In defence of virtue: The legitimacy of agent-based argument appraisal

Informal Logic 34 (1):77-93 (2014)
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Abstract

Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended

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Andrew Aberdein
Florida Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.
The Vices of Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Topoi 35 (2):413-422.
Was Aristotle a virtue argumentation theorist?Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - In Joseph Andrew Bjelde, David Merry & Christopher Roser (eds.), Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-229.

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References found in this work

Virtue in argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):165-179.
How to reason defeasibly.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Artificial Intelligence 57 (1):1-42.

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