory of perception as a multi-level information processing, the methodological role of the concept of representation and the relation of neurodynamic structures to subjective experience. The author critically reviews the philosophical presumptions underlying the various concepts of “local rationality,” the core of which is constituted by the belief that large ethnic cultures generate or are based on their own rationality and their own logic. Three statements are successively considered: thinking (...) is based on the inherent rules of rationality, logic is an extract of rationality, and types of rationality are geographically consistent with large ethnocultural communities. Empirical arguments are presented that demonstrate equivocality of the first two theses. In particular, firstly, it is shown that the genuine rationality of thinking lies not in following the rules that are immanent to it, but in the development of thinking and, more broadly, cognitive operations towards optimization of certain indicators of the cognitive or motor system that are important for survival and adaptation. In addition, this rationality is multivariate, and the choice between variants is often weakly determined or even random. Thus, the first statement turns out to be refuted. Secondly, by reference to the well-known experiments, it is shown that most people do not explicitly follow some declared logical rules in solving even logical or mathematical problems, and yet there is reason to consider their behavior rational. The third thesis, as shown with some limited empirical material, appears to be partially confirmed. Nevertheless, the demonstration of the doubtfulness of the first two theses makes the conclusion that different nations have different logics insufficiently substantiated. (shrink)

The relation between critical thinking and race prejudice can be made obvious, once we grant that race prejudice cannot be supported by good reasons. For, if, as Harvey Siegel has pointed out, critical thinking is being "appropriately moved by reasons," then holding racially prejudiced beliefs is to believe without being appropriately moved by reasons, thereby being, in this regard at least, an uncritical thinker. A practical corollary of this, for those of us who espouse critical thinking as (...) an educational ideal, is that it is incumbent upon us to speak to the issue of race prejudice, an obvious and glaringly pernicious example of uncritical thought that affects one of, if not the most, central social and ethical issues of our times. (shrink)

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors (...) suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialogical framework developed in Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020). After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiyās al-'illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiyās al-'illa. A caveat: in the present paper we will focus mainly in discussing the dynamics of the meaning constitution involved rather than in setting the rules of the underlying dialogical framework, the latter is the subject of a follow-up paper. (shrink)

span/spanspanspan style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px" class="Apple-style-span"spanThis paper is intended to examine the significance of Hegelrsquo;s emScience of Logic/em for social thought. I attempt to show that the claims advocating directly the social character of reason present in Hegelrsquo;s thought must be regarded against the background of the logical demand of a presuppositionless thinking. After reviewing the criticisms addressed against the possibility of fulfilling that demand, I suggest that Hegelrsquo;s demand of presuppositionless thinking could be understood as a (...) transformation ofnbsp; Kantrsquo;s transcendental philosophy .nbsp; That explanation will allow us to suggest that the demand of presuppositionless thinking works as the recognition of a gathering in which the ldquo;meaningrdquo; is both unified and dispersed. In base to that idea, it will be explained why most of the interpretations which emphasizes the social character of reason as the key to account the development of Hegelrsquo;s philosophy fail to recognize that presuppositionless ground.nbsp; So, it will be concluded that the sociality of reason must be understood as a determination reason gives itself through its self-situating in the field of meaning. br //span/span/span. (shrink)

Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable and durable. Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical (...) reasoners. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy. (shrink)

This reply to Oaksford and Chater’s ’s critical discussion of our use of logic programming to model and predict patterns of conditional reasoning will frame the dispute in terms of the semantics of the conditional. We begin by outlining some common features of LP and probabilistic conditionals in knowledge-rich reasoning over long-term memory knowledge bases. For both, context determines causal strength; there are inferences from the absence of certain evidence; and both have analogues of the Ramsey test. Some current (...) work shows how a combination of counting defeaters and statistics from network monitoring can provide the information for graded responses from LP reasoning. With this much introduction, we then respond to O&C’s specific criticisms and misunderstandings. (shrink)

This book brings together in one place David Hitchcock’s most significant published articles on reasoning and argument. In seven new chapters he updates his thinking in the light of subsequent scholarship. Collectively, the papers articulate a distinctive position in the philosophy of argumentation. Among other things, the author:• develops an account of “material consequence” that permits evaluation of inferences without problematic postulation of unstated premises.• updates his recursive definition of argument that accommodates chaining and embedding of arguments and allows any (...) type of illocutionary act to be a conclusion. • advances a general theory of relevance.• provides comprehensive frameworks for evaluating inferences in reasoning by analogy, means-end reasoning, and appeals to considerations or criteria.• argues that none of the forms of arguing ad hominem is a fallacy.• describes proven methods of teaching critical thinking effectively. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning. It focuses on Husserl's position as it develops from the Logical Investigations, published in 1900-01, through the writing of the Ideas in 1913. ;I argue that there are two theories of meaning at operation in Husserl's thinking in the Logical Investigations. One which is based upon the theory of pure logical grammar, the other based upon the theory of intentional acts of consciousness. I also consider the way (...) in which Husserl's employs the first of these to account for the distinction between sense and nonsense. ;The second chapter concerns the development of Husserl's thought from 1900 to 1913. In particular, I trace the development of this theory of the pure transcendental ego and its relationship to the notions of the epoche and the reduction. In turn, I consider the phenomenological criticism of this position made by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. ;Chapter three is concerned with the way in which the development of Husserl's thinking on the ego impacts on the theory of meaning. In particular, I focus on the developments which appear in the Vorlesungen Uber Bedeutungslehre: Sommersemester 1908 and Ideas I. The most significant development being the introduction of the concept of the noema as the object of the intentional act of meaning. I also consider the recent debate concerning the proper understanding of the noema as well as the relationship between sense and linguistic expression. ;These concerns lead to a consideration of Derrida's influential reading of Husserl's theory of meaning in Speech and Phenomena. While arguing that there is much of value in Derrida's reading, I criticize his claim that Husserl's theory is committed to a theory of pure self presence and intuitive presence. ;Finally, following Derrida, I question Husserl's theory of pure logical grammar. Through a consideration of poetic expression, I consider why this theory is unable to account for the distinction between sense and nonsense. However, I do argue that the intentional act theory can offer a justification for this distinction. For this reason, I conclude that a revised understanding of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning is still viable. (shrink)

After critiquing the arguments against using formal logic to teach critical thinking, this paper argues that for theoretical, practical, and empirical reasons, instruction in the fundamentals of formal logic is essential for critical thinking, and so should be included in every class that purports to teach critical thinking.

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library applies critical thinking concepts to the unique requirements of engineering. Students and professionals across the field of engineering will find their analytical abilities enhanced by the engaging authoritative framework of inquiry set forth by Richard Paul and Linda Elder.

The motivational constraint on normative reasons says that a consideration is a normative reason for an agent to act only if it is logically possible for the agent to act for that reason, or at least to be moved so to act. The claim figures Zelig-like in philosophical debates about practical reasons: on hand, occasionally prominent, but never the focus of discussion. However, because it is entailed by a number of prominent views about normative reasons—including various forms of (...) internalism and some views that closely connect reasons to good practical reasoning—its truth or falsehood has important implications. Mark Schroeder (2007) and Julia Markovits (2014) have recently criticized the Motivational Constraint on the grounds of so-called “elusive reasons”: reasons for some agent to act that are such that it is logically impossible both that they are normative reasons for that agent and the agent is moved to act for those reasons. In response, a number of philosophers (Sinclair 2016; Ridge and McKeever 2012; Paakkunainen 2017) have attempted to reconcile blindspot reasons with the motivational constraint. My aim in this paper is to show that these conciliatory strategies fail to overcome the challenge posed by elusive reasons. First, I examine each strategy and argue that it unsuccessful on its own terms. Second, I adduce another type of elusive reason not heretofore discussed in the literature, and I argue that these strategies also cannot make this kind of reason consistent with the motivational constraint. Finally, I defend the existence of this kind of reason against an important objection. (shrink)